was to assemble a group of papers that applied the insights and methods of law and economics to issues related to real estate. I believe that the seven articles included herein accomplish that objective admirably. What is most impressive is the wide range of topics covered, including issues in property law, tort law, contract law, and methodology. I have organized the papers according to these subject areas. The first two papers address issues in property law. Hughes and Turnbull examine the use of land-use covenants as private, contractual alternatives to zoning as a means of promoting efficiency in the land market (the analysis thus overlaps with contract law). They first develop a theoretical model that highlights the economic function of covenants--namely, to allow landowners to make credible commitments regarding land uses in the presence of spatial externalities. They then go on to examine the actual spatial variation of covenants in a particular urban area in light of the theory. Trefzger and Colwell examine the implications of paying compensation for government "takings" on the incentive of landowners to invest in land. It has been previously shown, most notably by Blume, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro (1984), that paying full compensation creates a moral hazard problem that leads to overinvestment. The primary contribution of the Trefzger and Colwell paper is to develop a model that unifies the literature that has arisen around this issue. The next two papers deal with issues intort law. Boyd, Harrington, and Macauley examine the effects of liability for environmental contamination on the operation of the land market. They show that uncertainty over potential liability of landowners per se does not necessarily impede efficient transfer and development decisions; instead, inefficiencies arise from information asymmetries between buyers and sellers and from costs of detecting hazards. The paper by Mieeli, Pancak, and Sirmans examines laws that assign liability for injuries caused by lead paint. In general, they show that holding landlords and sellers of housing strictly liable for damages suffered by tenants and buyers, respectively, is inefficient because it will result in overinvestment in removal of lead paint, and underinvestment in precaution against contamination. They do argue, however, that landlords and sellers should have a duty, backed by threat of liability, to disclose known hazards. The paper by Jaffe and Sharp examines statutorily imposed moratoria on mortgage foreclosures against the background of vairous theories of contract law, including the economic theory. Since foreclosure moratoria suspend the enforcement of one party's contractual obligations, they can be defended on efficiency grounds only if there ever exist situations in which nonenforcement of contracts is efficient. The authors examine explanations of this sort. Their conclusions are largely speculative and point to the need for further research.
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