Contemporary Philosophy Of Religion Research Articles

Gud og det givne

Two important preconditions for the thinking of God in contemporary philosophy of religion are Kant’s critique of the ontological argument and Heidegger’s critique of so-called onto-theology. In both cases we find a critique of metaphysics and in both cases the concept of being or existence is central. Against this background, the article discusses the thinking about God in K.E. Løgstup and Jean-Luc Marion, who both relate to Heidegger’s thought and to phenomenology. Other contributions are included, viz. Johannes Sløk’s and Niels Grønkjær’s. The main thesis is that there can be no ‘unbroken’ discourse about God in the context of a Heideggerian Seinsdenken. Language is a necessary intermediate: the transition from the sphere of being to God as a person presupposes linguistic discourse. Such a discursive theism is not vulnerable to the contemporary critique of metaphysics.

The Problem with the Satan Hypothesis: Natural Evil and Fallen Angel Theodicies

In contemporary discussions of natural evil, one classically important theodicy—variously called warfare theodicy, fallen angel theodicy, or the Satan hypothesis—is rarely mentioned, let alone defended. This is the view that so-called natural evil, the evil suffered by sentient beings that is not caused by human agency, is caused by angelic agency, specifically that of Satan and other fallen angels. Although the Satan hypothesis has received scant attention in contemporary philosophy of religion, Richard Swinburne, Michael Martin, Robert Adams, and David O’Connor have each brought separate objections against it, but their objections fail. The real problem with the Satan hypothesis lies elsewhere. This paper begins by stating the Satan hypothesis and briefly sketching its scriptural and theological warrants in the Christian tradition. Second, it canvasses the objections that have been brought against the hypothesis and shows how each objection fails. Third, it isolates the real problem for the Satan hypothesis, namely the lack of any satisfactory account of how malevolent angelic agency could conceivably be the cause of natural evil. Finally, the paper offers three speculative proposals for such an account, highlighting problems with each. The upshot is that although the Satan hypothesis is a prominent theodicy in the history of Christian thought and in popular Christianity, it confronts philosophical challenges not yet met by its proponents.

Inverse Correlation: Comparative Philosophy in an Upside Down World

Kitarō Nishida introduces the concept of “inverse correlation” (Jp. gyakutaiō 逆対応) in his final work, The Logic of Place and the Religious Worldview, which he uses to illuminate the relation between finite and infinite, human and divine/buddha, such that the greater the realization of human limitation and finitude, the greater that of the limitless, infinite divine or buddhahood. This essay explores the applicability of the logic and rhetoric of inverse correlation in the cases of the early Daoist Zhuangzi, medieval Japanese Buddhist Shinran, and modern Protestant Christian Kierkegaard, as well as broader ramifications for contemporary philosophy of religion.

Hume and Smith on Natural Religion

AbstractThe prominence of David Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion in contemporary philosophy of religion has led it to overshadow his other short work, The Natural History of Religion, and thus obscure the fact that the social psychology of religion was in many ways of greater interest and more widely debated among the philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment than philosophical theology. This paper examines and compares the social psychology of religion advanced by Hume and Adam Smith. It argues that Hume's account of the psychological sources and social significance of religion is less satisfactory than Smith's.

C. S. Lewis on the Problem of Divine Hiddenness

Along with the problem of evil, the problem of divine hiddenness has become one of the most prominent arguments for atheism in the contemporary philosophy of religion. Roughly it is this: if there is a loving God, surely he would make his existence apparent to us, and in a way that we could not rationally doubt. Why? (i) Because it is of the nature of love that the lover will seek open relationship with the object of love, and (ii) because on most traditional theisms it is claimed that our ultimate well-being requires having a positive relationship with God, which relationship presupposes belief in God's reality. Yet as a matter of fact many people fail to believe in God, and that through no fault of their own. Such nonbelief is incompatible with the truth of theism. Therefore God does not exist. Here I explore how the writings of C. S. Lewis (probably the twentieth century's most popular Anglican author) can be brought to bear on the problem.

Does absence make atheistic belief grow stronger?

Discussion of the role which religious experience can play in warranting theistic belief has received a great deal of attention within contemporary philosophy of religion. By contrast, the relationship between experience and atheistic belief has received relatively little focus. Our aim in this paper is to begin to remedy that neglect. In particular, we focus on the hitherto under-discussed question of whether experiences of God’s absence can provide positive epistemic status for a belief in God’s nonexistence. We argue that there is good reason to accept an epistemic parity between experiences of God’s presence and experiences of God’s absence

Reason, Rhythm, and Rituality. Reinterpreting Religious Cult from a Postmodern, Phenomenological Perspective

Contemporary philosophy of religion is often focused, at a theoretical level, on the epistemic value of religious doctrines, and at a practical level, on the possible impact of organized religion on secular society and politics. However, the cultic dimension of religion, such as prayer, religious service, ascetic practices, and other rituals, is considered as completely “irrational” and incomprehensible from a secular perspective and therefore often neglected by postmodern philosophy. The paper intends to call into question this rather simplistic interpretation by retracing the historical origins of the devaluation of religious symbolism in occidental thought, which culminates in Kant’s philosophy of religion. We then shall analyze to what extent certain paradoxical aspects of Habermas’ view on religion can be interpreted as consequences of the dilemma brought about by the Kantian dichotomy between man as moral subject and man as natural, sensible being. In a third step, we shall develop an alternative, phenomenological interpretation, which does not consider religious practice as a primitive, irrational phenomenon but as a proto-ethical schematism that aims at integrating the sphere of pure practical reason into the rhythmic structure of living, embodied consciousness.

Entre Dawkins e Plantinga: apontamentos

This paper contextualizes epistemologically and establishes some differences between the materialistic naturalism of Richard Dawkins and the analytical theism of Alvin Plantinga. It presents some of the main currents in contemporary philosophy of religion, especially for Anglo-American scenary, considering this scenary relevant, present and central. Then talks about the Dawkin's idea that organized complexity has no design, their criticism to the notions of chance and intelligent design, its position in favor of the theory of evolution and the theistic counter point that Plantinga develops against Dawkins.

The Potential Use-Value of Hume's ‘True Religion’

Many hold that Hume was an atheist, that he despised the church, and that he was a devastating critic of religion. One cannot deny, however, the references to ‘true religion’ in his work, his sometimes seemingly favorable references to Deity, his call for religion in ‘every civilized community’, and his sense of (what has come to be known as) ‘natural belief’. The following essay describes a speculative Humean ‘true religion’ and discusses its potential use-value for contemporary philosophy of religion. It begins, anecdotally, with a description of Hume's happiness in France, which I attribute to the fact that Hume was not taken to be an atheist by the French reading public. The main argument is that while Hume was critical of ‘vulgar’ and ‘popular’ religion, his philosophical position did not deny our habit to accept a genuine theism that could, if informed by the calm passions, serve to ‘purify our hearts’ and bond us more closely together. Reconceiving Hume's ‘true religion’ in this way allows his insights to be used to support constructive efforts in the philosophy of religion. I conclude with a description of how this might work in light of three debates in religious studies and the philosophy of religion.

Metaphysics and the Catholic view

Contemporary philosophy of religion almost allergically reacts to metaphysics. They do so because of the various critiques of the potential reach of reason, which each in their own way argue that God cannot be appropriately approached via autonomous reason. In this article, I argue, on the one hand, that these critiques are furtively inspired by a certain outlook on transcendence, which I call the ‘Protestant view’ and, on the other hand, that numerous contemporary philosophers of religion are slowly starting to appreciate a more ‘Catholic view’ on transcendence, which allows for a more metaphysically ambitious philosophy of religion.

Analytic Philosophy, Theism, and Contemporary Philosophy of Religion

Abstract: Klaas J. Kraay's 2013 Newman Lecture, “Method and Madness in Contemporary Analytic Philosophy of Religion” is a valuable survey of and interaction with four recent works by philosophers of religion, each of which advances arguments concerning how philosophy of religion ought to be pursued, given the relatively high percentage of theists in the field. My response to Kraay's stimulating lecture will focus on the phenomenon of “insider” vs “outsider” perspectives in the study of religion, as well as some comments on and supplements to Kraay's survey.

On Why Analytic Theology Is Not a Club

THE ARTICLES IN THIS ROUNDTABLE have already touched on many of the salient and distinctive features of the Analytic Theology project, including some of the more controversial dimensions of the co-editors' introductory accounts of its intentions. In the brief comments that follow, I am first and foremost concerned to stress that my own commitment to the Analytic Theology agenda is born of a deep desire to keep creative and mutually infective communication open between different parties in contemporary philosophy of religion. I am myself (in some contrast, perhaps, to our wonderfully energetic and doughty editors1) rather uninterested in announcing any particular polemical manifesto associated with Analytic Theology, or in declaring hard and fast entrance requirements for belonging to a “club” of this name. Indeed, if Analytic Theology were to turn into a club, then I, for one would want to flee the scene at speed—not least because I suspect that it might be one for Men Only, or to have irksome things like Annual Dues. (And anyway, and contrariwise, as Groucho Marx is supposed once to have declared: “Who would want to belong to a club that had me as a member?” Quite.) But the fact is that, on my rendition at least, Analytic Theology is mercifully no such club, never has been, and should strenuously avoid becoming such in the future if it is to foster its own emerging fruitfulness. I now try to explain why I think this is so.

C. S. Lewis: The Question of Multiple Incarnations

Formulated by Aquinas, commented on by post‐Copernican philosophers and theologians, analysed in depth by C.S. Lewis, and deliberated by some contemporary writers, the question of multiple incarnations either within humanity or amongst extra‐terrestrial sentient species is all too intermittently examined: ‘Can the Christ be incarnated more than once in our reality, or somewhere else in the universe, or another reality?’ In this paper, we examine the debate and the conclusions: that is, Lewis’s position within his philosophical theology and his analogical narratives; also, some contemporary philosophers of religion and theologians (Karl Rahner, with Christopher L. Fisher and David Fergusson; Sjoerd L. Bonting and William B. Drees; E.L. Mascall and Brian Hebblethwaite; Oliver Crisp and Keith Ward). How do they relate to Aquinas’s handling of the question and how do they compare with Lewis’s approach based on a theology of the imagination (grounded in Augustine and Alice Meynell)? Can Lewis resolve the argument? Could alien species have witnessed wholly different acts, equally unique, costly to God, and necessary to the process of salvation? Any answer or explanation relates to the function and purpose of the incarnation: the Fall, original sin—therefore, how we define the boundaries, limits, of atonement.

Teaching & Learning Guide for: The Epistemology of Religious Diversity in Contemporary Philosophy of Religion

Teaching & Learning Guide for: The Epistemology of Religious Diversity in Contemporary Philosophy of Religion

The Epistemology of Religious Diversity in Contemporary Philosophy of Religion

AbstractReligious diversity is a key topic in contemporary philosophy of religion. One way religious diversity has been of interest to philosophers is in the epistemological questions it gives rise to. In other words, religious diversity has been seen to pose a challenge for religious belief. In this study four approaches to dealing with this challenge are discussed. These approaches correspond to four well‐known philosophers of religion, namely, Richard Swinburne, Alvin Plantinga, William Alston, and John Hick. The study is concluded by suggesting four factors which shape one’s response to the challenge religious diversity poses to religious belief.

Religion and the new atheism: a critical appraisal

Acknowledgements Foreword, Richard Harries Preface, Reza Aslan Introduction: What is the New Atheism?, Amarnath Amarasingam I. Religion and the New Atheism Judaism and Atheism: The Challenge of Secular Humanism, Robert Platzner Beating 'God' to Death: Radical Theology and the New Atheism, Jeffrey Robbins and Christopher Rodkey Religion as Phantasmagoria: Islam in The End of Faith, Rory Dickson II. Science and the New Atheism What Has Atheism Ever Done for Science?, Steve Fuller Cognitive Science and the New Atheism, William Sims Bainbridge III. Sociology and the New Atheism One-Dimensional Rage: The Social Epistemology of the New Atheism and Fundamentalism, William A. Stahl The New Atheism and Sociology: Why Here? Why Now? What Next?, Stephen Bullivant The New Atheism and the Secularization Thesis, Michael Borer The New Atheism and the Empowerment of American Freethinkers, Richard Cimino and Christopher Smith IV. Philosophy, Ethics and the New Atheism Ethics, Out-Group Altruism, and the New Atheism, Gregory R. Peterson Disparate Destinations, Parallel Paths: An Analysis of Contemporary Atheist and Christian Parenting Literature, Jeff Nall Is God a Hypothesis? The New Atheism, Contemporary Philosophy of Religion, and Philosophical Confusion, Ryan Falcioni Afterword, Mark Vernon About the Authors References Index

Pure reason and contemporary philosophy of religion: the rational striving in and for truth

This essay urges contemporary philosophers of religion to rethink the role that Kant’s critical philosophy has played both in establishing the analytic nature of modern philosophy and in developing a critique of reason’s drive for the unconditioned. In particular, the essay demonstrates the contribution that Kant and other modern rationalists such as Spinoza can still make today to our rational striving in and for truth. This demonstration focuses on a recent group of analytic philosophers of religion who have labelled their own work ‘analytic theology’ and have generated new debates, including new arguments about Kant bridging philosophy and theology. Cultivation of a reflective critical openness is encouraged here; this is a practice for checking reason’s overly ambitious claims about God.

Schellenberg's Newman Lecture on Contemporary Philosophy of Religion: Responses and Reply

Abstract: In issue 25/1 (2009), the Toronto Journal of Theology invited readers to submit responses to John L. Schellenberg, “The Philosophy of Religion: State of the Subject Report.” It is the Jay Newman inaugural address delivered at the Canadian Theological Society in June 2009. Below are three responses and a reply.

God, the Best, and Evil - Bruce Langtry

Bruce Langtry has written a rigorous book that makes important contributions primarily to two debates in contemporary philosophy of religion, over whether the hypothesis of ‘no best world’ poses a problem for theists, and the more traditional problem(s) of evil. In addition, the book has interesting and original things to say about the relationship between possible worlds and value, the correct understanding of the divine attributes, and the question of how different theistic models of divine providence hold up in different dialectical contexts. Langtry's careful attention to how one's choice of model bears on the success of objections to theism is especially helpful and deserving of emulation. Ch. 1 is stage‐setting: Langtry distinguishes three leading theistic models (Molinism, theological determinism, and open theism), and while remaining neutral between them, draws out consequences of each which are relevant for his project. Defenders of each view might well have concerns about Langtry's presentation, but this need not detain us here. Ch. 1 also contains his understanding of the fundamental theistic doctrine that God is the creator of the world. Langtry takes this to mean that God chooses a possible world, and then causes it to be actual by exercising tight providential control over (nearly) every contingent state of affairs it contains. Langtry is of course free to stipulate the definition of terms for his project. But one unfortunate implication of his definition of ‘create’ is that theists who do not think that God exercises tight providential control over the creation (open theists in particular) cannot say that God creates a world, something many of them would no doubt be surprised to learn.

The Hebrew Bible in contemporary philosophy of religion

Some dialogue among these specialists, especially between biblical scholars and philosophers of religion, is unquestionably long overdue.(Stump 1985:1)�Over the last few decades, there has been an increased concern for the establishment of more sustained interdisciplinary dialogue between biblical scholars and philosophers of religion. In this article, aimed at biblical scholars, the author as biblical scholar offers a descriptive and historical overview of some samples of recourse to the Hebrew Bible in philosophical approaches in the study of religion. The aim is to provide a brief glimpse of how some representative philosophers from both the analytic and continental sides of the methodological divide have related to the biblical traditions in the quest for a contemporary relevant Christian philosophy of religion.