ANISH POLITICS are customarily described as stable, ideal, and placid. Nevertheless in May 1961 the principal Danish farmers' organizations instituted a virtually-complete production for the purpose of pressuring the government to accede to their demands. This resort to direct action in Danish politics was little noticed by either Danish or outside political scientists.' Yet an understanding of why Danish farmers felt constrained to adopt exceptional and extra-legal measures can be valuable for the student of comparative politics. Why did the stop occur in Denmark where political bargaining has been facilitated by the absence of sharp class distinctions; a native preference for pragmatic political results; the relatively few contentious issues in modern Danish politics; the homogeneity of Danes as regards their language, religion, and culture; and the comparatively small size of the country and population? How does one account for direct action tactics in a political system which achieved a remarkably peaceful transition to constitutionalism in 1849, has firmly adhered to parliamentarianism since its establishment in 1901, and has sustained a multi-party system with four dominant parties which have nearly always been able to work constructively together? The highly atypical behavior of Danish farmers in 1961 provides an opportunity to shed some light on those factors which may motivate important interest groups to take matters into their own hands despite the existence of a pronounced traditional emphasis upon the norms of negotiation and compromise. This study concludes that the stop was produced by the dysfunctional convergence of several developments in Danish politics which momentarily rendered Danish consensual norms inoperative.2 These dysfunctional developments behind the imposing stability of Danish politics suggest the need for a better understanding of political