In her ambitious critique of securities disclosure law, Professor Kim Scheppele seeks to attack a utilitarian account of, and prescription for, that law.l She seeks, as well-and this is what makes her contribution ambitious-to offer an alternative way to create, and a different standard to criticize, legal rules than the method offered by the utilitarian paradigm. Her account of, and prescription for, securities disclosure law derives from a contractualist approach to rule formulation and criticism. Her approach is inspired by, but somewhat different from, that employed by John Rawls in his famous work, A Theory of Justice.2 On a practical level, Professor Scheppele offers criticism of the current Supreme Court law on insider trading reflected in Chiarella v. United States3 and Dirks v. Securities Exchange Commission.4 Her policy recommendation is that federal disclosure law should recognize a duty to disclose nonpublic information or abstain from trading in securities whenever a market participant has access to information that is not accessible to all other participants in the market. She sees her proposal as differing from current law in that under her rule it would not matter whether one with nonpublic information received it as part of a relationship that implied confidence or knew that his or her receipt of the nonpublic information was made possible by a breach of trust. I begin by recognizing that this article is a pleasure to read. It is lucid, knowledgeable, textured, and innovative. The paper represents an imaginative effort to combine the method of Rawls (and others) with some available empirical data on risk preferences, and to apply that learning to problems of disclosure law. It thus enjoys an uncommon scope and breadth. Ultimately, however, for the reason discussed below, I find Professor Scheppele's critique of the existing Supreme Court law governing securities disclosure unconvincing. Perhaps more basically, I remain skeptical that the method employed by the article offers what its author hopes it can: a technique to generate specific legal