Allan Beever argues in his new book that there are two distinct forms of justice— commutative and distributive—and that we have forgotten about commutative justice, the form of justice that governs our interpersonal relationships. Consequently, we erroneously think of private law from the perspective of distributive justice, the form of justice that governs our relation to the state. Forgetting commutative justice, he claims, has been a serious philosophical mistake with potentially grave practical implications. Theoretically, says Beever, the modern view is wrong, because politics and distributive justice are grounded in our pre-political, interpersonal relationships. In other words, commutative justice is logically prior to distributive justice. Practically, the dominance of the mistaken modern view has led us to think of people too much as part of a collective and not as individuals and to over-emphasize the significance of the state. In this essay I challenge all of Beever’s claims. I argue that there is no basis for the claim that people these days have forgotten about interpersonal relationships, nor of the claim that interpersonal relationship are the foundation for politics. I challenge Beever’s historical account, arguing both that Beever has failed to provide any convincing argument for why commutative justice has been forgotten, and that there are historical facts that explain the changes in the structure of private law that he ignored. I then turn to Beever’s theoretical claims and argue that Beever’s view about the independence of commutative and distributive justice are indefensible. Even accepting pre-political norms of commutative justice as the foundation of politics, it does not follow that contemporary contract law should reflect such norms. Finally, I argue that contrary to Beever’s claim that commutative justice is apolitical, Beever’s views reveal a clear political bent, which Beever never defends. Note: A much shorter version of this essay will be published in Modern Law Review. In addition to what is mentioned in the abstract (which describes the shorter version), this SSRN version of the essay contains two additional sections. One is section VI, which examines whether Beever’s view matches legal doctrine (and concludes that it does not), and a long Appendix, which argues that Beever’s presentation of the various philosophers he discusses is often inaccurate and misleading. These sections are substantial, together making up more than half the text. Though not part of the review to be published, I believe they are important for a full assessment of Beever’s book as well as for a more general evaluation of corrective justice views of private law. To be clear, it was only the shorter version that was the assessed and accepted by MLR, and the anonymous referee or editors of the journal have not passed judgment on these additional sections. MLR’s acceptance of the shorter version in no way indicates that the journal accepted (or would have accepted) the additional sections. * Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. I thank Vincent Chiao, David Howarth, and Charlie Webb, and an anonymous referee for Modern Law Review for their comments. I also thank Michael Quinn for answering a few questions about Jeremy Bentham.
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