Этика буддизма в свете западных нормативных этических теорий: этика добродетели

Abstract

In the last two decades, a comparative trend has developed within the discipline of Buddhist ethics in which scholars argue which of the major Western normative ethical theories is closest to early Buddhism: virtue ethics, consequentialism, or deontology. This article is devoted to the view of Buddhist ethics as a variant of virtue ethics. The article begins with a statement of the basic provisions of Buddhist ethics on which researchers rely when constructing the theory of Buddhist ethics. The purpose of this article is to show why the comparison of Buddhist ethics with the virtue ethics of Aristotle seems to be a successful and productive variant of the conceptualising Buddhist ethics, able to compete with the equally popular consequentialist approach. The work is mainly based on the consideration of the argumentation proposed by Damien Keown, a researcher who was the first to thoroughly approach the study of Buddhist ethics from a comparativist point of view, opening a wide field for discussion. Keown defends the view of Buddhist ethics as a variant of Aristotle’s virtue ethics and offers a critique of the consequentialist interpretation of the ethics of Buddhism. In conclusion, I propose the following solution to the comparative question: from my point of view, Theravada ethics is closest to virtue ethics in its basic positions. However, in Mahayana ethics, the features of consequentialism are more pronounced. Although comparative thinking is certainly interesting and productive, in the end I agree with the position that Buddhist ethics does not fit completely into any of the Western normative theories, but is an independent phenomenon.