Conscious Thoughts Research Articles

Agency and observation in knowledge of one's own thinking

AbstractThis essay addresses the question how we know our conscious thinking. Conscious thinking typically takes the form of a series of discrete episodes that constitute a complex cognitive activity. We must distinguish the discrete episodes of thinking in which a particular content is represented in phenomenal consciousness and is present “before the mind's eye” from the extended activities of which these episodes form a part. The extended activities are themselves contentful and we have first‐person access to them. But because their content is not represented in phenomenal consciousness, this access cannot be broadly observational. Instead, I argue, it is agential. Furthermore, that extended activities are intentional explains the possibility of a nonobservational form of introspective access to the discrete episodes in consciousness.

In Repose

Sleep is the absence of performance, and the absence of conscious thinking. It does not model the flesh for another’s gaze, and it does not twist the face into masks. Sleep wears no mask. The actor...

Building Sensorium

Gilles Deleuze assumes that the source of creativity/the new (as opposed to just the development of what already is implicit in existing things) lies outside conscious thinking. Deleuze argues that film mimics our automatic processing of visual input and therefore is able to intervene in this processing in ways that conscious thought cannot, at the level of the most basic sensory experience. Since computers can and already offer input to multiple senses, can they do similar work? The authors discuss Deleuze's approach to finding the difference between development and creativity via the analysis of film technology and ask whether anyone is using computers the way Deleuze conceives of those film-makers who are philosophic using film? The focus of this article is on creativity in the domain of art making.

Work discussion in large groups: on modifying the teaching and learning method for universities of applied sciences in Austria

ABSTRACTThis paper briefly addresses the situation regarding early years and other teacher-training in Austria in order to clarify what is possible when there are reduced financial resources to offer regular small work discussion groups. The paper goes on to sketch out the author’s attempts to give a group of 40 students the opportunity to learn from the experience of work discussion. The author uses extracts from case studies to show way in which students came to understand that unconscious meaning and connections could be made accessible to their conscious thinking in a complex way.

The Machine as Art (in the 20th Century): An Introduction

The machine, over the course of the 20th century, progressively integrated itself into all fields of human activity, including artistic creation; and indeed, with the first decades of that century having established a surprisingly vital and wide-ranging series of perspectives on the relationship between art and the machine, certain artists in the wake of the Second World War no longer felt compelled to treat the machine as a mere theme or source of inspiration: the machine itself becomes art—unless it is art which seeks to become mechanical? The artist mutates into “artist-engineer”; and this transition, resonating within a specific historical context, leads not only to a questioning of the nature of the work itself, but also to a broader questioning which places us within the realm of anthropology: what is this art telling us about the actual conditions of contemporary human society, and what is it telling us about the future to which we aspire? It is the goal of this special issue of Arts to stimulate an historically conscious, protean, and global (re)thinking of the cultural relationship between man and machine; and to this end, we welcome contributions falling anywhere within the nearly infinite spectrum represented by the prismatic period during the middle of the last century in which the machine became a legitimate artistic medium.

Two kinds of perspective taking in narrative texts

In this paper, I argue for the existence of two distinct kinds of protagonists’ perspective taking in narrative texts. The first, Free Indirect Discourse, represents conscious thoughts or utterances of protagonists and involves context shifting: All context-sensitive expressions with the exception of pronouns and tenses are interpreted with respect to the fictional context of some salient protagonist (Schlenker 2004; Sharvit 2008; Eckardt 2014, Maier 2015). The second, which I dub viewpoint shifting, does not necessarily represent conscious thoughts or utterances and it does not involve context shifting. Rather, a situation is described as it is perceived by a salient protagonist or in a way that reflects the doxastic state of such a protagonist, not with respect to the Common Ground (CG) of narrator and reader. While FID is only available at the root level, i.e. at the speech act level, viewpoint shifting is available at the level of finite matrix clauses.

The Linguistic Determination of Conscious Thought Contents

AbstractIn this paper we address the question of what determines the content of our conscious episodes of thinking, considering recent claims that phenomenal character individuates thought contents. We present one prominent way for defenders of phenomenal intentionality to develop that view and then examine ‘sensory inner speech views’, which provide an alternative way of accounting for thought‐content determinacy. We argue that such views fare well with inner speech thinking but have problems accounting for unsymbolized thinking. Within this dialectic, we present an account of the nature of unsymbolized thinking that accords with and can be seen as a continuation of the activity of inner speech, while offering a way of explaining thought‐content determinacy in terms of linguistic structures and representations.

School Suicide Risk Assessment

Suicide is a leading cause of death among youth ages 10 years and older. Further, recent federal surveillance data suggest the rates of suicidal ideation and behaviors to be increasing. With these facts in mind, in this paper, we examine the school psychologist’s role in suicide risk assessment; which assesses the degree to which students, who have conscious thoughts of suicide, are at risk for engaging in a suicidal behavior. After acknowledging the limitations of school-employed mental health professionals when it comes to these activities, we begin by reviewing suicide risk factors and warning signs. Next, we discuss an approach to the identification of suicidal thinking. Finally, we provide guidance on a school-based suicide risk assessment protocol, which guides actions necessary to stop suicidal behavior and place students in a position from which suicidal ideation can be addressed.

Conscious Thought and the Cognitive Fine-Tuning Problem

Cognitive phenomenalism is the view that occurrent thoughts are identical with, or constituted of, cognitive phenomenology. This paper raises a challenge for (standard forms of) this view: the cognitive fine-tuning problem. In broad brushstrokes the difficulty is that, for the cognitive phenomenalist, there is a distinction between three kinds of fact: cognitive phenomenal facts, sensory phenomenal facts, and functional facts. This distinction gives rise to the challenge of explaining why, in actuality, these three phenomena tend to be matched together in ways that respect norms of rationality. Various solutions to this problem are explored – divine intervention, value-involving laws of nature, or basic capacities to respond to reasons – all of which are wildly at odds with naturalism. If cognitive phenomenalists want their view to be consistent with naturalism, as many do, they must come up with a naturalistic solution to the cognitive fine-tuning problem.

Dealing with prospective memory demands while performing an ongoing task: Shared processing, increased on-task focus, or both?

Prospective memory (PM) is the cognitive ability to remember to fulfill intended action plans at the appropriate future moment. Current theories assume that PM fulfillment draws on attentional processes. Accordingly, pending PM intentions interfere with other ongoing tasks to the extent to which both tasks rely on the same processes. How do people manage the competition between PM and ongoing-task demands? Based on research relating mind wandering and attentional control (Kane & McVay, 2012), we argue that people may not only change the way they process ongoing-task stimuli when given a PM intention, but they may also engage in less off-task thinking than they otherwise would. That is, people focus more strongly on the tasks at hand and dedicate considerable conscious thought to the PM goal. We tested this hypothesis by asking subjects to periodically report on their thoughts during prototypical PM (and control) tasks. Task-unrelated thought rates dropped when participants performed an ongoing task while holding a PM intention versus performing the ongoing task alone (Experiment 1), even when PM demands were minimized (Experiment 2) and more so when PM execution was especially rewarded (Experiment 3). Our findings suggest that PM demands not only elicit a cost to ongoing-task processing, but they also induce a stronger on-task focus and promote conscious thoughts about the PM intention. (PsycINFO Database Record

Consumers (and Consumer Researchers) Need Conscious Thinking in Addition to Unconscious Processes: A Call for Integrative Models, A Commentary on Williams and Poehlman

We suggest consumer research develop an integrative approach that favors neither unconscious nor conscious processes but rather appreciates the contributions and limitations of both, and how they work together. We agree that unconscious processes precede all conscious ones, but we argue that conscious thinking plays a prominent and likely indispensible role in much of consumer behavior. Conscious thought is particularly useful for logical reasoning, quantification (including about money), and communication, all of which are relevant to consumer behavior. We argue that most human behavior is produced by an interactive combination of conscious and unconscious causes and that favoring one over the other will yield an overly simplistic understanding of consumer behavior. Pragmatic and ethical concerns also argue for retaining a strong interest in conscious processes among consumers.

A green supply chain network design framework for the processed food industry: Application to the orange juice agrofood cluster

Food production has put enormous strain on the environment. Supply chain network design provides a means to frame this issue in terms of strategic decision making. It has matured from a field that addressed only operational and economic concerns to one that comprehensively considers the broader environmental and social issues that face industrial organizations of today. Adding the term “green” to supply chain activities seeks to incorporate environmentally conscious thinking in all processes in the supply chain. The methodology is based on the use of Life Cycle Assessment, Multi-objective Optimization via Genetic Algorithms and Multiple-criteria Decision Making tools (TOPSIS type). The approach is illustrated and validated through the development and analysis of an Orange Juice Supply Chain case study modelled as a three echelon GrSC composed of the supplier, manufacturing and market levels that in turn are decomposed into more detailed subcomponents. Methodologically, the work has shown the development of the modelling and optimization GrSCM framework is useful in the context of eco-labelled agro food supply chain and feasible in particular for the orange juice cluster. The proposed framework can help decision makers handle the complexity that characterizes agro food supply chain design decision and that is brought on by the multi-objective nature of the problem as well as by the multiple stakeholders, thus preventing to make the decision in a segmented empirical manner. Experimentally, under the assumptions used in the case study, the work highlights that by focusing only on the “organic” eco-label to improve the agricultural aspect, low to no improvement on overall supply chain environmental performance is reached in relative terms. In contrast, the environmental criteria resulting from a full lifecycle approach is a better option for future public and private policies to reach more sustainable agro food supply chains.

Why Are Some Phenomenal Experiences ‘Vivid’ and Others ‘Faint’? Representationalism, Imagery, and Cognitive Phenomenology

ABSTRACTOne central brand of representationalism claims that the specific phenomenal character of an experience is fully determined by its content. A challenge for this view is that cognitive and perceptual experiences sometimes seem to have the same representational content while differing in phenomenal character. In particular, it might seem that one can have faint imagery experiences or conscious thoughts with the same contents as vivid perceptual experiences. This paper argues that such cases never arise, and that they are probably metaphysically impossible. I also suggest a fully representational account of differences in vividness between phenomenal experiences.

On the origins of endogenous thoughts.

Endogenous thoughts are thoughts that we activate in a top-down manner or in the absence of the appropriate stimuli. We use endogenous thoughts to plan or recall past events. In this sense, endogenous thinking is one of the hallmarks of our cognitive lives. In this paper, I investigate how it is that we come to possess endogenous control over our thoughts. Starting from the close relation between language and thinking, I look into speech production-a process motorically controlled by the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG). Interestingly, IFG is also closely related to silent talking, as well as volition. The connection between IFG and volition is important given that endogenous thoughts are or at least greatly resemble voluntary actions. Against this background, I argue that IFG is key to understanding the origins of conscious endogenous thoughts. Furthermore, I look into goal-directed thinking and show that IFG plays a key role also in unconscious endogenous thinking.

Supplemental Material for From Conscious Thought to Automatic Action: A Simulation Account of Action Planning

Supplemental Material for From Conscious Thought to Automatic Action: A Simulation Account of Action Planning

Secondary science teachers as curriculum makers: Mapping and designing Scotland's new Curriculum for Excellence

AbstractScotland is one of several countries to have recently implemented a new national curriculum to highlight 21st century educational priorities. Teachers have been mandated to follow the new curriculum guidelines, known as Curriculum for Excellence (CfE), since the fall of 2010. The purpose of this study was to use a phenomenological lens to investigate how Scottish secondary science teachers are experiencing their work of curriculum development, including daily lesson design and more broadly, curriculum mapping within the context of reform (Remillard [1999], Curriculum Inquiry, 29: 315–342). We probed seven science teachers’ experiences to create both a composite profile of conscious thoughts about curriculum design and individual profiles that highlight interactions between the curriculum mandates, beliefs, and agentic orientations. The study indicated that changes to curriculum development required accepting new cognitive commitments including: (i) analyzing the CfE document to discern the most significant principles underlying change; (ii) reflecting on the ways that science teacher curriculum development is a problem‐solving endeavor; (iii) undertaking the complex processes of curriculum mapping, from primary school all the way through national qualification exams; and (iv) recognizing that the epistemological frame for students’ science learning has changed and providing opportunities for students to create and apply knowledge. Two significant findings include the unpacking of these cognitive activities as part of a transformation toward a new epistemology of pedagogy, and the assertion that official curriculum documents can promote change, albeit with caveats concerning individual beliefs, agentic orientations, and possibilities for agency within school contexts. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. J Res Sci Teach 54: 324–349, 2017

“The committee in my head”

Anecdotally, interpreters report experiencing self-talk before, during, and after assignments; however, this inner dialogue has neither been confirmed nor described in the literature. Prior studies suggest that guided self-talk can boost performance in learning and human performance activities. It follows that self-talk may also affect interpreting performance, either positively or negatively. In this study, reports of self-talk of American Sign Language-English interpreters were examined for the following characteristics: frequency, valence, overtness, self-determination, motivation, and function. Participants (N = 445) responded to online survey questions about the experience of self-talk in their interpreting work. Forfrequency, more than half of the respondents reported experiencing self-talk between 1–5 times during their work. Regardingvalence, 62% of respondents reported a mix of positive and negative self-talk about their performance. Forovertness, 62% reported talking (or signing) aloud in isolated settings about their work experiences. Regardingself-determination, nearly half of the respondents (48%) reported self-talk as a mix of conscious and unconscious thoughts. Eighty-nine percent of the respondents reported using self-talk formotivation, but 65% reported their self-talk was actually de-motivational at times. The most frequently reportedfunctionof self-talk was to improve interpreting. The findings offer a rich description of self-talk by American Sign Language-English interpreters. We suggest that more information about self-talk during interpretation may lead to greater self-awareness of the role of this phenomenon in working practitioners, as well as offer insights for the instruction of student interpreters.

The role of skill in sport

Skill is obviously a central part of sports and should therefore be central in sport philosophic studies. My aim in this paper is to try to place skill in a wider context and thus give skill the place it deserves. I will do this by taking up four points. I first try to place the concept of skill in relation to concepts like ability and know how. I argue that ability is something one has as part of a natural endowment, but skill is something one must acquire. ‘Knowing how’ seems to a greater extent to demand a cognitive grasp and is thus more than a skill. My second point is about development of skills toward expertise and the role of thinking and consciousness. When one is exercising a skill does one need to be conscious of what one is doing or can one act like a zombie and perform non-consciously? I argue that expertise demands know how and conscious thinking. My third point is about the role of skills in sport competitions. What we measure in sports are different sporting skills as they are displayed by and through the body. This does not mean that other factors, like motivation, courage, or strategic thinking are not involved. But what we see and what we measure when the sprinter crosses the goal line is not the courage but the skillful body. My fourth point is about skills and normativity. Should sports, and consequently sporting skills, promote ethical and esthetical values? A neutral view would imply that we can accept and admire the skill part of diving in football even if the purpose is bad. A normative view would imply that skill and purpose are intertwined. I here argue that diving skill is diving-specific and thus not morally neutral.

The Intersession Process in Psychotherapy for Anorexia Nervosa: Characteristics and Relation to Outcome.

The "inter session process" (ISP) is defined as therapy-related conscious thoughts, memories, and emotions that patients and therapists experience between psychotherapy sessions. It indicates how the participants process and use treatment. The main aim of this study is to describe the ISP characteristics of patients in outpatient treatment for anorexia nervosa (AN). An additional aim is to explore the relation between patients' ISP and treatment outcome. Patients taking part in a randomized controlled trial on outpatient psychotherapy for AN (ANTOP) filled in the Intersession Experience Questionnaire before each of the 40 psychotherapy sessions. Trajectories of different aspects of the ISP were analyzed with growth curve models based on orthogonal polynomials and tested for differences between 3 outcome categories (recovery, partially recovered, full syndrome AN). Data from 108 cases were available for analysis. ISP facets showed diverse, mostly nonlinear, trajectories over the course of treatment. Less favorable outcomes were associated with higher levels of patients' experiencing negative emotions when recalling therapeutic dialogue, thinking about therapy during dreaming/drowsy states, and applying therapeutic learning (in the second half of treatment). Findings confirm an overall relation between ISP and treatment outcome. In outpatient treatment in AN, patients with a less successful course seem to be more preoccupied with therapy and therapist between sessions. For the ISP facet "applying therapeutic learning," findings point to an optimal range dependent on treatment phase. Growth curve modeling is required to describe the nonlinear trajectories of ISP facets.

Conscious thinking and cognitive phenomenology: topics, views and future developments

This introduction presents a state of the art of philosophical research on cognitive phenomenology and its relation to the nature of conscious thinking more generally. We firstly introduce the question of cognitive phenomenology, the motivation for the debate, and situate the discussion within the fields of philosophy (analytic and phenomenological traditions), cognitive psychology and consciousness studies. Secondly, we review the main research on the question, which we argue has so far situated the cognitive phenomenology debate around the following topics and arguments: phenomenal contrast, epistemic arguments and challenges, introspection, ontology and temporal character, intentionality, inner speech, agency, holistic perspective, categorical perception, value, and phenomenological description. Thirdly, we suggest future developments by pointing to four questions that can be explored in relation to the cognitive phenomenology discussion: the self and self-awareness, attention, emotions and general theories of consciousness. We finalise by briefly presenting the six articles of this Special Issue, which engage with some of the topics mentioned and contribute to enlarge the discussion by connecting it to different areas of philosophical investigation.