Conscious Beliefs Research Articles

Cultural and Universal Routes to Authorship Ascription: Effects of Outcome Priming on Experienced Self-Agency in the Netherlands and Japan

The experience of self-agency is a fundamental feature of human experience. Recent research has suggested that self-agency experiences are driven by an unconscious authorship ascription process that relies on an online match between accessible outcome representations and the production of the outcome. Extending this work, this study explores the role of culture in the manifestation of this unconscious authorship ascription process by testing whether subliminal priming of the outcome of an action prior to occurrence increased experiences of self-agency in Dutch and Japanese participants. Results show that outcome priming enhances the experience of self-agency independently of cultural background. However, Dutch participants experienced higher levels of self-agency than did Japanese participants, and this cultural effect was mediated by differences in beliefs of self-determination.These findings suggest that the experience of self-agency has a universal, nonconscious component that operates independently from a more cultural one, reflecting differences in conscious beliefs about the role of the self in choice and control.

Implicit knowledge and motor skill: What people who know how to catch don’t know

People are unable to report how they decide whether to move backwards or forwards to catch a ball. When asked to imagine how their angle of elevation of gaze would change when they caught a ball, most people are unable to describe what happens although their interception strategy is based on controlling changes in this angle. Just after catching a ball, many people are unable to recognise a description of how their angle of gaze changed during the catch. Some people confidently choose incorrect descriptions that would guarantee failure of interception demonstrating unconscious knowledge co-existing with systematically different conscious beliefs. Where simple solutions to important evolutionary problems exist, unconscious perception needs to be impervious to conscious beliefs.

Associative learning requires associations, not propositions

AbstractWe discuss findings on evaluative conditioning (EC) that are problematic for the “conscious reasoning/propositional knowledge” account of learning, namely, dissociations between conscious beliefs and acquired (dis)liking. We next argue that, both for EC and for Pavlovian learning in general, conditioned responding cannot rationally be inferred from propositional knowledge type “CS refers to/signals US,” and that, therefore, performance cannot be explained.

What is implicit about implicit self-esteem?

Modern advances in implicit social cognition enabled development of novel methods for examining less conscious aspects of self-worth. The use of such “implicit” measures of self-esteem is based on the premise that because they circumvent direct self-reports, they must capture more implicit, automatic components of self-evaluation. Whether self-evaluations captured via “implicit” measures actually have these functional properties requires empirical verification, however. This investigation critically examined the evidence for such assumptions regarding the Name-Letter Test, one of the most popular implicit measures, by adopting a phenomenological approach. The results revealed that many respondents were aware of the self-relevant nature of the measure at the time of assessment. Moreover, at least some variance in the “implicit” measurement outcomes was accounted for by relevant conscious beliefs, particularly among those aware of the self-relevant nature of the task. The implications for understanding the nature and assessment of unconscious self-worth are discussed.

Catching the Wrong Leopard: Courage and Masochism in the Psychoanalytic Situation

This paper introduces the subject of courage into the psychoanalytic discourse about masochism and also demonstrates that ordinary ethical and axiological concerns can and should be included in our psychoanalytic language and practice. At each stage of a psychoanalysis, it may be helpful to consider whether the patient’s experience might be that taking a step deeper into the psychoanalytic relationship is both courageous and masochistic. This consideration can open the door to exploration of conscious beliefs and how they are related to unconscious fantasies and assumptions. Considering the possibility that even a sadomasochistic enactment may simultaneously represent a courageous attempt to rework conflict or trauma can enrich the way analysts listen to both manifest and latent material.

Spirituality in Violent and Sub stance-Abusing African American Men

Historically, African Americans have relied upon an undying belief in religious consciousness as a source of survival to endure the harsh treatment they experienced in a society that tended to de-humanize their existence (Martin & Martin, 2002). However, Vanzant (1996) said that Black men have lost their souls and feverishly search for a sense of meaning or the essence of their true sense of self. In addition, in fear, shame, and humiliation, Black men have run to alcohol and violence in a misguided attempt to feel more complete. The search for completeness is universal, cross-cultural, and (in essence) spiritual. Therefore, this article describes a means for recognizing and incorporating spirituality into treatment when clinicians work with African American men. The author utilizes case scenarios, reviews the literature, and provides practical examples on how clinicians can recognize and create an environment that invites clients to explore their spiritual needs. Although the primary focus of this article is upon holistically treating violent African American men, the principles and concepts the author uses can be effectively used in treating clients from a variety of ethnic backgrounds.

Moore’s Paradoxes and Conscious Belief*

For Moore, it is a paradox that although I would be absurd in asserting that (it is raining but I don’t believe it is) or that (it is raining but I believe it isn’t), such assertions might be true. But I would be also absurd in judging that the contents of such assertions are true. I argue for the strategy of explaining the absurdity of Moorean assertion in terms of conscious Moorean belief. Only in this way may the pathology of Moorean absurdity be adequately explained in terms of self-contradiction. David Rosenthal disagrees with this strategy. Ironically, his higher-order thought account has the resources to fulfil it. Indeed once modified and supplemented, it compares favourably with Brentano’s rival account of conscious belief.

From automatic antigay prejudice to behavior: The moderating role of conscious beliefs about gender and behavioral control.

Two experiments tested whether the relation between automatic prejudice and discriminatory behavior is moderated by 2 conscious processes: conscious egalitarian beliefs and behavioral control. The authors predicted that, when both conscious processes are deactivated, automatic prejudice would elicit discriminatory behavior. When either of the 2 processes is activated, behavioral bias would be eliminated. The authors assessed participants' automatic attitudes toward gay men, conscious beliefs about gender, behavioral control, and interactions with gay confederates. In Experiment 1, men's beliefs about gender were heterogeneous, whereas women's beliefs were mostly egalitarian; men's responses supported the predictions, but women's responses did not. In Experiment 2, the authors recruited a sample with greater diversity in gender-related beliefs. Results showed that, for both sexes, automatic prejudice produced biased behavior in the absence of conscious egalitarian beliefs and behavioral control. The presence of either conscious process eliminated behavioral bias.

Trapped in a "Secret Cellar": Breaking the Spell of a Picture of Unconscious States

I argue for two theses: 1) An unconscious belief that p is not the same attitude as a conscious belief that p (here I am disagreeing with David Finkelstein and Richard Moran). 2) An unconscious belief that p is the attitude it is on account of its rational connection with the conscious belief that p (taking issue with Georges Rey). I defend parallel theses for emotions. I then argue that Wittgenstein can be understood as accepting both theses and that this shows – contrary to the interpretations of Jacques Bouveresse and Donald Levy – that Wittgenstein can accept talk not only of descriptive but also dynamic unconscious states (in Freud's terminology).

Moore's Paradox and the Structure of Conscious Belief

Propositions such as are paradoxical, in that even though they can be true, they cannot be truly asserted or believed. This is Moore's paradox. Sydney Shoemaker has recently argued that the paradox arises from a constitutive relation that holds between first- and second-order beliefs. This paper explores this approach to the paradox. Although Shoemaker's own account of the paradox is rejected, a different account along similar lines is endorsed. At the core of the endorsed account is the claim that conscious beliefs are always partly about themselves; it will be shown to follow from this that conscious beliefs in Moorean propositions are self-contradictory.

Women's internal reality: birthplace or graveyard.

This article is an exploration of the etiology of female subjectivity and its relationship to unconscious and conscious images of mother and mother's body. Within the analytic process in dream and phantasy internal aspects of daughter's subjective beliefs and feelings about her body, sexuality, pregnancy, maternal capacity, and mental strength emerge. An analysis of their transformations into language, conscious beliefs, and cultural biases are juxtaposed with the development of women's subjectivity. The concept of the "illness of the signifier" is shown to be the outcome of the painful difficulties of realizing the meaning of the maternal presence as they are constructed internally and culturally.

Finkelstein on the Distinction between Conscious and Unconscious Belief

AbstractIn a recent article, D. H. Finkelstein offers a new proposal about the distinction between conscious and unconscious belief. On his proposal, someone's belief is conscious if he has an ability to express it simply by self-ascribing it; and someone's belief is unconscious if he lacks such an ability. In this article, I argue that his proposal is inadequate, and then offer a somewhat different proposal. On my proposal, someone's belief is conscious if he has self-ascribed this belief without recourse to any evidence about his behaviour, and someone's belief is unconscious; if it is not conscious.

Implicit romantic fantasies and women's interest in personal power: a glass slipper effect?

Three experiments investigated the relationship between women's romantic fantasies and their interest in personal power. Romantic fantasies (associating partners with chivalry and heroism) were assessed using the Implicit Association Test and self-reports. In each experiment, women's implicit romantic fantasies were dissociated with their conscious beliefs. More important, implicit (but not explicit) romantic fantasies negatively predicted women's interest in personal power, including projected income, education goal, interest in high-status jobs, and group leadership appeal. By contrast, men's implicit romantic fantasies were not routinely linked to their interest in personal power. In concert, the findings are consistent with positing a "glass slipper" effect for women that may be an implicit barrier to gender equity.

Implicit Association Test: Separating Transsituationally Stable and Variable Components of Attitudes toward Gay Men

Implicit Association Test: Separating Transsituationally Stable and Variable Components of Attitudes toward Gay Men

Unwanted Beliefs: Age Differences in Beliefs of False Information

Two experiments were conducted to test the Spinozan model of believing. Because of their reduced cognitive resources, older adults were predicted to be more likely than young adults to believe false information. Experiment 1 used a dispositional attribution paradigm to test this hypothesis. Young and older adults were exposed to both true and false (either positive or negative) trait information about the target persons. Participants then made dispositional ratings and evaluated the target persons on overall likeability scales. Results supported the Spinozan model of believing. Older adults were more likely than young adults to believe false information and their dispositional ratings were reliably biased by the valence of false information. Experiment 2 further examined whether these false beliefs of older adults were actually conscious beliefs. It was found that older adults consciously recollected the false statements as true and these false beliefs mediated age differences in dispositional attribution.

History, meaning, and interpretation: a critical response to Bevir

This paper is a discussion of Mark Bevir's The Logic of the History of Ideas (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999). It focuses on three topics central to Bevir's book: his weak intentionalism; his anthropological epistemology; and his priority claim regarding sincere, conscious, and rational beliefs. It is argued that Bevir's position on these issues is problematic in certain important respects, and that some of his related critical claims against Pocock, Skinner and others are misconceived.

Hiding Your Difference: How Non-global Languages are being Marginalised in Everyday Interaction

This paper is about the effect of a particular inherited ideology on the language practices of a particular intercultural community. The ideology, outlined in the first section, may be characterised as difference-equals-conflict. The community is a multi-national student body, and in the second section I trace the origin of one feature of its language practices to the application of the ideology. The ultimate effect is the marginalisation of smaller languages. Like all ideologies, the difference-equals-conflict ideology affects people's behaviour independently of their conscious beliefs. In this case, the students' positive attitudes to cultural diversity fail to prevent the diminution of this diversity. In the final section, I argue that this unwanted process results from the failure to examine the constituent elements of the ideology. I conclude with some suggestions for undermining it.

The secret life of the psychoanalyst.

In this article I have discussed what philosophers formally call subdoxastic about. Subdoxastic states are unconscious states about something that lead to conscious beliefs and conscious experiences. In the field of psychoanalysis Sullivan's (1953) "malevolent transformation" is a simple example of this. We all known how patients who have unconsciously undergone this kind of transformation of beliefs about people often appear more or less openly, depending on how well they are able to hide it, to be paranoid, suspicious, angry, and mistrustful of everybody, with the result that their conscious behavior and attitude alienate people and drive them away, resulting in experiences serving to verify the patients' beliefs. Psychoanalysts, we hope, are more subtle. Because they operate in a situation where there is little consensual validation and public scrutiny, the temptation to such syndromes as "compromise of integrity" or "partial private schemata" is very strong, leading to enactments that can be damaging to both patient and analyst and ultimately to burnout, as I have described it in this article. It is necessary, therefore, for analysts to keep a careful check on their conscious value systems and beliefs and to maintain continuing self-analysis for the subdoxastic factors that shape such beliefs. It is not possible to hide this from patients, and we must assume that sooner or later the patient gets to know the analyst pretty well. Analysts displaying the syndromes just mentioned, which are more subtle than ordinary character pathology such as that which forms the all-too-pervasive narcissistic analyst, may not even be aware they are doing so if they do not maintain a continual self-scrutiny, and if they do not pay close attention to their patients' material. This material--the patients' dreams, free associations, behavior, and enactments in the analytic process--often reflects not only transference but also constitutes a response to the analyst's unconscious and conscious value systems, which in turn are based on the subdoxastic factors that make the analyst the person that he or she is. Some patients may even precipitate crises or other situations that test the analyst's value system and force the analyst to display his or her secret self in immediate decisions that cannot be avoided. This is especially true if the patient is frightened or terribly threatened by factors in the secret self of the analyst; in this situation the patient may behave like a child who knows his or her father or mother is really very angry under a seemingly calm exterior, and as a result the child deliberately precipitates a display of that parental anger to get it out on the surface, get it over with, and reduce the child's anxiety. I have called for a genealogical study of analysts' choices of theoretical orientation in various cultures, and herein I am calling for a study of the subdoxastic factors in each individual analyst's theoretical orientation. Every theoretical orientation is based on a value system and a set of desires that determine the goals the analyst consciously or unconsciously wishes for the patient to actualize in the treatment process in order for the analyst to feel that he or she has catalyzed a "successful" treatment. This is a preliminary formulation. Further work is needed to distinguish between countertransference in the sense that we ordinarily use that concept today, and these subdoxastic factors determining the analyst's theoretical orientation and value systems, as well as to increase our focus on a subclass of these factors, the cultural ambience and background practices that Heidegger, for example, has identified as being crucial in the formation of the analyst's self as well as that of the patient.

On the role of beliefs in observational flavor conditioning

In previous research (Baeyens, Vansteenwegen et al., 1996) we demonstrated that when observers consume a series of CS+ and CS−flavored drinks while simultaneously watching a videotaped model who synchronically drinks identical drinks and facially expresses his evaluation (dislike to CS+, neutral to CS−) of the liquids, the observers acquire a dislike for CS+ flavored relative to CS−flavored drinks. The aim of the present experiments was to test some predictions derived from a “direct conditioning” theory of such observational flavor learning. Using the same observational flavor conditioning procedure, we investigated (Exp. 1) the effect of manipulating the observers’ belief concerning the relationship between the drinks that they and the model were consuming (same/different/no information). Observational flavor conditioning was obtained when observers were led to believe that they were drinking the same drinks as the model did, and when they were not informed about this relationship, but not when told to be drinking different drinks. At the same time, however, the observers were not able to correctly identify the source of the model’s expression of dislike: They showed no CS-US contingency-awareness. Whereas the former finding suggests the causal involvement of conscious beliefs and cognitive inference processes in observational learning, the latter is more in line with the idea that the model’s facial expressions may act like a US’ which is automatically associated with the paired flavor CS+, without any involvement of conscious beliefs or cognitive inferences. These two crucial findings were replicated in Exp. 2. Also, we obtained evidence in this study that the belief manipulation affected learning through its influence on the observers’ attention for the model’s facial evaluative expressions. These results can be integrated either by a cognitive theory allowing the beliefs on which the inferences are based to be of an implicit nature, or by a “direct conditioning” theory that conceives of the US’ as an interpreted event, rather than as a mechanistically and invariantly acting physical entity.

Two Conceptions of Reasons for Action*

In his rich and inventive book, Morality: It's Nature and Justification, Bernard Gert offers the following formal of reasons for action: Reasons for acting are conscious beliefs that can make some otherwise irrational actions rational (56). As a definition of the subject matter of dispute, the account is inadequate because it presupposes a substantive view of what is at issue-anyone who thinks that reasons can be desires could not have a genuine quarrel with Gert because she would simply have the wrong concept. As a substantive view of reasons for action, however, Gert's account has much more appeal. Suppose I am deciding whether to get root canal work done on my teeth. Getting a root canal for no reason at all or because I want to put off some trivial pain, such as grading papers, is irrational. But if I consciously, rationally believe that getting a root canal will save me from the excrutiating pain of having my teeth fall out one by one, I have a reason to get the root canal. My belief that the root canal will save me from significantly worse future suffering is a reason because it makes the otherwise irrational act of getting a root canal, rational. Gert's claim is that all reasons are beliefs of this sort. In this note, I examine Gert's claim that all reasons must be able to make some otherwise irrational actions rational. (I assume, for the sake of argument, that Gert is right in thinking that reasons must be conscious beliefs.) Gert's claim involves what I will call the 'toggle' conception of reasons: considerations are reasons just in case they can toggle actions from being otherwise irrational to being rational. I will suggest that this conception is not faithful to our ordinary understanding of reasons, and that the deep view of rationality that seems to underwrite it is compatible with a more