INCE the time of Edmund Burke, the mandate vs. independence coil troversy has been a staple of representation theory.' It has been givet new life in recent years by the success of Hanna Pitkin's seminal studv (1967). Yet attempts to operationalize this construct in empirical research have yielded rather tentative results. In their comparative study of four state legislatures, John Wahlke an(d associates (1962: chs. 12-13) attempted to distinguish between two dimensions of representation. The first, areal concerned the individual legislator's propensity to further the interests of constituents in the district. as opposed to the populace of the state as a whole. The second, termed th'style of representation, involved a distinction between deference to th' expressed wishes of constituents (the delegate role) and following the dictates of conscience (the trustee role). Wahlke et al. failed to establisli clearly how or why legislators come to adopt a specific role. Moreover, thev found that about one-fourth of the legislators could not be assigned to either of the categories, and that one-third fell between the two polar focus categories. Roger Davidson (1969: ch. 4) subsequently applied this typology to congressmen (altering the focus dimension, of course, to the district vs. the nation). With regard to focus, he found a local orientation predominant, but 31 percent of the members could not be classified as primarily representing either the nation or the district. Similarly, on the dimension, while delegates and trustees each accounted for about one-fourth of the sample. fully 46 percent were classified as exhibiting a mixture of the two role orientations. As Davidson himself notes, Many congressmen observe that their problem is one of balancing the one role against the other' (p. 119). In their pioneering study of constituency influence on congressional rollcall voting, Miller and Stokes (1966) concluded that variations in the representative relation are most likely to occur as we move from one policy domain to another (p. 371). In particular, they found congressmen in 1958 were most responsive to constituency opinion on civil rights, with a moderate degree of influence prevailing on social welfare issues and virtually none apparent on foreign policy. Donald Gross (1978) later reanalyzed the Miller-Stokes data after classifying the sample of congressmen with regard to representational style. Like Davidson, Gross found a plurality of politicos in the House. The difference in constituency responsiveness between delegates and trustees was readily apparent on the highly salient issue of civil rights, while the impact of style on the support of constituency opinions on social welfare or foreign policy was shown to be insignificant. In January 1977, the Commission on Administrative Review interviewed 154 non-freshman members of the House of Representatives to obtain their views on a variety of topics relevant to the functioning of the House.2 After about 30 minutes of largely open-ended questioning of the