Contingency Judgment Research Articles

EXPRESS: When is a causal illusion an illusion? Separating discriminability and bias in human contingency judgements.

Humans often behave as if unrelated events are causally related. As the name suggests, such causal illusions imply failures to detect the absence of a causal relation. Taking a signal-detection approach, we asked whether causal illusions indeed reflect failures of discriminability, or whether they reflect a general bias to behave as if events are causally related. Participants responded in a discrete-trials procedure in which point gains, point losses, or no change in points occurred dependent on or independently of responding. Participants reported whether each event was response-dependent or response-independent by choosing between two stimuli, one corresponding to reporting "I did it" and the other to "I didn't do it". Overall, participants responded accurately in about 80% of trials, and were biased to report that events depended on responding. This bias was strongest after point gains, and for higher-performing participants. Such differences in event-specific biases were not related to response rates; instead, they appear to reflect more fundamental differences in the effects of appetitive and aversive events. These findings demonstrate that people can judge causality relatively well, but are biased to attribute events to their own behaviour, particularly when those events are desirable. This highlights discriminability and bias as separable aspects of causal learning, and suggests that some causal illusions may not really be "illusions" at all - they may simply reflect a bias to report causal relations.

Are There Two Kinds of Reasoners?

There is little consensus about the underlying parameters of human reasoning. Two major theories have been proposed that suppose very different mechanisms. The mental model theory proposes that people use working memory intensive processes in order to construct limited models of problem parameters. Probabilistic theories propose that reasoning is a process by which people use the sum of their existing knowledge in order to generate an estimate of the probability of a conclusion given problem parameters. Following an initial proposition by Verschueren et al., the dual-strategy model supposes that these different approaches to reasoning are in fact an important individual difference. Specifically, a recently developed diagnostic questionnaire has identified two major categories of reasoners: Counterexample reasoners use a mental model form of processing, while Statistical reasoners use a probabilistic form of processing. In the following, I describe results that show that the Counterexample/Statistical distinction affects information processing across a variety of reasoning and judgment tasks. In addition, strategy use correlates with performance on very different kinds of thinking, such as contingency judgments, processing of negative emotions, or susceptibility to social biases. Although this distinction is related to differences in cognitive ability, it has been found to predict performance over and above these differences. More recent results have shown that it is possible to experimentally modify strategy use. These results suggest that strategy use is an important individual difference that can affect performance in a wide variety of contexts.

Associative interference and nonreinforcement in human contingency learning.

This article reports three experiments comparing the impact on contingency assessment of associative cue interference (proactive, interspersed, and retroactive) and nonreinforcement (latent inhibition, partial reinforcement, and extinction). All three experiments used variants of the rapid trial streaming procedure developed by Allan and collaborators. Participants were exposed to stimulus streams and then asked how likely it was for a target cue to be accompanied (Experiment 1) or to be followed (Experiments 2 and 3) by a target outcome. Experiments 1 and 2 looked at interference and found that when the objective target cue-outcome contingency is positive, interspersed interference is more effective than either proactive or retroactive interference. Experiment 2 additionally showed that this conclusion was a function of the target cue-outcome contingency: when the number of cue-outcome pairings was low, retroactive interference was more efficient than interspersed interference. Experiment 3 examined nonreinforcement and found that the efficacies of latent inhibition, partial reinforcement, and extinction are also a function of the target cue-outcome contingency, but the pattern differed greatly from what was observed in Experiment 2. When the number of cue-outcome pairings was high, there was no difference between latent inhibition, partial reinforcement, and extinction. When the number of cue-outcome pairings was low, extinction did not lower the contingency judgement, whereas latent inhibition and partial reinforcement did.

Interpretation of ambiguous trials along with reasoning strategy is related to causal judgements in zero-contingency learning.

The dual strategy model suggests that people can use either a Statistical or a Counterexample reasoning strategy, which reflects two qualitatively different ways of processing information. This model has been shown to capture individual differences in a wide array of tasks, such as contingency learning. Here, we examined whether this extends to individual differences in the interpretation of contingency information where effects are ambiguous. Previous studies, using perceptually complex stimuli, have shown that the way in which participants interpret ambiguous effects predicts causal judgements. In two studies, we attempted to replicate this effect using a small number of clearly identifiable cues. Results show that the interpretation of ambiguous effects as effect present is related to final contingency judgements. In addition, results showed that Statistical reasoners had a stronger tendency to interpret ambiguous effects as effect present than Counterexample reasoners, which mediates the difference in contingency judgements.

A debiasing intervention to reduce the causality bias in undergraduates: the role of a bias induction phase

The causality bias, or causal illusion, occurs when people believe that there is a causal relationship between events that are actually uncorrelated. This bias is associated with many problems in everyday life, including pseudoscience, stereotypes, prejudices, and ideological extremism. Some evidence-based educational interventions have been developed to reduce causal illusions. To the best of our knowledge, these interventions have included a bias induction phase prior to the training phase, but the role of this bias induction phase has not yet been investigated. The aim of the present research was to examine it. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three groups (induction + training, training, and control, as a function of the phases they received before assessment). We evaluated their causal illusion using a standard contingency judgment task. In a null contingency scenario, the causal illusion was reduced in the training and induction-training groups as compared to the control group, suggesting that the intervention was effective regardless of whether or not the induction phase was included. In addition, in a positive contingency scenario, the induction + training group generated lower causal judgments than the control group, indicating that sometimes the induction phase may produce an increase in general skepticism. The raw data of this experiment are available at the Open Science Framework at https://osf.io/k9nes/

Functional neuroanatomical correlates of contingency judgement

Contingency judgement is an ability to detect relationships between events and is crucial in the allocation of attentional resources for reasoning, categorization, and decision making to control behaviour in our environment. Research has suggested that the allocation of attention is sensitive to the frequency of contingency information whether it constitutes a negative, zero or positive relationship. The aim of the present study was to explore the functional neuroanatomical correlates of contingency judgement with different frequencies and whether these are distinct from each other or whether they rely on a common mechanism. Using three contingency tasks within a streaming paradigm (one each for negative, zero, and positive contingency frequencies), we assessed brain activity by means of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in 20 participants. Contingency frequency was manipulated between blocks which allowed us to determine the neural correlates of each of the three contingency tasks as well as the common areas of activation. The conjunction of task activation showed activity in left parietal cortices (BA 23, 40) and superior temporal gyrus (BA42). Further, the interaction analysis revealed distinct areas that mainly involve lateral (BA 45) and medial (BA 9) prefrontal cortices in the judgment of negative contingencies compared with positive and zero contingencies. We interpret the finding as evidence that the shared regions may be involved in coding, integration, and updating of associative relations and distinct regions may be involved in the investment of attentional resources to varied degrees in the computation of contingencies to make a judgment.

More frequent, shorter trials enhance acquisition in a training session: There is a free lunch!

The strength of the learned relation between two events, a model for causal perception, has been found to depend on their overall statistical relation, and might be expected to be related to both training trial frequency and trial duration. We report five experiments using a rapid-trial streaming procedure containing Event 1-Event 2 pairings (A trials), Event 1-alone (B trials), Event 2-alone (C trials), and neither event (D trials), in which trial frequencies and durations were independently varied. Judgements of association increased with increasing frequencies of A trials and decreased with increasing frequencies of both B and C trials but showed little effect of frequency of D trials. Across five experiments, a weak but often significant effect of trial duration was also detected, which was always in the same direction as trial frequency. Thus, both frequency and duration of trials influenced learning, but frequency had decidedly stronger effects. Importantly, the benefit of more trials greatly outweighed the observed reduction in effect size caused by a proportional decrease in trial duration. In experiment 5, more trials of proportionately shorter duration enhanced effects on contingency judgments despite a shortening of the training session. We consider the observed 'frequency advantage' with respect to both frequentist models of learning and models based on information. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

A dual strategy account of individual differences in information processing in contingency judgments

ABSTRACT The dual strategy model of reasoning suggests that people can either use a Statistical or a Counterexample strategy to process information. Previous studies on contingency learning have shown a sufficiency bias: people give more importance to events where the potential cause is present (sufficiency) rather than events where the potential cause is absent (necessity). We examine the hypothesis that strategy use predicts individual differences in use of sufficiency information in contingency judgements. Study 1 used an active learning contingency task. Results showed that Statistical reasoners were more influenced by sufficiency information than Counterexample reasoners. Study 2 used a passive learning contingency task, where sufficiency was constant and only necessity information (based on outcomes when the potential cause was absent) was varied. Results showed that only Counterexample reasoners were sensitive to necessity information. These results demonstrate that strategy use is correlated with individual differences in information processing in contingency learning.

The effects of numeracy and presentation format on judgments of contingency

Covariation information can be used to infer whether a causal link plausibly exists between two dichotomous variables, and such judgments of contingency are central to many critical and everyday decisions. However, individuals do not always interpret and integrate covariation information effectively, an issue that may be compounded by limited numeracy skills, and they often resort to the use of heuristics, which can result in inaccurate judgments. This experiment investigated whether presenting covariation information in a composite bar chart increased accuracy of contingency judgments, and whether it can mitigate errors driven by low numeracy skills. Participants completed an online questionnaire, which consisted of an 11-item numeracy scale and three covariation problems that varied in level of difficulty, involving a fictitious fertilizer and its impact on whether a plant bloomed or not. Half received summary covariation information in a composite bar chart, and half in a 2 × 2 matrix that summarized event frequencies. Viewing the composite bar charts increased accuracy of individuals both high and low in numeracy, regardless of problem difficulty, resulted in more consistent judgments that were closer to the normatively correct value, and increased the likelihood of detecting the correct direction of association. Findings are consistent with prior work, suggesting that composite bar charts are an effective way to improve covariation judgment and have potential for use in the domain of health risk communication.

Learning mechanisms underlying accurate and biased contingency judgments.

Many experiments have shown that humans and other animals can detect contingency between events accurately. This learning is used to make predictions and to infer causal relationships, both of which are critical for survival. Under certain conditions, however, people tend to overestimate a null contingency. We argue that a successful theory of contingency learning should explain both results. The main purpose of the present review is to assess whether cue-outcome associations might provide the common underlying mechanism that would allow us to explain both accurate and biased contingency learning. In addition, we discuss whether associations can also account for causal learning. After providing a brief description on both accurate and biased contingency judgments, we elaborate on the main predictions of associative models and describe some supporting evidence. Then, we discuss a number of findings in the literature that, although conducted with a different purpose and in different areas of research, can also be regarded as supportive of the associative framework. Finally, we discuss some problems with the associative view and discuss some alternative proposals as well as some of the areas of current debate. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

The Origin of Illusory Correlations.

If the distributions of two binary variables are skewed, people erroneously perceive a correlation even if the variables are actually uncorrelated. Specifically, people perceive a correlation between the variables' infrequent (vs. frequent) levels. While such systematic Illusory Correlations (ICs) can account for important phenomena, including erroneous stereotypes linking minority groups with infrequent attributes, the theoretical explanation is still a matter of debate. As proposed in the distinctiveness-based account, ICs arise due to a memory advantage for infrequent events. Alternatively, it has been proposed that ICs reflect ad hoc inferences from univariate base rates. In two experiments, we tested the accounts' predictions using a standard IC paradigm followed by (1) a contingency judgment task, asking participants to directly report contingencies, and (2) a trial-by-trial source assignment task of group membership and attribute. Bayesian-hierarchical model analysis revealed that ICs in contingency judgments were positively correlated to ad hoc inferences, but uncorrelated to exemplar memory in participants' source assignments. Moreover, inducing a focus on infrequent events improved memory for distinct events, but did not result in stronger ICs. Thus, our results support the explanation of ICs as ad hoc inferences from base rates, rather than a memory advantage for distinctive item combinations.

Using Mobile Phones to Examine and Enhance Perceptions of Control in Mildly Depressed and Nondepressed Volunteers: Intervention Study.

BackgroundPerceived control is strongly linked to healthy outcomes, mental healthiness, and psychological well-being. This is particularly important when people have little control over things that are happening to them. Perceived control studies have been performed extensively in laboratory settings and show that perceived control can be increased by experimental manipulations. Although these studies suggest that it may be possible to improve people’s mental health by increasing their perceived control, there is very little evidence to date to suggest that perceived control can also be influenced in the real world.ObjectiveThe first aim of this study was to test for evidence of a link between noncontrol situations and psychological well-being in the real world using a mobile phone app. The second and arguably more important aim of the study was to test whether a simple instructional intervention on the nature of alternative causes would enhance people’s perceptions of their own control in these noncontrol situations.MethodsWe implemented a behavioral action-outcome contingency judgment task using a mobile phone app. An opportunity sample of 106 healthy volunteers scoring low (n=56, no depression) or high (n=50, mild depression) on a depression scale participated. They were given no control over the occurrence of a low- or high-frequency stimulus that was embedded in everyday phone interactions during a typical day lasting 8 hours. The intervention involved instructions that either described a consistent alternative cause against which to assess their own control, or dynamic alternative causes of the outcome. Throughout the day, participants rated their own control over the stimulus using a quantitative judgment scale.ResultsParticipants with no evidence of depression overestimated their control, whereas those who were most depressed were more accurate in their control ratings. Instructions given to all participants about the nature of alternative causes significantly affected the pattern of perceived control ratings. Instructions describing discrete alternative causes enhanced perceived control for all participants, whereas dynamic alternative causes were linked to less perceived control.ConclusionsPerceptions of external causes are important to perceived control and can be used to enhance people’s perceptions. Theoretically motivated interventions can be used to enhance perceived control using mobile phone apps. This is the first study to do so in a real-world setting.

Overexpectation effect in human contingency judgment: A Study of application of a RPG task

Overexpectation effect in human contingency judgment: A Study of application of a RPG task

Psychophysics of associative learning: Quantitative properties of subjective contingency.

Allan and collaborators (Allan, Hannah, Crump, & Siegel, 2008; Allan, Siegel, & Tangen, 2005; Siegel, Allan, Hannah, & Crump, 2009) recently proposed to apply signal detection theory to the analysis of contingency judgment tasks. When exposed to a flow of stimuli, participants are asked to judge whether there is a contingent relation between a cue and an outcome, that is, whether the subjective cue-outcome contingency exceeds a decision threshold. In this context, we tested the following hypotheses regarding the relation between objective and subjective cue-outcome contingency: (a) The underlying distributions of subjective cue-outcome contingency are Gaussian; (b) The mean distribution of subjective contingency is a linear function of objective cue-outcome contingency; and (c) The variance in the distribution of subjective contingency is constant. The hypotheses were tested by combining a streamed-trial contingency assessment task with a confidence rating procedure. Participants were exposed to rapid flows of stimuli at the end of which they had to judge whether an outcome was more (Experiment 1) or less (Experiment 2) likely to appear following a cue and how sure they were of their judgment. We found that although Hypothesis A seems reasonable, Hypotheses B and C were not. Regarding Hypothesis B, participants were more sensitive to positive than to negative contingencies. Regarding Hypothesis C, the perceived cue-outcome contingency became more variable when the contingency became more positive or negative, but only to a slight extent. (PsycINFO Database Record

Let me take the wheel: Illusory control and sense of agency.

ABSTRACTIllusory control refers to an effect in games of chance where features associated with skilful situations increase expectancies of success. Past work has operationalized illusory control in terms of subjective ratings or behaviour, with limited consideration of the relationship between these definitions, or the broader construct of agency. This study used a novel card-guessing task in 78 participants to investigate the relationship between subjective and behavioural illusory control. We compared trials in which participants (a) had no opportunity to exercise illusory control, (b) could exercise illusory control for free, or (c) could pay to exercise illusory control. Contingency Judgment and Intentional Binding tasks assessed explicit and implicit sense of agency, respectively. On the card-guessing task, confidence was higher when participants exerted control than in the baseline condition. In a complementary model, participants were more likely to exercise control when their confidence was high, and this effect was accentuated in the pay condition relative to the free condition. Decisions to pay were positively correlated with control ratings on the Contingency Judgment task, but were not significantly related to Intentional Binding. These results establish an association between subjective and behavioural illusory control and locate the construct within the cognitive literature on agency.

Accounting for Depressive Realism in Contingency Judgments: Attentional Processing Differences

The purpose of this series of experiments was to determine the necessary conditions for eliciting depressive realism in a contingency judgment task and to compare the explanatory power of divergent theoretical accounts for this phenomenon. Across a series of experiments, groups of dysphoric and non-dysphoric undergraduate students (n1 = 46; n2 = 60) completed contingency judgment tasks, after which they estimated their control over the task. Depressive realism was elicited when the method of responding to the task was manipulated. Only when participants faced a choice between a “pressing” response option and a “not pressing” response option did dysphoric participants make more accurate judgments of control than non-dysphoric participants, F(1, 59) = 11.24, p < .05. The evidence for a boundary condition identified in the current paper suggests important attentional differences between dysphoric and non-dysphoric individuals that must be explained by any theoretical account of depressive realism.

Why are Some Games More Addictive than Others: The Effects of Timing and Payoff on Perseverance in a Slot Machine Game.

Manipulating different behavioral characteristics of gambling games can potentially affect the extent to which individuals persevere at gambling, and their transition to problematic behaviors. This has potential impact for mobile gambling technologies and responsible gambling interventions. Two laboratory models pertinent to this are the partial reinforcement extinction effect (PREE) and the trial spacing effect. Both of these might speed up or delay the acquisition and extinction of conditioned behavior. We report an experiment that manipulated the rate of reinforcement and inter trial interval (ITI) on a simulated slot machine where participants were given the choice between gambling and skipping on each trial, before perseverative gambling was measured in extinction, followed by measurements of the illusion of control, depression and impulsivity. We hypothesized that longer ITI’s in conjunction with the low rates of reinforcement observed in gambling would lead to greater perseverance. We further hypothesized, given that timing is known to be important in displaying illusory control and potentially in persevering in gambling, that prior exposure to longer intervals might affect illusions of control. An interaction between ITI and rate of reinforcement was observed, as low reinforced gamblers with a long ITI gambled for longer. Respondents also displayed extinction and a PREE. Gamblers exposed to a higher rate of reinforcement gambled for longer in acquisition. Impulsivity was associated with extended perseverance in extinction, and more depressed gamblers in the high reinforcement short ITI group persevered for longer. Performance in the contingency judgment failed to support the second hypothesis: the only significant contrast observed was that participants became better calibrated as the task progressed.

Cue competition in evaluative conditioning as a function of the learning process

Evaluative conditioning (EC) is the change in the valence of a stimulus resulting from pairings with an affective (unconditioned) stimulus (US). With some exceptions, previous work has indicated that this form of conditioning might be insensitive to cue competition effects such as blocking and overshadowing. Here we assessed whether the extent of cue competition in EC depends upon the type of contingency learning during conditioning. Specifically, we contrasted a learning task that biased participants toward cognitive/inferential learning (i.e., predicting the US) with a learning task that prevented prolonged introspection (i.e., a rapid response made to the US). In all cases, standard EC effects were observed, with the subjective liking of stimuli changed in the direction of the valence of the US. More importantly, when inferential learning was likely, larger EC effects occurred for isolated stimuli than for compounds (indicating overshadowing). No blocking effects on explicit evaluations were observed for either learning task. Contingency judgments and implicit evaluations, however, were sensitive to blocking, indicating that the absence of a blocking effect on explicit evaluations might be due to inferences that occur during testing.

Individuals Who Believe in the Paranormal Expose Themselves to Biased Information and Develop More Causal Illusions than Nonbelievers in the Laboratory.

In the reasoning literature, paranormal beliefs have been proposed to be linked to two related phenomena: a biased perception of causality and a biased information-sampling strategy (believers tend to test fewer hypotheses and prefer confirmatory information). In parallel, recent contingency learning studies showed that, when two unrelated events coincide frequently, individuals interpret this ambiguous pattern as evidence of a causal relationship. Moreover, the latter studies indicate that sampling more cause-present cases than cause-absent cases strengthens the illusion. If paranormal believers actually exhibit a biased exposure to the available information, they should also show this bias in the contingency learning task: they would in fact expose themselves to more cause-present cases than cause-absent trials. Thus, by combining the two traditions, we predicted that believers in the paranormal would be more vulnerable to developing causal illusions in the laboratory than nonbelievers because there is a bias in the information they experience. In this study, we found that paranormal beliefs (measured using a questionnaire) correlated with causal illusions (assessed by using contingency judgments). As expected, this correlation was mediated entirely by the believers' tendency to expose themselves to more cause-present cases. The association between paranormal beliefs, biased exposure to information, and causal illusions was only observed for ambiguous materials (i.e., the noncontingent condition). In contrast, the participants' ability to detect causal relationships which did exist (i.e., the contingent condition) was unaffected by their susceptibility to believe in paranormal phenomena.

The Role of Positive Affect and Individual Differences in Intuition in the Accuracy of Pattern Recognition

Two studies examined the interaction of individual differences in intuitive processing style and induced positive affect in implicit pattern recognition in undergraduates. In Study 1 ( N = 187), induced mood and intuition interacted to predict accuracy in pattern recognition using an implicit learning paradigm. Participants high in intuition in a positive mood were the most accurate. In Study 2 ( N = 90), induced mood interacted with intuition to predict accurate reports of stimulus-reward contingencies in an operant conditioning paradigm. Intuition predicted accuracy in judgments of reward contingencies in the positive mood condition. This research suggests that individual differences in faith in intuition predict accurate implicit pattern recognition in the presence of positive affect.