Abstract Comparing ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s (d. 415/1025) ethical assessment of acts with their legal status, this paper draws attention to the complex manner in which he arrives at his definitions. The detailed analysis complicates the often presumed dichotomy between consequentialist and deontological approaches to ethics and between rationalist Muʿtazilism and theistic subjectivist Ashʿarism. It demonstrates that ʿAbd al-Jabbār employs both consequentialist and deontological perspectives. The paper argues that ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s definitions of “good,” “bad” and “obligatory” derive from taking God’s justice (ʿadl) as the standard by which he evaluates divine and human action, thus reversing analogizing from the seen to the unseen. Understanding an action as tipping the balance of justice in favor or against the agent explains ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s ethical and legal definitions of acts. It shows how an act of benefit for somebody else establishes a right for the agent and an obligation of restitution on the recipient.