Conscious Experience Research Articles

Invention in Bergson's Integral Empiricism: Differential Matter and Integral Memory

Abstract Bergson's integral empiricism is a philosophical approach that aims to harmonize the scientific study of nature with the experience of consciousness. Bergson drew heavily on the basic concepts of calculus in framing his philosophy of intuition. He did not merely use calculus metaphorically to describe processes and organizational patterns of consciousness. Instead, he studied the thought processes actually involved in calculus and showed that they are intimately connected to how we think about change more generally. I propose a distinction between derivative empiricism, i.e., reductionism, and integral empiricism that incorporates the study of the mind by the mind. The method involves the invention of a new kind of knowledge that is not based on generalization or abstraction but rather on the integration of experience. This is predicated on a study of the act of integration in consciousness that underpins our ability to think and do philosophy.

First-person thought is associated with body awareness in daily life

Sensations from the body are thought to play a critical role in many aspects of conscious experience, including first-person thought. In the present set of studies, we examined within-person relationships between in-the-moment subjective awareness of sensations from the body and self-reported first-person thought in real-world settings using ecological momentary assessment (EMA) protocols. In Study 1, participants reported experiencing greater first-person thoughts in moments when they also reported heightened awareness of sensations from their body, and this relationship was stable over a 4-week period even with mean-level changes in body awareness and first-person thought. In Study 2, we replicated this association in a 1-week EMA protocol using both self-report measures and measures derived from participants’ open-ended descriptions of their ongoing thoughts using a natural language processing approach. Taken together, findings shed light on the role of subjective body awareness in other facets of conscious experience.

О феноменологии логических переживаний в «Логических исследованиях» Э. Гуссерля

In this paper, the author endeavors to clarify the relationship between logic and phenomenology in the context of a detailed examination of E. Husserl’s inquiries into the nature of logical knowledge. This endeavor appears justified not only from a historical-philosophical perspective but also from a purely conceptual standpoint: the present study investigates the role that E. Husserl assigns to ideal structures within the experience of consciousness, interpreted by him as logical objects. Through a sequential analysis, the philosophical approach of Husserl is illustrated by elucidating the essence of his anti-psychologist stance regarding logic, explicating the idea of the intentional character of consciousness, and subsequently synthesizing these two perspectives to reveal the reflexive nature of logic, which is necessitated by consciousness for self-discovery and self-clarification. It is emphasized that Husserl’s examination unfolds in a manner that defines the typological proximity of the considered acts of consciousness. By addressing these dimensions, the study aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of how Husserl intertwines phenomenology and logic, and how this interplay informs the dynamics of logical experiences within the framework of conscious acts.

Instincts as Sedimentation in E. Husserl’s Phenomenology

Husserl’s concept of instincts transformed the concept of intentionality, supplemented the concept of teleology of consciousness, and shed new light on the problem of the relationship between irrationality and rationality. This article analyses Husserl’s phenomenology of instincts through the prism of the concept of sedimentation. I argue that instincts can be understood as sedimentation, as a pattern of the transformation of consciousness into unconsciousness, and the transformation of unconsciousness into consciousness. The concept of instincts as sedimentation helps to understand how skills are preserved and transmitted from generation to generation, and how unconscious instincts work in our conscious experience.

More than words: can free reports adequately measure the richness of perception?

The question of the richness (or sparseness) of conscious experience has evoked ongoing debate and discussion. Claims for both richness and sparseness are supported by empirical data, yet they are often indirect, and alternative explanations have been put forward. Recently, it has been suggested that current experimental methods limit participants' responses, thereby preventing researchers from assessing the actual richness of perception. Instead, free verbal reports were presented as a possible way to overcome this limitation. As part of this approach, a novel paradigm of freely reported words was developed using a new metric, intersubjective agreement (IA), with experimental results interpreted as capturing aspects of conscious perception. Here, we challenge the validity of freely reported words as a tool for studying the richness of conscious experience. We base our claims on two studies (each composed of three experiments), where we manipulated the richness of percepts and tested whether IA changed accordingly. Five additional control experiments were conducted to validate the experimental logic and examine alternative explanations. Our results suggest otherwise, presenting four challenges to the free verbal report paradigm: first, impoverished stimuli did not evoke lower IA scores. Second, the IA score was correlated with word frequency in English. Third, the original positive relationship between IA scores and rated confidence was not found in any of the six experiments. Fourth, a high rate of nonexisting words was found, some of which described items that matched the gist of the scene but did not appear in the image. We conclude that a metric based on freely reported words might be better explained by vocabulary conventions and gist-based reports than by capturing the richness of perception.

The Creative Awareness Theory: A Grounded Theory Study of Inherent Self-Regulation in Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder

Objectives: The aim of this study was to determine why and how adults with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) experience variable impairment and identify the processes and strategies adults with ADHD use to develop positive self-regulation skills. Methods: A mixed cohort of 11 participants (6 female and 5 male) from a university, an adult ADHD clinic and an ADHD support group in the UK were interviewed online between September 2021 and February 2022. Data were collected and analysed simultaneously, inspired by a constructivist grounded theory methodology. Results: Participants described a “polar awareness of difference” from others in terms of engagement and ADHD characteristics, and a “polar awareness of consciousness” experienced as the states of chaotic attention and hyperfocus, both of which impact core perceptions of self. Using an infinity paradigm, the results demonstrate unskilled attempts to self-regulate within and between these states using self-absorption or self-transcendence strategies, including their inherent challenges and energetic cost. Our results further indicate that at the centre of this dynamic paradigm, creative awareness strategies exist, which exemplify polarity awareness and the regulation of that awareness supported by an authentic inner compass (AIC). Conclusions: This paper presents the empirical foundation for the ADHD Creative Awareness Theory (CAT)—a new theory for understanding the experience of ADHD consciousness and environmental engagement. Practical implications are explored, and recommendations include use of the CAT as a framework for understanding and development of inherent self-regulation skills for adults with ADHD.

Theories of consciousness: A concise overview

Consciousness or conscious experience is a mental phenomenon that is familiar to all of us, but the way in which it is produced escapes us to a large extent. Each person has a vague idea of what it means to be conscious, but consciousness is rather hard to define, albeit easy to identify. It is that function of the brain that makes us conscious of external or internal stimuli and of our thoughts regarding these subjective experiences. Conscious experience is a first-person perspective of mental states and events tracking as they unfold. It includes mental phenomena such as a perception, emotion, memory, idea, continuous temporal sequence of events. A mental process and its adjoining neurophysiological phenomena represent two aspects of the same event. We have direct access to the mental aspect, while we can observe the neurophysiological aspect only when we study the event as a biological process. The psychological study of consciousness describes the special properties of this brain function, its origin and utility in the global economy of an animal organism. The neurobiological study aims to find the neural correlates of consciousness, aims to establish causal relations between the neural phenomena and the different conscious states. Lastly, the formulation of an explanatory theory can provide a satisfactory understanding of the phenomenon. This review aims to bring some clarification in the field of consciousness, selecting the hypotheses which mostly fulfill the requirements, in order to be confirmed as explanatory theories. A valuable test for confirming an explanatory hypothesis is its predictive power. Using this criterion we have evaluated comparatively, some of the proposed explaining hypotheses.

Deformation of Stable Meaning Formation and Its Difference from Transformation in Experiencing a Situation of Life Crisis

Introduction. Deformation of meaning formation, as an internal mechanism of personal meaning change in the situation of life crisis, is insufficiently studied. This leads to a limited use of the process of meaning regulation of personal meaning change, which entails difficulties of the individual in finding a way to correct his or her meaning-oriented state, such asstagnation, getting stuck and overcoming. Objective. To reveal the mechanism of deformation of meaning formation when personal meaning changes in it in the situation of life crisis and to indicate the difference between deformation and transformation. Comparison of deformation and transformation processes. Using a comparative analysis of the processes of deformation and transformation of meaning formation, we find a clear difference in the mechanism of personal meaning change. In the case of deformation, the situation of life crisis remains unchanged, including motive and goal (meaning motive), attitude and action (meaning attitude). In this case, only their ratio changes, in contrast to the transformation of meaning formation, where the situation changes completely with a complete transition of meaning structures into new or different ones. Pattern of meaning regulation. Deformations of meaning formation are revealed in the mechanism of the pattern of meaning regulation, where changes in personal meaning occur when experiencing a situation of life crisis by means of meaning choice. Meaning choice is a system-forming factor of personal meaning change towards one of the three poles of the pattern of meaning regulation, in the meaning trace of experience (introjection), in conscious experience (ensartence) and in goal-setting (intension). Strategies of meaning choice. In the case of deformation of meaning formation, the meaning motive and meaning attitude do not change into new meaning structures, but change the internal ratio of the goal and action, respectively. This occurs through meaning choice with the purpose of changing personal meaning toward stability (certainty) or instability (uncertainty). Three types of meaning choice strategies are involved in changing personal meaning: the strategy of meaning trace of experience, the strategy of conscious experience, and the strategy of goal setting. Discussion. At deformation of semantic formation its type and type of personality are formed depending on what semantic choice was made under the influence of the situation of life crisis. Such an indicator of semantic choice as readiness of a personality to make it in experiencing the situation of life crisis is determined.

What is Consciousness and What is it Good For?

What do you see around you right now? What do you hear or smell? How are you feeling—happy, sad, bored? And what thoughts are in your head? All the sensations, feelings, and thoughts you have every day are part of what is called your conscious experience—something that all humans have. But do they have a purpose? Would you act the same without them? These are the questions we will address in this article. We will first introduce the concept of conscious experience and then review the methods that scientists use to study it, which is not an easy task! Finally, we will explain why it is important to study consciousness at all.

Episodic memory without autonoetic consciousness.

Ever since Tulving's influential 1985 article 'Memory and consciousness', it has become traditional to think of autonoetic consciousness as necessary for episodic memory. This paper questions this claim. Specifically, it argues that the construct of autonoetic consciousness lacks validity and that, even if it was valid, it would still not be necessary for episodic memory. The paper ends with a proposal to go back to a functional/computational characterization of episodic memory in which its characteristic phenomenology is a contingent feature of the retrieval process and, as a result, open to empirical scrutiny. The proposal also dovetails with recent taxonomies of memory that are independent of conscious awareness and suggests strategies to evaluate within- and between-individual variability in the conscious experience of episodic memories in human and non-human agents. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

Co-administration of midazolam and psilocybin: differential effects on subjective quality versus memory of the psychedelic experience

Aspects of the acute experience induced by the serotonergic psychedelic psilocybin predict symptomatic relief in multiple psychiatric disorders and improved well-being in healthy participants, but whether these therapeutic effects are immediate or are based on memories of the experience is unclear. To examine this, we co-administered psilocybin (25 mg) with the amnestic benzodiazepine midazolam in 8 healthy participants and assayed the subjective quality of, and memory for, the dosing-day experience. We identified a midazolam dose that allowed a conscious psychedelic experience to occur while partially impairing memory for the experience. Furthermore, midazolam dose and memory impairment tended to associate inversely with salience, insight, and well-being induced by psilocybin. These data suggest a role for memory in therapeutically relevant behavioral effects occasioned by psilocybin. Because midazolam blocks memory by blocking cortical neural plasticity, it may also be useful for evaluating the contribution of the pro-neuroplastic properties of psychedelics to their therapeutic activity.

Electrophysiological (EEG) microstates during dream-like bizarre experiences in a naturalistic scenario using immersive virtual reality.

Monitoring the reality status of conscious experience is essential for a human being to interact successfully with the external world. Despite its importance for everyday functioning, reality monitoring can systematically become erroneous, for example, while dreaming or during hallucinatory experiences. To investigate brain processes associated with reality monitoring occurring online during an experience, i.e., perceptual reality monitoring, we assessed EEG microstates in healthy, young participants. In a within-subjects design, we compared the experience of reality when being confronted with dream-like bizarre elements versus realistic elements in an otherwise highly naturalistic real-world scenario in immersive virtual reality. Dream-like bizarreness induced changes in the subjective experience of reality and bizarreness, and led to an increase in the contribution of a specific microstate labelled C'. Microstate C' was related to the suspension of disbelief, i.e. the suppression of bizarre mismatches. Together with the functional interpretation of microstate C' as reported by previous studies, the findings of this study point to the importance of prefrontal meta-conscious control processes in perceptual reality monitoring.

Who Is Buying Green Products? The Roles of Sustainability Consciousness, Environmental Attitude, and Ecotourism Experience in Green Purchasing Intention at Tourism Destinations

The main purpose of this study was to reveal the relationships between green purchasing intention, sustainability consciousness, environmental attitude, and ecotourism experience within the scope of the theory of planned behaviour. The results of the analysis showed that there are positive relationships between sustainability consciousness, environmental attitude, ecotourism experience, and green purchasing intention. The model was tested using SPSS with 435 survey responses. Tourists with a higher consciousness of sustainability develop positive attitudes toward the environment. Tourists with positive attitudes toward the environment intend to purchase more green products. However, while tourists with more ecotourism experience have stronger green purchasing intentions, less ecotourism experience does not affect green purchasing intentions. This study highlights the critical role of sustainability consciousness in shaping environmental attitudes and behaviours.

Is artificial consciousness achievable? Lessons from the human brain

We here analyse the question of developing artificial consciousness from an evolutionary perspective, taking the evolution of the human brain and its relation with consciousness as a reference model or as a benchmark. This kind of analysis reveals several structural and functional features of the human brain that appear to be key for reaching human-like complex conscious experience and that current research on Artificial Intelligence (AI) should take into account in its attempt to develop systems capable of human-like conscious processing. We argue that, even if AI is limited in its ability to emulate human consciousness for both intrinsic (i.e., structural and architectural) and extrinsic (i.e., related to the current stage of scientific and technological knowledge) reasons, taking inspiration from those characteristics of the brain that make human-like conscious processing possible and/or modulate it, is a potentially promising strategy towards developing conscious AI.Also, it cannot be theoretically excluded that AI research can develop partial or potentially alternative forms of consciousness that are qualitatively different from the human form, and that may be either more or less sophisticated depending on the perspectives. Therefore, we recommend neuroscience-inspired caution in talking about artificial consciousness: since the use of the same word “consciousness” for humans and AI becomes ambiguous and potentially misleading, we propose to clearly specify which level and/or type of consciousness AI research aims to develop, as well as what would be common versus differ in AI conscious processing compared to human conscious experience.

Re-enactment and embodied resonance in episodic memory: reconciling phenomenological approaches and constructive theories

AbstractThis paper investigates the embodied dimensions of episodic memory through a phenomenological analysis. Contemporary philosophical theories understand episodic memory as a mental representation of a past event ‘happening in the head’. A philosophical account that seemingly supports an embodied understanding of episodic memory comes from phenomenology. Phenomenology has traditionally understood episodic memory in terms of presentification, which implies a reproduction of the elapsed portion of the consciousness lived during the foreground experience, replicating the previous perceptual activity. However, this appears to be incoherent with the constructive theories of episodic memory, which highlight how subjects shift perspectives in memory or include information not present in the foregoing experience. Thus, according to these contemporary theories, episodic memory is unlikely to imply a replay of the past conscious experience. I argue that if we investigate the embodied dimensions, then it is possible to reconcile the phenomenological approach and the constructive theories. More precisely, I ground the investigation on the analysis of operative intentionality and its role in comparing procedural and episodic memory. I argue that two embodied features qualify the reproductive modification of consciousness: the flexible re-enactment of the previous operative intentionality and the pre-reflective mode of embodied resonance with an agent I am no longer.

К вопросу об эпистемологии, сознании и интеллекте

This paper is devoted to issues of epistemology, which has recently acquired par­ticular relevance in the national philosophy. The role of cultural-historical episte­mology in the modern theory of knowledge is revealed, where the authors hold the idea that knowing the origin and development of knowledge itself, and its cultural conditioning in specific historical experiences contributes to a better un­derstanding of its significance and the scope of use. The authors present their vi­sion of the problem of transition from gnosiology to epistemology as from a strict prescribed methodology to the choice of one’s ways and methods of con­ducting science, where a significant role is given to such disciplines as computer science and logic. In this context, the relationship between consciousness and in­telligence with the theory of knowledge, in particular with cultural-historical epistemology, is also analyzed, since both the philosophy of consciousness and epistemology seek to understand the nature of knowledge and beliefs based on our conscious experience. This approach, considering the influence of social norms, values and cultural traditions on our cognition and thinking, stimulates the development of the theoretical basis of epistemology and its practical appli­cation. The authors conclude that modern research in the field of consciousness and artificial intelligence and their application in the methodology of epistemo­logy contribute not only to rethinking views on the nature of subjectivity but also to establishing the objectivity of our judgments. Ultimately, this leads to the inte­gration of collective and individual consciousness as an important factor in un­derstanding the world and forming scientific knowledge

Beyond primary visual cortex: The leading role of lateral occipital complex in early conscious visual processing

The study of the neural substrates that serve conscious vision is one of the unsolved questions of cognitive neuroscience. So far, consciousness literature has endeavoured to disentangle which brain areas and in what order are involved in giving rise to visual awareness, but the problem of consciousness still remains unsolved. Availing of two different but complementary sources of data (i.e., Fast Optical Imaging and EEG), we sought to unravel the neural dynamics responsible for the emergence of a conscious visual experience. Our results revealed that conscious vision is characterized by a significant increase of activation in extra-striate visual areas, specifically in the Lateral Occipital Complex (LOC), and that, more interestingly, such activity occurred in the temporal window of the ERP component commonly thought to represent the electrophysiological signature of visual awareness, i.e., the Visual Awareness Negativity (VAN). Furthermore, Granger causality analysis, performed to further investigate the flow of activity occurring in the investigated areas, unveiled that neural processes relating to conscious perception mainly originated in LOC and subsequently spread towards visual and motor areas. In general, the results of the present study seem to advocate for an early contribution of LOC in conscious vision, thus suggesting that it could represent a reliable neural correlate of visual awareness. Conversely, striate visual areas, showing awareness-related activity only in later stages of stimulus processing, could be part of the cascade of neural events following awareness emergence.

States of consciousness and interoceptive hypersensibility: A study in patients with insomnia disorder.

This exploratory study aimed to investigate the relationship between interoceptive sensibility and quality of consciousness in individuals with insomnia disorder, in order to understand how the modulation of internal states may contribute to modifying the experience of consciousness during sleep difficulties. A total of 37 patients with insomnia disorder (mean age = 46.05 ± 18.16) and 41 healthy good sleepers (mean age = 50.2 ± 12.99) underwent a psychometric sleep and interoceptive sensibility assessment, using Insomnia Severity Index (ISI), Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index (PSQI), and Multidimensional Assessment of Interoceptive Awareness (MAIA). Moreover, patients with insomnia disorder also completed a quality of consciousness evaluation, using the Phenomenology of Consciousness Inventory (PCI). Patients with insomnia disorder exhibited heightened interoceptive sensibility, particularly in noticing body sensations (p < 0.0001) and emotional awareness (p = 0.032), along with diminished abilities in attention regulation (p = 0.040), not-worrying (p = 0.001), and trusting (p = 0.002). Furthermore, correlations between interoceptive sensibility and multiple aspects of the consciousness state during the insomnia night were identified. Specifically, higher emotional awareness was linked to a 2.49-fold increase in the likelihood of subjectively experiencing altered consciousness states during insomnia. The study sheds light on the relationship between interoceptive sensibility and the subjective state of consciousness during insomnia, emphasising the importance of exploring and considering interoception as part of the therapeutic process for insomnia disorder. Given the exploratory nature of the study and the increased risk of type-I error from numerous correlations, the results should be interpreted with caution. Further research is needed to validate and confirm their robustness.

Dynamic medial parietal and hippocampal deactivations under DMT relate to sympathetic output and altered sense of time, space, and the self.

N,N-Dimethyltryptamine (DMT) is a serotonergic psychedelic, known to rapidly induce short-lasting alterations in conscious experience, characterized by a profound and immersive sense of physical transcendence alongside rich and vivid auditory distortions and visual imagery. Multimodal neuroimaging data paired with dynamic analysis techniques offer a valuable approach for identifying unique signatures of brain activity - and linked autonomic physiology - naturally unfolding during the altered state of consciousness induced by DMT. We leveraged simultaneous fMRI and EKG data acquired in 14 healthy volunteers prior to, during, and after intravenous administration of DMT, and, separately, placebo. fMRI data was preprocessed to derive individual dynamic activity matrices, reflecting the similarity of brain activity in time, and community detection algorithms were applied on these matrices to identify brain activity substates; EKG data was used to derive continuous heart rate. We identified a brain substate occurring immediately after DMT injection, characterized by hippocampal and medial parietal deactivations and increased superior temporal lobe activity under DMT. Deactivations in the hippocampus and medial parietal cortex correlated with alterations in the usual sense of time, space and self-referential processes, reflecting a deconstruction of essential features of ordinary consciousness. Superior lobe activations instead correlated with audio/visual hallucinations and experience of "entities", reflecting the emergence of altered sensory experiences under DMT. Finally, increased heart rate under DMT correlated positively with hippocampus/medial parietal deactivation and the experience of "entities", and negatively with altered self-referential processes. These results suggest a chain of influence linking sympathetic regulation to hippocampal and medial parietal deactivations under DMT, which combined, may contribute to positive mental health outcomes related to self-referential processing following psychedelic administration.

A cosmopolitan approach to international law (CAIL) reflection on the space development experience of Africa

Space power theory from the realist school states that the proliferation of space technology is a foe rather than a friend because it contributes to military and economic competition; and, above all, it empowers the exercise of threat of force in, through and from Outer Space. It is thus important to examine questions of justice in one's professional field and locate the analysis of one's practice within wider social, economic, and political context. While law is not justice and simply announces the form of justice sought, the approach taken in this paper is more precisely the lived experience or mental processes of consciousness and its aim begins a conversation to investigate this in a rigorous way. The cognitive act that characterizes the phenomenological reflection is “paying attention.” Therefore, this reflection contemplates the relevance of experience and reflective practice as a valuable methodology for using insights and learning from the past to support the assessment of the present and recommendations for the future. This is applied in the case of over 17 years of personal experience in following the development path of African space programs. The paper concludes that the African case confirms that multi-level governance is an approach that is of importance, and Africa is in a unique position to master this as stakeholders must think about how to engage in space development at all 4 levels: the global, regional, national, and local level.