This article argues that, with respect to formal private company law enforcement, a balance is required between legal accommodation of the context of pluralism of interests, surrounding companies, and corporate managerial autonomy. This balance is primarily established through standing rules. Consequently, the enforcement mechanisms which exist in United Kingdom, Belgian, French and Dutch company law and allow (minority) shareholders and/or third parties to affect board decisions’ substance will be the subjects of comparison. This particular scope shows that, contrary to conventional wisdom, United Kingdom company law apparently offers fewer enforcement opportunities than the continental European countries which were also studied. This novel finding ties in with the interplay between standing, remedy and harm. While United Kingdom enforcement actions potentially lead to various remedies and standing is determined by qualifying harm, continental European company law systems typically determine standing as the function of a certain remedy. Finally, the article lays bare the risks which are inherent in the aforementioned balance. It is submitted that the United Kingdom prefers to refuse meritorious claims rather than admit unmeritorious ones, a preference that is taken to extremes regarding third parties. Belgian, French and Dutch company law instead prefer to allow potential unmeritorious claims by all interested parties, potentially inciting overzealous litigation that interferes with managerial decisions.