THE analysis of Knowledge, which I attempt in this article, is opposed to certain commonly received principles of modern philosophy. That the Unity of Consciousness is the presupposition of all Knowledge and Reality, or at least of all Phenomenal Reality, is one of the most accepted of these principles. Associated with the name of Kant, and brought into prominence by him, it has been maintained in one form or another by his disciples. Now it is true that unless I have some idea of a thing, and so qtnite it to my conscious self, I can make no kind of assertion about it; and as to -things also, unless I represent them in one consciousness, I can make no statement of their mutual relations. But what I can unite in one consciousness is limited, and when I try to embrace too much I am forced to let go what is in excess. What thus passes out of me becomes dead to me, nor can I think about it again till the idea of it recurs. Then, in company with the reappearance, rises naturally the judgment of Memory, that what I now experience I once experienced before. The import of the last phrase is to be noted. The reappearanice I am conscious of, whether it be only the image of the past object, or that object itself; but that past order in which I was conscious of it -I can never again say I am conscious of: it has passed for ever out of the unity of my consciousness-that is, the peculiar judgment of memory involves a wider object, an order of events. which is not within consciousness, but without. Can we escape this conclusion ? Can I suppose that this past order is nothing but the thoughts which the words suggest in me, which presuppose relation to a subject? There are two insuperable reasons why I cannot. In the first place, I have no such all-sufficient test of the truth of memory. I cannot find anywhere within consciousness the object of remembrance, and so decide in this simple way whether it is really what it asserts itself. In the second place, such an object I a'm conscious of, but an universal element of Memory is the past order which I aim not conscious of, which in distinction I say I was conscious of; and it is not the remembrance which I was conscious of, but its object. In memory, then, -we have an instance of thought as it