Consensus Democracy Research Articles

Kinder, Gentler, Safer? A Re-Examination of the Relationship between Consensus Democracy and Domestic Terrorism

Can inclusive institutions tame the threat of domestic terrorism? In a series of recent publications, the political scientists Arend Lijphart and Matt Qvortrup claim that consensus democracies are not only kinder and gentler, but also safer: consensus democracies are less likely to experience deadly domestic terrorism and when they do, they suffer fewer fatalities than majoritarian democracies. This article reexamines the logic and the evidence. It argues that the underlying grievance theory of terrorism contains important gaps and that the statistical results are based on a problematic coding of cases and lack robustness. Lijphart and Qvortrup have opened up an important new line of inquiry, but their results do not withstand scrutiny.

Duch d’Hondta w Strasburgu. Zasada proporcjonalnej dystrybucji stanowisk w Parlamencie Europejskim

Proportionality is an intrinsic feature of parliamentary democracy. It is a principle stating that, depending on its size, each political party has a commensurate ability to influence legislature. This is confirmed by comparative studies which show that proportionality is a significant principle in the distribution of parliamentary posts in a majority of West European states. Consequently, even deputies from the smallest parties can chair commissions or lead sessions of the chambers, and by this token participate in the political decision-making process. This softens the domination of the majority party and – in line with Arend Lijphart’s concept – generates consensual democracy, based on the search for broad compromises instead of simply outvoting the opponent. Given this picture, a question emerges whether the situation is similar in the representative institution of the European Union, i.e. the European Parliament. The paper answers this question positively. The standard of proportionality has strong roots in the European Parliament forming a fundamental principle expressed in terms of d’Hondt’s formula applied to distribute posts among different political groups. This mainly concerns the division of the members of the Presidium and commission chairmen, who exercise the most important decisive functions. The implementation of the idea of appropriate representation may not be ideal, but divergences are rare, insignificant and usually they result from political bargaining that favors smaller fractions. The proportionality principle is also binding when distributing parliamentary posts inside political groups. There is a strong and positive correlation between the size of national delegations and the number of key posts they obtain in the Parliament – members of the Presidium, commission chairmen and coordinators. Only in the case of the latter is proportionality subjected to certain distortions, following from their key political importance. This, however, does not interfere with the general picture of symmetric participation of national groups in appointing parliamentary posts. In conclusion, the standard of proportionality allows all political groups to adequately participate in the work of the European Parliament, which deserves to be emphasized, the more so, as it is not formalized.

Consensual democracy And the role of elites in institutionalizing political divisions

The consensual democracy Considered a form of a ruling , in the Unconsensus in heterogeneous national or sectarian or ideological, which is limited to the core political issues that require political consensus, does not extend to all levels of political action because this democracy may be crippling political stability and lead the leaders of the political forces role pivotal in this aspect, the more these leaders have taken in the national interest supreme value at the expense of ethnic or narrow sectarian interests, whenever consensus and political stability, and the more hardened leaders in their own interests, were introduced in a closed circle of conflict and instability.

Polarization and Electoral Incentives: The End of the Chilean Consensus Democracy, 1990–2014

AbstractConsensus democracy among the main Chilean political forces ended abruptly after the 2013 presidential and parliamentary elections, the most polarized elections since the return to democracy in 1990. Relying on spatial voting theory to uncover latent ideological dimensions from survey data between 1990 and 2014, this study finds patterns of gradual polarization starting at least ten years before the collapse of consensus, based on an increasing demobilization of the political center that misaligned politicians from their political platforms (particularly in the center-left parties). That phenomenon changed the political support for the two main political coalitions and the intracoalition bargaining power of their various factions. The pattern also helps to explain the process behind the 2015 reform of the electoral system.

Austrian postwar democratic consensus and anti-Semitism

AbstractThis paper explores the relation between the use of anti-Semitic rhetoric in post-war Austrian parliamentary debate and the development of the consensus-oriented, corporatist model of Austrian democracy, the “consociational model,” between 1945 and 1955. Specifically, this paper examines the anti-Semitic stereotypes found in parliament, an arena where “the sayable” of official politics is defined, and whether such anti-Semitic stereotyping serves political-strategic purposes. The predominant pattern of exclusion proves to be the attribution of ambivalence, drawing on the repertoire of nationalist anti-Semitic stereotypes, depicting “emigrants” as “cowards,” incapable of love for and defense of their countries. The analysis shows this pattern of exclusion is rooted in an ethnicized, homogeneous, and masculinist understanding of the people – recurrent in contemporary right-wing movements and parties. It follows the lines of Carl Schmitt’s concept of the political, in which the distinction of “friend” and “enemy,” and hence, the eradication of pluralism and ambivalence, is pivotal.

African school of thought: The missing ideology in finding a solution to sub-Saharan African insecurity

Post‐colonial sub‐Saharan Africa continually experiences a collapse of consensual democracy as an ideology and system of governance. Poverty, greed and corruption have bred political instability, conflicts and dependence on exporting primary products. For post‐colonial Africa to feel truly independent, its adoption of consensual democracy needs to be sincere. Ideological theories, the epistemological origins of development programmes, and the philosophy of choice cherished in consensual democracy have been overlooked in current African political cultures, which habitually disregard grassroots voices. Using the Department for International Development's Research Strategy (2008–2013), the article explores how ideological functions transcend the political cultures, underdevelopment and insecurities of sub‐Saharan Africa. It is hoped that the possibility of sustainable development may be enhanced by the inclusion of an African school of thought.

How Populists Wage Opposition: Parliamentary Opposition Behaviour and Populism in Netherlands

This article analyses how populist parties wage opposition in parliament. We conceptualise opposition behaviour in terms of two independent dimensions: scrutiny (monitoring and criticising government actions) and policy-making (participating in or directly influencing legislative production). In line with the conceptualisation of populism as an opposition to the ruling elite in name of ‘the people’, our hypothesis is that populist opposition parties are more likely to use scrutiny and less likely to use policy-making tools than non-populist opposition parties. We study the Netherlands between 1998 and 2017 as a typical example of a consensus democracy, where populist parties have a greater opportunity to win representation and use parliamentary tools (compared to majoritarian democracies). Our findings indicate that populist opposition parties are particularly less likely to engage in policy-making behaviour and somewhat more likely to engage in scrutiny behaviour.

The cartel party, consensus democracy and democracy without politics

Although the age of the mass party as an organizational form is long in the past, the mass party remains a widely accepted normative ideal, closely connected to the idea of party government and to a voters-as-principals-parties-as-agents understanding of democracy. In evolving from mass party, to catch-all party, to cartel party European democracies have also been evolving towards an ‘anti-political’ view of government, along with models of consensus democracy and the regulatory state. This evolution helps to explain the decline in popular connection to political parties. Ironically, the associated causes of this decline are generally regarded as good, notwithstanding that the decline itself is often identified as a crisis. Moreover, analysis of this decline suggests as striking similarity between the consensus model of democracy and the cartel party model of democracy, notwithstanding that the first is often seen as a goal to which democracies should be moving while the second is seen as a threat to democracy itself.

Participatory developments in majoritarian and consensus democracies

Recently, many democracies have developed towards more citizens’ involvement in direct democracy or public deliberation. Are these developments linked to different types of democracy? Can public deliberation be mainly found in consensus democracies, whereas direct democracy prevails in majoritarian democracies? By analysing OECD countries around the year 2012, we examine these assumptions. The answer is surprisingly clear. The choice of a democracy to opt for direct democratic instruments or for public deliberation is neither dichotomous nor is it related to the respective pattern type of democracy. Based on these findings, a new typology with four participatory models of democracy is suggested.

O współczesnych problemach z prawdą. Refleksje w świetle eseju Harry’ego G. Frankfurta O wciskaniu kitu (On Bullshit)

This article is an attempt to present one of the vital features of modern culture, namely indifference to truth. In the context of proclaiming the expression “post-truth” the Word of the Year 2016, the author shows how this modern indifference should be understood. It is explained by recalling the essay of Harry G. Frankfurt entitled On Bullshit. This short text presents a certain characteristic trait of modern times, that is, a certain attitude to truth typical of the contemporary man. What is interesting is that it is convergent with the meaning of the very expression that has recently made such a spectacular career and became the Word of the Year. In the first part of the article the author presents the history of the term “post-truth”, its basic meaning and the context in which it was created and is now used. The term “bullshit” is then treated in a similar way. In the third part of the article the main thoughts of Frankfurt’s essay are referred to. It is pointed out that this short essay, written already in the 1980s, proves to be still valid up until today. For in his essay Frankfurt does not describe any political reality, social or medial one, saturated with dishonesty, disinformation, lies and manipulation. He does not attempt to present various types of examples of “bullshit”. Instead, as befits a philosopher, he goes deeper and attempts to reach the essence of this phenomenon. In this way he draws an unusually accurate image of the modern man for whom truth has lost its significance, for whom there has grown between truth and lies – contrary to any logic – a whole sphere of bullshit, or otherwise post-truth. In the fourth part of the article the author points out the sources of such a situation. He talks about the rejection of the realistic, classical way of understanding truth and, in relation to it, about turning away from reality, that is from facts. In the last part the author explains that in modern times in place of reality (as an important point of reference) the criterion of coherence and democratic consensus has been introduced, or – what fits well into the culture of “bullshit” – the criterion of practicality and usefulness. Instead of thinking in terms of objective order, it is therefore proposed that one should think and act in terms of subjectively perceived advantages. At this point the author refers to Richard Rorty’s philosophical conception and shows that Rorty’s end of philosophy, the abandonment of the search for the ultimate foundations of cognition, for the discovery of truth, for the dominant idea of „contingency” and usefulness, and his „language games” are all excellent illustrations of what a man of the era of post-truth, the era of indifference to truth, nourishes.

The Italian Welfare State in the Crisis: Learning to Adjust?

After a decade of inertia, that left it unprepared to withstand the blow of the great recession, the Italian welfare state has witnessed significant changes since 2012. Externally driven consolidation in the wake of the sovereign debt crisis spurred yet another wave of social policy reforms after that of the 1990s. These reforms did not however invariably entail retrenchment. Both the Monti and the Renzi governments combined liberalisation with expansion of social rights, particularly in income support. As a result, the Italian welfare state looks more comprehensive than it was before the crisis. At the same time, there was no overall strategy of welfare modernisation based on coordinated social investment measures. The changes in Italian social policy since the outburst of the great recession highlight the importance of domestic politics interacting with external drivers of change. They also facilitate an assessment of the opportunity structures for further reforms in a political system that appears to be veering again towards consensus democracy.

A DEMOCRATIC CONSENSUS? ISAIAH BERLIN, HANNAH ARENDT, AND THE ANTI-TOTALITARIAN FAMILY QUARREL

Amid the ongoing political turmoil, symbolized by the recent violence in Charlottesville, Virginia, books and articles abound today to encourage us to re-read anti-totalitarian classics ‘for our times’. But what do we find in this body of work originally written in response to Nazism and Stalinism? Do we find a democratic consensus forged by a shared anti-totalitarian commitment? I doubt it. Considering the cases of Isaiah Berlin and Hannah Arendt, this article highlights discord beneath what may today appear like a post-war democratic consensus. I argue that the anti-totalitarian literature of the last century encompassed multiple political philosophies, which sometimes differed irreconcilably from each other.

Timor-Leste

Timor-Leste Michael Leach (bio) The year 2017 in Timor-Leste was dominated by a round of national elections and a major breakthrough in the country's long-running dispute [End Page 539] with Australia over maritime boundaries. In the latter part of the year, a newly installed fretilin-led minority government proved unable to pass its program in Parliament, which saw the country head back to the polls in May 2018. (fretilin is the acronym for one of Timor-Leste's major political parties: the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor.) A new maritime boundary and revenue-sharing treaty with Australia negotiated over 2017 was signed in early March 2018. The year started unexpectedly with a joint announcement that the government of Timor-Leste would terminate the 2006 Treaty on Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea (cmats) with Australia (Australian Treaty Series 2007). The decision, which Australia did not contest, opened the way for progress in boundary negotiations. Aside from sharing the proceeds of undersea resources, the key feature of cmats was a fifty-year moratorium on boundary negotiations in favor of a series of revenue-sharing agreements, known as "provisional arrangements" under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, or unclos. Having vigorously defended cmats as recently as 2016, several factors explain the change in Australia's position. The 2006 treaty had been tarnished by allegations that Australia had spied on the East Timorese negotiating team in 2004 (smh 2013). Timor-Leste had then challenged the treaty, invoking the Vienna Convention's principle that negotiations should take place in "good faith." Equally significantly, in April 2016 the government of Timor-Leste initiated compulsory conciliation proceedings under unclos with the aim of concluding permanent maritime boundaries with Australia. Australia's opening legal gambit—a jurisdictional claim that the cmats treaty had already settled the border dispute—was dismissed by the conciliation commission in September 2016, which found that Australia's obligation to settle the boundary survived the treaty and its purported moratorium (unclos Conciliation Commission 2016). Having lost this argument, Australia had little further practical use for cmats. An additional factor was the dispute between China and its neighbors in the South China Sea, which raised the regional profile of international law in boundary disputes. In that case, Australia urged China to follow the rule of law, as represented by the decision of the tribunal formed under unclos. The contrast with Canberra's own behavior—its refusal to discuss a boundary in the Timor Sea and its withdrawal from the dispute-settlement provisions of unclos shortly before East Timorese independence in 2002—had created a public relations problem for Australia. For example, the powerful US House Armed Services Committee's National Defense Authorization Act for 2018 was specifically amended to encourage resolution of the maritime-boundary dispute between Australia and Timor-Leste. The committee noted that negotiations would send "a positive signal to other states in the region regarding adherence to a rules-based international order," highlighting the "potential security benefits" likely to flow from a peaceful resolution of the dispute (US House Armed Services Committee 2017, 2). There is little question that this shift in Washington [End Page 540] signaled extra pressure on Canberra to resolve the matter within the unclos conciliation process. These negotiations reached a partial conclusion in September 2017, discussed later in this review. The 2017 round of elections occurred in the wake of a government formed in extraordinary circumstances in early 2015, when the former independence movement leader Xanana Gusmão handed over the prime ministership to an opposition fretilin figure, Rui Araújo. Though best seen as a power-sharing executive rather than a formal government of national unity, this informal "grand coalition" between Timor-Leste's two largest parties—the National Congress for Timorese Reconstruction (cnrt) and fretilin—was a remarkable development, given the bitter tensions between the parties as recently as 2012. Described by a senior cnrt minister as a transition from "belligerent democracy to consensus democracy" (Pereira 2014), this powerful combination left President José Maria Vasconcelos (better known by his nom de guerre, Taur Matan Ruak) as the closest thing to an effective opposition. Ruak did...

Smells like politics: planning and the inconvenient politics of intensive peri‐urban agriculture

AbstractIntensive farming is an increasing part of Australian agriculture, including in the multi‐functional landscapes at the edges of Australian cities. The example of intensive “broiler” poultry production reveals the tensions that arise when sites of hyper‐productivity conflict with social change in rural areas. Planning processes for intensive farming in the Australian state of Victoria are predicated on stability and consensus: on assumed static and uncontroversial ideas of agriculture, its place, and the primacy of agricultural productivity. Yet concerns about the industrialisation of agriculture are live political issues at the local level, especially in dynamic peri‐urban locations. This paper explores the emergence of a politics of place outside the bounds of planning consensus through an analysis of planning appeals and associated media relating to planning permits for intensive poultry developments in Victoria over 2011–2016. We highlight tensions that exist in relation to technical planning assessments and categorisations used to assert farming as the orthodox use of rural land, especially when new forms of farming look and feel demonstrably different. Using Mouffe's problematising of the negation of antagonism and Rancière's notion of the risks of a false consensus democracy, we argue that planning processes for intensive farming illustrate critical issues in participatory planning. While ostensibly post‐political decision‐making narrows the politics of place and food systems to decisions about policing the boundaries and buffer distances placed around intensive poultry developments, alternative representations of rural life persist. The certainty offered by code‐based planning does not negate the ongoing (if inconvenient) politics of intensive peri‐urban agriculture.

Secession and the Prevalence of Militant Constitutionalism Worldwide

The prevalent approach suggests that constitutions are silent about secession and may even implicitly allow it. But an examination of world constitutions reveals that the overwhelming majority of countries vigorously protect territorial integrity. This is true even of countries classified as consociational or consensus democracies. Scholars further point to the existence of secessionist political parties as proof that secession may align with constitutionalism. This Article, however, explains how democracies engage in a delicate game to chase and eliminate secessionist political mobilization. Democracies have been able to conceal their fight against secessionists by creating a large gap between “the law on the books” and “the law as practiced.” Some constitutions also use doublespeak to declare territorial integrity inviolable while nevertheless setting procedures for territorial change. In fact, democracies employ the most unconventional constitutional weapons to fight against secession. These include a ban on secessionist political parties from participating at elections and a constitutional eternity clause that makes territorial integrity an eternal value, not subject to constitutional amendment. These tools raise democratic paradoxes so extreme that democracies appear to be using the tools of authoritarian regimes. Militant democracy must be re-characterized to capture not just bans on political parties, but also eternity clauses. It serves to protect existential needs of states, not just their democratic regime. Even when democracies allow for secession, they set such hurdles that secession becomes all but impossible to achieve. Countries’ total prohibition on secession may be explained on strategic as well as principled constitutional law considerations. This Article argues that constitutions’ treatment of secession reveals that “We the People” is a territorial concept. The Canadian landmark Reference re Secession of Quebec decision’s precedential value for world constitutionalism must thus be qualified.

Peace economics and peaceful economic policies

This article outlines pillars of peace economics and peaceful economics policies. It first highlights Kenneth Boulding’s contribution to peace economics. In particular, substantial attention is paid to his conception of three systems that govern social life, namely the exchange system, the threat system, and the integrative system. Examples are produced to describe the differences between and among them. Second, in light of Boulding’s views, a workable definition of peace is proposed and associated suggestions for peaceful economic policy are made. Three aspects are underlined: The establishment of consensual democracies, the setting of a novel economic policy target—namely the ratio of public education expenditure to military expenditure—and the pursuit of stricter regulations on the international arms trade.

The Jury as a Translation of Democratic Participation and Political Conflict

A long tradition in scholarship champions the juror as an important manifestation of democratic participation. Some scholarship advances the jury as an expression of and method to instill democratic duty and produce lay participation at the individual level (Dalton 2008; Hans 2007; Fukurai, Knudtson, and Lopez 2009). Other scholarship views the jury as an institutional manifestation of deliberative democracy and as a method to facilitate consensual democracy (Gastil et al. 2002; Smith and Wales 2000; Hans, Gastil, and Feller 2014; Warren and Gastil 2015). Both approaches view the jury as a mechanism to establish further democracy through participation in democratizing societies. In her presidential address, Valerie Hans offers the useful concept of translating to understand further the adoption, expansion and decline of trial by jury in established and developing democracies. I use her deployment of this term to argue that the implementation of liberal democratic structures in new democracies opens new opportunities to translate the jury system into and onto new democratic societies.Hans's address is grounded in the idea of lay participation, but she also alludes to the concerns that policy makers have about the strength and vibrancy of this participation (31). This concern opens questions as to policy makers' decision-making processes to translate trial by juror into the fabric of polities. I would argue here that the aims of policy makers are not always democratic. Nonetheless, the consequence of the translation of trial by jury furthers democratic development. To express this idea I examine specifically the adoption (or attempt to adopt) trial by jury in three countries: Nicaragua, Mexico and Russia. These three countries implemented the process to adopt trial by jury between 1992 and 2008. In all three cases, governments adopted or attempted to adopt the jury trial in the aftermath of control of the state apparatus by a hegemonic political party. The strategic decision to adopt trial by jury was partly an attempt to remove legal decision making from the sole control of a state that was occupied by officials who the new government believed retained allegiance to the prior government.In Nicaragua, the Popular-Socialist Sandinista (FSLN) government partly abolished the jury trial in 1988 because of juries' tendencies to acquit, particularly to acquit poor defendants (Wilson 1990). Juries during the Revolutionary period use the intima conviccion (innermost belief) standard to guide deliberations (Wilson 1992: 359). The government prior to the Sandinista state (the Somoza dictatorship 1933-1979) had constitutionally established trial by jury, but rarely were people tried-by-jury in civilian criminal courts during the period of the Somoza regime.The Sandinista Government did embrace the concept of lay participation in legal decision-making process. As Hans's address highlights, the jury is only one of several forms of lay participation in legal decision-making. The Sandinista government attempted to institute the concept of lay participation by allowing non-attorneys to populate the lower levels of the judicial hierarchy (Walker 2003). Jackson and Kovalev (2016) point out that the lay-judge mechanism has been adopted in some European countries to replace juries as a mechanism of lay participation.The Sandinista Government built its justice system on the idea of popular justice. It, nonetheless, abolished trial by jury. Indeed, the Government's overall lay participation program failed. Beyond juries' tendencies to acquit, the Sandinista Government constructed criminal justice system on a socialist model of justice that requires a machine-like system of judgment and punishment (Ventura 1971: 101). Because the Sandinistas opted for the socialist model of justice, they viewed the jury system as flawed in its ability to efficiently allocate judgment and punishment. In addition, the system requires judges, even lay-judges, to interpret cases and to base their decisions on the norms of formal law, rather than popular sentiment (McDonald and Zatz 1992: 289). …

Participation Beyond Consensus? Technology Assessments, Consensus Conferences and Democratic Modulation

In this article, we inquire into two contemporary participatory formats that seek to democratically intervene in scientific practice: the consensus conference and participatory technology assessment (pTA). We explain how these formats delegitimize conflict and disagreement by making a strong appeal to consensus. Based on our direct involvement in these formats and informed both by political philosophy and science and technology studies, we outline conceptions that contrast with the consensus ideal, including dissensus, disclosure, conflictual consensus and agonistic democracy. Drawing on the notion of meta-consensus and a distinction between four models of democracy (aggregative, deliberative, participatory and agonistic), we elaborate how a more positive valuation of conflict provides opportunities for mutual learning, the articulation of disagreement, and democratic modulation—three aspirations that are at the heart of most pTAs and consensus conferences. Disclosing the strengths and weaknesses of these different models is politically and epistemically useful, and should therefore be an integral part of the development of participation theory and process in science and technology.

Conditional Changes: Europeanization in the Western Balkans and the Example of Media Freedom

This paper takes a broad view on the context of EU conditionality and, after presenting various challenges, narrows down its focus to provide evidence for the shortcomings concerning media freedom in the Western Balkans. That enlargement is not the linear, one-way process it was once believed to be – where countries gravitating towards an evident liberal democratic consensus through the pull of integration – is evident from cases reaching beyond the Western Balkans. While we will not try to establish any direct causal relationship between the shortcomings of EU conditionality and the democratic backlash in the Western Balkans in the past ten years, we do seek to demonstrate how conditionality is failing in a particular context, by providing an overview of what the essential conditions of successful norm promotion, credibility and, most importantly, consistency are, and illustrate how these are lacking in the case of media freedom conditionality.

Continuity and Change: Dealing with Political Volatility to Advance Climate Change Mitigation Strategies—Examples from the Transport Sector

As the recent withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Agreement has shown, political volatility directly affects climate change mitigation policies, in particular in sectors, such as transport associated with long-term investments by individuals (vehicles) and by local and national governments (urban form and transport infrastructure and services). There is a large potential for cost-effective solutions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and to improve the sustainability of the transport sector that is yet unexploited. Considering the cost-effectiveness and the potential for co-benefits, it is hard to understand why efficiency gains and CO2 emission reductions in the transport sector are still lagging behind this potential. Particularly interesting is the fact that there is substantial difference among countries with relatively similar economic performances in the development of their transport CO2 emissions over the past thirty years despite the fact that these countries had relatively similar access to efficient technologies and vehicles. This study aims to explore some well-established political science theories on the particular example of climate change mitigation in the transport sector in order to identify some of the factors that could help explain the variations in success of policies and strategies in this sector. The analysis suggests that institutional arrangements that contribute to consensus building in the political process provide a high level of political and policy stability which is vital to long-term changes in energy end-use sectors that rely on long-term investments. However, there is no direct correlation between institutional structures, e.g., corporatism and success in reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the transport sector. Environmental objectives need to be built into the consensus-based policy structure before actual policy progress can be observed. This usually takes longer in consensus democracies than in politically more agile majoritarian policy environments, but the policy stability that builds on corporatist institutional structures is likely to experience changes over a longer-term, in this case to a shift towards low-carbon transport that endures.