A Look Back at the Dred Scott Decision STEPHEN G. BREYER Thank you for inviting me to deliver the 2009 Annual Lecture of the Supreme Court Historical Society. I am a great admirer of the Society’s commitment to preserving the history of the Supreme Court and to increasing the public’s awareness of the Court’s contributions to our nation’s history. This is an especially interesting time for the Society to be meeting because the Court, for the third time in the past fifteen years, is about to have a change in its membership. As soon as my friend and colleague Justice Souter announced his intent to retire, public specula tion began as to whom President Obama would nominate to replace him. And as soon as the Presidentput an end to the speculation with his announcement that he had selected Judge So tomayor, commentators began discussing and debating her legal views and how her presence will affect the Court’s decisions. The public’s interest in a change in the Court’s membership reminds us that the Court, for all the technical cases it decides, also can decide controversial, contentious cases that raise questions that lie at the heart of contemporary political debates. Today, I shall re-examine one such case: the Dred Scott decision, a case that many be lieve is the Court’s worst mistake. By examin ing the case in detail, I hope to find something of value for our present-day judicial institu tion. The case I have chosen stands at the in tersection of law and politics. Throughout its history, the Supreme Court has decided cases containing legal issues that have a significant political impact. And how the Court can, or should, make its decisions in such cases is a topic ofabiding interest. Alexander Hamilton, one of the Framers of our Constitution, ar gued that a court is better suited than a leg islative or executive body to insist that the Constitution be followed—particularly in an instance where doing so is politically unpop ular. But he did not explain how we know in such instances that the public—or the other branches of government—will do what the Court says. And while we now assume as a matter ofcourse that the Court’s decisions will be followed, that was not always the case. For A LOOK BACK AT THE DRED SCOTT DECISION ill example, despite an 1834 Court determina tion that the Cherokee Indians owned northern Georgia, President Andrew Jackson evicted the Indians, supposedly saying that ChiefJus tice John Marshall “has made his decision; now let him enforce it.” Americans have gradually, over time, de veloped customs and traditions that lead them to accept and follow Court decisions. But how that has come to be is a complicated ques tion, a question that itself touches on politics. The answer, in part, has something to do with the way in which the Court has responded to legal issues that have political impact. This afternoon I hope to illustrate the relation by speaking about Dred Scott. The Court decided Dred Scott in 1817 at a time when political tensions about slavery ran high. In that case, the Supreme Court held that no African Amer ican could be a citizen entitled to sue in federal court and that no African American could be come free simply because he was taken into a free state by his owner. Dred Scott was a legal and practical mistake. And for that very reason it can tell us something about the more general question: namely, it can tell us what courts cannot and should not do when politics and law overlap. Let us, then, look back to the mid nineteenth century, to the era of slavery in the United States. And let us consider the back ground, the issues, the reasoning, the imme diate consequences, and the topical lessons of Dred Scott. I. Background Three individuals play key roles in this story: Dred Scott, Roger Taney, and Benjamin Curtis. Scott was born a slave on a Virginia plantation in the early 1800s. His first owner, Peter Blow, took Scott with him to St. Louis, Missouri; he sold Scott to...