Contact Isolation Precautions Research Articles

Control of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus in the hospital setting

Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) is a common cause of nosocomial infections. Healthcare professionals in the United States should develop programs to prevent transmission of this organism within their institutions. Aggressive control efforts are justified for several reasons: (1) the incidence of nosocomial MRSA reflects the general effectiveness of infection control practice; (2) MRSA do not replace susceptible strains but instead increase the overall rate of nosocomial S. aureus infections; (3) MRSA infections cause substantial morbidity and mortality; (4) serious MRSA infections must be treated with vancomycin. Thus, in hospitals with high rates of MRSA, use of this antimicrobial agent increases, which in turn may increase the risk for selecting vancomycin-resistant enterococci. Hospitals have used numerous different approaches to control nosocomial spread of MRSA. Staff should choose a control method based on the prevalence of MRSA in their institution and in their referring facilities, the rate of nosocomial transmission of MRSA in their hospital, the risk factors present in their patient population, the reservoirs and modes of transmission specific to their hospital, and their resources. Any MRSA control plan must stress adherence to basic infection control measures, such as hand washing and contact isolation precautions. In addition, decolonization of patients and staff, control of antimicrobial use, surveillance cultures, and molecular typing may be helpful adjuncts.

Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus Control in Hospitals: The French Experience

The first cases of isolation of Staphylococcus aureus resistant to methicillin in France were published in 1962. However, until recently, very few epidemiological studies or attempts to control the epidemic have been done in France. In this article, we present the results of a prospective study performed during a 3-month period in 27 hospitals of the Région des Pays de la Loire. Among the 94,605 hospitalized patients included in the study, 0.45% (427) developed methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) infections, the incidence rate ranging from 0% to 1.2%. Thirty-four percent of MRSA-infected patients were 80 years old or older, 30% had been transferred from another service and 19% from another hospital, 56% were hospitalized at least once during the previous year, MRSA had been isolated at least once previously in 18% of MRSA-infected patients, 19% died, 16% were transferred to another service and 11% to another hospital, and only 32% were discharged to their homes. A poor compliance to contact isolation precautions was observed in all hospitals: 46% of MRSA-infected patients were hospitalized in a private room; gloves, masks, and gowns were worn for the care of 63.4%, 14%, and 42.5% of MRSA-infected patients, respectively; and handwashing was feasible in the rooms of 52% of the patients.

Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus Control in Hospitals: The French Experience

AbstractThe first cases of isolation of Staphylococcus aureus resistant to methicillin in France were published in 1962. However, until recently, very few epidemiological studies or attempts to control the epidemic have been done in France. In this article, we present the results of a prospective study performed during a 3-month period in 27 hospitals of the Région des Pays de la Loire. Among the 94,605 hospitalized patients included in the study, 0.45% (427) developed methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) infections, the incidence rate ranging from 0% to 1.2%. Thirty-four percent of MRSA-infected patients were 80 years old or older, 30% had been transferred from another service and 19% from another hospital, 56% were hospitalized at least once during the previous year, MRSA had been isolated at least once previously in 18% of MRSA-infected patients, 19% died, 16% were transferred to another service and 11% to another hospital, and only 32% were discharged to their homes. A poor compliance to contact isolation precautions was observed in all hospitals: 46% of MRSA-infected patients were hospitalized in a private room; gloves, masks, and gowns were worn for the care of 63.4%, 14%, and 42.5% of MRSA-infected patients, respectively; and handwashing was feasible in the rooms of 52% of the patients.

Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus Control in Hospitals: The French Experience

The first cases of isolation of Staphylococcus aureus resistant to methicillin in France were published in 1962. However, until recently, very few epidemiological studies or attempts to control the epidemic have been done in France. In this article, we present the results of a prospective study performed during a 3-month period in 27 hospitals of the Région des Pays de la Loire. Among the 94,605 hospitalized patients included in the study, 0.45% (427) developed methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) infections, the incidence rate ranging from 0% to 1.2%. Thirty-four percent of MRSA-infected patients were 80 years old or older, 30% had been transferred from another service and 19% from another hospital, 56% were hospitalized at least once during the previous year, MRSA had been isolated at least once previously in 18% of MRSA-infected patients, 19% died, 16% were transferred to another service and 11% to another hospital, and only 32% were discharged to their homes. A poor compliance to contact isolation precautions was observed in all hospitals: 46% of MRSA-infected patients were hospitalized in a private room; gloves, masks, and gowns were worn for the care of 63.4%, 14%, and 42.5% of MRSA-infected patients, respectively; and handwashing was feasible in the rooms of 52% of the patients.

Nosocomial colonization and infection with multiresistant Acinetobacter baumannii: outbreak delineation using DNA macrorestriction analysis and PCR-fingerprinting

The prevalence of nosocomial acinetobacter colonization and infection in a university hospital was reviewed and multiresistant Acinetobacter baumannii infections in an intensive care unit (ICU) were investigated using epidemiological typing and a case-control study. Acinetobacter colonization at various body sites was found in 3·2 to 10·8 per 1000 patients. Acinetobacter infection accounted for 0·3% of endemic nosocomial infections in critically ill patients and for 1% of nosocomial bacteraemia hospitalwide. Over a three-week period, four ventilated patients developed colonization, followed by pneumonia in two patients, with A. baumannii resistant to multiple antimicrobials. Cultures of samples from respiratory equipment and ICU surfaces ( n = 27) as well as from hands of personnel ( n = 14) failed to yield A. baumannii, except for one sample of respiratory tubing. Antibiogram, biotype, chromosomal DNA macrorestriction profiles and polymerase chain reaction (PCR) mediated fingerprints of A. baumannii isolates ( n = 31) indicated that this outbreak was caused by two strains, one of which later spread to another hospital where it caused a second outbreak. Both strains were clearly discriminated from control strains from cases of sporadic infection. Risk factors for cross-colonization that were identified by a case-control comparison were neurosurgery, mechanical ventilation and treatment with broad-spectrum antibiotics. Transmission was controlled by implementing contact isolation precautions and routine sterilization of ventilator tubing. Wider use of sensitive genotypic methods like DNA macrorestriction analysis and PCR-mediated fingerprinting for typing nosocomial pathogens should improve the detection of micro-epidemics amenable to early control.

Epidemic Pseudomonas aeruginosa serotype O16 bacteremia in hematology-oncology patients

From 1 August 1978 through 31 December 1982, 98 hematology-oncology patients had positive cultures for Pseudomonas aeruginosa serotype O16; 22 of these patients developed bacteremia, and this bacteremia was associated with the occurrence of extensive perineal cellulitis in 10 patients (45.5%). Seventeen bacteremic patients died. The epidemic strain differed from other P. aeruginosa organisms isolated at the hospital by its resistance to all antibiotics available at that time (ticarcillin, piperacillin, azlocillin, tobramycin, ceftizoxime, ceftriaxone, moxalactam, ceftazidime, and fosfomycin). Univariate analysis showed the following factors to be significantly associated with P. aeruginosa O16 bacteremia: the severity of granulocytopenia at the time of the bacteremia, more days with fever, the administration of ticarcillin or an aminoglycoside, the receipt of a greater number of antimicrobial agents for a longer period of time before documentation of the bacteremia, and the occurrence of cellulitis. Logistic regression analysis showed that duration of fever, duration of bacteremia, and the number of antimicrobial agents administered before documentation of the bacteremia were the best predictors of P. aeruginosa O16 bacteremia. In a prospective study of the acquisition of P. aeruginosa by hematology-oncology patients, 1,149 specimens (throat and rectal swabs) from 270 patients and 201 specimens from their washbasin drains were collected. On only three occasions was the epidemic strain isolated from both the patient and his or her washbasin, but in each case the colonization of the patient preceded the isolation of the strain from the washbasin. The transmission of any P. aeruginosa organism from washbasin drain to patient could not be documented. Contact isolation precautions from the Centers for Disease Control were used for all hematology-oncology patients colonized or infected with P. aeruginosa after 7 January 1983. No case of P. aeruginosa O16 bacteremia has occurred at Hotel Dieu since July 1984.