The prevailing view about procreation, Christine Overall observes, is that “having children is the default position; not having children is what requires explanation and justification” (p. 3). These assumptions, she says, “are the opposite of what they ought to be” and that the “burden of proof... should rest primarily on those who choose to have children” (ibid). The ostensible goal of Why Have Children? is to discuss when this burden is and is not met. Professor Overall’s conclusions are much less radical than one would expect from somebody reversing the ordinary assumptions about procreation. Indeed, her conclusions about procreation are remarkably permissive. She begins her argument with a discussion (in Chapter 2) of reproductive rights, which she says are necessary but not sufficient for evaluating reproductive decisions (p. 21). Her focus is on moral rather than legal rights, and she distinguishes between a right to reproduce—in both a positive and a negative sense—from a right not to reproduce (p. 22). The right to reproduce, in its positive sense, includes not only assisted reproduction but also access to health services during pregnancy and labour. Professor Overall says that this right protects against “unjustified discrimination in access to reproductive services” (p. 24). However, she recognizes that a society may place limits on access to publicly funded in vitro fertilization, for example, on condition that these decisions are made on medical grounds (p. 26). The right to reproduce in the negative sense is the right not to have third parties interfere with a decision to procreate. While this right, on her view, is not limited in comparable ways (p. 29), it does not follow that a decision to produce is necessarily morally justifiable. The right not to reproduce is strongest and any violation of it is serious, amounting to “reproductive slavery” (p. 31). In Chapters 4 and 5 she considers, respectively, purportedly deontological and consequentialist reasons for having children. Among the many reasons considered are the claims that (a) having children is intrinsically worthwhile (pp. 59–61); (b) one must keep any promise one might have made to a partner to procreate (pp. 65–6); (c) one has a religious duty to procreate (pp. 66–8); and (d) children provide economic and psychological (pp. 76–80) benefits to their parents. She argues that none of the alleged reasons for procreating generates an obligation to do so. Here Professor Overall is in agreement with the overwhelming majority of philosophers, who deny that one ever has an obligation to procreate. Ethic Theory Moral Prac (2014) 17:583–585 DOI 10.1007/s10677-013-9477-5