Constitution Of Uganda Research Articles

COMBATING THE SILENT THREAT OF STREET TRADING RESULTING IN ILLEGAL DUMPING OF WASTE IN UGANDA

The Uganda government has taken legal and institutional measures (such as the Uganda constitution, National Environmental Act and the Climate Change Act) to ensure clean and healthy environment and resolving major environmental issues. However, the rate of street trading within the terrain of Uganda, has resulted in the illegal dumping of refuse. It suffices to state that illegal dumping of refuse could generate major environmental issues such as flood, soil pollution, water pollution, air pollution, and destruction of habitat. This study embarks on a hybrid method of study in examining the need to combat the threat of street trading associated with the illegal dumping of waste. 290 questionnaires were sent to respondents residing in the various regions of Uganda. The data obtained through the questionnaire was analyzed using a descriptive and analytical method of research. The study therefore found that, there are unchecked incidents of street trading which often result in illegal dumping of refuse. Furthermore, the continuous dumping of refuse as a result of street trading could result in severe environmental pollution. The study therefore concludes and recommends that for a sustainable environment free from any form of pollution, there is a need for the Uganda government to through institutional measures reinforce the laws against illegal dumping of refuse resulting from street trading.

Judicial Independence: A Continued Political Interference in Recent Judicial Proceedings in Uganda

Chapter eight of Uganda's constitution highlights the judiciary's crucial role as the protector of the constitution, with the authority to exercise judicial powers bestowed upon them by the people. The judiciary is essential to upholding the constitutionality of laws, acts of parliament and customs and identifying and addressing inconsistencies. Article 128 Clause 1 of Uganda’s 1995 Constitution emphasizes the importance of maintaining the judiciary’s independence, ensuring it remains a bastion of integrity and fairness. However, recent cases shed light on the consequences of political interference, which is becoming an increasingly worrisome issue in Uganda. Thus, the research focuses on some sources of political interference in Uganda's judicial proceedings and its persistence, including an opaque and politicized process of appointments, pressure applied to judges by the executive branch and powerful interests, and disrespect for court orders by the executive and legislature. The consequences of such interference in the democratic justice system are discussed, and they have led to a decline in the independence of the judiciary, covering the breakdown of public trust in the judiciary, unfair legal judgements, and weakened constitutional principles. The findings highlight Uganda's urgent need for action and an independent judiciary. This study applies doctrinal legal research methodology to discuss the continued political interference in the recent judicial proceedings in Uganda since 2006. The study recommends constitutional reforms to curb the overgrowing political interference in courts’ judicial independence and preserve constitutionalism principles by examining this theme.

Construing pre-1995 laws to bring them in conformity with the Constitution of Uganda: Courts' reliance on article 274 of the Constitution to protect human rights

Article274 of the Ugandan Constitution (1995) provides that laws that existed at the time of the entry into force of the Constitution 'shall be construed with such modifications, adaptations, qualifications and exceptions as may be necessary to bring it in conformity with this Constitution'. The jurisprudence from Ugandan courts shows that they have adopted three approaches to give effect to article 274 and, as a result, protected human rights such as the right to equality (freedom from discrimination), property, human dignity, liberty and the right to bail. The first approach is for the court to read word(s) into the impugned legislative provision without any deletions. This is done in one of the two ways: by either reading these words expressly into the impugned legislation, or by doing so impliedly. The second approach is for the court to strike out words from the impugned provision and replace these with new words. According to this approach, the court either adds a few words or overhauls the entire provision. It is argued that overhauling a legislative provision is beyond the mandate of the court's power under article 274 and it ignores the principle of separation of powers in terms of which Parliament has the role to make laws. The third approach is for the court to 'strike out' or 'read out' words from the impugned legislation without replacing them. Although the Constitutional Court is the only court with the mandate to declare legislation inconsistent with the Constitution (under article 137), other courts have invoked article 274 to declare legislation unconstitutional, thus usurping the powers of the Constitutional Court. Is it argued that the Constitution may have to be amended so that other courts, other than the Constitutional Court, are also empowered to declare legislation unconstitutional on condition that such declaration takes effect after it has been confirmed by the Constitutional Court. A similar approach has been followed in other African countries such as South Africa.

Securing legal reforms to the use of force in the context of police militarisation in Uganda: The role of public interest litigation and structural interdict

This article argues that the failure by the Ugandan government to put in place clear regulations governing the use of force and firearms by the police and armed security forces, particularly during joint police and military operations, as part of arrest and crowd control operations, threatens to violate the right to life, the right to freedom from inhumane treatment, the right to assemble and the right to a remedy under the Ugandan Constitution. It argues that the constitutional, statutory law and case law framework in Uganda can facilitate public interest litigation in order to secure the adoption by the Ugandan government of comprehensive and internationally-accepted standards on the use of force and firearms by police and armed security forces. The article draws on a recent progressive decision of the High Court in James Muhindo & 3 Others v Attorney-General, and the Human Rights Enforcement Act of 2019 to expound on the proactive potential of article 50 of Uganda's Constitution to deliver expedited institutional and human rights-oriented reforms and to afford the courts oversight functions in the implementation of these reforms through structural interdict. These aspects of the public interest litigation framework in Uganda offer a pathway to civilian-led reform in a highly state-controlled, politicised and militarised police and security sector over which Ugandans otherwise have no civilian oversight. Thus, the article explores the potential of public interest litigation as an empowering tool in competing approaches to state formation in transitional contexts and positions public interest litigation as a transformative response to militarisation in a fragile state.

The right to bail pending trial in Uganda

Article 23(6)(a) of the Constitution of Uganda (1995) states that an arrested person is ‘entitled’ to apply to court for bail (discretionary bail). Articles 23(b) and (c) require a court to release on bail a person who has been awaiting trial in custody for a specified number of days (mandatory bail). Jurisprudence of Ugandan courts on bail pending trial shows that courts have dealt with two main issues: the right to bail or to apply for bail; and the conditions for granting of discretionary bail pending trial. The Supreme Court has held that an accused has a right to apply for bail. In this article, the author argues that the drafting history of Article 23(6)(a) shows that an accused has a right to bail (as opposed to just apply for bail). The author also demonstrates how courts have been inconsistent in many cases when dealing with the conditions for granting of discretionary bail pending trial. It is argued further that since the Ugandan government is increasingly re-arresting opposition politicians who have been granted bail by the high court, Ugandan courts may explore the possibility of granting anticipatory bail. It is also argued that the drafting history of Articles 129(d) and 210 of the Constitution shows that courts martial are courts of judicature and subordinate to the high court which means, inter alia, that the high court has the power to release an accused on bail should the general court martial refuse to release him/her on bail.

Bail pending appeal in Uganda

Article 23(6) of the Constitution of Uganda (1995) provides that an arrested person is ‘entitled’ to apply to court for bail. However, it is silent on the issue of bail pending appeal. Bail pending appeal is provided for in the Magistrates Courts Act, the Judicature Act and the Criminal Procedure Code Act. Although the Supreme Court, the highest court in Uganda, provided criteria for granting bail pending appeal, some high court and Court of Appeal judges, who are bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court, have ignored these criteria. There are conflicting high court, Court of Appeal and Supreme Court judgments on the questions of whether art 23(6) is applicable to bail pending appeal and whether the right to be presumed innocent is applicable to a person who is applying for bail pending appeal. There are notable controversies in the rich jurisprudence of the Supreme Court on bail pending appeal. In October 2020, one of the justices of the Supreme Court held that the Supreme Court does not have the jurisdiction to grant bail pending appeal and that Rule 6(2)(a), which empowers the Supreme Court to grant bail pending appeal, is unconstitutional. In November 2020, another Supreme Court justice granted an applicant bail pending appeal without even referring to her colleague’s decision which held that the court did not have jurisdiction to grant bail pending appeal. This article examines the jurisprudence developed by the courts of Uganda on the subject. The discussion focuses on the following issues: courts with jurisdiction to grant bail pending appeal; the right to bail pending appeal; the presumption of innocence and bail pending appeal; and conditions for granting bail pending appeal.

The Laws Impacting On Freedom Of Expression In Uganda, 2019

Freedom of expression in Uganda is a fairly contentious area. The Constitution of Uganda, 1995 provides for the right but also very quickly limits in public interest and other considerations. There are a plethora of other laws in play that introduce both civil and penal sanctions for those that violate their rights to expression. The case of Stella Nyanzi could be an interesting one. She wrote several poems against the head of state that did not go down well with the state and resulted in her conviction and sentencing. Some of the sections of the law under which she was being tried were challenged in the constitutional law but that case remains pending at the court. I hope you find this article an interesting read.

The Public Order Management Act: The Demise of Freedom of Assembly in Uganda.

The paper discusses the freedom of assembly in Uganda. Freedom of assembly is internationally protected by various international instruments including the UDHR; ICCPR; ICESCR; ACHPR; The Constitution of Uganda, 1995 among others. However, the enjoyment of the right has been curtailed by various laws over time. At first, the Police Act was utilised to ban rallies. After the Constitutional Court declaring parts of the Act to be unconstitutional, the government reacted by introducing the Public Order Management Act which effectively has been enforced by the police against any form of gathering for political or other public protests. The opposition has suffered the brunt of this law over time. Hence my opinion that freedom of assembly is dead in Uganda.

Rules Followed in Constitutional Interpretation: A Case of Uganda

Constitutional interpretation, or constitutional construction, is the process by which meanings are assigned to words in a constitution, to enable legal decisions to be made that are justified by it. The Constitution is a legal document that is Sui Generis “unique” and must be construed as a special document. The interpretation of the Constitution is provided for under Art. 257 of the 1995 Constitution of Uganda (herein referred to as “the Constitution”). Courts are often alive to its peculiar nature and have over the years developed principles followed in interpretation of the Constitution and these are discussed in this paper. The emphasis is put on Ugandan cases, however some cases from other jurisdictions were also adopted.

The Ugandan Constitution of 1995: How it integrated Human rights Principles to Contribute to the Promotion, Protection and Preservation of Rights in Uganda

Human Rights as rights recognized in the preamble of the Universal declaration of Human rights to be inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family, adding that it is considered to be the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world. This paper presents the recognized form of protection, promotion and protection of human rights through enactment of acts in the Ugandan constitution. More is done in the paper to demonstrate how it integrates the international and regional rights in the constitution. A brief history of the constitution is presented and interpretation of the implication of acts towards the established human rights institutions is explained. Lastly a critical view on the implementation of the constitution of Uganda by the Government of Uganda is made consecutively on the analysis made from acts in relation to promotion, protection and preservation of rights in Uganda.

Interpreting the human right to water as a means to advance its enforcement in Uganda

The water supply and mechanisms for the delivery of water currently available to improve access to water for citizens remain a challenge for many African states. In Uganda, although executive policy has made some progress in alleviating the various impediments to enjoying access to water, these impediments have not been completely removed. Evidence from other jurisdictions has shown that the judicial interpretation of socioeconomic rights may go a long way to crystallise the exact nature and scope of these rights and, thus, contribute to removing barriers to the enjoyment of these rights. The article explores the manner in which the right to water currently is spelt out in Uganda's Constitution. The article explores how the Constitutional and Supreme Courts of Uganda have used interpretive paradigms as a strategy to better articulate other constitutional socio-economic rights. The article finds that a teleological approach to interpreting socio-economic rights has not been utilised fully by Ugandan courts. It proposes that, if such an expansive approach to the interpretation of implicitly-protected human rights is adopted, it may enhance current conceptualisations and ultimately improve citizens' enjoyment of the right to water.

The Right to Privacy of People in or Presumed to be in Same-Sex Relationships in Uganda

The right to privacy is also protected in different pieces of legislation such as the Children Act, the Electronic Media Act, and in the Press and Journalists Act. The Constitution of Uganda expressly prohibits marriage between people of the same sex and the Ugandan Penal Code criminalises same-sex relationships. In Uganda senior government officials and religious leaders have publicly and repeatedly made it clear that those in same-sex relationships should be

Capital Punishment Jurisprudence: A Critical Assessment of the Supreme Court of Uganda's Judgment in Attorney General v Susan Kigula and 417 Others

AbstractThe Ugandan Supreme Court's decision in Attorney General v Susan Kigula & 417 Others ended a ten year constitutional challenge against capital punishment. The attorney general was appealing the Constitutional Court's declarations that a mandatory death penalty and a delay on death row of more than three years violate Uganda's Constitution. The respondents cross-appealed the Constitutional Court's declarations that the death penalty is constitutional and that hanging is an appropriate and therefore constitutional method of execution. The Supreme Court dismissed both the appeals and cross-appeals. This article summarises the Supreme Court's findings and analyses the court's reasoning. It demonstrates that, while the court's reasoning is generally in line with the interpretations offered by international courts and human rights bodies, the court arguably missed an opportunity to take a bolder approach regarding the relationship between the death penalty and the prohibition on cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, particularly in light of recent international trends.

Comment The Right to Freedom to Practice One’s Religion in the Constitution of Uganda

AbstractThe right to freedom to practice one’s religion is protected under the Ugandan constitution and in the international human rights instruments to which Uganda is party. There are also different pieces of legislation governing the marriages and divorces of different religious groups in Uganda. The Supreme Court of Uganda in the judgement of Dimanche Sharon and Others v. Makerere University has dealt with the constitutional limitations on the right to freedom of religion. This article discusses the constitutional history leading to the inclusion of the right to freedom of religion in the Constitution of Uganda and the Supreme Court decision interpreting the limitations on the right to freedom of religion.

Bride Wealth (Price) and Women's Marriage - Related Rights in Uganda: A Historical Constitutional Perspective and Current Developments

This article deals with the background to the inclusion of women's marriage - related rights in the constitution of Uganda, especially the issues around bride wealth, and against that backdrop the author highlights the issues in and the holding of the recent Constitutional Court judgement of Mifumi(U) Ltd and 12 others v the Attorney-General and another1 in which the Court by majority held that most of the elements of bride wealth were constitutional. Finally, the article critically analyses the Court's judgement in the context of the drafting history of the Constitution on the issues of bride wealth and women's rights in general and also in the light of international human rights law or practice. The main argument is that had the Court considered international law, especially the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women's concluding observation on Uganda's 2002 report and Uganda's May 2009 report to the same Committee, it would probably have concluded that the practice of bride wealth is against Uganda's international human rights obligations.

Even Lesbian Youths or Those Presumed to be Lesbians Are Protected by the Constitution of Uganda—But to a Limited Extent: Rules the High Court

The Ugandan Penal Code criminalizes same-sex relationships. The author analyzes the Ugandan High Court decision where the judge relied on the Constitution and international human rights instruments to hold that law enforcement officers must respect the rights to privacy and human dignity even of those people presumed to be in same-sex relationships.

Women's Rights to Equality and Non-discrimination: Discriminatory Family Legislation in Uganda and the Role of Uganda's Constitutional Court

In 1995 Uganda adopted the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda 1995 which protected a wide range of human rights including women's rights to equality and freedom from discrimination. Article 33(6) of the Constitution prohibited ‘laws, customs or traditions which are against the dignity, welfare or interest of women’. However, more than ten years later legislation, customary laws and practices have continued to be in force largely due to the lack of political will to confront issues of inequality and discrimination in a holistic and comprehensive manner. This article examines such discriminatory laws against women and the jurisprudence of Uganda's Constitutional Court in the areas of divorce, criminalization of adultery, succession and marriage laws. Using a comparative approach, it observes that these laws conflict with Uganda's Constitution as well as regional and international human rights treaties to which Uganda is a State party. It recommends that discriminatory laws should be harmonized with principles of equality and non-discrimination, and advocates for a litigation strategy.

Augmenting the Struggle for Gender Equality in Uganda: A Case for the Domestication of International Human Rights Standards

This article critically examines the extent to which States have respected the right to gender equality both in theory and practice, using Uganda as a case study. This is accomplished through a critical examination of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) of 1980 and the degree to which its obligations have been met in Uganda. The article also draws on the equality jurisprudence engendered by the UN Human Rights Committee established under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966. The article argues that while there is a general acceptance of the universality of human rights among States, and the primacy of the notion of nondiscrimination on any ground, including sex, women continue to suffer discrimination in almost all spheres of human existence. The article therefore centers on how best to address the plight of women who continue to suffer oppression both in private and public spheres. The article suggests ways to address the plight of women, particularly through the domestication of international human rights standards. The article argues that the international community must make a concerted effort to ensure that States do not merely ratify treaties in theory alone, but must translate them into practice within their domestic systems where they have meaning in people's lives. Uganda's Constitution of 1995 generally ushers in a progressive gender equality jurisprudence. However, the rest of Uganda's legal system is still littered with draconian and repugnant legislation and customary and religious laws and practices antithetical to gender equality. So far no one has relied on the Constitution's general guarantee of equality to impugn antithetical legislation and practices, and the Constitution generally remains without interpretation or construction. Uganda urgently needs to domesticate international human rights standards on gender equality particularly those enshrined in CEDAW. The Constitution's general guarantee of gender equality can be enriched by the domestication of the comprehensive provisions of CEDAW. Uganda also urgently needs to bring reforms in all areas of law and practices that oppress women. The Primary objective of CEDAW is an obligation of means and results: States must reform their laws, and implement programmes to eliminate all forms discrimination against women by both State and non-State actors. Under CEDAW, law reforms and other programmes must include affirmative action to ensure substantive equality of women.

A New-Style Judicial Service Commission in Uganda

The Judicial Service Commission (JSC) was established by the Constitution of Uganda, 1995, and brought into operation by the Judicial Service Act, 1997. This is particularly notable because the role of the Commission is not only to oversee the appointment, discipline and removal of judicial officers but also to provide a link between the judiciary and the public and to provide training for judges. Its major features are as follows.

New Human Rights Commission in Uganda

The Constitution of Uganda was adopted on 22 September, 1995, and full details of the document will appear in the next issue of the J.A.L. One of the most interesting institutions established is the Uganda Human Rights Commission. Composed of a Chairperson, who must be a judge of the High Court or qualified to hold that office, and not less than three other persons, the Commission will have wide-ranging investigative and promotional functions. However, it is the enforcement powers of the Commission that are unusual. Traditionally, national institutions (offices of the ombudsman and human rights commissions) have no enforcement powers and can only recommend corrective action. In recent years these powers have been enlarged. For example, in Ghana the Commissioner on Human Rights and Administrative Justice has the power to bring proceedings in a competent court for a remedy “to secure the termination of the offending action or conduct” (article 218(d)(iii) Constitution of Ghana).