Consequence Argument Research Articles

‘Determinism’ Is Just Fine: A Reply to Scott Sehon

Scott Sehon recently argued that the standard notion of determinism employed in the Consequence Argument makes it so that, if our world turns out to be deterministic, then an interventionist God is logically impossible. He further argues that because of this, we should revise our notion of determinism. In this paper I show that Sehon’s argument for the claim that the truth of determinism, in this sense, would make an interventionist God logically impossible ultimately fails. I then offer and respond to a weaker version of the argument for the claim that we should revise our notion of determinism.

Slippery slope arguments imply opposition to change.

Slippery slope arguments (SSAs) of the form if A, then C describe an initial proposal (A) and a predicted, undesirable consequence of this proposal (C) (e.g., "If cannabis is ever legalized, then eventually cocaine will be legalized, too"). Despite SSAs being a common rhetorical device, there has been surprisingly little empirical research into their subjective evaluation and perception. Here, we present evidence that SSAs are interpreted as a form of consequentialist argument, inviting inferences about the speaker's (or writer's) attitudes. Study1 confirmed the common intuition that a SSA is perceived to be an argument against the initial proposal (A), whereas Study2 showed that the subjective strength of this inference relates to the subjective undesirability of the predicted consequences (C). Because arguments are rarely made out of context, in Studies 3 and 4 we examined how one important contextual factor, the speaker's known beliefs, influences the perceived coherence, strength, and persuasiveness of a SSA. Using an unobtrusive dependent variable (eye movements during reading), in Study3 we showed that readers are sensitive to the internal coherence between a speaker's beliefs and the implied meaning of the argument. Finally, Study4 revealed that this degree of internal coherence influences the perceived strength and persuasiveness of the argument. Together, these data indicate that SSAs are treated as a form of negative consequentialist argument. People infer that the speaker of a SSA opposes the initial proposal; therefore, SSAs are only perceived to be persuasive and conversationally relevant when the speaker's attitudes match this inference.

Será a análise condicional uma resposta satisfatória ao incompatibilismo?

Peter van Inwagen (1983) uses the Consequence Argument to support the idea that free will is incompatible with determinism. One of the most disputed versions of this argument is its modal version. In order to formulate this version of the argument, van Inwagen adds to the traditional modal operators (necessity and possibility) the “ N ” operator, which represents the expression «it’s not up to us that…». According to van Inwagen, the N operator has two fundamental inference rules: rule (α) and rule (β) , which allow him to derive the incompatibilist thesis from a set of apparently uncontroversial premises. However, the compatibilist Thomas Flint (1987) suggests that using the so called “ conditional analysis ” it’s possible to find a counterexample to rule (β) in the Consequence Argument itself. In this paper, we intend to show that this objection is unsuccessful, because rule (β) seems to be more plausible than the conditional analysis itself. In order to support this idea, we will follow two strategies. First, we will follow Roderick M. Chisholm’s (1964) argument in order to show that if we take the conditional analysis seriously we are wrongly committed to think that the meaning of: a) «S could have done otherwise» is to be understood in the following way: b) «If S had chosen to act otherwise, he could have acted otherwise». Secondly, we will appeal to Michael Fara’s (2008) reply to the conditional analysis, according to which it doesn’t provide proper understanding of the notion of “ability” at stake in this discussion, because it doesn’t provide an explanation for cases in which an ability doesn’t manifest because it’s masked. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.21747/21836892/fil33a19

Free Will and Miracles

The Consequence Argument is sound only if no one has a choice about the laws of nature, and one prominent compatibilist reply to the argument—championed by David Lewis (1981)—begins by claiming that there is a sense in which we do have such a choice, and a sense in which we don’t. Lewis then insists that the sense in which we do have such a choice is the only sense required by compatibilism. Peter van Inwagen (2004) has responded that even if Lewis’s distinction between two senses of having a choice about the laws is accepted, compatibilists are still committed to the incredible view that free will requires the ability to perform miracles. In this paper, I offer a reply to van Inwagen on Lewis’s behalf.

Research Ethics: Re-Evaluating the Consequentialist Perspective of Using Covert Participant Observation in Management Research

PurposeThis paper presents empirical evidence that focuses on the use of covert participant observation as a method of data collection and considers the ethical nature of this method as a means to create knowledge that leads to direct management action. This ethical debate centres on issues such as informed consent, rights and consequences. This paper develops the consequentialist argument by reflecting on our experiences of using covert participant observation and the consequences of using such a method in empirical management research.MethodologyTwo empirical case studies, conducted independently of one another, highlight the choices we made and the justification for using covert participant observation as a means to investigate organisational issues.FindingsWhilst we conclude that this research method can be used effectively within an ethical framework, we suggest that researchers need to be more aware issues of the potential consequences on themselves in terms of the personal, emotional and trust issues that centre around deception when using covert participant observation. Research ImplicationsResearchers are now asked to consider the consequences on themselves of conducting covert participant observation, and in particular, to assess the potential problems arising in the form of emotional or personal implications when being deceptive. Originality of Paper The ethical debate concerning the rights and consequences of conducting covert participant observation is extended to include a consideration of the consequences for the researcher pertaining to the collection and use of data using this research method. We go beyond the traditional aspects of the debate by extending it to consider the consequences on the researcher of using what is essentially research method based on deception.

Justifying a duty to suicide

Summary Asserting that there are mandatory suicides is a controversial claim to make, to say the least. The idea that some people have an obligation to end their own lives creates a visceral reaction in its apparent attack on the central moral tenets of respecting life and people for the intrinsically valuable entities they are. Moreover, there is a well-justified fear that some despicable groups might take advantage of such a position in their attempts to eliminate what they consider to be undesirable populations in their community. Given the conventional view that these populations are generally the most vulnerable, believing that there is a mandatory duty for vulnerable, persecuted populations to suicide would plausibly make the person holding such a position a moral monster to be roundly condemned. The issue of obligatory death, however, deserves far more serious consideration than generally given because it is not a simple view with obvious conclusions. The very arguments used against duties to die or suicide can be shown to support such obligations in certain increasingly common situations. In this article, I will develop the philosophical justifications for mandatory suicide based on Gillian Bennett's suicide letter. The letter shows the practical reasoning that many reasonable people facing end of life decisions use to justify, and more importantly, explain to others why they are going to take their own lives on their own terms. Bennett's message serves not only as a foundation to developing critical arguments but as a grounding of the emotional, reasonable humanity involved in these tragic situations. In what follows, seven arguments for suicide duties will be considered. Some, such as the Rights’ Argument, will be found deficient based on the existential implausibility of the rights existing, as Jeremy Bentham pointed out approximately 200 years ago. Others, such as the Consequentialist Argument, are far more plausible in that they appeal to our intellectual desire to use the most objective, rational approach to solving ethical quandaries that literally involved life and death decisions. The problem, however, is that consequentialism denies the very foundation of morality in that it treats intrinsically valuable entities, i.e., persons, as mere objects. What might be surprising to many is that the most convincing arguments suicide duty are built upon moral foundation that most people think are the most hostile to any such obligation. However, care ethics, narrative ethics, and even Kantianism can justify a duty to die if certain conditions obtain. In fact, these theories show far more humanity to those who are facing the existential decision to remain alive or to end their lives. The Kantian Argument, for instance, can justify a suicide only in those instances in which the person faces the moral dilemma of sacrificing her physical life as the only way to preserve her human dignity, or continuing to physically live even though her dignity has been destroyed by an unethical choice she made or implemented. Of course, the latter is an irrational action to take. The Care Ethics and Narrative Arguments are based far more on subjective grounds, including personal relationships that create attendant obligations or existential choices the person makes to be a particular type of person with a particular history. Finally, it should not be thought that any one of the suicide duty arguments cover every situation or must be used on their own. In the final section, a compromise argument is developed that uses elements of all the plausible justifications for an obligation to die. The power of this argument makes it far more difficult for anyone to claim that there are not real instances in which a person has a duty to take his own life.

Shareholder Primacy and Deontology

AbstractThis article argues that shareholder primacy cannot be defended on the grounds that there is something special about the position of shareholders that grounds a right to preferential treatment on part of management. The notions of property and contract, traditionally thought to ground such a right, are now widely recognized as incapable of playing that role. This leaves shareholder theorists with two options. They can either abandon the project of arguing for their view on broadly deontological grounds and try to advance consequentialist arguments instead or they can search for other morally relevant properties that could ground shareholder rights. The most sustained argument in the latter vein is Marcoux's attempt to show that the vulnerability of shareholders mandates that managers are their fiduciaries. I show that this argument leads to the unacceptable conclusion that it would be unethical for corporations to make incomplete contracts with nonshareholding stakeholders.

Reputational risks and participation in flood risk management and the public debate about the 2013 flood in Germany

Stakeholder participation is seen to be integral for the improvement of flood risk management. In many cases, however, participation in flood risk management practice has also become a space of conflict and debate. In order to better understand these conflicts, this paper focuses on the interplay between the practices of participation which seek to improve the management of first order risks such as floods and second order reputational risks which arise as a consequence of arguments about participation in political and publicised discourses.Our analysis draws on empirical data related to the experience of the 2013 flood, which affected large parts of eastern and south-western Germany. The empirical data was gathered in Saxony and includes interviews conducted with citizens and experts involved in participatory processes in flood risk management as well as analysis of newspaper articles published during and directly after the 2013 flood.The analysis found that practices of participation in flood risk management are highly politicised in Saxony and Germany in general. The basic argument that surfaced in the aftermath of the 2013 flood was that because some groups were very powerful and active in pursuing their individual interests during participatory processes, the planning and construction of technical measures took too long to provide some communities with protection against the flood and hence increased their overall susceptibility. As a consequence of this public blaming of participation for the damages that occurred in 2013, the very structure of participatory processes as well as the right of actors to participate in flood risk management were questioned. The paper concludes that the interplay of institutionalised practices of participation and public and media-related discourses about participation stand in close connection in Saxony. The institutional setting only allows for very limited participation in decision-making processes and, at the same time, provides the possibility for responsible administrations to delegate responsibility and blame to those stakeholders participating in risk management in case “something goes wrong”.

Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: A Balanced Retributive Account

The standard of proof in criminal trials in many liberal democracies is proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the BARD standard. It is customary to describe it, when putting a number on it, as requiring that the fact finder be at least 90% certain, after considering the evidence, that the defendant is guilty. Strikingly, no good reason has yet been offered in defense of using that standard. A number of non-consequentialist justifications that aim to support an even higher standard have been offered; all are morally unsound. Meanwhile, consequentialist arguments plausibly support a substantially lower standard — in some cases so low as to undermine the idea that punishment is what is at stake. In this paper, I offer a new retributive justification that supports excluding the instrumental benefits of punishment from the balance that sets the standard. The resulting balance supports a standard arguably in the ballpark of the customary understanding of BARD: a standard requiring that the fact finder have a high, though not maximally high, degree of confidence that the defendant is guilty.

Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding in Africa: Nexus Or Nemesis?

In what way have liberal peacebuilding interacted with the mechanisms commonly associated with Transitional Justice (TJ), and how has this enriched the debate of liberal peace and democracy in Africa? In two parts, this article briefly elucidates the intersection between Transitional Justice (TJ) and liberal peacebuilding. The first part begins by revising Oliver Richmond’s four generations of practices in peacebuilding. A particular emphasis will be placed here in the fourth, the most contemporary framework for liberal peacebuilding, and the major criticisms that it has received in Africa. The second part acknowledges the sustained criticism of liberal peace in Africa, which is key to understanding the growing relevance of the ‘justice versus peace’ debate in two specific forms of post-conflict reconstruction experiments in Africa. Two are: (i) transformation from peacekeeping to peacebuilding; (ii) a paradigm shift from the normative, liberal peace conviction that justice is a good project, to a legal, consequentialist argument that peace cannot be lastingly sustained without some form of criminal prosecution, resulting the increasing usage of human rights language in drafting peace agreements. The aims is to highlight the deeper affinity and deficiency that can be viewed as two sides of the same coin in the liberal cosmopolitan approach to post-Cold War International Relations (IR): peacebuilding as a political project concerned with sustainable peace, and TJ as a legal project that concerns itself with evaluating the modes of justice during the transitional phase.

Molinists (still) cannot endorse the consequence argument

Perszyk (Faith Philos 20:131–151, 2003) has argued that Molinists cannot consistently endorse the consequence argument because of a structurally similar argument for the incompatibility of true Molinist counterfactuals of freedom (CCFs) and the ability to do otherwise. Wierenga (in: Molinism: the contemporary debate, 2011) has argued that on the proper understanding of CCFs, there is a relevant difference between the consequence argument and the anti-Molinist argument. I argue that, even on Wierenga’s understanding of CCFs, there is in fact no relevant difference between the two arguments. Moreover, I strengthen Perszyk’s challenge by highlighting further relevant similarities between CCFs and facts about the laws.

Free Choice and Patient Best Interests.

In medical practice, the doctrine of informed consent is generally understood to have priority over the medical practitioner's duty of care to her patient. A common consequentialist argument for the prioritisation of informed consent above the duty of care involves the claim that respect for a patient's free choice is the best way of protecting that patient's best interests; since the patient has a special expertise over her values and preferences regarding non-medical goods she is ideally placed to make a decision that will protect her interests. In this paper I argue against two consequentialist justifications for a blanket prioritisation of informed consent over the duty of care by considering cases in which patients have imperfect access to their overall best interests. Furthermore, I argue that there are cases where the mere presentation of choice under the doctrine of informed consent is detrimental to patient best interests. I end the paper by considering more nuanced approaches to resolving the conflict between informed consent and the duty of care and consider the option of permitting patients to waive informed consent.

Sound mind, irrational behavior?

Sound mind, irrational behavior?

Self-Representation & Good Determination

I argue that a distinction made in recent literature in the philosophy of mind between self-organizing and self-governing systems can serve as the basis of a principled distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ determination on the part of the compatibilist with respect to freedom or control. I first consider two arguments for the claim that causal determinism undermines control: the Consequence Argument as presented by Peter van Inwagen, and the Four Case Argument of Derk Pereboom. I then elucidate the difference between a self-organizing and self-governing system, and argue that the capacity for self-representation that is constitutive of the latter allows for agential control. This difference, I argue, can provide the basis of a principled distinction between good and bad determination. I subsequently show how the framework presented undermines the Consequence and Four Case Arguments in their attempt to establish the claim that causal determinism undermines control, and I discuss the application of this framework to manipulation arguments in general. Finally, I consider and respond to Galen Strawson’s Basic Argument and the general rejoinder to my account that one is not responsible for the particular way in which one exercises one’s capacity for self-representation, and that this undermines any claim to agential control and responsibility.

Questioning South Africa’s ‘genetic link’ requirement for surrogacy

and a legal challenge currently being made against SA’s Minister of Social Development, who supports the current law. [3] To begin to appreciate some of the rationale for doubting the justice of the law, consider the following scenario. Imagine a couple that has tried for over a decade to get pregnant, but has been unable to do so. Suppose that he is sterile and she is now in her late 40s, without viable eggs and unable to gestate a fetus. And yet both still long to be involved with a child from the start, perhaps one that is likely to have features similar to theirs. The law, as it stands in SA, forbids them from using a surrogate mother who would carry an embryo fertilised by donor gametes that the couple has selected. In this article I appeal to moral-philosophical reasons to conclude that SA’s surrogacy law is unjust in respect of the above scenario and those similar to it. I rebut rationales, usefully divided into consequentialist and non-consequentialist moral arguments, for

Freedom, responsibility and the past: A consideration of the new consequence argument (Proceedings of the CAPE International Workshops, 2013. Part II: The CAPE International Conference “A Frontier of Philosophy of Time”)

Freedom, responsibility and the past: A consideration of the new consequence argument (Proceedings of the CAPE International Workshops, 2013. Part II: The CAPE International Conference “A Frontier of Philosophy of Time”)

A Taxonomy of Constitutional Arguments

This article explores how the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom (and the House of Lords) has generally appealed to four forms of constitutional arguments when interpreting the Human Rights Act 1998: (i) textual arguments, (ii) historical arguments, (iii) precedential arguments, and (iv) consequentialist arguments. The author will also illustrate how the various types of constitutional arguments are substantially interdependent and interrelated, such that they often dovetail with one another to reach a reasonably coherent and defensible legal result.

Causes, laws, and free will: why determinism doesn't matter

CONTENTS Chapter 1 The Problem Introduced: Would Determinism Rob us of Free Will? 1. Free Will, Ability to do Otherwise, and the Basic Argument 2. Determinism and some Distinctions 3. Narrow Ability, Wide Ability, and the No Choice Argument 4. The Basic Argument Extended and Two Ways of Replying: Metaphysical Compatibilism and Moral Compatibilism 5. How I propose to Navigate the Treacherous Waters of the Free Will/Determinism Problem: A First Road Map of the Book Chapter 2 The Problem Distinguished: Is it Possible for Us to Have Free Will? Do We Have Free Will? 1. Two Questions about Free Will: The Possibility Question and the Determinism Question 2. Some Remarks about Methodology 3. The Existential Question and Common Sense Compatibilism 4. Impossibilism: Five Arguments for Fatalism 5. Hard Determinism or Impossibilism? Five Versions of the Clarence Darrow Argument Chapter 3 Abilities, Choices, and Agent Causation 1. What This Chapter is About and Why 2. The Common Sense View (and the Limits of Common Sense) 3. Two Steps Beyond Common Sense: Limited Laws Indeterminism and Agent Causation 4. Are Events the only Causes? Could an Object be a Cause? 5. Could an Agent be a Cause? 6. Where We Are Now Chapter 4 The Unavoidability of Metaphysics: Moral Responsibility and Ability to do Otherwise 1. Alternatives, Choice, and Moral Responsibility 2. Frankfurt's Bold Gambit and the Long Debate that Followed 3. Two Ways of Getting Someone to Do What you Want 4. Heads I Win, Tails you Lose 5. Why There is No Middle Way (Why Putting the Pre-Emptor on the Scene Doesn't Help) 6. Freedom of Action, Freedom of Will, and Three Ways of Having a Choice 7. Frankfurt's Intuition Reconsidered: Why the Subtraction Argument Fails, Why the Supervenience Argument Fails 8. Lessons for Compatibilists Chapter 5 Arguments for Incompatibilism 1. No Forking Paths Argument 2. No Present Causes Argument 3. No Agent Causes Argument 4. No Inner Commander Argument 5. Manipulation Arguments 6. The Consequence Argument Chapter 6 The Abilities and Dispositions of our Freedom 1. The Big Picture: the Bundle View 2. Abilities and Dispositions 3. Dispositions and Counterfactuals 4. The Intrinsic Dispositions Thesis and Frankfurt's Argument 5. Wide Abilities, Choice, and the Consequence Argument 6. Historical Interlude: Objections to the Simple Conditional Analysis Reconsidered 7. Virtues of the Bundle View Chapter 7 Laws, Counterfactuals, and Fixed Past Compatibilism 1. What this Chapter is About and Why 2. How the Laws Constrain 3. Counterfactuals and Our Experience of Choice 4. Counterfactuals: From Goodman to Lewis 5. Choice Counterfactuals and Fixed Past Compatibilism 6. Concluding Remarks Notes References Index

‘Can’ and the Consequence Argument

AbstractThe consequence argument is a powerful incompatibilist argument for the conclusion that, if determinism is true, what one does is what one must do. A major point of controversy between classical compatibilists and incompatibilists has been over the use of ‘can’ in the consequence argument. Classical compatibilists, holding that abilities to act are dispositions, have argued that ‘can’ should be analyzed as a conditional. But such an analysis of ‘can’ puts compatibilists in a position to grant the premises of the argument while denying the conclusion. Incompatibilists remain unconvinced, and this corner of the debate over free will has reached a dialectical impasse. The present paper has two aims. First, to offer a new dialectical point of entry into this dispute on behalf of incompatibilists. By making use of Angelika Kratzer's influential semantic work on ‘can’ and ‘must’, I argue that incompatibilists are in a position to offer a plausible, positive treatment of ‘can’ that favors their view. Second, even if one does not think incompatibilism is thereby true (for as we shall see there are places to push back), the Kratzer semantics yields a number of important insights concerning the consequence argument that should be of broad interest.

Will There Ever Be a Drug with No or Negligible Side Effects? Evidence from Neuroscience

Arguments in the neuroenhancement debate are sometimes based upon idealistic scenarios involving the assumption of using a drug that has no or negligible side effects. At least it is often implicitly assumed – as technology and scientific knowledge advances - that there soon will be a drug with no or negligible side effects. We will review evidence from neuroscience, complex network research and evolution theory and demonstrate that - at least in terms of psychopharmacological intervention – on the basis of our understanding of brain function it seems inconceivable that there ever will be a drug that has the desired effect without undesirable side effects. We will illustrate this by reference to enhancing edge detection in V2 in monkeys and demonstrate that even for this localised single neuron coded function there would be numerous side effects. Taking the more realistic case of pharmacological enhancement that is inevitably associated with side effects will change consequentialist arguments for neuroenhancement and have implications for the conception of autonomy, specifically in the case of performance enhancement. We conclude that a neuroethics debate that aims to inform policy decisions should take these findings into account. We hope that our article will precipitate more interdisciplinary research in neuroscience and philosophy.