American Conservatism Research Articles

Bridging the divide: The effect of individuating information on attitudes toward political outgroup members

Liberals and conservatives in the United States exhibit intergroup bias toward those on the other side. In three preregistered experiments (N = 1,389), we examined the bias-reducing benefits of individuating members of the political outgroup by providing people with individuating information—information that provides knowledge about them beyond their group membership, such as their social roles, emotions, and personality. Studies 1 and 2 extended work on individuating information into this domain by testing its impact on a novel political outgroup member. Study 3 broke new ground by testing whether the benefits of learning individuating information can extend to additional members of the outgroup. Each methodology revealed that, compared to those who read non-individuating controls, participants who learned individuating information about a political outgroup member were less hostile and more empathic toward that outgroup member. The current studies thus identify a promising avenue for reducing interparty hostility.

The Crisis of American Conservatism in Historical–Comparative Perspective

Starting from the assessment that contemporary American conservatism is in a state of crisis, manifested in a dynamic of growing radicalization, this article seeks to identify the factors and actors that contributed to this trajectory and to thus elucidate its more fundamental drivers, assuming that Donald Trump and the Make America Great Again (MAGA) movements are symptoms rather than causes of this radicalization. To this effect, a succinct and pointed history of modern American conservatism from its beginnings in the postwar era is presented, using a periodization into three broad eras. Particular attention is given to the internal heterogeneity and conflicts within the conservative movement on a political and an intellectual level that help explain how conservatism as a whole, or at least its dominant forces, has continued to move to the right over the decades. In order to put this trajectory into perspective, a parallel history of German conservatism is used as contrast. One conclusion that can be drawn from this account is that both German and American conservatism are experiencing a crisis, but for very different reasons and with highly different manifestations. While American conservatism is in a radicalization spiral, German conservatism suffers instead from an identity crisis and a loss of any meaningful ideological–political profile.

Conservative News Cultures and the Future of Journalism History

Political historians have long identified a gap in the literature on US conservatism surrounding that movement’s relationship to journalism and mass media. This essay calls on journalism historians to fill this gap and theorizes why they have thus far failed to do so. It notes the field’s tendency to engage with ahistorical and anachronistic concepts, which make journalism history legible to journalism studies but also subordinates historical work to the imperatives of social science. It uses “conservative news cultures” as a historically rooted theoretical framework for narrating discrete works of journalism history that, when put into conversation, comprise an unrealized subfield. More broadly it advocates for recognizing journalism history as political history and for theorizing new, historically rooted objects of study in need of social scientific analysis.

A Conspiratorial Life: Robert Welch, the John Birch Society, and the Revolution of American Conservatism by Edward H. Miller (review)

A Conspiratorial Life: Robert Welch, the John Birch Society, and the Revolution of American Conservatism by Edward H. Miller (review)

Inter‐attitude centrality does not appear to reduce persuasion for political attitudes

AbstractAre attitudes more resistant to change when they are more central to a belief system? Theories of inter‐attitude structure and belief system dynamics both suggest that the answer is yes. We demonstrate how to combine belief system network methods with pretest‐posttest experiments to empirically test this idea. We aimed to persuade US conservatives (Experiment 1 N = 890) and US liberals (Experiment 2 N = 1305, Experiment 3 N = 1293) using moral reframing persuasive strategies. Although we find that moral reframing was persuasive (9 of 12 attempts), there was no evidence that central attitudes were more difficult to change than peripheral attitudes. This was the case across all experiments, target attitudes and methods for assessing belief system structure. The results suggest that moral reframing persuades people, but that theories of inter‐attitude structure and belief system dynamics both do not make accurate predictions in this situation.

“The Most Marketable Political Commodity”: Oliver North, Iran-Contra, and American Domestic Politics

From Oliver North's congressional testimony in 1987 to his near-successful Senate run in 1994, this article assesses the significance of the Iran-Contra scandal to the American domestic political landscape. It positions Iran-Contra at a transitional moment in right-wing politics, torn between loyalty to Reagan on one hand and the combativeness of the 1990s’ New Right on the other. In four stages—denial, fame, fundraising, and forgetting—defenders of North set forth a model of how ascendant forces in the New Right would, post-Reagan, transform scandal into political capital. Iran-Contra provided grist for media outlets that demonized the mainstream media, voters and members of Congress who excused criminality, and two White Houses who longed to forgive and forget. Thus can the historiography of American conservatism, currently in full bloom, begin to reckon with Iran-Contra's place in domestic politics.

Review Essay: Whence Came the Modern American Right?

For scholars of American political history, the 2016 election was a moment of methodological reassessment. After Donald Trump eviscerated his seemingly “respectable” GOP challengers in the Republican presidential primary and went on to win the general election, historians and theorists of the American Right rethought the reigning “ostracization thesis,” a memorable phrase Edward H. Miller uses to describe a historiographical narrative grounded in the theory that American conservatives, led by Ronald Reagan, had prevailed in the 1980s by systematically purging their movement of extremists in the 1960s and 1970s (258). In 2017, Rick Perlstein, one of the most celebrated popular historians of the conservative movement, published an essay in the New York Times memorably titled “I Thought I Understood the American Right. Trump Proved Me Wrong.” In it, he expressed regret for helping to forge this narrative in his first book, Before the Storm: Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking of the American Consensus (Hill and Wang, 2001). Cory Robin updated his influential book The Reactionary Mind (Oxford University Press, 2011; 2018) to account for Trump's ascendance. “Like most observers of American politics,” Robin wrote in the preface to the second edition, “I was shocked by Trump's victory in the 2016 presidential election.” But if the 2016 election prompted a critical reassessment, then the 2020 election and its chaotic coda (i.e., the attack on the US Capitol on January 6, 2021) prompted a scholarly reckoning not only with modern American conservatism, but also with the broader narrative arc of twentieth-century American politics. The four recent books under review here, which were all published after the 2020 election, represent some of the first revisionist fruits of this reckoning.

The Right Stuff

Edward S. Shapiro reviews Matthew Continetti’s The Right: The Hundred Year War for American Conservatism

Promoting climate actions: A cognitive-constraints approach

The present paper reports an experiment with a two-year-delayed (M = 695 days) follow-up that tests an approach to raising willingness to take political and personal climate actions. Many Americans still do not view climate change as a threat requiring urgent action. Moreover, among American conservatives, higher science literacy is paradoxically associated with higher anthropogenic climate-change skepticism. Our experimental materials were designed to harness the power of two central cognitive constraints — coherence and causal invariance, which map onto two narrative proclivities that anthropologists have identified as universal — to promote climate action across the political spectrum. Towards that goal, the essential role of these constraints in the causal-belief-formation process predicts that climate-change information would be more persuasive when it is embedded in a personal climate-action narrative, the evocation of which can benefit from exposure to parsimonious scientific explanations of indisputable everyday observations, juxtaposed with reasoners’ own, typically less coherent explanations, occurring in a context that engages their moral stance. Our brief one-time intervention, conducted in ten U.S. states with the highest level of climate skepticism, showed that across the political spectrum, our materials raised appreciation of science, openness to alternative views, and willingness to take climate actions in the immediate assessment. It also raised how likely were reports two years later of having taken those actions or would have taken them had the opportunity existed, suggesting a long-lasting effect. Our approach adopts the framework that conceptions of reality are representations, and adaptive solutions in that infinite space of representations require cognitive constraints to narrow the search.

Charging Complicity in Abuses, Ignoring Beneficial Engagement: How American Conservatives Secured the Blocking of U.S. Funds for the UNFPA by Misrepresenting the UN’s Efforts to Reform China’s One-Child Policy

We describe a key moment during the world’s attempt to come to terms with enormously expanding populations. China was an extreme case, both in the magnitude of its population explosion and in its government’s control of reproduction through the One-Child Policy (OCP). The U.S. had been a founder and the main financial supporter of The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). Starting in 1998, UNFPA’s program in China attempted to move the OCP away from two decades of coercive family planning and toward acceptance of the women’s rights–centered global consensus that emerged from the 1994 Cairo Conference on Population and Development. In 2001, a conservative U.S. organization, the Population Research Institute, claimed to have gathered evidence of UNFPA’s involvement in Chinese coercion. Although several investigations, including one sent by President George W. Bush himself, refuted this evidence, and UNFPA had used no U.S. funds in China, conservative political power was sufficient to cause President George W. Bush to eliminate all U.S. funding for UNFPA’s activities everywhere in the world. Ironically, this period was exactly when the UNFPA project had shown that coercion was unnecessary. China eventually followed the UNFPA’s lead, liberalizing and eventually ending the OCP.

Political Differences in Knowledge and Its Connection With Vaccination During COVID-19

Abstract. Conservatives in the United States have more negative attitudes toward COVID-19 vaccines and are less likely to be vaccinated than liberals. The present research tests whether political differences in knowledge underlie differences in vaccination. Participants in Study 1 completed a knowledge test about COVID-19 vaccines and indicated whether they had received a COVID-19 vaccine. Republicans had worse knowledge about COVID-19 vaccines than Democrats. Furthermore, political differences in vaccination were significantly mediated by knowledge. Study 2 found that exposure to facts about COVID-19 vaccines led to more favorable perceptions of vaccine effectiveness among Republicans, which in turn was associated with stronger vaccination intentions. These data suggest that knowledge about COVID-19 vaccines may help to explain political differences in vaccination.

Metaphorical framing in news

Abstract This study investigates metaphorical framing in political language. In particular, we describe dominant metaphoric frames which are used by the conservative and liberal media in the US when debating over the different aspects of the socio-political issues. The data for this study have been collected from the online archives of CNN and Fox news that were published on the two topics of medical healthcare system and immigration. We draw upon the ideas from some of the most recent semi-automated metaphor identification approaches to identify metaphors in texts. The findings of this study indicate that the US conservatives use a wider range of metaphorical frames to discuss the political issues. Some metaphorical frames are often used by both parties, while some others mark the divisive partisan rhetoric. Besides, the findings show that there are some metaphoric frames that are exclusively used to talk about a particular aspect of a topic.

Illiberalism and the Deinstitutionalization of Public Diplomacy: The Rise of Hungary and Viktor Orbán in American Conservative Media

The promotion of Hungary and Viktor Orbán among American conservatives is often presented as a warning of conservative embrace of illiberal politics. While acknowledging the draw of Hungary’s illiberal policies as the motivating factor for American conservative interest in Hungary, our focus seeks to answer to what extent this embrace of Hungary can be considered a form of public diplomacy. We examined the frequency and substance of mentions of Hungary and Viktor Orbán in 1643 articles within 13 American conservative media outlets to track how the narrative around the country and the prime minister has evolved over the past four years, bearing in mind the impact of Tucker Carlson’s interview with Viktor Orbán in late 2021. We found both an increase in the quantity of articles focused on Hungary and Viktor Orbán as well as a largely positive trend defending and praising the policies of Hungary and the prime minister. We also observed a strong focus on Orbán as the primary actor of Hungarian public diplomacy and argue that this hyper-presidentialized focus exemplifies the deinstitutionalization of public diplomacy, along with other elements that contribute to the enhancement of Orbán as an individual public diplomacy actor.

The Role of Basic Psychological Needs in Right-Wing Extremism Risk Among American Conservatives

ABSTRACT Modern psychological theories of violent extremism stress the roles of social connections and personal meaning as motivators for individuals to participate in extremist groups. Personal meaning and social connections are both important aspects of Basic Psychological Needs Theory, a motivation framework commonly used in workplace and educational psychology. This study sought to assess the relationship between Basic Psychological Needs and extremism among (N = 361) self-identified American conservatives. Psychological Need fulfilment was strongly negatively associated with endorsement of extremism (range of rs = −.43 to −.68). In addition, Psychological Need fulfilment explained incremental variance in extremism scores after accounting for other psychological characteristics, including aggression, psychopathy, empathy, and Five-Factor Model personality traits. These findings suggest that Basic Psychological Needs may be a useful framework to expand our understanding of the etiology of extremism, and that prosocial alternatives for meeting these needs may reduce the risk of engaging in extremist behaviors.

The distribution, magnitude, and endemic species of US springs

Freshwater springs and other groundwater-dependent ecosystems represent important natural resources in landscapes, providing consistent, high-quality water to both freshwater and terrestrial organisms. However, spring and GDE conservation does not appear to be a prominent feature on the US conservation radar. Therefore, this study evaluated the distribution and size of springs in the US with the national water dataset: the US Geological Survey National Water Information System. Using all available measurements of spring discharge and the sampling dates for all springs with data in the dataset (10,279 springs), I compared the number and sizes of springs between states and, where time series were available, determined whether the springs were maintaining historic discharges. I evaluated data quality using the date of the last sampling, number of times sampled, and the length of time sampled for each spring. Finally, I searched the literature for spring endemic species and recorded the states in which they occurred. Within the database, springs were most abundant in western states, but average discharges were largest for states in the southeast and for Idaho and Alaska. Very large springs occurred in some western states, but the multitudes of tiny springs reduced the average discharges. The data were poorly resolved as many of the springs had been sampled only once, often 40–50 years ago. Time series were available only for 126 springs and half of these springs exhibited declines in discharge. Endemic species were mentioned in the literature for 24 states, particularly those in the lower half of the country, and so loss of spring integrity would threaten biodiversity in many states. Due to the poor resolution of the data, broad conclusions about the integrity of these important freshwater systems are difficult to impossible to make for most states using the national dataset. Therefore, I call for a concerted national effort to more broadly evaluate spring and GDE resources. Springs and GDEs are likely to become even more important in the future as climate changes and their roles as freshwater refuges, temperature buffers, and bellwethers become even more important.

American Conservative Think-Tanks as Generators of Trumpist Agenda

American Conservative Think-Tanks as Generators of Trumpist Agenda

АМЕРИКАНСКИЕ КОНСЕРВАТОРЫ И ИММИГРАЦИОННАЯ ПОЛИТИКА В ПЕРИОД ПРЕЗИДЕНСТВА ДЖ. У. БУША

Immigration reform in the United States is one of the hottest topics in politics, causing a split in American society. Numerous attempts by presidents and Congress to reform this sphere ended either in failure or in half-hearted measures that dissatisfied both supporters of immigration and its opponents. The article examines the role of American conservatives in blocking the liberal immigration reform of the George W. Bush administration in 2006–2008. I a very short period, representatives of various currents of the U.S. conservative movement were able to consolidate their positions on the basis of an anti-immigrant platform and use new tools of influence, both in relation to congressmen and in the formation of public opinion. The article analyzes the role of social networks and a new phenomenon in the conservative movement (the name was originally proposed by The New York Times) such as a “New Internet-linked national constituency”, which managed to very quickly and effectively close ranks among the opponents of the president’s “grand bargain” and destroy the unity of the pro-immigrant-minded elite. The article evaluates the actions of George W. Bush to initiate the immigration reform and explores the nature of the conflict between conservatives and the president. Analysis of various aspects of the political conflict that arose in 2006–2008 between the restrictionists and the president helps in better understanding of the situation within the conservative movement and the prospects for its development.

텍사스 혁신주의와 미국 보수주의 등장

많은 역사가들은 텍사스가 남부에서 주도적으로 혁신주의를 이끈 주도 아니었고 뛰어난 개혁가도 없었기 때문에 텍사스 혁신주의에 대해 거의 관심을 기울이지 않았다. 뿐만 아니라 과거 남부연합의 일원으로서 전형 적인 ‘남부’라는 이유로 남부 혁신주의의 틀 속에서 텍사스의 개혁을 바라 보았다. 하지만 본 논문은 20세기 초 새롭게 형성된, 텍사스의 근대화와 진보를 이끈 개혁가들이 전후 텍사스 보수화의 중심 축이 되는 과정을 보 여 주었다. 텍사스의 서부적 전통과 정체성은 텍사스의 보수화를 추동하 였고, 근대 미국 보수주의 부활의 중요한 요인이 되었다. 결국 미국 보수 주의 부활의 씨앗은 1920년대 텍사스 혁신주의에서 배태(胚胎)되었다.

‘Freedom’ on the Road to Ruin: An Australian Apology to America’s Freedom-Loving Hard Right.

Contemporary America faces deep-seated problems - not least because so many Americans have lost respect for their own electoral system and democratic institutions. America suffers too from unrelenting right wing hyperbole in respect of significant social issues, including their conviction that only they understand, and value, freedom. Because of Australia’s restrictive responses to the covid-19 pandemic, Florida’s Governor Ron DeSantis – a potential Presidential candidate - denigrates Australia as ‘not a free country; not a free country at all’. Australians may dismiss Governor DeSantis’s comments as laughable, but a chorus of hard right comments in support of his view invites a comparison of the different ways in which ‘freedom’ is understood in Republican America and in Australia. One consequence of DeSantis’s conception of ‘freedom’ is the extraordinary American death rate from the Covid-19 pandemic, which in the case of Florida – which DeSantis celebrates as the ‘free-est State’ – stood at about 48 times the Australian rate when he scorned Australia as indistinguishable from communist China. Despite massive American spending on defence budgets, a domestic battle has been waged, and lost, in respect of the more prosaic defence of America’s traditional economic philosophy, and its defining institutions; and American conservatives are now divided even within their own ranks as to what it is that they wish to conserve, other than partisan advantage. The roots of America’s present malaise are to be found in the evolving (mis)understandings of a set of keywords including ‘freedom’, ‘democracy’, ‘tyranny’, ‘individualism’, and ‘society’. The radical right has impoverished the understanding of these keywords, and Australia’s pandemic response was in fact designed to give itself freedom from the ‘freedom’ that the Republican right now eulogises. In the name of an implicit and contentious teleological vision, the Republican understanding of ‘freedom’ has now descended to the point where America’s hard right perversely sees itself as actually now needing to save Australia from democracy, while simultaneously undermining its own democratic institutions. The need for a reinvigorated teaching of economic philosophy is plain to see.

Beyond the reactionary sea change: Antimodern thought, American politics and political science

This article examines the migration of reactionary antimodern thought from Europe to the United States of America. It assesses the impact that the work of two antimodern thinkers, Leo Strauss and Eric Voegelin, had on two distinct domains of American thought, namely, conservative political ideology and academic political science. The paper argues that the antimodern perspective, eagerly absorbed by many intellectuals, has pushed American conservatism not only in an anti-liberal, but also in an antidemocratic direction. On the other hand, in academic political science, Strauss's and Voegelin's critiques of modernity, though certainly audible and noted, were neither taken seriously nor confronted in depth by the mainstream of the discipline. This neglect should be corrected, I contend, for contemporary political science is in need of a mature and nuanced theory of modernity that is capable of rising up to the radical challenge of the antimoderns.