Constitutional System Of Government Research Articles

Cabinet formation under semi-presidentialism: European countries in comparison

Abstract The article demonstrates that the rules and practices of cabinet formation and investitures should be taken into account to better grasp the variety of semi-presidentialism in Europe. This is extremely important, since semi-presidentialism as a constitutional system of government (primarily according to a minimalist approach to the definition) is the most common form of inter-institutional and political relations in European countries. The former is most often understood as a constitutional design of inter-institutional relations with a president popularly elected for a fixed term, as well as with a cabinet headed by a prime minister who are collectively responsible to parliament. Thus, not only presidents and parliaments, but cabinets too play a crucial role in the constitutional and political practice of semi-presidentialism, since the latter are collectively responsible to parliaments (or simultaneously to presidents), but are characterised by distinctive parameters of formation. The assumption and hypothesis are that options of cabinet formation and inter-institutional relations in this regard can structure European semi-presidentialism, even without affecting the definition of this constitutional design, but probably depending on the roles and powers of presidents and parliaments in cabinet formation, as well as types of semi-presidentialism regarding the consideration of who can dismiss the cabinet. Based on comparison and systematisation of the cases of European semi-presidentialism, it is justified that cabinet formation (including within various types and consequences of parliamentary votes of investiture in cabinets, as well as their absence) is typically focused on a junction of relations between presidents and parliaments, and are likely to serve as a classification indicator of semi-presidentialism. This is important for constitutional engineering, since detailing the optionality of semi-presidentialism as a constitutional design and system of government, particularly regarding cabinet formation, should extend the horizons, as well as systematise the idea of the options and effects of various institutional designs (in addition to presidentialism and parliamentarism) and political regimes (including democratic, autocratic and hybrid).

The Urgency of Reorganizing Independent State Institutions in Realizing a Democratic and Constitutional Government System

Since the Amendment of the 1945 Constitution, the development of state institutions has exercised state power by rearranging existing institutions, forming new institutions, and even independent state institutions. The presence of these institutions can strengthen Indonesia's position as a democracy and a modern rule of law. However, in its development, these independent state institutions began to arise various problems that triggered public distrust of these institutions. Therefore, it is necessary to re-establish these independent institutions to realize a democratic and constitutional system of government.

System rządów w konstytucji Tunezji z 25 lipca 2022 r. na tle procesu autokratyzacji państwa w okresie prezydentury Kaïsa Saïeda

The paper deals with the system of government that was established in the Constitution of Tunisia of July 25, 2022. The author points out that both this legal act and the accompanying constitution-making process should be seen as the result of the rapid departure from democratic mechanisms and standards. The autocratization process was launched during the presidency of Kaïs Saïed, although negative tendencies in this field had already occurred earlier. This led to the 2022 Constitution guaranteeing presidential dominance over the government and parliament, as the position of the head of state was significantly strengthened compared to the previous basic law (it was adopted in 2014, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring). The author argues that due to the imbalance of power, the constitutional system of government in Tunisia corresponds more to the assumptions of undemocratic hyper-presidentialism than the typical presidential model.

An Examination of the Presidential Power to Veto or Assent to Bills in Nigeria

ABSTRACT: This paper examines the prerogative given the executive arm of the government to give assent to Bills passed by the legislature along with its corollary power to veto Bills passed by the legislature. This executive prerogative is expressly provided for in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, as amended, which established the legislative, judicial, and executive branches of the government. This prerogative of assent or veto is exercisable by the President of the Federation in respect of Bills passed by the National Assembly or by the Governor of a State with respect to a Bill passed by the State House of Assembly or even by the Chairman of a Local Government Area involving a bill for a by-law passed by the Local Government Councilors. This paper examines various illustrations of the dynamic relationships and actions when Bills passed by the National Assembly have been presented for Presidential action. The above prerogative in the field of law-making, which field is constitutionally vested in the legislative arm of the government is without prejudice to the hallowed principle of separation of powers. It only strengthens the desired checks and balances against abuses and arbitrariness by the legislative arm of the government. Thus, the Constitution requires that a bill duly passed by the National Assembly, that is to say, by both the Senate and the Federal House of Representatives, shall be presented to the President for his assent or as a corollary, for his veto. The President must either assent or withhold his assent within thirty days of the presentment of a Bill passed by the National Assembly. There is no explicit third option of conditional assent or conditional veto. Notwithstanding the above, to demonstrate that the National Assembly retains the final discretion in the field of law-making, the Constitution vests in the legislature the power to override the veto of the President, or, when the President simply fails to act regarding a Bill within the thirty-day period. The manner in which the above law-making powers have been exercised in Nigeria has created controversies especially with regard to which are the arguably correct procedures in three situations – (i) whether there is an agreed process and time for an override by the National Assembly of a Presidential veto, (ii) whether the President may give merely conditional or partial assent to a Bill, and (iii) whether it is necessary for a President to assent to a proposed Act intended to amend the Constitution. This paper examines these controversies along the following outline: i. The Constitutional Requirement for the Executive to Assent to Bills enacted by the National Assembly ii. The Essence of an Assent or Veto by the President to Bills iii. Whether the President is vested with the authority to Assent to a Bill Not Duly Passed by the National Assembly iv. The Assent of the Executive to Bills for an Act for the Amendment of the Constitution v. The Procedure for the Override of the Veto of the President vi. The Interpretation of Section 58(5) of the 1999 Constitution This paper compares the way Nigeria practices its Constitutional system of government with the practices of similar federal tri-branch systems of government, especially the United States of America. This paper concludes that these controversies can only be resolved by the authoritative rulings of Nigeria’s apex court, the Supreme Court of Nigeria, or when there exist express provisions of the Constitution of Nigeria relevant to a controversy, by strictly enforcing those provisions.

Outlook for democracy and democratic institutions.

If countries are not ready for democracy until they have a well-developed civil society, which can take many years to develop, then we need to identify its essential elements, so that their development can be directly encouraged in new democracies. It is argued here that autonomously elected local governments are the essential elements of civil society. A theory of the foundations of the state should begin by recognizing that states are established by leaders. Both to win power and to wield it, a leader needs an ability to make credible long-term promises of future rewards. For a successful democracy, we need that our democratic candidates should also have reputations for respecting democratic norms and for using public resources effectively in public service, and not just for reliably rewarding loyal supporters. Such reputations for democratic leadership can be generated most abundantly in local politics. In a federal democracy, successful local leaders can demonstrate their qualifications to compete for higher office. In this way, autonomously elected local governments effectively reduce entry barriers into national politics. It is suggested that Americans should never again elect anybody president who has not served responsibly in some lower public office under our constitutional system of government.

Elementy prezydencjalizmu w systemie ustrojowym Francji okresu V Republiki

Elements of Presidentialism in the Constitutional System of France’s Fifth Republic The Fifth French Republic was created as a modified parliamentary system, but due to constitutional changes and tendencies revealed in political practice, the functioning system of government was quite significantly modified. The purpose of this article is to analyze the elements of the presidential system that were introduced in 1958, thus in the original text of the constitution, resulted from its subsequent amendments, or can only be seen in the practice of exercising power in the conditions of the politically homogenous executive branch, i.e. outside of cohabitation periods. The author draws attention to two different ways of defining the term “presidentialism” in the French context (as a formal constitutional structure or as a pro-presidential configuration of the semi-presidentialism of the Fifth Republic), and argues that the regime initiated in 1958 is still based on at least some pillars characterizing the parliamentary model. Hence, its subsequent modifications were only to highlight presidentialism as one of the possible variants of political practice under the Fifth Republic, and not to accept presidentialism as a constitutional system of government.

The Role of Universities in Private Environmental Governance Experimentalism

In our federal, constitutional system of government, the states are often lauded as “laboratories of experimentation” for public policy, including for public environmental law. Yet private actors are playing an increasingly important role as parallel regulators through the adoption of private environmental governance. Private environmental governance can functionally advance one of federalism’s core values: policy experimentalism. To the extent that private governance by business firms arouses skepticism for this experimental role because firms’ motives to achieve profit in a competitive environment differ from the incentives motivating public regulators, private universities offer an alternative institutional locus for experimentalism. Using Yale University’s recent adoption of a private carbon charge as a case study, this article argues that universities should play a greater role in private environmental governance experimentalism, and are worthy of more scholarly focus.

The Role of Universities in Private Environmental Governance Experimentalism

In our federal, constitutional system of government, the states are often lauded as “laboratories of experimentation” for public policy, including for public environmental law. Yet private actors are playing an increasingly important role as parallel regulators through the adoption of private environmental governance. Private environmental governance can functionally advance one of federalism’s core values: policy experimentalism. To the extent that private governance by business firms arouses skepticism for this experimental role because firms’ motives to achieve profit in a competitive environment differ from the incentives motivating public regulators, private universities offer an alternative institutional locus for experimentalism. Using Yale University’s recent adoption of a private carbon charge as a case study, this article argues that universities should play a greater role in private environmental governance experimentalism, and are worthy of more scholarly focus.

Constitutional Status of Montserrat as United Kingdom Overseas Territory

The article explores that partnership as a form of relations between Britain and the Overseas Territoriesis of various and nominal nature. The political and territorial relations between the UK and the overseasterritory under consideration are examined is the paper as a unitary federalism elements. Having examinedthe provisions of the Constitution of Montserrat, 2010 in the part of the Governor of the status of theregulation, the Cabinet, the Legislature, it is emphasized that a special place in the constitutional systemof government of Montserrat is taken by a representative of the British Crown in view of the powers whichwill subject to the established by the Constitution to make key decisions in the sphere of the island internalpolicy (convening the Cabinet, its resignation, the dissolution of the Legislative Assembly, law-makingfunction and others). This provides mechanisms to prevent the concentration of powers in the jurisdictionof the Governor. In particular, a significant role in the formation and implementation of the constitutionalcourse is assigned to the Prime Minister and the Legislative Assembly the recommendations of which aresubject to implementation in ordinary conditions. The theses are formulated on the advisability of furtherregulation of the competence of local public authorities in Montserrat and Governor, respectively, specifyingthe content and procedure for organizing and conducting the proceedings based on a considerationof questions on the resignation of the Cabinet, early dissolution of the Legislative Assembly, clarify thecriteria for such decisions, the coordination of positions on the dissolution of the Legislative Assembly.The paper studies the question on the Cabinet of Montserrat in the UK Cabinet by including membersof cabinet representing particular territories. Besides, the article mentions submitting by the LegislativeAssembly to UK House of Commons data on its opinion on draft laws relating to the entire Kingdom andsubmitting by the House of Commons the drafts related to the interests of the Commonwealth to the overseasterritories. The paper specifies the advisability of further regulation in the Constitution as to organizingand holding consultations with public authorities of overseas territory on the matters concerning theirinterests, referendum mechanisms for the people of islands to participate in the decision-making processof public nature, including the early termination of certain categories of officials.

THE ESSENSE OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: CONSTITUTIONALISM AS IDEOLOGY, DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE OF LIMITED GOVERNMENT

The article investigates the essence of constitutionalism. It is proved that a phenomenon of constitutionalism has a complex philosophical and political-legal nature and comprises three main sections: ideology, philosophical and legal doctrine and constitutional system of government. In a broad sense it is a system of relations between a human, the society and the state, in which individual rights and freedoms are really guaranteed, the society is free, and state power is actually limited by constitutional means. In a narrow sense, it is reduced to a constitutional system of government (ruling mechanism), which is a system of actors, institutions, forms, tools, and methods of government in the state, based on the ideas of human dignity, freedom, rule of law, democracy and limited government. In the ideological aspect constitutionalism is based on liberal ideas, practical implementation of which in fact led to the emergence of this phenomenon. Different combinations (in various models of constitutionalism) of ideas of individual freedom and democracy (popular sovereignty) are at the core of constitutionalism. Two traditions of liberalism (in Hayek ‑ American and European) actually led to corresponding models of constitutionalism. European constitutionalism is based on the ideology of liberal democracy whith the original principles of freedom and equality, human rights, periodic elections, «open» society, rule of law, representative democracy, popular sovereignty. The institutional mechanism through which they are implemented is a constitutional system of government. The doctrinal foundation of constitutionalism make up several theories – the concept of limiting state power for individual freedom, limiting state power for containment of government tyranny and the theory of self-limiting of the government. They are reflected in the constitutional systems of various countries. Their formation took place on the the background of national specificities, aggregate national, cultural, historical, political, social and economic characteristics of the respective societies. Therefore, if the ideological and doctrinal levels of constitutionalism are supranational, the constitutional system of government is the result of the implementation of certain common ideas and approaches, but has a distinct national character. Therefore, considering the constitutional systems of government of individual states we can isolate their similarities using the methodology of comparative studies but not unify them.

Federalism: a reference guide to the United States Constitution

This book analyzes the structure of our constitutional system of government, providing an overview of the constitutional history of American federalism as it has been developed in decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Federalism: A Reference Guide to the United States Constitution provides a thorough examination of this significant and distinctive part of the U.S. constitutional system, documenting its role in major domestic constitutional controversies in every period of American history. Although the book is organized historically rather than doctrinally, the marked evolutions of important areas of doctrine are addressed over time. These subject areas include the scope of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause, the scope of Congress's powers under the Fourteenth and other post-Civil War Amendments, the states' authority to regulate commercial and economic matters when Congress is silent, the principle of the supremacy of federal law and the law of preemption that follows from it, intergovernmental and sovereign immunities, the obligation of state courts to enforce federal law, and the scope of national power to regulate or impose obligations on the states. * Provides historical information in a clear, chronological order * Enables law students and lawyers to improve their understanding of the legal doctrines that underlie today's conflicts. * Documents the relationships among different doctrines across particular time periods

The Supreme Court in the 21st Century

How does the Supreme Court serve the “common good”? What is the Court's responsibility, as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution, in our constitutional system of government? This essay explores that question with an eye on the recent performance of the Court in highly controversial and divisive cases. What explains the Court's decisions in cases involving such issues as campaign finance regulation, gun control, abortion, affirmative action, health care reform, voting rights, and even the 2000 presidential election? This essay argues that there is a right and a wrong way for the Supreme Court to interpret and apply the Constitution; and whereas the Warren Court properly understood its responsibilities, the Court in more recent decades has adopted a less legitimate and more troubling mode of constitutional interpretation.

Seyyed Jamal Vaez and the Aljamal newspaper in Iran

It is usually the intellectuals who first become aware of or develop novel ideas and hence acquire a desire for social change. In order to transmit their new perceptions and desire for change to the masses, they develop a sense of mission to communicate their vision effectively to the public. To mount a social movement these change-oriented intellectuals must either adapt the existing media of public communication to their purpose or adopt suitable new ones. The aim of this article is to discuss the development of the media during the constitutional movement in Iran. Between 1905 and 1911 there was a series of protests against internal corruption, misgovernment and foreign influence, which led to the establishment of a constitutional system of government.1 Informing, agitating and guiding the public was an integral part of the movement. Contact with the West played an important part in the awakening of the constitutional leaders. The ideas of democracy and equality before the law had come from the West. After recognizing the need to arouse the people, some liberal intellectuals sought the assistance of the preachers who were trained to deliver homilies and sermons from the pulpit and in some cases were themselves liberal and pro-Western. Others tried the newspaper, a recent innovation that had come from the West. Our guiding hypothesis for the examination of both the Islamic pulpit and the newspapers during the constitutional movement in Iran is that during a social movement, the need for public communication increases. We intend to examine the adaptation that some intellectuals brought about in an existing medium of public communication, the Islamic pulpit, in response to this need. We want to know in what ways the pulpit changed as a communication medium during the constitutional movement, and how effectively it performed its function in informing, agitating and guiding the public. Further, we would like to investigate briefly the relationship between the pulpit and the new medium, the newspaper. Did the pulpit facilitate the emergence and the acceptance of the newspaper? To provide specific issues and concrete illustrations for our discussion, we concentrate on one well-known preacher of the constitutional period and a newspaper that emerged from his pronouncements from the pulpit.

A Federal Republic: Australia's Constitutional System of Government.

Tables and figures Preface Introduction 1. A federal republic 2. Federal theory and Australian federalism 3. The Senate and responsible government 4. Labor and the federal constitution 5. The referendum process 6. The protection of rights 7. Federalism and the High Court 8. Intergovernmental relations and new federalism 9. Fiscal federalism 10. Towards 2001 and beyond Bibliography Index.

What is the Future of the Federation?

Federalism has proved enduring in Australia, despite predictions of its imminent demise. Yet new challenges of internationalism and social movements are cutting across old political boundaries and eroding the sovereign nation state. This article, which draws on ideas developed at length in my recent book A Federal Republic: Australia's Constitutional System of Government (Cambridge University Press, 1995), argues that the characteristics of federalism may prove surprisingly compatible with social and international trends.

A federal republic: Australia's constitutional system of government

A federal republic: Australia's constitutional system of government

BOOK REVIEWS

BOOK REVIEWS A Federal Republic: Australia's Constitutional System of Government, by Brian Galligan. Oakleigh, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1995, 296 pp., $90.00 cloth, $29.95 paper. Robert Agranoff Robert Agranoff Indiana University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Volume 25, Issue 4, Fall 1995, Pages 141–145, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.pubjof.a038221 Published: 01 January 1995

A Federal Republic: Australia's Constitutional System of Government

A Federal Republic: Australia's Constitutional System of Government

Joseph Story: A Man For All Seasons

Joseph Story: A Man For All Seasons Ronald D. Rotunda and John E. Nowak Editor’s Note: Professor Rotunda adapted this article from the introduction to the authors’ book, Joseph Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (Carolina Academic Press, Durham, N.C. 1987). As we celebrate the bicentennial of our Bill of Rights — ratified by the States from the period from November 20,1789 (New Jer­ sey) through 1790, and completed by Decem­ ber 15,1791 (Virginia) - it is appropriate also to celebrateJoseph Story, theJusticewho wrote the opinions that first gave meaning to our unique federal system of government, a struc­ ture that protects the rights we cherish today. Joseph Story lived at an ideal time and under ideal circumstances to reflect upon the nature of our constitutional system of govern­ ment. Story’s life spanned the period from 1779 to 1845. He spent 34 of his 66 years as a Justice of the United States Supreme Court. During most of that time he was also professor of law at Harvard University, and his accomplishments as a teacher and scholar were key elements in establishing the Harvard Law School’s initial success and enduring reputation. Story is, in a very real sense, father to all American legal education, for his efforts demonstrated that professional academic training for lawyers was possible and desirable. What he created at Harvard became the model for all subsequent American law schools. Joseph Story was also the intellectual grandfather of earlyAmerican political theory. He provided scholars of the early nineteenth century, such as Francis Lieber and Simon Greenleaf, an understanding of our constitu­ tional system ofgovernment. Alexis de Tocqueville relied heavily on Story’s works when he wrote his renowned book, Democracy in Amer­ ica, analyzing the young American Republic and its workings in the earlynineteenth century. Joseph Story was born three years af­ ter the Declaration of Independence, but he must have felt as if he had lived through it all. His father, Elisha Story, was active in the War of Independence and, in fact, was one of the “Indians” at the Boston Tea Party.1 Story be­ came a close associate of men who had been both the intellectual and political leaders of the Joseph Story was a great lover of poetry. In 1805 he pub­ lished a longpoem,written in heroic couplets, called “The Power of Solitude.” He enjoyed other creative pursuits such as music, drawing and painting. 18 JOURNAL 1990 revolution. The Constitution was drafted when he was only eightyears old; the first ten amend­ ments to the Constitution, which form the Bill ofRights,were ratifiedonlytwentyyearsbefore Storytook his oath ofoffice as aSupreme Court Justice. For all practical purposes, he was present at the creation of our constitutional system of government. Elisha Story’s first wife, who gave her husband seven children, died two years before Joseph was born. Elisha remarried and Joseph was the eldest of eleven more children. Yet Story never got lost in the crowd. His mother told him: “Now Joe, I’ve sat up and tended you many a night when you were a child, and don’t you dare not to be a great man.”2 In January 1795, Story entered Har­ vard College where, in his own words, he “stud­ ied most intensely” and “reaped the fair re­ wards in collegiate honors.”3 He loved the col­ lege life, but he studied too much. Story’s son later explained that in the dead of night young Joseph “would go down to the college yard, and pump cold water on his face and head in order to revive himself, and then would return with renewed energy to his studies.” He entered college “robust and muscular,” but left “pale and feeble.”4 He was graduated in 1798, and began to read law at Marblehead, Massachusetts, in the offices of Samuel Sewall. A formal legal education would have been most unusual in Story’s day. Less than a year later Sewall became a Justice of the Massachusetts Su­ preme Judicial Court, so Story moved to Salem and studiedin thelawoffices ofSamuel Putnam, who later also became a Justice of the Massa­ chusetts Supreme Judicial Court. In July...

The Process of Constitutional Amendment: Law, History, and Politics

The first part of the seminar examined a mystery that reverberates through two centuries: how does a constitutional system of government, itself born of revolution, properly provide for its own revision — provide literally for its own reconstitution? We first considered the political and intellectual assumptions against which Article V of the United States Constitution — the amendment article — was drafted, and then looked briskly at the historical context in which the Constitution's twenty-six amendments have been adopted. With this as background, we addressed a range of issues concerning the law and policy of constitutional change that are currently the subject of lively dispute in America.