Conspiracy Theories Research Articles

Antivaccine, denialist, and conspiracy theorist content on Facebook. An analysis of the No to the New World Order page

Introduction. Antivaccine, denialist, and conspiracy ideas are generally part of an ecosystem of beliefs reinforcing each other. With the advent of covid-19, these ideas figure among the main disinformation contents of counter-official discourses. The article aims to characterize the contents of the Facebook page ‘No to the New World Order’. Method. The content analysis method was employed for the 625 publications on the page during the period studied (October 2020 to January 2022). Analysis. Descriptive statistics were used for the analysis, the topic modeling technique, and the Latent Dirichlet Allocation algorithm. Results. Covid-19 was the main focus of the analysed posts (68%). Many posts criticised government measures, while others alleged censorship and media manipulation of unofficial covid-19 information. Additionally, the posts asserted that the pandemic is part of a New World Order promoted by elites. Conservative ideas were also found, alongside the criticism of health, economic, and financial organisations. The most liked posts included two videos: one about a strike by health workers in France and another criticising vaccines. Conclusions. Based on the published content, it can be observed that 'No to the New World Order' serves as a platform for criticizing pandemic management across all fronts. However, this space does not accommodate divergent opinions, criteria, or perspectives, nor does it offer criticism or questioning of the accuracy of shared content. These conditions foster misinformation and polarization on the issue.

Artificial Stupidity and Jailbreaks as a Form of Algorithmic Creativity

The article discusses the practices of creativity, where the aesthetics of conscious error is transferred to the realm of algorithms. Taking the so-called perspective of artificial stupidity as a point of reference, the article analyzes the conditions of creativity in an algorithmic culture where unpredictability has become unlikely. As one of the practices of artificial stupidity, the article discusses so-called jailbreaks, the purpose of which is to deliberately confuse large language models, forcing systems to behave outside the intended purpose defined by the manufacturer. The article puts forward the idea that jailbreaks are a new type of dual-purpose narratives, which, on the one hand, act as a technical tool that “breaks” the limitations of algorithmic media, and on the other hand, they are significant structures, facing the user and performing a certain function of self-reflection. The article formulates the narratological structure of jailbreaks and highlights its similarity to the narrative structure of conspiracy theories.

Conspiracy theories, social polarization and crises

Social media facilitate the distribution of conspiracy theories. It is uncertain whether indeed the number of myths and also the number of those who appropriate myths has increased. Conspiracy theories have so far essentially been the subject of sociological and psychosociological research showing ageneral disposition to become infected irrespective of the topic of amyth. Are there specific psychopathological risk factors for becoming infected by conspiracy myths? Are there effective therapeutic or preventive measures? Asystematic search was carried out in PubMed using the query "conspir*[title] AND review" followed by manual selection and appraisal only of publications addressing conspiracy theories in general, i.e. not limited to specific myths, with afocus on systematic reviews and meta-analyses. Moreover, the publications identified were manually screened for further meta-analyses. The search resulted in 166 hits. The available evidence is essentially based on studies using questionnaires, which can clarify only associations but not causalities. The evidence suggests that the strongest correlates of conspiratorial ideation pertain to low cognitive abilities, nonanalytic style of thought resulting in reduced balancing of probabilities before deciding, feelings of loss of control, paranoia, schizotypy and the dark triad (narcissism, Machiavellianism, authoritarianism). Specific psychological characteristics are risk factors for conspiratorial ideation. Current research approaches are unsuitable to clarify whether psychiatric disorders are overrepresented. Sociodemographic risk factors include male gender, low level of education, low income, social isolation and are non-specific. Group processes promote, again presumably nonspecifically, conspiracy theories thus contributing to social polarization. The genetic basis and neurobiological mechanisms are unknown. Conspiracy theories were and are used as an instrument of political contention. The enlightened democratic social contract requires free, unbiased thinking. Consequently, the risk factors identified so far facilitate conspiratorial ideation and question the very fundaments of the social contract by impairing unbiased evaluation and decision making. Therefore, prevention is warranted. .

Durably reducing conspiracy beliefs through dialogues with AI.

Conspiracy theory beliefs are notoriously persistent. Influential hypotheses propose that they fulfill important psychological needs, thus resisting counterevidence. Yet previous failures in correcting conspiracy beliefs may be due to counterevidence being insufficiently compelling and tailored. To evaluate this possibility, we leveraged developments in generative artificial intelligence and engaged 2190 conspiracy believers in personalized evidence-based dialogues with GPT-4 Turbo. The intervention reduced conspiracy belief by ~20%. The effect remained 2 months later, generalized across a wide range of conspiracy theories, and occurred even among participants with deeply entrenched beliefs. Although the dialogues focused on a single conspiracy, they nonetheless diminished belief in unrelated conspiracies and shifted conspiracy-related behavioral intentions. These findings suggest that many conspiracy theory believers can revise their views if presented with sufficiently compelling evidence.

Conspiracy beliefs and majority influence

ABSTRACT Conspiracy beliefs (i.e. beliefs in specific conspiracy theories or the more general conspiracy mentality) are associated with a need for uniqueness and lower adherence to social norms. These findings suggest that conspiracy beliefs might be generally associated with less influence by majority opinions – absolutely and compared to minority opinions. In five experiments involving scenarios unrelated to conspiracy theories (overall N = 1669), participants were informed about the majority/minority opinion on a given issue (e.g. the building of a tunnel), afterward indicating their evaluation or voting intentions regarding the issue. We then tested whether the influence of a majority/minority opinion on evaluation or voting intentions is moderated by conspiracy beliefs. Across studies, we find no significant moderation. A meta-analysis confirms no correlation between conspiracy beliefs and susceptibility to majority influence. Taken together, our studies provide no evidence for the assumption that those holding conspiracy beliefs reject majority opinions per se.

Conspiracy mentality in autistic and non-autistic individuals

ABSTRACT Background Belief in conspiracy theories has emerged across times and cultures. While previous accounts attributed conspiracy beliefs to mental health conditions, accumulating research suggests that conspiracy theories are common among the general population. In the present study we examined whether conspiracy mentality – that is, a general predisposition to believe conspiracy theories – differed between a group of autistic adults and a general population sample. Methods This study included an autistic sample (n = 682) and a general population sample (n = 4358). Participants’ conspiracy mentality was measured using the Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (CMQ). Results A one-way ANCOVA (controlling for participants’ age, gender, educational level, and ethnicity) revealed no difference in conspiracy mentality between an autism and a community sample. Conclusions The current study suggests that being autistic, or having more autistic traits, does not predict conspiracy mentality. These findings underscore that autism does not predispose people to conspiracy theories and suggest that autism is neither a risk factor for, nor a protective factor against, conspiracy mentality.

Development and validation of the COVID-19 vaccine beliefs scale for the Chinese population

BackgroundAt present, there is no culturally appropriate scale designed to measure Chinese people’s attitudes and beliefs about COVID-19 vaccines. Understanding people’s attitudes and beliefs about vaccines can help policy makers and health care professionals better evaluate local beliefs to increase vaccine coverage and minimize COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy.MethodsWe developed a COVID-19 vaccine attitudes and beliefs scale comprising items based on qualitative research data. We then conducted an explorative and confirmatory factor analysis using data from two online sources.ResultsThe 26-item vaccine belief scale includes a five-factor model: vaccine benefit (VB), vaccine concern (VC), observing others’ reactions to vaccination (VR), the influence of authority and others toward vaccination (VI), and common sense about vaccination (VS). The multivariate analysis results showed that VB (OR = 1.065, 95% CI 1.035–1.097), VR (OR = 0.878, 95% CI 0.832–0.927), and VS (OR = 1.076, 95% CI 1.032–1.122) were associated with the intention to receive the vaccine. These results implied that VC (OR = 0.957, 95% CI 0.928–0.987) could predict the choice not to be vaccinated. A correlation between beliefs about vaccines and conspiracy theories and fear of COVID-19 was also found and discussed.ConclusionsThese findings suggest that the locally designed and culturally sensitive scale has good reliability and validity. The questionnaire provides researchers with a standardized assessment tool to measure Chinese people’s beliefs about the COVID-19 vaccine.

Uncertainty and Fertility in Ukraine on the Eve of Russia’s Full-Scale Invasion: The Impact of Armed Conflict and Economic Crisis

While uncertainty has been a key explanation for very low fertility throughout Europe, few studies have analysed how macro-level uncertainty trickles down to shape how people think about having children. Most research focuses on economic uncertainty, not political or social uncertainty. We address these gaps with qualitative data from Ukraine, which has experienced extreme political uncertainty and, for the past decade, armed conflict. Ukraine also had exceptionally low fertility, with an estimated total fertility rate of 1.17 in 2021. In July 2021, we conducted 16 online focus groups on topics related to childbearing with informants living in urban and rural areas in Eastern Ukraine, including areas of Donetsk province that were outside Ukrainian government control. Half the groups consisted of persons displaced by the 2014 Donbas war. The discussions revealed distinct patterns whereby experiences of displacement, the simmering armed conflict, and economic problems combined to produce and intensify uncertainties that discouraged couples from having more than one child. Some blamed the government or delved into conspiracy theories. Armed conflict generates its own forms of uncertainty that interact with persistent economic challenges, dampening fertility.

A quantitative content analysis of topical characteristics of the online COVID-19 infodemic in the United States and Japan

BackgroundThe COVID-19 pandemic has spurred the growth of a global infodemic. In order to combat the COVID-19 infodemic, it is necessary to understand what kinds of misinformation are spreading. Furthermore, various local factors influence how the infodemic manifests in different countries. Therefore, understanding how and why infodemics differ between countries is a matter of interest for public health. This study aims to elucidate and compare the types of COVID-19 misinformation produced from the infodemic in the US and Japan.MethodsCOVID-19 fact-checking articles were obtained from the two largest publishers of fact-checking articles in each language. 1,743 US articles and 148 Japanese articles in their respective languages were gathered, with articles published between 23 January 2020 and 4 November 2022. Articles were analyzed using the free text mining software KH Coder. Exploration of frequently-occurring words and groups of related words was carried out. Based on agglomeration plots and prior research, eight categories of misinformation were created. Lastly, coding rules were created for these eight categories, and a chi-squared test was performed to compare the two datasets.ResultsOverall, the most frequent words in both languages were related to health-related terms, but the Japan dataset had more words referring to foreign countries. Among the eight categories, differences with chi-squared p ≤ 0.01 were found after Holm-Bonferroni p value adjustment for the proportions of misinformation regarding statistics (US 40.0% vs. JP 25.7%, ϕ 0.0792); origin of the virus and resultant discrimination (US 7.0% vs. JP 20.3%, ϕ 0.1311); and COVID-19 disease severity, treatment, or testing (US 32.6% vs. JP 45.9%, ϕ 0.0756).ConclusionsLocal contextual factors were found that likely influenced the infodemic in both countries; representations of these factors include societal polarization in the US and the HPV vaccine scare in Japan. It is possible that Japan’s relative resistance to misinformation affects the kinds of misinformation consumed, directing attention away from conspiracy theories and towards health-related issues. However, more studies need to be done to verify whether misinformation resistance affects misinformation consumption patterns this way.

Discourses of Hate

Since the COVID-19 pandemic, the global North has seen a drastic increase in usage of platform apps’ services. Platforms such as Uber, Lyft, DoorDash, and Deliveroo have become staples that connect consumers directly to workers on standby, ready to be activated at a moment’s notice to rideshare or deliver food orders. These companies offer low barriers of entry and flexible work hours, which is the ideal situation for many migrants looking for work. The scope of this research aims to build an understanding of the intersection between the rise of the far-right and the anti-immigration rhetoric in Canada and the EU that influences the hate faced by racialized migrants working highly visible gig jobs in the platform economy. By examining academic articles, news reports, and social media communications of far-right groups a major theme is apparent. The online rhetoric of the far-right can be categorized through its usage of fear and hate against racialized migrants. Migrants have been depicted as sexual threats to women, economic threats to workers, and an overall threat to the white population through demographic replacement. This conspiracy theory, known as the ‘Great Replacement’, found its way into the discursive attempts of far-right groups and political parties (ex. Chega - Portugal; VOX - Spain) to promote anti-immigration and violence against migrants. The threat that this rhetoric poses to racialized migrant workers has yet to be fully explored, and despite passing mention in a few academic articles, the violence faced by workers in the platform economy is not common in the literature, even more so in regards to its intersection with race based hate. This gap brings further questions concerning alliances among workers, advocacy groups, and trade unions based along the lines of ethnic, racial, and gendered differences to combat the growth of support for the far-right. With reasonable speculation, this research contends that far-right rhetoric and violence will continue to be targeted at racialized migrants in visible spaces and jobs, such as those in the gig economy which requires further labour solidarity and activism to aid migrants in vulnerable situations.

"Life as We Knew It": Continued Challenges in Getting Up-to-Date COVID-19 Vaccinations Amongst Black and Latinx Michigan Residents.

Minority communities are disproportionately impacted by COVID-19. In Michigan in 2024, 59% of Latinx residents, 46% of Black residents, and 57% of White residents have received at least one dose of the vaccine. However, just 7% of Black residents and 6% of Latinx residents report being up-to-date per CDC definition, versus 13% of White residents. Drawing from protection motivation theory, we aimed to identify barriers to COVID-19 vaccination. Interviews with 24 Black and 10 Latinx Michigan residents self-reported as not up-to-date (n = 15) or up-to-date (n = 19) on COVID-19 vaccines were conducted in 2022-2023. We used a community-based participatory approach in collaboration with 16 leaders from 15 organizations to develop research questions, interview protocols, and methods for data collection and analysis. Thematic coding of interviews was conducted. Findings indicate participants' lack of confidence in the COVID-19 vaccine's efficacy, with those not up-to-date expressing greater doubt. Participants were also concerned about vaccine benefits versus risks, safety, and side effects. Distrust in medicine, confusion about public health guidelines, and conspiracy theories were often reported. Younger unvaccinated individuals cited low health risk as reason to remain unvaccinated. Many participants felt that health education, especially through medical professionals, was beneficial. There is great need for more data to make informed decisions given ongoing lack of understanding of the public health benefits of COVID-19 vaccination. Identifying drivers of vaccine uptake, particularly boosters, in communities of color and developing age-appropriate and culturally responsive interventions to increase vaccination rates are of utmost importance.

Belief in conspiracy theories and satisfaction in interpersonal relationships

AbstractResearchers have theorized about how belief in conspiracy theories can negatively affect interpersonal relationships. However, despite growing anecdotal evidence of the effects that conspiracy theories seem to have on people's relationships, a systematic assessment of these effects is lacking. In seven studies (six of them preregistered, N = 2526), we examined whether people's perceptions of others' conspiracy beliefs were negatively associated with their actual (or anticipated) relationship satisfaction with those others. We found that participants' perceptions of their social contacts' beliefs in general (Pilot Studies 1–2) and specific conspiracy theories (Study 1) were negatively associated with their relationship satisfaction with those contacts. Using a hypothetical scenario, we further observed that participants anticipated that their relationship satisfaction would worsen when one of these social contacts explicitly endorsed (vs. opposed) a conspiracy theory (Studies 2, 3a, and 3b). Finally, participants expected lower relationship satisfaction with a stranger who endorsed (vs. opposed) a conspiracy theory in their online dating profile (Study 4). Importantly, across all studies we observed that participants' own conspiracy beliefs moderated the association between others' conspiracy beliefs and relationship satisfaction, revealing a similarity–dissimilarity pattern: although the association was negative among participants with weaker conspiracy beliefs, we observed signals of reversal among participants with stronger conspiracy beliefs. Our findings further suggest that a process of attitudinal distancing (among other relational changes) could explain why perceived conspiracy beliefs negatively predicted relationship satisfaction. Taken together, this research provides evidence that conspiracy beliefs have the potential to harm interpersonal relationships.

Conspiracy! Or, when bad things happen to good litigants in person

Abstract This paper considers the relationship between litigants in person (LiPs) and conspiracy theories and seeks to answer two questions: how, and why, do some LiPs come to be conspiracy theorists? The majority of LiPs, of course, do not become conspiracy-minded. There is also no evidence that LiPs are more likely than anyone else in legal proceedings to be conspiracists, only, perhaps, that it is more obvious when they are. But there continue to be individuals who have conspiracist explanations for difficulties or failures they experience throughout legal proceedings. And while it is widely held that some LiPs hold eccentric beliefs about the law, there has been little attempt to understand how and why LiPs may come to acquire or articulate these beliefs. This is presumably because it has not been considered important to interrogate the views of people already often assumed to be ‘difficult’ or eccentric. This paper contends, however, that trying to understand how and why these conspiracist beliefs are acquired matters very much. This is because conspiracy theories can give us a critical insight into how negative experiences of litigation can result in a loss of faith or trust in legal institutions.

The far right, religion, and conspiracy theories: a discourse-theoretical analysis of the case of Poland

The far right, religion, and conspiracy theories: a discourse-theoretical analysis of the case of Poland

‘And then … ’: new media’s conspiracy theories and counternarratives in Loose Change and The Power of Nightmares

ABSTRACT This paper re-asserts the politically contested status of new media as a site of both conspiracy theories and counterhegemonic narratives through analyses of Dylan Avery’s Loose Change and Adam Curtis’ The Power of Nightmares. I outline how Loose Change’s form reflects its origins in online research, and how the web’s structures influence the film’s conspiracy theory narrative. This is compared to the production and distribution of The Power of Nightmares. The juxtaposition of images and ideas (the ‘and then … ’) provides an example of the web’s formal influence. Exploring Curtis’ use of the BBC archive, barriers to distributing his counternarrative, and the appropriation of his films through online channels, I inform a discussion of the ways new media provides a crucial resistance to hegemonic narratives. Drawing on Jean Baudrillard’s account of September 11th, I argue that both texts must be understood as dialectical responses to the official narratives around 9/11 and the War on Terror.

The pursuit of ‘good’ Internet policy

AbstractAs our digital society continues to advance, an increasingly diverse array of scholars, policymakers, civic interest groups, companies and regulatory bodies from around the world are seeking to have an increased say in its governance. This diversity makes the challenge of achieving ‘good’ Internet policy more complex and contested. Of course, the notion of 'good Internet policy' raises several important questions: What defines a good Internet policy? Who is it intended for? How can it be achieved and evaluated? Why is it worth pursuing? The papers in this collection explore a number of issues relevant to this pursuit. They include research into deploying digital systems to increase participation in democratic elections and other e‐governance initiatives, navigating the intersection of local norms and global rules, addressing algorithmic discrimination, confronting the role of conspiracy theories in democratic processes, defining responsibility in content moderation, balancing legal certainty with operational flexibility in platform governance and the potential for data justice in AI governance.

COVID-19 anti-vaccine misinformation discourse on Twitter: Influential roles of polarization and the 2020 US presidential election

This study investigated the politicization of COVID-19 vaccination on Twitter in the context of the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election. I analyzed 2,100 English tweets related to COVID-19 antivaccine misinformation from October 28th, 2020, to November 3rd, 2020 (one week before Election Day). Those tweets clustered into 12 topics.The result indicated that conspiracy theories about population control have raised concerns and become prevalent in perpetuating anti-vaccine beliefs. It also reflects the rise of a new trend in anti-vaccine topics. The study highlights the influence of partisan reasoning on vaccination decision-making in the context of a public health crisis caused by COVID-19, and the difficulty in correcting partisan-driven conspiracy theories and misinformation.

Against Disinformation: Bridging Science and Public Discourse

The Science and Society Research Group at the Ludovika University of Public Service organised a conference in Budapest on 13 October 2023 titled: ‘Science and disinformation: how science can support society against disinformation’. The conference explored the complex relationship between science, society, and disinformation. A panel discussion was held with the aim of examining the challenges and strategies for science communication in the context of the ever-increasing issues of dis-/misinformation. The discussion highlighted the multifaceted factors that influence public trust in science; the role of digital culture on science communication and scientific knowledge production; the impact of artificial intelligence; and the relationship between science and business developments on science disinformation, especially on science-related conspiracy theories. The participants helped shed light on how science communication strategies can be improved to stabilise trust in a multi-stakeholder information environment. This article summarises the main insights and conclusions from the discussion.

Partners in crime? Radical scepticism and malevolent global conspiracy theories

Although academic work on conspiracy theory has taken off in the last two decades, both in other disciplines as well as in epistemology, the similarities between global sceptical scenarios and global conspiracy theories have not been the focus of attention. The main reason for this lacuna probably stems from the fact that most philosophers take radical scepticism very seriously, while, for the most part, regarding ‘conspiracy thinking’ as epistemically defective. Defenders of conspiracy theory, on the other hand, tend not to be that interested in undermining radical scepticism, since their primary goal is to save conspiracy theories from the charges of irrationality. In this paper, I argue that radical sceptical scenarios and global conspiracy theories exhibit importantly similar features, which raises a serious dilemma for the ‘orthodox’ view that holds that while we must respond to radical scepticism, global conspiracy theories can just be dismissed. For, if, as I will show, both scenarios can be seen to be epistemically on a par, then either radical sceptical scenarios are as irrational as global conspiracy theories or neither type of scenario is intrinsically irrational. I argue for the first option by introducing a distinction between ‘local’ and ‘global’ sceptical scenarios and showing how this distinction maps onto contemporary debates concerning how best to understand the notion of a ‘conspiracy theory’. I demonstrate that, just as in the case of scepticism, ‘local’ conspiracies are, at least in principle, detectable and, hence, epistemically unproblematic, while global conspiracy theories, like radical scepticism, are essentially invulnerable to any potential counterevidence. This renders them theoretically vacuous and idle, as everything and nothing is compatible with what these ‘theories’ assert. I also show that radical sceptical scenarios and global conspiracy theories face the self-undermining problem: As soon as global unreliability is posited, the ensuing radical doubt swallows its children – the coherence of the sceptic’s proposal or the conspiracy theorist’s preferred conspiracy. I conclude that radical sceptical scenarios and global conspiracy theories are indeed partners in crime and should, therefore, be regarded as equally dubious.

Leveraging artificial intelligence to identify the psychological factors associated with conspiracy theory beliefs online

Given the profound societal impact of conspiracy theories, probing the psychological factors associated with their spread is paramount. Most research lacks large-scale behavioral outcomes, leaving factors related to actual online support for conspiracy theories uncertain. We bridge this gap by combining the psychological self-reports of 2506 Twitter (currently X) users with machine-learning classification of whether the textual data from their 7.7 million social media engagements throughout the pandemic supported six common COVID-19 conspiracy theories. We assess demographic factors, political alignment, factors derived from theory of reasoned action, and individual psychological differences. Here, we show that being older, self-identifying as very left or right on the political spectrum, and believing in false information constitute the most consistent risk factors; denialist tendencies, confidence in one’s ability to spot misinformation, and political conservativism are positively associated with support for one conspiracy theory. Combining artificial intelligence analyses of big behavioral data with self-report surveys can effectively identify and validate risk factors for phenomena evident in large-scale online behaviors.