Context Of Corporate Governance Research Articles

Business Ethics and Corporate Governance in Latin America

This article determines what the role of business ethics is within the Latin American corporate governance context. We analyzed five sources of information that provide vital information on the state of corporate governance in Latin America: the meetings of the Latin American Corporate Governance Network; the debates in the Latin America Corporate Governance Roundtables; the study Panorama Atual da Governança Corporativa no Brasil [Overview of Corporate Governance in Brazil], developed by the IBGC (Brazilian Institute of Corporate Governance) in partnership with Booz Allen Hamilton in 2003; the third version of the Code of Best Practices of Corporate Governance produced by the IBGC in March 2004; and the IBGC Corporate Governance Survey in Brazil. Based on the analysis of the above sources, conclusions are drawn on the role of business ethics within Latin American corporate governance.

Accountants, Ethical Issues and the Corporate Governance Context

This paper aims to identify the types of ethical issues encountered by accountants, the influence of such experience on accountants' ethical perceptions and the effect of situational factors—the field of employment and the accountant̂s position in the organisation—on accountants' perceptions of ethics. Differences were found in perceptions about ethical issues among accountants in different fields of employment. The study also confirms the inverse relationship between hierarchical position and ethical perception among top, middle and junior staff, with higher-ranked accountants perceiving most ethical issues as less important than their subordinates.

The Future of Corporate Governance in Australia: Will Australia Take the Right Track?

Corporate governance deals with the legal and organizational structures that determine the way in which a company is managed. It is about the exercise of power over corporate entities. Throughout the twentieth century, there have been few rules to guide us and a scarcity of fine example to inspire us to achieve excellence in this field. Pettigrew (1992) says corporate governance lacks any form of coherence, either empirically, methodologically or theoretically with only piecemeal attempts to try and understand and explain how the modern corporation is run. Tricker (2000) argues that corporate governance, as yet, does not have an accepted theoretical base or commonly accepted paradigm. He points out that the term 'corporate governance' was scarcely used until the 1980s. Tricker says the nineteenth century saw the foundations laid for modern corporations... the twentieth century was the century of management... now the twenty-first century promises to be the century of governance... as the focus swings to the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the wielding of power over corporate entities world-wide. In this paper, we provide an overview of the historical context of corporate governance, analyze some of the international and domestic trends in this field, identify some of the catalysts for change, look at some alternatives that we could consider and, conclude with thoughts on the future of corporate governance in Australia.

The Way We Govern: Why the CLERP 9 Regulations in Australia May Not Address Governance Issues

Corporate governance deals with the legal and organizational structures that determine the way that a corporation is managed and how power is exercised within the corporate entity. Although corporate structures have been around for some time, there are few examples of corporations that have exhibited exceptional behavior in this field. As corporations fail, attention often focuses on the absence of sustainable corporate governance structures. To this end, regulators have intervened and imposed reforms on the way that corporations are governed. In Australia, the latest in a series of attempts to reform corporate governance is entitled CLERP 9. In this paper, we will exam the historical context of corporate governance, the many factors lie at the root cause of corporate governance issues, the focus of the CLERP 9 regulations, and introduce some other initiatives that may advance self-sustaining and reliable corporate governance.

Trends in Japanese Management: Continuing Strengths, Current Problems and Changing Priorities

The Context of Japanese Management Corporate Governance and Top Management Goals and Philosophies Product Mix and New Product Development Strategic Alliance and Vertical Integration Multinational Management Competition Strategy Planning and Decision Making Organizational Structure and Process Human Resource Management Concluding Remarks

Does Law Matter? The Separation of Ownership and Control in the United Kingdom

The corporate world today subdivides into rival systems of dispersed and concentrated ownership, with different corporate governance structures characterizing each. Various corporate governance experts have argued that ownership concentration is a consequence of poor legal protection of shareholders. The experience in the United Kingdom casts doubt, however, on the extent to which legal regulation matters in the corporate governance context. Developments in Britain suggest that a highly specific set of laws governing companies and financial markets do not have to be in place in order for dispersed share ownership and strong securities markets to develop. Instead, alternative institutional structures can perform the function that “law matters” advocates say the legal system needs to play.

Does Law Matter?: The Separation of Ownership and Control in the United Kingdom

The corporate world today subdivides into rival systems of dispersed and concentrated ownership, with different corporate governance structures characterising each. The United States and the United Kingdom fall into the former category and other major industrial countries tend to fall into the latter. There is anecdotal evidence that suggests market forces are serving to destabilise traditional structures and cause some form of convergence along American corporate governance lines. According to some corporate governance experts, a variable that will affect how far will progress is the law. They argue that because the matters, a transition to the US pattern of corporate governance will occur only gradually and tentatively unless there is a legal environment which is hospitable to dispersed share ownership. This paper provides evidence on the extent to which legal regulation does matter in the corporate governance context. The approach is historical in orientation and the focus is on the emergence of a separation of ownership and control, characterised by widely dispersed share ownership and strong managers, in the United Kingdom. The experience in Britain is instructive because, with respect to corporate governance, no other major industrial nation has more in common with the United States. Developments in the UK suggest that a highly specific set of laws governing companies and financial markets does not have to be in place to ensure that a separation of ownership and control becomes a central feature of a country's corporate governance system. Instead, alternative institutional structures can perform the function law matters advocates say the legal system needs to play. It is an open question, however, whether such alternatives are likely to emerge in countries where a transition to the American pattern of corporate governance could be in progress.

Governance Antecedents of Board Entrenchment: The Case of Classified Board Provisions

Using a sample of 192 Standard & Poor’s 500 firms, we examine the impact of corporate governance and ownership context on a particular instance of board entrenchment: adoption of classified board provisions. Interestingly, while increased outsider representation measured simply as a proportion of outsiders does not affect the rate of adoption, reliance on a more fine grained measure, which includes other affiliations of outsiders, results in a marginally significant influence. Moreover, it appears that reliance on a simple proportional measure is likely to distort the effects of other variables. Finally, institutional stock ownership is found to be the most significant factor associated with decreased rate of adoption.

Governance antecedents of board entrenchment: The case of classified board provisions

Using a sample of 192 Standard & Poor's 500 firms, we examine the impact of corporate governance and ownership context on a particular instance of board entrenchment: adoption of classified board provisions. Interestingly, while increased outsider representation measured simply as a proportion of outsiders does not affect the rate of adoption, reliance on a more fine grained measure, which includes other affiliations of outsiders, results in a marginally significant influence. Moreover, it appears that reliance on a simple proportional measure is likely to distort the effects of other variables. Finally, institutional stock ownership is found to be the most significant factor associated with decreased rate of adoption.