Constitutionality Of Statute Research Articles

Ministério Público de Contas: estatuto constitucional e perspectivas sob o prisma da autonomia institucional e da independência funcional

This article approaches, in general terms, the constitutional statute and the perspectives of the Public Ministry of Accounts outlined under the prism of institutional autonomy and functional independence. Through the historical foreshortening of the body, its origin and its iter of institutional maturation are rescued, bringing up the discussions that surround the theme, with the prospective bias of the necessary interpretative and sedimentation advances essential to the guarantor of the constitutional desideratum both of the Parquet of Accounts and the external control system as a whole, in order to ultimately reaffirm the own effectiveness and legitimacy of the specific jurisdiction exercised by the Courts of Accounts.

Parliament's Constitution: Legislative Disruption of Implied Repeal.

UK constitutional law establishes priority rules governing the relations among legal sources. According to the implied repeal rule, a later statute is preferred to and repeals an earlier statute where the two cannot stand together. There is a vast literature testing the rule's application in future-facing scenarios: whether Parliament in enacting legislation is capable of legally binding its successors. This article instead adopts a backward-facing perspective, focusing on past enactments. I examine Parliament's legislative power to disrupt how implied repeal applies to earlier, inconsistent statutes. This sheds light on Parliament's capacity to shape the constitution's architecture-here, by rearranging priority relations among existing statutes. I juxtapose the technique against the doctrine of constitutional statutes, and also address the implications for the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. Nor is the technique simply of academic interest. A backward-facing reprioritising regime has already been established in the legislation governing UK withdrawal from the EU. Lastly, the argument may be generalised to encompass other legislatures that also enjoy powers to disrupt the implied repeal rule normally operating among past statutes.

Confronting State Power: Constitutional Statutes in India

Confronting State Power: Constitutional Statutes in India

Jurisdiction without the Law

The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Kenya has been a subject of debate since the inception of the court. However, what has raised more questions than answers is the jurisdiction to interpret and apply the Constitution. The Supreme has extended this jurisdiction to mean interpretation and application of a category of statutes it calls “normative derivative legislations”. In this response to Walter Khobe’s piece, this paper argues that Kenya does not have constitutional statutes that enjoy a special character in the country. In a country with a written Constitution, laws acquire their status not because of their content but because of their formal place in the legal system. This piece posits that jurisdictional clauses should not be interpreted broadly as a matter of policy to avoid courts redefining their functions. It proceeds to demonstrate that normative derivative doctrine emanates from the fallacy of hasty conclusion- that by statutes enacting constitutional provisions they change their character from ordinary statutes to special ones. This piece engages with some of the monumental Supreme Court decisions that have exposed the court as lacking a coherent approach to the issue of the normative derivative.

Constitutional functions and institutional responsibility: a functional analysis of the UK constitution

AbstractThis paper advances a functional analysis of the UK constitution. It explores how the UK constitution discharges three minimum ‘constituting’, ‘legitimating’ and ‘limiting’ functions that citizens living in modern liberal democracies may legitimately expect all constitutions – irrespective of form – to perform. This functional enquiry breaks with dominant trends in the legal scholarship that remain focused on theorising the constitution's underlying political or legal nature or, likewise, identifying its ultimate source of authority. In addition to offering a richer descriptive account of constitutional practice, this paper identifies, normatively, an institutional responsibility for Parliament to discharge the UK constitution's three minimum functions. Recognising that institutional responsibility unlocks fresh insights into two constitutional conundrums: the legitimacy of judicial review and the status of ‘constitutional statutes’. At the same time, it also exposes deficiencies and tensions in relation to the quality of Parliament's institutional performance on matters of minimum constitutional functioning.

Jurisdiction without the Law: A Response to Walter Khobe’s Reflections on the Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Kenya has been a subject of debate since the inception of the court. However, what has raised more questions than answers is the jurisdiction to interpret and apply the Constitution. The Supreme Court has extended this jurisdiction to mean interpretation and application of a category of statutes it calls “normative derivative legislations”. In this response to Walter Khobe’s piece, this paper argues that Kenya does not have constitutional statutes that enjoy a special character in the country. In a country with a written constitution, laws acquire their status not because of their content but because of their formal place in the legal system. This piece posits that jurisdictional clauses should not be interpreted broadly as a matter of policy to avoid courts redefining their functions. It proceeds to demonstrate that normative derivative doctrine emanates from the fallacy of hasty conclusion- that by statutes enacting constitutional provisions they change their character from ordinary statutes to special ones. This piece engages with some of the monumental Supreme Court decisions that have exposed the court as lacking a coherent approach to the issue of the normative derivative.

Суд и порядок: классический институционализм М. Ориу и С. Романо*

The subject of the study is the ideas of classical institutionalists (M. Hauriou and S. Romano) on the role of court and the nature of justice. The methodological basis of the work is the method of interpretation, which is the main one for the study of the legal theories history, and also the method of problem-theoretical reconstruction, as well as general scientific methods of analysis, synthesis, etc. The relevnce of the conducted research is to identify the key elements of Maurice Hauriou and Santi Romano’s ideas on the role and content of justice and their interpretation, taking into account the achievements of modern legal science regarding the different styles (strategies) of judicial interpretation. Maurice Hauriou believes that the basis of the court powers is not the political power, but the sovereignty of the constitutional statute. This makes it possible for courts to perform the function of deterrence (restriction) of other state bodies, the source of power of which is a political sovereignty. For this reason, the French jurist pushes the boundaries of justice wide enough to allow judicial rule-making, which is competitive with the parliament. To a certain extent, this position of Maurice Hauriou may be at the heart of his world view. For example, he puts an «idea» in the foundation of the institution, which eventually becomes the guardian of justice. Santi Romano, on the other hand, seeks to avoid any idealism by remaining in positions close to sociological positivism. Unlike Maurice Hauriou, he creates not a public law theory, but a general legal theory. For this reason, he focuses much more on the content of interpretation as a specific judicial activity than his French teacher. He considers it as a formal logical and essentially cognitive procedure. However, the general context of the pluralistic teaching of Italian jurisprudence makes it possible to take a broader view of the judiciary than that of Maurice Hauriou. Santi Romano also allows the court to have normative competence, but does not consider it part of justice. Despite the fundamental assumption that it is possible for the courts to create norms, neither Santi Romano nor Maurice Hauriou can be considered forerunners or supporters of radical judicial realism, according to which the judge is the only true creator of law, who makes norms in a sovereign and spontaneous manner without looking back at the existing legal order.

The Henry VIII powers in the Brexit process: justification subject to political and legal safeguards

ABSTRACT Henry VIII powers, which are commonly found in legislation, until recently, were not an issue of major constitutional concern. However, their extensive use in the EUWA and the subsequent EUWAA attracted the attention of academics and politicians alike. This article aims to offer justifications for the use of Henry VIII powers in extraordinary situations such as Brexit, given that such powers would be subject to enhanced legal safeguards. In doing so, this article examines the challenge that the Brexit process poses to the law making institutions, and it elaborates on how the proper use of Henry VIII powers has the capacity to meet the Brexit ends. It also focuses on the particular Henry VIII powers in the EUWA and the EUWAA and it examines both the legal and the political safeguards. It evaluates both the legal and the political safeguards and it highlights their positive and negative aspects. Finally, this article concludes with a set of legal safeguards, procedural and material, that are necessary for the proper use of such powers in future legislation. In particular, it argues that the proper use of Henry VIII powers should include at least two safeguards; first a pre-legislative stage attracting public engagement and second a substantive limit according to which the executive should not be allowed to use Henry VIII powers to amend acts of constitutional value and most importantly the enabling act. Accordingly, it proposes that there is need for a constitutional statute to set uniform safeguards and standards for every use of Henry VIII powers.

The Henry VIII Powers in the Brexit Process: Justification Subject to Political and Legal Safeguards

Henry VIII powers, which are commonly found in legislation, until recently, were not an issue of major constitutional concern. However, their extensive use in the EUWA and the subsequent EUWAA attracted the attention of academics and politicians alike. This article aims to offer justifications for the use of Henry VIII powers in extraordinary situations such as Brexit, given that such powers would be subject to enhanced legal safeguards. In doing so, this article examines the challenge that the Brexit process poses to the law making institutions, and it elaborates on how the proper use of Henry VIII powers has the capacity to meet the Brexit ends. It also focuses on the particular Henry VIII powers in the EUWA and the EUWAA and it examines both the legal and the political safeguards. It evaluates both the legal and the political safeguards and it highlights their positive and negative aspects. Finally, this article concludes with a set of legal safeguards, procedural and material, that are necessary for the proper use of such powers in future legislation. In particular, it argues that the proper use of Henry VIII powers should include at least two safeguards; first a pre-legislative stage attracting public engagement and second a substantive limit according to which the executive should not be allowed to use Henry VIII powers to amend acts of constitutional value and most importantly the enabling act. Accordingly, it proposes that there is need for a constitutional statute to set uniform safeguards and standards for every use of Henry VIII powers.

The United Kingdom’s Statutory Constitution

Abstract The emergence of the UK’s statutory constitution has challenged the old Diceyan adage that ‘neither the Act of Union with Scotland nor the Dentists Act 1878 has more claim than the other to be considered supreme law’. This article reconceptualises constitutional statutes, offering a three-pronged approach to identifying such legislation. This new model examines the content of the statute, the history of enacting the constitutional statute (the ‘life of the Bill’), and the post-enactment history (the ‘life of the statute’). The proposed framework reflects a historical approach to constitutionalism and gives weight not only to judicial practice, but also to the interactions between other constitutional actors and to popular endorsement. Four case studies of statutes demonstrate how the new model adds layers to, and diverges from, the current judicial approach. Finally, the article describes the implications of taking constitutional statutes seriously under the proposed approach.

The Conceptualization of Constitutional Supremacy: Global Discourse and Legal Tradition

AbstractThis Article argues that a) constitutional supremacy is affected by the legal tradition, which implies that it is a concept largely shaped by the legal context in which it is elaborated, and b) the common law version of constitutional supremacy determines a sort of cultural resistance to constitutional imperialism. In making its argument, this Article begins with the doctrine of sources of law with a view to unpack its operational logic within the common law and, therefore, to understand how the supremacy of constitutions is conceptualized. It then examines the embryonic conceptualization of constitutional supremacy in the British legal culture by addressing the “constitutional statutes.” It goes on to analyse how constitutional supremacy is safeguarded in jurisdictions that are affected by the British tradition and equipped with written constitutions, to show how constitutions concretely established themselves as supreme laws without neglecting the relevance of traditions pre-dating the constitutional texts. It then shows how the common law finds its way to be applied alongside or even instead of the constitution. Eventually, this Article offers some conclusions as to the implications of such a conceptualization of constitutional supremacy for comparative and global constitutional studies.

The United Kingdom’s Statutory Constitution

The emergence of the United Kingdom’s statutory constitution has challenged the old Diceyan adage that ‘neither the Act of Union with Scotland nor the Dentists Act 1878 has more claim than the other to be considered supreme law.’ This article re-conceptualizes constitutional statutes offering a three-pronged approach to identifying such legislation. This new model examines the content of the statute, the history of enacting the constitutional statute (the ‘life of the Bill’), and the post-enactment history (the ‘life of the statute’). The proposed framework reflects a historical approach to constitutionalism and gives weight not only to judicial practice but also to the interactions between other constitutional actors and to popular endorsement. Four case studies of statutes demonstrate how the new model adds layers to, and diverges from, the current judicial approach. Finally, the article describes the implications of ‘taking constitutional statutes seriously’ under the proposed approach.

Rationality Review of Legislative Process in Adjudication on Constitutionality of Statutes

위헌법률심판에서 헌법재판소는 다투어지는 법률 내용이 헌법에 위반되는지 여부를 심사한다. 헌법재판소는 합리성 내지 비례성 심사를 통해 법률 내용의 헌법합치성을 판단한다. 위헌법률심판에서 헌법재판소는 과잉금지원칙 같은 실체적 사법심사기준을 매개로 문제되는 법률의 내용적 정당성을 판단하고 입법자가 그법률에 이르게 된 입법과정에는 별반 관심이 없다. 그럼에도 불구하고, 헌법재판 소가 실체적 심사기준을 적용하더라도 법률의 내용적 정당성을 판단하기 곤란한 경우가 있다. 다원성과 불확실성을 특징으로 하는 현대사회에서 입법자는 사회적 으로 논란 있는 사안에 대하여 가치판단을 수행하거나 예측이 쉽지 않은 장래 상황을 규율해야 하는 처지에 놓인다. 이러한 경우, 헌법재판소는 일정 정도는 입법의 내용 그 자체의 정당성이 아닌 입법과정의 합리성에 주목하지 않을 수없다. 헌법재판소는 입법과정에서 입법자가 문제되는 쟁점을 빠짐없이 고려하였 는지, 이를 공적 토론에 충분히 개방하였는지, 그리고 입법자가 신뢰할 수 있는 정보에 근거하여 결정하였는지를 고려하여 법률의 헌법합치성을 판단하게 된다. 입법에 대한 실체적 정당성 판단이 헌법재판소 결정의 대부분을 차지하고 실체적 사법심사기준의 정교화가 헌법학의 주된 관심을 끌어온 반면, 입법과정의 합리성에 대한 헌법재판소의 통제가 갖는 의미는 우리 학계에서 비중 있게 다루어 지지 않았던 쟁점이다. 이에, 본고에서는 위헌법률심판에서 입법과정의 합리성에 대한 심사의 허용가능성과 그 내용, 그리고 그것이 실체적 사법심사와 맺는 관계를 중심으로 입법과정의 합리성 심사를 검토한다. 본고는 우선 헌법재판에서 문제될 수 있는 절차적 심사의 유형을 구분하고, 이른바 입법의 내적 과정으로서 광의의 입법과정에 대한 헌법재판소의 통제를 둘러싼 정당성 논란을 고찰한 후 ( ), 입법과정심사는 무엇을 지칭하는지, 그것이 특히 활용될 수 있는 영역은 어디인지를 비교헌법적 사례를 소재로 하여 검토한다( ). 다음으로, 입법과정 심사와 실체적 내용 심사 간 관계를 고찰하고, 입법과정에 대한 심사강도 문제를 검토한다. ( ) 마지막으로, 입법과정심사의 우리 헌법실무에 대한 시사점을 언급하는 것으로 글을 마무리한다. ( )In an adjudication on constitutionality of statutes, the Constitutional Court examines whether the content of questioned law violates the Constitution. The Constitutional Court determines the constitutionality by examining reasonableness or proportionality of the law. In the adjudication on constitutionality of law, the Constitutional Court judges the legitimacy of the law through substantive judicial review standard, such as the principle of proportionality, and has little interest in the legislative process through which the legislator enacted the law. Nevertheless, even when the Constitutional Court applies substantive review criteria, it may be difficult to determine the legitimacy of the law. In modern societies characterized by pluralism and uncertainty, legislator is often forced to make value judgments on socially controversial issues or to determine future situations that are difficult to predict. In this case, the Constitutional Court focuses on not only the content of the law itself but also the rationality of legislative process. The Constitutional Court has no choice but to judge the constitutionality of the law, taking into account whether the legislator has considered all aspects at issue, whether the legislator has opened the issue to public debate, and whether the legislator enacted the law with reliable evidence. While substantive legitimacy review of the law accounts for most of the decisions of the Constitutional Court and the elaboration of substantive judicial review standards has attracted the attention of the constitutional jurisprudence, the significance of the Constitutional Court’s control over the rationality of the legislative process has not been addressed sufficiently. Therefore, this article examines the rationality of the legislative process, focusing on the justification of the legislative process review, its contents, and its relationship with the substantive judicial review. This article first identifies the types of procedural reviews that may be a problem in the constitutional adjudication and considers the controversy surrounding the constitutional court’s control of the internal process of legislation (II). The article examines what the review of legislative process refers to and in which areas it can be particularly used, using comparative constitutional precedents (III). Next, the relationship between the review of the legislative process and the review of substantive content is examined, and the intensity of review on the legislative process is examined. (IV) Finally, the article concludes with an implication of legislative process review to the practice of Constitutional Court. ( )

Constitutional Statutes—Roots and Recognition

Abstract Sir John Laws, the originator of the principle of constitutional statutes, suggests that the protection accorded to them has its roots in the protection from implied repeal given to the European Communities Act 1972 and to constitutional fundamentals. We argue that this suggestion is more convincing with regard to the latter than it is with the former. Further, we contend that founding constitutional statutes on the protection afforded to constitutional fundamentals rather than the 1972 Act may provide a stronger basis for the principle of such statutes if the United Kingdom leaves the European Union. We then provide evidence that the idea of constitutional statutes has been accepted across the three arms of state and argue that, as a consequence, the rule of recognition may be taken to have changed to encompass the amendment to the implied repeal rule that such statutes represent.

Protecting Journalists’ Sources Without a Shield: Four Proposals

Journalists’ right to protect the identities of their confidential sources relies on an inconsistent set of court decisions based on constitutional and common law interpretations and state statutes. Efforts to bring some consistency to federal law through the passage of a shield law have stalled while journalists face new threats because of the vulnerability of their communications to discovery and monitoring by third parties. Also, the entry of non-professional communicators into the news ecosystem is causing courts to reevaluate and redefine long-standing protections. This article proposes four ways that sources could be better protected from unmasking without the passage of a shield law: improving whistleblower laws to better protect people who report illegal or unethical actions to the media; vastly reducing the number of government secrets to make “leaking” less attractive or necessary; changing legal strategy to focus on protecting the anonymity of sources instead of the rights of journalists to keep secrets; and more widespread and intelligent use of encrypted applications and software could all improve the security of journalistic sources. Because of the complexity of amending multiple whistleblower protection laws and changing the government’s document classification system, the article argues that the best solutions may be to persuade news organizations to change legal tactics and to use better encryption technology.

Implementation of federal laws in the regions

In the Iraqi model of federalism, the federal legislature is enacting legislation that is tend to be implemented in its constituent regions. However, there is only one region within Iraq, the Kurdistan Region. Despite the fact that establishing other region in Iraq is not contradicting with legal and constitutional statutes, no other regions have been established in Iraq. What should be looked into in the mechanism of legislations issued by the Iraqi Parliament within Kurdistan Region is that: is it necessary to implement all the laws in the Kurdistan Region? Taken into consideration that the Iraqi Parliament is enacting two types of legislations, local and federal legislations. This led us to make differentiation between the two types of legislation and thus the mechanism of implementation of such legislation within the Kurdistan Region and those provinces outside Kurdistan Region. The constitutional areas that the federal legislature is entitled to issue are four, including: exclusive competencies, common competencies, competences related to the establishment of federal bodies and their institutions, and the sparse aspects. As for the implementation of the federal laws in the provinces or the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, the result is the adoption and application of the mixed management or implementation method, given that the federal government itself implements federal laws, especially those relating to the majority of exclusive competencies that it practiced by the federal authorities. Besides, there are federal laws implemented through a joint administration between the federal government and the Regional Government (such as the Customs Law, the Antiquities Law, Oil and Gas Law ...etc. The study concluded that two proposals were submitted to the constitutional legislator and the ordinary law legislator in Iraq in order to determine the nature of the federal legislation and separate it from the domestic legislation, and thus to explicitly stand on the mechanism of implementation of federal laws in the regions.

Freedom of Expression in the Nordic Countries 1815–1914: Theory and Practice

The Nordic countries have traditionally been regarded as pioneers in the historical development of the freedom of expression. In 2016, Sweden and Finland celebrated the 250th anniversary of the world’s first freedom of the press act, passed in 1766. Even later on, the history of freedom of expression remained primarily synonymous with that of freedom of the press. The Danish autocracy’s regulation on the boundaries of press freedom in 1799 restricted the previously tolerated freedom of the press but was based on the idea of the rule of law and on two principles, namely the absence of advance censorship and the right of the author and publisher to have their case tried before a court. These principles were repeated in the Swedish Instrument of Government of 1809, the Norwegian Constitution of 1814 and the Danish Constitution of 1849. Even the Grand Duchy of Finland, which was in Russia’s possession, received its own constitutional statute concerning the freedom of expression in 1906. In reality, however, freedom of expression was often under threat as all those in power were opposed to the right of the opposition to express themselves. Judicial control therefore acted as an important protection for the freedom of expression, but even this shield had its limits depending on the political views of the judges.

Is the Climate Change Act 2008 a Constitutional Statute?

This study poses a question: can the UK’s Climate Change Act 2008 (CCA 2008) be construed as a ‘constitutional statute’ in law? The consequent analysis seeks to provide an answer to this question. It also provides reasons as to why the question is important. It is concluded that it is debatable on the evidence whether the 2008 Act is a ‘constitutional statute’, but that the Act does have the arguable capacity to be construed in legal terms as a constitutional statute. Additionally, and related to this, it is argued (as a value judgment) that it is desirable for the CCA 2008 to be classified as a constitutional statute.

El gran ausente: por un estatuto de la Oposición política tras 40 años de Constitución

Resumen:Dando por sentado que en un Estado plural y democrático como es el nuestro no puede haber más contrapeso para la mayoría que la minoría ni puede existir más contrapoder oponible a aquélla que la oposición. La ausencia de un estatuto constitucional para la oposición parlamentaria debiera ser una ceguera puede agudizar la desafección ciudadana en una época en la que los partidos mainstream con vocación de gobierno en la Unión Europea son «agents with two principals», es decir, agentes de dos instancias a veces contrapuestas, de un lado los electores, de otro las instituciones supranacionales, de modo que la brecha entre representantes y representados puede hacerse insalvable. Añádase a ello que la oposición parlamentaria post-crisis económica ya no se declina en singular sino que la fragmentación electoral ha multiplicado sus sujetos. Se impone por tanto como tarea futura la de proceder a una reconsideración e institucionalización de la oposición, No se trata con ello desde luego ni de instaurar un derecho a colegislar, o al obstruccionismo, o de atribuir poderes deveto, sino de reorientar la función de la oposición y dotarle de nuevos instrumentos, que pueden ir desde la revisión de las reglas de constitución degrupos parlamentarios, o la creación de la Oficina del Jefe de la oposición, al que se pueden reconocer facultades y derechos, la calendarización de los plenos de control, o la fijación del orden del día. Abstract:Assuming that in a plural and democratic state such as the Spanish one, there cannot be more counterbalance to majority than minority nor it can there be more counterbalance to the opposition than majority. The absence of a constitutional statute for the parliamentary opposition can become a blindness that could aggravates citizen disaffection at a time when the mainstream partieswith a vocation for government in the European Union are «agents with twoprincipals», that is, agents of two instances sometimes opposed, on one sidethe electors, on the other the supranational institutions, so that the gap betweenrepresentatives and represented can become insurmountable. Furthermore,the post-economic crisis parliamentary opposition is no longer declined in singular but, because of electoral fragmentation it has multiplied its subjects.It is therefore necessary as a future task to proceed to a reconsideration and institutionalization of the opposition. The focus is not on establishing a right to co-legislate, or to obstructionism, or to attribute veto powers, but to reorient the function of the opposition and provide it with new instruments, which can range from the revision of the rules for the constitution of parliamentary groups, or the creation of the Office of the Chief of the opposition, to which faculties and rights can be recognized, the scheduling of plenary sessions of control, or fixing the order of bussiness. Summary:I. Foreword. II. Is there an opposition guarantee?: The difficulty in defining an statute for opposition. III. Being in the opposition, is it a constitutive fact or a declarative act? IV. The irrelevant character of the motion of censure. V. Bidirectional obstructionism of majority-opposition. 1. Over legislation. 2. Over the scrutiny function. 3. Over the investiture of the Government. VI. The role of constitutional conventions. VII. The prolongation of the political contest by means of appeals to the constitutional court and through the supportive media corporations. 1. Appeals to constitutional court. 2. Media corporations. VIII. Alternative forms to the parliamentary opposition: the experiences of constitutional opposition, extra-parliamentary opposition, vote-protest, strike and criminal prosecution. 1. The vote-protest. 2. The strike. 3. The criminal prosecution. IX. Balance and perspectives.

Exploring Constitutional Statutes in Commonlaw Systems

Constitutional Statutes seem to describe an oxymoron that challenges the traditional hierarchical dichotomy between regular statutes and constitutional provisions. Constitutional Statutes might mean different things to different political actors (including judges) and academics within the same legal system and across countries. This article argues that we should analyze constitutional statutes along two vectors: what makes these statutes constitutional (identification) and what are the ramifications of such identification (consequences). It further argues that the answer to the first question affects the results of the second. The article argues that statutes are identified as constitutional based on either the process of their enactment or their content, which may itself be subdivided into two classifications: content in terms of importance and content in terms of entrenchment language. Constitutional statutes discussed in the literature and jurisprudence are often treated as though they are made of one cloth, when in fact they belong to different categories based on the justification for, as well as ramifications of, their constitutionality. The article’s approach is examined with relation to the U.S., U.K., Canada, Israel, New Zealand and Australia.