I share Mueller's concern over the potential antisocial impact of concentrated economic power. And there is no denying that corporations have a great deal of control over the food system, and that if present trends continue this control will increase. Perhaps he is correct in asserting that one result has been antisocial behavior on the part of food corporations. The limited usefulness of industrial organization theory, however, provides rather weak support for general conclusions with respect to behavior or for public policy prescriptions. Either a restructuring of Mueller's model to include a broader selection of variables or a simple empirical survey of the food industry turns up many significant departures from the general results he has attempted to establish. Thus, while I certainly would not argue against the updating and enforcement of existing antitrust laws, I do not find in the current organization of the food industry a compelling reason for a wholesale overhaul of antitrust laws, much less a need to initiate a public debate over the role of huge corporations vis-a-vis democratic theory. The application of industrial organization theory to any industry situation is a slippery task. The building of models from the theory leaves much to the imagination of the researchers. As Mueller says, the theory admits the examination of any characteristic that has a significant influence over behavior. I would prefer that the theory require the examination of all significant characteristics plus some quantification of their relative significance. For instance, in the two examples, coffee and beer, heavy weight was given the financial resources of the firm and the size of promotional budgets in predicting marketing success. While those variables are undoubtedly important, one can wonder about their relative importance had the model also examined a broader grouping of variables, such as raw material prices, consumer demand patterns, management competence of competitive firms and existing competitive conditions. For both examples one could argue that the entry or expansion of a new large firm is more a threat to an existing, but not necessarily socially appropriate, competitive equilibrium than of long-run monopolization. In beer, the rise from eighth to second in an already concentrated industry may have a variety of explanations, only one of which is the size of the promotional budget of the successful firm. Further, there is no particular theoretical reason to believe that once one firm has achieved such success it necessarily precludes any other firm from doing the same thing. The process of selecting significant c aracteristics is symptomatic of a general problem with the theory. For example, even the term market is uncomfortably open to arbitrariness as it seems to allow definitions ranging from relative product prices, products, and consumers, to geographic area, and o use them interchangeably. Similarly, perfo mance can be and is defined and measured in economic, social, or political terms. Certainly if the performance in the food industry is defined as financial results (a frequently u ed measure in micro economics) the industry is no big deal. The evidence of monopoly profits, whose short-term existence even in a perfectly competitive model should not be a surprise to an economist, suggests less than desirable economic performance, although the attraction of such a potential apparently is not lost on firms moving into new markets or act vities. I am not aware of any quantitative m asure of political performance, but from my view of food corporations, I am not overly impressed with their success. The heavy reliance on concentration ratios, while admittedly a useful indicator, does make R. J. Herder is director of economic research for Central Soya Co., Fort Wayne, Indiana.
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