Суд и порядок: классический институционализм М. Ориу и С. Романо*

Abstract

The subject of the study is the ideas of classical institutionalists (M. Hauriou and S. Romano) on the role of court and the nature of justice. The methodological basis of the work is the method of interpretation, which is the main one for the study of the legal theories history, and also the method of problem-theoretical reconstruction, as well as general scientific methods of analysis, synthesis, etc. The relevnce of the conducted research is to identify the key elements of Maurice Hauriou and Santi Romano’s ideas on the role and content of justice and their interpretation, taking into account the achievements of modern legal science regarding the different styles (strategies) of judicial interpretation. Maurice Hauriou believes that the basis of the court powers is not the political power, but the sovereignty of the constitutional statute. This makes it possible for courts to perform the function of deterrence (restriction) of other state bodies, the source of power of which is a political sovereignty. For this reason, the French jurist pushes the boundaries of justice wide enough to allow judicial rule-making, which is competitive with the parliament. To a certain extent, this position of Maurice Hauriou may be at the heart of his world view. For example, he puts an «idea» in the foundation of the institution, which eventually becomes the guardian of justice. Santi Romano, on the other hand, seeks to avoid any idealism by remaining in positions close to sociological positivism. Unlike Maurice Hauriou, he creates not a public law theory, but a general legal theory. For this reason, he focuses much more on the content of interpretation as a specific judicial activity than his French teacher. He considers it as a formal logical and essentially cognitive procedure. However, the general context of the pluralistic teaching of Italian jurisprudence makes it possible to take a broader view of the judiciary than that of Maurice Hauriou. Santi Romano also allows the court to have normative competence, but does not consider it part of justice. Despite the fundamental assumption that it is possible for the courts to create norms, neither Santi Romano nor Maurice Hauriou can be considered forerunners or supporters of radical judicial realism, according to which the judge is the only true creator of law, who makes norms in a sovereign and spontaneous manner without looking back at the existing legal order.