Conspiracy Believers Research Articles

Durably reducing conspiracy beliefs through dialogues with AI.

Conspiracy theory beliefs are notoriously persistent. Influential hypotheses propose that they fulfill important psychological needs, thus resisting counterevidence. Yet previous failures in correcting conspiracy beliefs may be due to counterevidence being insufficiently compelling and tailored. To evaluate this possibility, we leveraged developments in generative artificial intelligence and engaged 2190 conspiracy believers in personalized evidence-based dialogues with GPT-4 Turbo. The intervention reduced conspiracy belief by ~20%. The effect remained 2 months later, generalized across a wide range of conspiracy theories, and occurred even among participants with deeply entrenched beliefs. Although the dialogues focused on a single conspiracy, they nonetheless diminished belief in unrelated conspiracies and shifted conspiracy-related behavioral intentions. These findings suggest that many conspiracy theory believers can revise their views if presented with sufficiently compelling evidence.

Anything but Representative Democracy: Explaining Conspiracy Believers’ Support for Direct Democracy and Technocracy

Conspiracy theories gained considerable attention during the Covid-19 pandemic. Although studies have extensively explored their (mostly) negative impacts on various political and social aspects, like participation, health-related behavior, and violence, their influence on support for democracy remains relatively unexplored. The few existing studies offer conflicting findings, prompting my focus to shift from assessing generic support for democracy to examining preferences for alternative decision-making models. To address some limitations of prior research on alternative models of decision-making, I combine a trade-off item with a ranking methodology: respondents were prompted to indicate their first and second preferences for different democratic and non-democratic models over representative democracy. The study is based on data from a representative survey in Germany (July/August 2022; N = 2,536). My findings confirm that the belief in conspiracy theories is positively associated with a preference for direct democratic decision-making. However, conspiracy believers also favor expert-based decision-making over elected politicians—but direct democracy would be their primary choice. Although the evidence for a preference for autocracy over representative democracy is associated with a higher degree of uncertainty, it does suggest that conspiracy believers tend to favor “anything but” representative democracy. These findings contribute to the broader discourse on the impact of conspiracy beliefs on democratic systems.

Share If You Believe, Comment If You Doubt: The Effect of Source of Information, Trust, and Belief in Conspiracy Theories on Engagement with Facebook Posts.

This study examines the effect of one of three sources of information: a politician (authority figure), a physician (expert), and an ordinary person (non-expert) who appeared in a personal story related to a controversial issue (COVID-19 vaccination) on Facebook, on the willingness to engage with it. Using a between-subjects experiment (N = 848) conducted among Israeli adults (18 and older), we found a higher likelihood of sharing the story in interpersonal conversations than in other types of communications, regardless of the source that appeared in the story. However, respondents with high levels of institutional trust preferred sharing a politician's story, while conspiracy believers tended to comment on an ordinary person's story. The findings of the different patterns of communication behavior among conspiracy believers and people with high trust in political institutes contribute to our understanding of the mechanisms underlying the spread of misinformation in the digital age and during times of crisis.

Engaging with Conspiracy Believers

AbstractConspiracy theories abound in social and political discourse, believed by millions of people around the world. In this article, we highlight when it is important to engage with people who believe in conspiracy theories and review recent literature highlighting how best to do so. We first summarise research on the potentially damaging consequences of conspiracy beliefs for individuals, including consequences related to psychopathology. We also focus on the consequences for groups, and societies, and the importance of understanding and addressing conspiracy beliefs. We then review recent literature on how to engage with people who believe in conspiracy theories, specifically with the goal to reduce susceptibility to conspiracy theories and other types of misinformation. We focus on interpersonal strategies to communicate with individuals who believe in conspiracy theories, and large-scale strategies designed to reduce conspiracy beliefs within broader communities.

Are conspiracy theory believers drawn to conspiratorial explanations, alternatives explanations, or both?

Individuals differ in their general propensity to believe in conspiracy theories, often referred to as conspiracy mentality. Because prototypical conspiracy theories exhibit a conspiratorial content (i.e., they claim that a conspiracy occurred) and an alternative status (i.e., they are rejected by authorities), it is unclear if conspiracy mentality captures a general tendency to believe in conspiracies, to endorse alternative narratives, or to believe in conspiratorial alternative narratives. To adjudicate between these interpretations, we carried out three experimental studies (Ns = 364, 772, 629) in which we experimentally manipulated the respective statuses (endorsed by authorities vs. rejected by the authorities) of competing conspiratorial and non-conspiratorial explanations for fictitious controversial events. Overall, conspiracy mentality predicted the endorsement of conspiratorial explanations and the rejection of non-conspiratorial explanations. However, these relationships were moderated by the respective statuses of these explanations. When authorities endorsed the conspiratorial explanation and rejected the non-conspiratorial explanation, the relationships were either nullified (in Studies 1 & 3) or attenuated (in study 2). These effects were driven by participants scoring low on the conspiracy mentality measures, who reported a lower endorsement of the conspiratorial explanation when it was rejected by authorities. They also reported a stronger endorsement of the non-conspiratorial explanation when it was presented as endorsed by authorities. By contrast, conspiracy believers' endorsement of the explanations was unaffected by their status. These findings are informative of what conspiracy mentality scales capture and highlight the need to adopt more specific definitions in psychological research on conspiracy theories.

“I Have Some Serious Doubts About this Vaccine…” – Generic Conspiracy Beliefs Predict the Acceptance of the Covid-19 Vaccination

Abstract The start of the Covid-19 vaccine rollout in early 2021 was accompanied by miscommunication from medical and political actors and decision-makers with regard to its availability. In central European countries, it was not clear when and to what extent vaccines would be available to the public. As our main hypothesis, we assumed that uncertainty about the availability of vaccines (vs certainty), as they were stated in media communication, might affect vaccination acceptance in conspiracy believers positively, who are otherwise assumed to have a low acceptance of vaccination. In a large preregistered online study (N = 659), we did not find evidence that media communication relates to vaccination acceptance, but conspiracy believers tended to accept the vaccine more if they were given the option to choose their preferred vaccine. This latter exploratory finding could be confirmed in a follow-up study (N = 199).

Agreement with COVID-19 Conspiracy Theories Has Poor Temporal Stability.

Low temporal stability may complicate the interpretation of survey measures of conspiracy theories (CTs). Current study examines the stability of endorsement of CTs on a popular set of items addressing COVID-19-related CTs. An online survey tapping two CTs about COVID-19 was administered to 179 students of general medicine. The same items were presented twice in March 2022 and once in May 2022. The mean endorsement of the CTs did not differ between March and May. The correlation between answers provided in March and May was low (.5 < r < .7). Most of those reporting agreement with CTs in March reported disagreement in May. Conspiracy believers' responses did not change between two measurements in March but were different in May, suggesting that the low temporal stability was due to situational factors rather than erroneous or random answers. Poor temporal stability of responses endorsing CTs may problematize interpretation of survey data. Respondents' endorsement of CTs may be affected by situational factors, inflating agreement with CTs, and correlations with other survey-based measures.

The role of cognitive biases in conspiracy beliefs: A literature review

AbstractIn recent years, several studies have found that conspiracy believers tend to be more susceptible to cognitive biases (e.g., conjunction fallacy, proportionality bias, agency detection bias, etc.). The aim of this work is to review such literature, systematizing these concepts in a unifying framework of conspiracy mentality as a set of biased cognitive processes, which categorizes cognitive biases in two classes: those that contribute to belief formation and those that contribute to belief updating. Drawing on several empirical results, this paper summarizes the role of cognitive biases in conspiratorial thinking, offering some insights for future research and raising questions about the possible weaknesses of this approach.

Impressions of science and healthcare professionals who share anti-science conspiracy theories

Background: The majority of science and healthcare professionals agree with the scientific consensus on issues such as anthropogenic climate change and the safety and efficacy of vaccines. However, a small number of professionals diverge from this consensus and espouse conspiracy theories arguing, for example, that climate change is a hoax and that the dangers of vaccines are being hidden by greedy pharmaceutical companies. What impressions do people make of conspiracy-sharing professionals and, importantly, would people follow their advice? We aimed to answer these questions in a brief report comprising of two preregistered experiments. Methods: In Experiment 1 (N = 296) participants rated their impressions of a scientist who endorsed (vs. refuted) climate change conspiracy theories, and indicated their willingness to follow the scientist’s advice. Experiment 2 (N = 280) followed a similar method but focused on a healthcare professional who endorsed (vs. refuted) mRNA vaccine conspiracy theories. In a control condition, the professional provided neutral information. Results: In both experiments, people formed negative impressions of the conspiracy-sharing professional, perceiving them to be less trustworthy, honest, brave (Experiment 1 only), credible, intelligent, less able to effect change, and more of an outsider and a fraud. They also showed less willingness to follow the professionals’ advice. However, participants’ own conspiracy beliefs shaped these impressions, with stronger negative impressions found among participants with weaker conspiracy beliefs. Notably, higher conspiracy believers perceived the conspiracy-sharing professionals as braver. Conclusions: These findings suggest that scientific and healthcare professionals who share conspiracy theories are perceived negatively, and people are less willing to follow advice. However, this is moderated by participants’ own conspiracy beliefs.

Conspiracy believers perceive an ideological match with their party

ABSTRACT Research demonstrates conspiracy endorsement arises from a strong motivation to preserve beliefs. This same motive is implicated in political projection—the degree to which political judgments about groups are anchored on the self. This paper is the first to test the hypothesis that conspiracy endorsement regulates the magnitude of in-group projection. Empirical evidence from the 2012, 2016 American National Election Surveys is presented. Across the ideological spectrum, Democrats and Republicans that endorsed party concordant conspiracies were more likely than party members that did not to perceive strong similarity between their own ideology and the ideology of their party. Whether liberal, moderate, or conservative, conspiracy believers do not consider their ideological preferences as unique. Rather they perceive their ideological preferences as widely shared by in-group party members.

Conspiracy believers claim to be free thinkers but (Under)Use advice like everyone else.

Conspiracy believers often claim to be critical thinkers their 'own research' instead of relying on others' testimony. In two preregistered behavioural studies conducted in the United Kingdom and Pakistan (Nparticipants = 864, Ntrials = 5408), we test whether conspiracy believers have a general tendency to discount social information (in favour of their own opinions and intuitions). We found that conspiracy mentality is not associated with social information use in text-based (Study 1) and image-based (Study 2) advice-taking tasks. Yet, we found discrepancies between self-reported and actual social information use. Conspiracy believers were more likely to report relying less on social information than actually relying less on social information in the behavioural tasks. Our results suggest that the scepticism of conspiracy believers towards epistemic authorities is unlikely to be the manifestation of a general tendency to discount social information. Conspiracy believers may be more permeable to social influence than they sometimes claim.

Do Real and Invented Scandals Fuel Beliefs in Conspiracy Theories?

Abstract: Introduction: Conspiracy believers often claim that they believe in conspiracy theories not on irrational grounds, as scholars often argue, but because of the real scandals and real conspiracies that have occurred in history. Methods: We tested whether reminding people of real scandals in the political, economic, or scientific domain and exposition to invented scandals (i.e., that did not occur) increase beliefs in conspiracy theories. A secondary research question was whether conspiracy beliefs positively relate to differentiating between real and invented scandals. Results: Our results showed that reminding people of real scandals and exposing them to invented scandals did not affect their conspiracy beliefs. Higher conspiracy believers were slightly better than lower conspiracy believers at recognizing invented scandals but somewhat worse at recognizing real scandals. Participants from left-wing political orientation were also marginally better than those with right-wing orientation at identifying real scandals. Discussion/conclusion: Reminding people of real and invented scandals did not have a short-term effect on conspiracist beliefs. This article supports the argument that conspiracy theories are not helpful for social critique, as higher believers in conspiracy theories were not better than lower believers at recognizing actual scandals.

Does Belief in Conspiracy Theories Affect Interpersonal Relationships?

In recent years, researchers have begun to study the social consequences of conspiracy beliefs. However, little research has investigated the impact of conspiracy beliefs on interpersonal relationships. In this review, we draw attention to this issue by summarizing available empirical evidence and proposing potential social-psychological mechanisms to explain whether and why conspiracy theories affect interpersonal relationships. We firstly discuss that the attitude change that often accompanies the internalization of conspiracy beliefs might distance people's opinions and, consequently, erode their relationships. Furthermore, we argue that the stigmatizing value of conspiracy theories can negatively affect the evaluation of conspiracy believers and discourage others from getting close to them. Finally, we consider that the misperception of social norms associated with the acceptance of certain conspiracy narratives can lead conspiracy believers to engage in non-normative behavior. Others are likely to perceive such behavior negatively, resulting in diminished interpersonal interaction. We highlight the need for further research to address these issues, as well as the potential factors that may prevent relationships being eroded by conspiracy beliefs.

Perceived expert and laypeople consensus predict belief in local conspiracy theories in a non-WEIRD culture: Evidence from Turkey

AbstractPast research has shown that perceived scientific consensus (or lack thereof) on an issue predicts belief in misinformation. In the current study (N= 729), we investigated how perceived consensus among both experts and laypeople predicts beliefs in localized and specific conspiracy theories in Turkey, a non-WEIRD country. Participants in our study were found to overestimate consensus among both experts and laypeople regarding baseless conspiracy theories surrounding the alleged secret articles of the Lausanne Treaty and unused mining reserves in Turkey. Notably, conspiracy believers exhibited a higher tendency to overestimate consensus compared to non-believers. Furthermore, perceived expert consensus had a stronger association with conspiracy beliefs than perceived laypeople consensus. We also explored the correlates of conspiracy beliefs and perceived consensus, including socioeconomic factors, worldview, cognitive sophistication, and personality. The results further indicate that the correlations between belief and perceived consensus manifest with comparable magnitudes, irrespective of the specific conspiracy theories under consideration. These findings support the potential of perceived consensus as an important factor for understanding conspiracy beliefs.

Creating Conspiracy Beliefs: How Our Thoughts Are Shaped

Creating Conspiracy Beliefs: How Our Thoughts Are Shaped

Deflected by the tin foil hat? Word‐of‐mouth, conspiracy beliefs, and the adoption of innovative public health apps

AbstractDue to rapid technological advances and the increasing diffusion of smart devices, public health applications (apps) have become an integral aspect of public health management. Yet, as governments introduce innovative public health apps (e.g., contact tracing apps, data donation apps, ehealth apps), they have to confront controversial debates that fuel conspiracy theories and face the fact that app adoption rates are often disappointing. This study explores how conspiracy theories affect the adoption of innovative public health apps as well as how policymakers can fight harmful conspiracy beliefs. Acknowledging the importance of word of mouth (WOM) in the context of conspiracy beliefs, the study focuses on the interplay between WOM and conspiracy beliefs and their effects on app adoption. Based on theories of social influence and conspiracy beliefs, substantiated by data derived from a multi‐wave field study and confirmed by a controlled experiment, the results show that (1) changes in WOM concerning public health apps change conspiracy beliefs, (2) the effects of WOM on changes in conspiracy beliefs depend on both the sender (peer vs. expert) and the receiver's initial conspiracy beliefs, and (3) increases in conspiracy beliefs reduce public health app adoption and trigger more negative WOM regarding such apps. These results should inform health agencies about how to market innovative public health apps. For consumers with initially low levels of conspiracy beliefs, the distribution of expert WOM supporting the efficacy of public health apps effectively prevents the development of conspiracy beliefs and increases app adoption. However, expert WOM is ineffective in reducing conspiracy beliefs among firm conspiracy believers. These consumers should instead be targeted by campaigns distributing peer WOM that highlights an app's benefits and contradicts conspiracy theories.

Coronavirus Conspiracy Theories in Southeast Europe: (Non-)Believers, Social Network Bubbles, and the Discourse of Blame

ABSTRACT Using survey and social network evidence from Southeast Europe, we advance the understanding of conspiracy theories and politics related to the coronavirus pandemic in three ways: (1) we show that beliefs in coronavirus conspiracy theories are related to ideological support for a nationalist vision of society and socialist vision of the economy; (2) we also show that both conspiracy believers and nonbelievers are living in bubbles of the like-minded; and (3) we use the tools of natural language processing to elucidate the unambiguous differences in the discourse related to the coronavirus used by conspiracy believers and nonbelievers.

Defining and explaining conspiracy theories: Comparing the lay representations of conspiracy believers and non-believers

Despite a growing literature on the topic, little is known about how individuals perceive the label “conspiracy theory”. In two studies, we compare social representations of conspiracy theories, and how these are influenced by individuals’ own conspiracy beliefs. In addition, we examine how these representations relate to how scholars define and explain conspiracy theories. In Study 1, we used lexicometric analysis to explore the vocabulary that French participants (n = 939) spontaneously associated with the notion of ‘conspiracy theory’ and the personal definitions they provided. The representation of participants scoring high on the generic conspiracist beliefs scale was centred on the content of conspiracy theories (e.g., “lies” or “government”). By contrast, the representation of participants scoring low on the conspiracist beliefs scale was centred on the believer (e.g., “paranoia” or “cognitive biases”). They proposed definitions of conspiracy theories centred on the function(s) conspiracy theories supposedly fulfil for the believer (e.g., simplify complex realities). To make sure that these results did not merely express participants’ endorsement or rejection of conspiracy theories, we carried out a second study. In Study 2 (n = 272), we found that the more participants endorsed generic conspiracist beliefs, the less they mobilised intra-individual causes (e.g., reasoning biases) to explain why some people believe in conspiracy theories that they did not endorse themselves. This research shows that people’s representations of conspiracy theories differ depending on their conspiracy beliefs.

Impaired Perceptions and Conspiracy Beliefs about the Way of Emergence of the COVID-19 Infection

This study aimed to reveal the perceptions and conspiracy theories surrounding the new coronavirus infection. We aimed to explore associations between COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs with recommended health protective attitudes and sociodemographic features among the Turkish population. A questionnaire consisting of seven items about COVID-19 conspiracy theories and perceptions and ten items about attitudes was given to patients and their relatives in five different centres during the second national lockdown in Istanbul. A chi-square test was used to evaluate the associations of disease perceptions and conspiracy beliefs with sociodemographic features and with health protective attitudes. Logistic regression analysis was performed for significant results. Of 483 participants, 242 (50.1%) were found to have a conspiracy belief. Conspiracy theories were more frequent in the participants who were older than 50 years of age (p = 0.009) (OR: 1.83) and less frequent in higher education levels (p = 0.005) (OR: 0.499). In addition, 6.6% of the participants were infected with COVID-19, but having the infection was found to have no effect on disease perceptions or conspiracy beliefs. Wearing a mask in crowds, avoiding shaking hands and kissing, and washing hands were less frequent among conspiracy believers and participants with impaired perceptions. These results indicate that misconceptions and conspiracy beliefs are driving the adoption of disinformation about the prevention of COVID-19 infection.

Characterisation of conspiracy believers and their mental health during the COVID-19 emergency state in Latvia

Background A wave of believers in conspiracies has emerged amid the COVID-19 crisis. The purpose of this study was to characterise an individual who believes in conspiracies and to discover whether believing in them is associated with mental health. Methods Data was collected as an online survey in a randomised, stratified cohort in July 2020 as a part of the National Research Program of Latvia. The precisely selected and segmented database corresponding to the general population of Latvia was used. Non-parametric tests to compare medians and Spearman correlation to measure the strength of the relationship were applied. Results The weighted study sample consisted of 2608 participants. A positive correlation was detected between age and belief in conspiracies among females (r = 0.061; p = 0.017). Median conspiracy theory points were significant as follows: individuals who have primary or high school education (p < 0.001) rather than higher education; females (p < 0.001) who resided in a town (p < 0.001) as opposed to occupying the capital; divorcees (p = 0.022) in contrast with those being in a relationship; along with those being unemployed (p < 0.001) compared to the employed, or students. Depressed respondents more often than healthy individuals believed that COVID-19 was created in a laboratory (p < 0.05), that this virus is a result of a 5G antenna (p < 0.05) and that it is a sign of divine power to destroy our planet (p = 0.001). Conclusion The important messages conveyed to the public should be reviewed so that they are more relatable and comprehensible. Furthermore, additional attention should be paid to critical thinking in education programs.