In many authoritarian countries of the world, rulers proclaim that the current regime is a model of liberal democracy. Its most significant flaw, however, is that it does not actually exist. This discrepancy between the supposed democratic leadership and reality is due to the neopatrimonial nature of the current political systems. Neopatrimonialism appears to be a hybrid model in which state structures, laws, and rules formally exist but are overridden by informal politics, networks of patronage, kinship, and tribalism. Rather than being organized according to merit, social functions, or administrative rank, the neopatrimonial regime finds its stability in bonds of loyalty to those at the top of the political hierarchy. Often, decentralisation reforms are initiated to overcome this crisis and stalemate. Their result is not always unambiguous, and the resulting effect corresponds to widely advertised expectations. In this context, this study examines the peculiarities of decentralisation reforms and their results in the countries with neopatrimonial democracy. Special attention is paid to the advantages and disadvantages of delegating part of state powers and authority to the local level, as well as its possibilities in achieving peace and resolving conflicts. The results suggest that, ideally, decentralisation generally contributes to an inclusive world where different groups can access power and are included in governance. In practice, however, this result is not always achieved because of the weak institutionalisation of the party system, the lack of transparency in government, and an underdeveloped civil society. The paper examines in detail the specifics of neopatrimonialism in its theoretical and methodological dimension. In addition, emphasis is placed on the potential of decentralisation to contribute to the peaceful resolution of conflicts in a country or — given weak social and political institutions, on the contrary, to increase uncertainty and the threat of military confrontation. A positive example of decentralisation in a neo-patrimonial democracy is seen in the Republic of Kazakhstan, where reforms aimed at changing the contour of the political system, namely constitutional changes affecting, among other things, the powers of the president, were introduced in 2022–2023. The successes in the implementation of constitutional reform in the country are outlined, and the key foundations of successful delegation of powers and separation of powers are highlighted. Using Kazakhstan as an example, the experience of democratisation through the prism of political and socio-economic transformations is examined. The conclusions of the article contain the thesis that depending on the totality of circumstances, peculiarities of political culture, the structure of the power apparatus, etc., the process of decentralisation in neopatrimonial regimes can be both effective and weakly expressed, aimed at strengthening the concentration of power by the ruling elite.