Contemporary Evolutionary Biology Research Articles

Conceptualizing Evolutionary Novelty: Moving Beyond Definitional Debates

According to many biologists, explaining the evolution of morphological novelty and behavioral innovation are central endeavors in contemporary evolutionary biology. These endeavors are inherently multidisciplinary but also have involved a high degree of controversy. One key source of controversy is the definitional diversity associated with the concept of evolutionary novelty, which can lead to contradictory claims (a novel trait according to one definition is not a novel trait according to another). We argue that this diversity should be interpreted in light of a different epistemic role played by the concept of evolutionary novelty-the structuring of a problem space or setting of an explanatory agenda-rather than the concept's capacity to categorize traits as novel. This distinctive role is consistent with the definitional diversity and shows that the concept of novelty benefits ongoing investigation by focusing attention on answering different questions related to comprehending the origins of novelty. A review of recent theoretical and empirical work on evolutionary novelty confirms this interpretation.

The evolution of novelty in conserved gene families.

One of the major aims of contemporary evolutionary biology is the understanding of the current pattern of biological diversity. This involves, first, the description of character distribution at various nodes of the phylogenetic tree of life and, second, the functional explanation of such changes. The analysis of character distribution is a powerful tool at both the morphological and molecular levels. Recent high-throughput sequencing approaches provide new opportunities to study the genetic architecture of organisms at the genome-wide level. In eukaryotes, one overarching finding is the absence of simple correlations of gene count and biological complexity. Instead, the domain architecture of proteins is becoming a central focus for large-scale evolutionary innovations. Here, we review examples of the evolution of novelty in conserved gene families in insects and nematodes. We highlight how in the absence of whole-genome duplications molecular novelty can arise, how members of gene families have diversified at distinct mechanistic levels, and how gene expression can be maintained in the context of multiple innovations in regulatory mechanisms.

The primal scene in cross‐species and cross‐cultural perspectives

A review of cross‐species and cross‐cultural research suggests that, throughout most of human behavioral evolution, children may have been enlightened as to the facts of life by observing parental intercourse and then imitating it in sexual rehearsal play in the context of a continuously rising curve of sexual desire and sexual knowledge throughout childhood. Concealment of the primal scene and prohibition of cross‐generational, bisexual, and ‘polymorphously perverse’ childhood sex play may be of relatively recent origin in human cultural evolution, buttressed by the instillation of culturally acquired sexual disgust in sexually conservative cultures. Looking at the primal scene in cross‐species and cross‐cultural perspectives utilizing the adaptationist framework of contemporary evolutionary biology can challenge normative assumptions that may still be embedded in psychoanalytic theories of species‐wide psychosexual development.

New Essentialism in Biology

The architects of the modern synthesis banned essentialism from evolutionary theory. This rejection of essentialism was motivated by Darwin's theory of natural selection, and the continuity of evolutionary transformation. Contemporary evolutionary biology witnesses a renaissance of essentialism in three contexts: “origin essentialism” with respect to species and supraspecific taxa, the bar coding of species on the basis of discontinuities of DNA variation between populations, and the search for laws of evolutionary developmental biology. Such “new essentialism” in contemporary biology must be of a new kind that accommodates relational (extrinsic) properties as historical essences and cluster concepts of natural kinds.

Evolutionary Novelty and the Evo-Devo Synthesis: Field Notes

Accounting for the evolutionary origins of morphological novelty is one of the core challenges of contemporary evolutionary biology. A successful explanatory framework requires the integration of different biological disciplines, but the relationships between developmental biology and standard evolutionary biology remain contested. There is also disagreement about how to define the concept of evolutionary novelty. These issues were the subjects of a workshop held in November 2009 at the University of Alberta. We report on the discussion and results of this workshop, addressing questions about (i) how to define evolutionary novelty and understand its significance, (ii) how to interpret evolutionary developmental biology as a synthesis and its relation to neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory, and (iii) how to integrate disparate biological approaches in general.

The Rediscovery of Common Sense Philosophy. By Stephen Boulter

Pp. xvi, 239 , New York , Palgrave Macmillan , 2007 , $74.95. Should philosophy be based upon common sense? Stephen Boulter argues that it should. What would philosophy look like if it were in friendly ‘relations’ with common sense? This text explores these and related questions. Contrary to popular conception and practice Boulter argues that any philosophical paradox and counterintuitive thesis ought to make one conclude that an error has been made in the formulation of the philosophical position, which reinforces the validity of the common sense foundation. This book is essentially a defense of the philosophy of common sense broadly in the spirit of Thomas Reid and G.E. Moore. The text breaks new ground, proffering a meta-philosophy of common sense, which draws upon the work of Aristotle, contemporary evolutionary biology and psychology, as well as historical studies on the origins of early modern philosophy (particularly Descartes). Boulter also dialogues rather extensively with Gilbert Ryle, John Austin, and Paul Grice within this text. Part One offers new answers to the questions: What counts as a common sense belief? Why should common sense beliefs be considered default positions?, and Why is it that philosophers so frequently end up denying what we all know to be true? Pointedly, chapter one sets forth the distinctive and characteristic claims of a common sense philosopher, and draws up a tentative list of nearly two dozen common sense positions that philosophers would do well to respect. For example, building upon G.E. Moore, Boulter notes that the existence of material bodies within the universe, that all material objects are located within space, that human beings have minds endowed with higher level consciousness, and that mental acts are contained within (and ontologically dependent upon) bodies should be taken as a given truths. From Reid, Boulter constructs the following given truths (among others): that memory of an event is reliable (particularly recent ones), that there are some things that cannot exist by themselves (i.e., they must be in something else, as qualities or attributes), that moral judgments are true or false, and that most universally accepted principles should be taken as first principles (pp. 28–31). In chapter two, Boulter offers a rigorous defense of the position that common sense beliefs ought to be treated as default positions. Interestingly, within this chapter Boulter suggests that a proposition counts as a common sense belief if it is reasonable to assume that it was necessary to ensure either social or ecological fitness in the evolution of hominids (I wonder, pointedly, if he would classify religion as such?). In chapters three and four Boulter questions why it is that philosophers of the past have commonly posited answers to questions that the common person never asks. In part, he suggests, these philosophical errors (at least in the modern period) are due to these philosophers (unwittingly) conducting their philosophical endeavors according to the rules and expectations of medieval theologians, and not of the philosophers. Part Two defends common sense beliefs from specific challenges from prominent philosophers on topics from metaphysics to ethics, which in essence is an application of his meta-philosophy developed in part one. In particular, chapter five is a defense of the view that the external world is independent of our representations of it, and that this world is perceived directly, without projective perception. Chapter six is a rebuttal of Michael Dummett's semantic anti-realist challenge to metaphysical realism. Herein Boulter argues that Dummett provides no veritable reason to give up the principle of bivalence (i.e., that every proposition takes exactly one of two truth values: true or false). Chapter seven focuses on the philosophy of mind, and is a refutation of the eliminative materialist claims holding that all mental states now deemed to be filled with intentional content must be rejected on the basis of a as-yet-unidentified concept of neuroscience. Chapter eight is, for me, the most valuable. Here Boulter asserts and defends the notion that humans are, at least some of the time, responsible for their actions (which is in contradistinction to Galen Strawson and Peter van Inwagen, who both argue for a sort of determinism) In sum, this book picks up the threads of former conceptions of the philosophy of common sense and relocates it within contemporary discussion, arguing for a return to intuitionism. Readers who have interests in early modern philosophy, intuitionism, and the Scottish School of Common Sense will find much to be delighted in. I caution the reader to be rather well versed with these topics, however, for Boulter makes assumptions rather regularly on the pre-understanding from the potential reader.

Introduction: A Primer on Adaptationism

Thirty years ago Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Lewontin published a article called ‘‘The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm: A Critique of the Adaptationist Programme.’’ This article initiated the debate over the fate of adaptationism. While the prevalence and exact nature of adaptationism were not immediately clear in 1979, the target of Gould and Lewontin’s critique was: the practice of accepting adaptation hypotheses too quickly based on little or no evidence. The critique generated a discussion of lasting influence, a discussion still relevant to both evolutionary biology and philosophy. Indeed, the reach of the Spandrels article is such that Rose and Lauder (1996, pp. 1–8) claim that one task of contemporary evolutionary biology is to articulate a viable ‘‘post-spandrels adaptationism.’’ This special issue commemorates both the seminal article and the literature it inspired. The contributions here provide extensions and elaborations of many threads woven into this complex debate. There is little chance of successfully summarizing all complicated contours of the Spandrels literature in sufficient detail. Instead, I will briefly provide my take on why the article enjoys lasting relevance, and attempt to locate the contributions in the conceptual landscape. The explanation for the Spandrels phenomenon rests on four features of the critique. First, the article attempts to identify and make explicit a coherent program of research in evolutionary biology with the goal of criticizing and reforming the practices of the program. Second, as the title makes clear, the Spandrels article uses rich cultural metaphors to inform our perspective on biological science. Third, the critique targets a specific and central sort of inference—inferring evolutionary origin from current utility—and the often lax evidential standards taken to warrant the inference. And fourth, the article argues for the evolutionary significance of development and constraint.

The end of the adaptive landscape metaphor?

The concepts of adaptive/fitness landscapes and adaptive peaks are a central part of much of contemporary evolutionary biology; the concepts are introduced in introductory texts, developed in more detail in graduate-level treatments, and are used extensively in papers published in the major journals in the field. The appeal of visualizing the process of evolution in terms of the movement of populations on such landscapes is very strong; as one becomes familiar with the metaphor, one often develops the feeling that it is possible to gain deep insights into evolution by thinking about the movement of populations on landscapes consisting of adaptive valleys and peaks. But, since Wright first introduced the metaphor in 1932, the metaphor has been the subject of persistent confusion, from equivocation over just what the features of the landscape are meant to represent to how we ought to expect the landscapes to look. Recent advances—conceptual, empirical, and computational—have pointed towards the inadequacy and indeed incoherence of the landscapes as usually pictured. I argue that attempts to reform the metaphor are misguided; it is time to give up the pictorial metaphor of the landscape entirely and rely instead on the results of formal modeling, however difficult such results are to understand in ‘intuitive’ terms.

On the Compatibility of Terror Management Theory and Perspectives on Human Evolution

Terror management theory (TMT) posits that the uniquely human awareness of death gives rise to a potential for debilitating terror, which is averted by the construction and maintenance of cultural worldviews. Over 300 studies have supported hypotheses derived from TMT. In a recent critique of TMT, Navarrete and Fessler (2005) argued that TMT is inconsistent with contemporary evolutionary biology and that the evidence supporting TMT can be better accounted for by an alternative “coalitional psychology” (CP), which posits a domain general mechanism whereby a wide range of adaptive threats activate an even wider range of judgments and behaviors all directed toward sustaining unspecified coalitions. In this paper, we argue that: a) Navarrete and Fessler do not adequately present either TMT or the empirical evidence in support of it; b) TMT is in no way inconsistent with modern evolutionary biology; and c) CP is not theoretically plausible and cannot provide a convincing empirical account of evidence supporting TMT. The broader goal of this paper is to encourage evolutionary theorists to move beyond overly simplistic alternatives that target superficial portrayals of TMT and the evidence supporting it, and contribute to a more useful integration of TMT and its findings with evolutionary thinking about culture and human social behavior.

Statistical Sciences and Evolutionary Biology with Special Reference to Phylogeny Estimation

Contemporary evolutionary biology has used various statistical methods for collecting and analyzing data. Here methods for estimating phylogenetic trees are reviewed in the context of recent history of evolutionary biology, especially of systematics and phylogenetics. Estimating evolutionary history based on character data (molecular or morphological) poses a couple of epistemological problems all of which are common to historical sciences in general. Karl Popper's philosophy of science, in particular, his theory of falsification and corroboration has been espoused by many theoretical phylogeneticists. In this paper the long-standing controversy on philosophical aspects of phylogenetics and its implications for statistical methods in this discipline is discussed.

Organisms as natural purposes: The contemporary evolutionary perspective

Kant’s conception of organisms as natural purposes raises a challenge to the adequacy of mechanistic explanation in biology. Certain features of organisms appear to be inexplicable by appeal to mechanical law alone. Some biological phenomena, it seems, can only be accounted for teleologically. Contemporary evolutionary biology has by and large ignored this challenge. It is widely held that Darwin’s theory of natural selection gives us an adequate, wholly mechanical account of the nature of organisms. In contemporary biology, the category of the organism plays virtually no explanatory role. Contemporary evolutionary biology is a science of sub-organismal entities—replicators. I argue that recent advances in developmental biology demonstrate the inadequacy of sub-organismal mechanism. The category of the organism, construed as a ‘natural purpose’ should play an ineliminable role in explaining ontogenetic development and adaptive evolution. According to Kant the natural purposiveness of organisms cannot be demonstrated to be an objective principle in nature, nor can purposiveness figure in genuine explain. I attempt to argue, by appeal to recent work on self-organization, that the purposiveness of organisms is a natural phenomenon, and, by appeal to the apparatus of invariance explanation, that biological purposiveness provides genuine, ineliminable biological explanations.

Problem of organism integrity and its perspectives

The organism integrity in onto- and phylogenesis is considered as an initial element of biosphere integrity and its evolution at the eukaryotic level. The Schmalhausen's concept of organism integrity is discussed in the context of his original strategy of evolutionary synthesis and his works on stabilizing selection. The perspectives of investigations on the problem of integrity and development of the principle of dynamic stability in contemporary evolutionary biology as integrating factors are discussed.

Evolutionary morphology and Evo-devo: Hierarchy and novelty

Although the role of morphology in evolutionary theory remains a subject of debate, assessing the contributions of morphological investigation to evolutionary developmental biology (Evo-devo) is a more circumscribed issue of direct relevance to ongoing research. Historical studies of morphologically oriented researchers and the formation of the Modern Synthesis in the Anglo-American context identify a recurring theme: the synthetic theory of evolution did not capture multiple levels of biological organization. When this feature is incorporated into a philosophical framework for explaining the origin of evolutionary innovations and novelties (a core domain of inquiry in Evo-devo) two specific roles for morphology can be described: (1) the conceptualization and operational identification of the targets of explanation; and (2) the elucidation of causal interactions at higher levels of organization during ontogeny and through evolutionary time. These roles are critical components of any adequate explanation of innovation and novelty though not exhaustive of the parts played by morphology in evolutionary investigation. They also invite reflection on what counts as an evolutionary cause in contemporary evolutionary biology.

Normative Bias and Adaptive Challenges: A Relational Approach to Coalitional Psychology and a Critique of Terror Management Theory

Adherence to ingroup ideology increases after exposure to death-related stimuli, a reaction that proponents of terror management theory (TMT) explain as a psychological defense against the uniquely human existential fear of death. We argue that existential concerns are not the relevant issue; rather, such concepts can be subsumed under a larger category of adaptive challenges that prime coalitional thinking. We suggest that increases in adherence to ingroup ideology in response to adaptive challenges are manifestations of normative mental representations emanating from psychological systems designed to enhance coordination and membership in social groups. In providing an alternative to TMT, we (1) explain why the theory is inconsistent with contemporary evolutionary biology, (2) demonstrate that mortality-salience does not have the unique evocative powers ascribed to it by TMT advocates, and (3) discuss our approach to coalitional psychology, a framework consistent with modern evolutionary theory and informed by a broad understanding of cultural variation, can be employed to help account for both the corpus of results in TMT research and the growing body of findings inconsistent with TMT's predictions.

Sociology and the Second Darwinian Revolution: A Metatheoretical Analysis

Sociologists tend to eschew biological explanations of human social behavior. Accordingly, when evolutionary biologists began to apply neo-Darwinian theory to the study of human social behavior, the reactions of sociologists typically ranged from indifference to overt hostility. Since the mid-1960s, however, neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory has stimulated a “second Darwinian revolution” in traditional social scientific conceptions of human nature and social behavior, even while most sociologists remain largely uninformed about neo-Darwinian theory and research. This article traces sociology's long-standing isolation from the life sciences, especially evolutionary biology, to divergence in the metatheoretical assumptions that typify conventional sociological thought versus contemporary evolutionary biology. We conclude with a discussion of the recent emergence of a nascent “evolutionary sociology” that integrates sociobiological reasoning with contemporary sociological thought.

Ancient DNA enables timing of the pleistocene origin and holocene expansion of two adélie penguin lineages in antarctica.

The timing of divergent events in history is one of the central goals of contemporary evolutionary biology. Such studies are however dependent on accurate evolutionary rates. Recent developments in ancient DNA analysis enable the estimation of more accurate evolutionary rates and therefore more accurate timing of divergence events. Consequently, this leads to a better understanding of changes in populations through time. We use an evolutionary rate calculated from ancient DNA of Adélie penguins (Pygoscelis adeliae) to time divergent events in their history. We report the presence of two distinct and highly variable mitochondrial DNA lineages and track changes in these lineages through space and time. When the ancient DNA and the phylogenetic rates are used to estimate the time of origin of the lineages, two very different estimates resulted. In addition, these same rates provide very different estimates of the time of expansion of these lineages. We suggest that the rate calculated from ancient DNA is more consistent with the glacial history of Antarctica and requires fewer assumptions than does a narrative based on the phylogenetic rate. Finally, we suggest that our study indicates an important new role for ancient DNA studies in the timing of divergent events in history.

Erich Wasmann, Ernst Haeckel, and the Limits of Science

In the late nineteenth century, two German evolutionary biologists, Ernst Haeckel and Erich Wasmann, argued publicly about how to apply evolutionary biology and where its explanatory limits, if any, lay. The German Jesuit evolutionist entomologist Wasmann’s (1859–1931) faith and Jesuit philosophical training intersected to reconcile evolution and Catholicism by delineating the philosophical limits of science: Wasmann demarcated a material and historical world, which science can describe, and the realm of subjective experience and the soul, which it cannot. Wasmann’s evolution contrasted (and conflicted) strongly with contemporary German atheistic and anticlerical monistic evolutionary biology. This paper discusses Wasmann’s very public debates with monism’s prophet, Ernst Haeckel.

Diachronic Biology Meets Evo-Devo: C. H. Waddington's Approach to Evolutionary Developmental Biology

Abstract Conrad Hal Waddington (1905–1975) did not respect the traditional boundaries established between genetics, embryology, and evolutionary biology. Rather, he viewed them together as a “diachronic biology.” In this diachronic biology, evolutionary change was caused by heritable alterations in development. Stabilizing selection within the embryo was followed by normative selection on the adult. To explain evolution, Waddington had to invent many concepts and terms, some of which have retained their usage and some of which have not. In this paper I seek to explicate Waddington's ideas and evaluate their usefulness for contemporary evolutionary developmental biology.

Diachronic Biology Meets Evo-Devo: C. H. Waddington's Approach to Evolutionary Developmental Biology1

Conrad Hal Waddington (1905–1975) did not respect the traditional boundaries established between genetics, embryology, and evolutionary biology. Rather, he viewed them together as a “diachronic biology.” In this diachronic biology, evolutionary change was caused by heritable alterations in development. Stabilizing selection within the embryo was followed by normative selection on the adult. To explain evolution, Waddington had to invent many concepts and terms, some of which have retained their usage and some of which have not. In this paper I seek to explicate Waddington's ideas and evaluate their usefulness for contemporary evolutionary developmental biology.

Henri Bergson: Evolution, time and philosophy

Evolutionary theory is hindered by the conflict between the apparently antagonistic principles of its two founding figures, Darwin and Lamarck. Bergson's Creative Evolution outlines the means of transcending this impasse. If the evolutionary process is conceived as enduring then the atomistic model of static genetic states is never fully realisable. In the light of this, Bergson considers the germ‐plasm to be essentially “fluid.” If there is to be influence on the germ‐line it will be primarily in terms of the manner in which the genetic data is unfolded. In order to designate this influence Bergson introduces the concept of the “tendency.” The tendency will be explicated in relation to contemporary evolutionary biology. However, as the concept signifies that which is given only in the duration in which information is elaborated, it is precluded from representation. Bergson demonstrates that it is the evolutionary principle of continuous transformation which constitutes the limit to any scientific of view. For this reason, science needs to be complemented by a philosophical account of the duration of process.