Content Of Legal Norms Research Articles

LEGAL PERSONALITY OF INCORPORATED ENTITIES IN RUSSIAN LEGISLATION AND TNC

The goal of any branch of law is the effective regulation of public relations in any area with the goal of streamlining them. For this, it is necessary that the content of legal norms, as in a mirror, reflects the modern development of society and its ties. The past century and the current century have brought a lot to the modern world, and many of these innovations are associated primarily with the process of globalization. The consequence of this was the spread of integration processes, both between states and between business structures. Transnationalism and transnational corporations are natural consequences of the development of the world; they reflect the desire of mankind to unify goods and services. We note right away that by a transnational corporation we mean a complex union of legal and non-legal entities with the ability to combine their resources, experience and knowledge on a global scale, between which there are stable internal economic ties, consisting of one or more parent companies and separate, but dependent subsidiaries units located in more than two states. This article compares the legal personality of a legal entity under the civil law of the Russian Federation with the legal personality of transnational corporations.

ЮРИДИЧЕСКАЯ КОНВЕРГЕНЦИЯ В КОНТЕКСТЕ РЕГУЛИРОВАНИЯ МИГРАЦИОННЫХ ПРОЦЕССОВ В РОССИИ: ПОСТАНОВКА ПРОБЛЕМЫ

In this paper, the authors considers the problem of legal convergence on the example of migration processes, covering a wide range of social relations and affect national, public, public interests of the state.
 The purpose of the study to perform legal convergence in the context of regulation of migration processes in Russia, the main objectives of the study: to establish methodological approaches to the cognition of legal convergence; to show the mechanism of legal convergence; to define the essence of legal divergence; to identify methods of implementation of legal convergence; to reveal the peculiarities of the legal convergence of the elements of the system of law in the regulation of migration processes.
 In this study, the following methods were used: methods of collection and study of single facts; methods of compilation; methods of scientific abstraction; the methods of cognition of regularities. At the stage of collecting and studying of the isolated facts were used the methods of legal interpretation, which has revealed the content of legal norms, the will of the legislator, which is reflected in legal acts; concrete-sociological methods (observation, analysis of written sources, questionnaires, interviews); socio-psychological methods - tests of the scale, as a kind of specific sociological methods, modified for the study of legal psychology and legal consciousness of citizens, based on their lawful or unlawful conduct.
 On the basis of the study concluded that, establishing a special legal status of foreign citizens, the legislator reflects public interests and the interests of individuals (including foreign citizens). A measure of the convergence of natural rights and their legislative display are the national interests of balanced interests of individuals, society and the state in various spheres of life.

Law: An Information Technology

This article offers an historical, theoretical and practical perspective on law as an information technology. Law fundamentally concerns information — providing information to the community about the content of legal norms and, at least in its common law form, eliciting information about the world from the disputes before a court. The article first surveys law’s history as an information technology and shows how law is changed by the information technology of its day. The article then applies information theory to understand how the computer — the key technology of our day — is changing legal search and thereby the efficient form of law. Information theory focuses on the signal to noise ratio of communication. The key to progress in creating a better computerized legal search engine is to reduce the signal to noise ratio in the link between the user and the search engine. As this ratio decreases, we show that legal search translates the uncompressed form of legal information into an algorithm for predicting what the law will be in a particular situation. The ongoing improvement in legal search is transforming the optimal form of the law by changing the cost of finding it. It rebalances the weights in the classic debate between rules and standards. In particular, exponential increases in computational power make standards relatively more attractive than rules by decreasing the costs of their application. These same increases also allow us to embed information gathering processes within the law itself by creating what we call “dynamic rules.” Dynamic rules are rules that change automatically in response to changing empirical information. Such rules are already beginning to be enacted by legislatures. Since we believe that standards and dynamic rules are likely to be prevalent legal forms of the coming era, we close our article with a comparison of their relative costs and benefits.

An Institutional Approach to Legal Indeterminacy

For over a generation, academic jurisprudence and constitutional theory have attempted to reconcile, on the one hand, the rule of law and the Constitution's fundamentality with, on the other hand, the fact that legal and constitutional rules frequently do not produce determinate answers to concrete controversies. The approach of radical democrats who would abandon judicial review is unacceptable to all those who believe that some judicially enforceable limits on politics are needed to prevent majoritarian tyranny. At the same time, however, constitutional theories that attempt to justify judicial review have limited utility; at best they strike a compromise between the tyranny of the majority and the counter-majoritarian difficulty. Academic jurisprudence faces a parallel dilemma. Under close scrutiny, both positivism and its principal alternative turn out to adopt the same strategy for coping with legal indeterminacy: each claims that the law's areas of ambiguity are small; yet neither theory nor any of the leading approaches to constitutionalism proposes concrete measures to minimize the impact of legal indeterminacy. Drawing inspiration from the Legal Process approach of Hart and Sacks, this Article proposes that instead of devising justifications for judicial review or explanations of the task of judges, theorists would do better to design institutions that reduce the domain of legal indeterminacy. Where Hart and Sacks proposed deference to politically accountable actors, however, this Article advocates deep collaboration with the other institutions of government. Departing from the Legal Process assumption that courts must defer to one of a fixed menu of institutions, this Article develops a model of experimentalist courts and agencies that are always in transition. That model is based in part on the explosive emergence of problem-solving courts, nominally judicial bodies that are more akin to decentralized administrative agencies than to conventional adjudicators. The model is also based on some hints in Supreme Court doctrine that suggest a role for appellate courts in using the opportunity of legal indeterminacy to create the pre-conditions for local deliberation about the content of legal norms.

TROUBLE FOR LEGAL POSITIVISM

Many contemporary legal positivists have argued that legal theory is evaluative because it requires the theorist to make judgments of importance. At the same time they argue that it is possible to know “what the law is” without resort to evaluative considerations. I distinguish between two senses of “what the law is”: in one sense it refers to legal validity, in another to the content of legal norms, and I argue that legal positivism is best understood (as indeed some legal positivists have explicitly said) as a claim about legal content. Understood this way, however, it is open to the objection that knowing the content of legal norms requires evaluative considerations for reasons similar to those offered by positivists for thinking that legal theory is requires evaluative considerations. I then distinguish between evaluative considerations in general and moral considerations and argue that because of the subject-matter of legal norms, there are good reasons for thinking that it is moral considerations, and not just any other evaluative considerations, that are required for knowing the content of legal norms.