Rules pertaining to State contracts is the most intricate part of public international law dealing with foreign investors. While earlier this branch predominantly focused on safeguarding interests of foreign business, the attitude of international commercial community has evolved. Still, the major focus on committing the State to honor its voluntary contractual undertakings throughout the business project's life is maintained. At the same time, nowadays Tribunals tend to refer to various subsets of sustainable business environment principles when assessing implications of changed Government policies, conduct of the Investor, or workings of International Governmental Organizations. This paper aims to be the first codified set of modern public international rules regarding full plethora of major issues regarding State contracts. Especially, it gives position on such issues commonly facing Tribunals as: hierarchy of applicable laws to a State contract; conflict between terms of a State contract and EU law; whether defenses of force majeure and similar tools are applicable to State contracts at all (with regard to a Host State); or - when hardship has occurred and Parties are obliged to renegotiate terms of the deal. It is frequently forgotten (even by reputable Arbitrators) that, in the first half of the 20th century, when protection of State contracts was developing as a specific subset of public international law, the whole system was implicitly based on assumption that a Home State of the Investor permits direct dealing by the Host State with Investor only on condition as if the direct international bond existed between the two States regarding the agreed rules for operation of business of the Investor in the Host State. In other words, intention was to avoid opportunistic behavior on part of the Host State (that could formally cite changes in its laws - or impetus from international organizations - as ground for deviation from the contract). There are Tribunals committing a grand mistake of letting political factors influence their decisions - while it is true that, especially lately, international scene has witnessed various high level misuses of corporate power and links (and so, one shall be careful enough to properly assess each case), Tribunals shall persistently maintain a realistically juristic attitude rather than making politics or becoming popular with States (in terms of, potentially securing appointments as arbitrators in further proceedings). Of course, there are more and more known or publicized instances when Investor has been so exploitively, speculatively, or grossly negligently keen to secure the deal that it would run contrary to basic tenets of international justice to protect its interests, when later the deal brakes off and various risks turn against the Investor. But, for a proper and comprehensive assessment of peculiarities of each case, Tribunal would much benefit from existence of codified rules and guidance, such as put forward in this Paper. As a final note, these Codified Rules have been amalgamated from workings of both (i) Tribunals specifically formed under State contracts, or bilateral or multilateral investment protection treaties (including, the Energy Charter Treaty), and (ii) general international courts and tribunals (including, International Court of Justice and Permanent Court of International Arbitration). The latter referred general courts are an extremely useful source for inspirations concerning efficient and progressive adjudication of modern complex international relations.