Congressional Oversight Research Articles

Casework as a Technique of U. S. Congressional Oversight of the Executive

Casework as a Technique of U. S. Congressional Oversight of the Executive

Changes in Congressional Oversight

Changes in Congressional Oversight

The Political Economy of Arthur Burns

DR. ARTHUR F. BURNS' tenure as Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board witnessed a remarkable number of economic and political events that make the Burns' years fascinating to study. Burns began his term when the old economics seemed to fail, when recession appeared to bring greater rather than less inflation. Following the recession, the economy was subjected to price controls, international financial shocks and domestic turmoil associated with reescalation of the Vietnam War. Price decontrols and currency devaluation then presented a new set of problems, only to be followed by an oil embargo and a quadrupling of oil prices by OPEC. The social and political upheaval over Watergate presented their own problems. The economy then plunged into the worst recession since the 1930's. Despite the severity of the recession, inflation remained strong. The economy began its long recovery from the collapse only to watch a slowing of inflation turn to resurgence. Burns left office with an economy that was expanding but which was experiencing strong inflation and worsening international problems. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the political environment and pressures that existed during the Burns' term of office and to assess the possible implications of these pressures for the conduct of monetary policy. The paper will focus on the first five years of Burns' term because these were the more difficult and interesting years. I served as a senior staff member of the Federal Reserve Board and attended all but a few of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings during Burns' tenure prior to my departure from the staff in 1975. However, I was not privy to all decisions and all pressures exerted on the Fed by Presidential administrations, Congress or foreign governments. While being an insider has lent me insights, my assessment here is derived exclusively from an examination of the economic developments plus material from Congressional testimony and press accounts. The analysis will avoid attributing motives to the various players but rather will stick to facts. The discussion will associate monetary policy with Arthur Burns, because for all intents and purposes monetary policy was Burns. His colleagues on the Board and FOMC exerted little influence on monetary policy. The conclusions of the analysis are a little sad. After presiding over monetary policy for many difficult years in which the economy was subjected to a seemingly unending string of shocks, both external and self-inflicted, Burns left the Federal Reserve a weaker institution than he found it. Despite his impressive public presence and forceful statements of intent, Burns' tenure was marked by serious policy errors that weakened the economy and the credibility of the Fed. Congressional oversight of the Fed has begun and will likely strengthen in coming years.

Congressional oversight of monetary policy

Congressional oversight of monetary policy

Organizational Rationality, Congressional Oversight, and Decentralization: An Exchange

Organizational Rationality, Congressional Oversight, and Decentralization: An Exchange Get access John Brademas, John Brademas Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Neil Peirce, Neil Peirce Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Elliot Richardson, Elliot Richardson Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Vincent Ostrom, Vincent Ostrom Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Caspar W. Weinberger Caspar W. Weinberger Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Volume 8, Issue 2, Spring 1978, Pages 111–119, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.pubjof.a038490 Published: 01 January 1978

Organizational Rationality, Congressional Oversight, and Decentralization: An Exchange

Organizational Rationality, Congressional Oversight, and Decentralization: An Exchange

Rulemaking by improvisation: Guidelines and goals in the model cities program

Bureaucratic guidelines are statements by public administrators explaining--more or less clearly; in greater or lesser detail--how recipients of public funds or targets of public law will be expected to behave. By "the guideline process" we mean the activities by which guidelines are devised (formulated and written); promulgated (issued, interpreted, and modified); and enforced. Two elements carry special importance in distinguishing bureaucratic guidelines from other techniques of government: first, guidelines are devised, promulgated, and enforced by public administrators (that is, not by elected officials, but by appointed ones deriving authority from bureaucratic roles). Second, guidelines are public rules--vehicles of control---not mere advice. Close inspection of the guideline process might provide useful empirical data for a range of topics of interest to political scientists and students of public administration. These topics include: the workings and proper scope of administrative responsibility in a democracy; the uses and effectiveness of techniques of congressional oversight of administration; the relationship between regulatory agencies (and federal departments exercising regulatory roles) to regulated interests; the consequences for program implementation of delegation of authority to administrative officials. Moreover-to introduce the subject of this paper--examination of the guideline process might shed light on lengthy and polemical debates over whether and how the expansion of the domestic agenda of the federal government in the last decade has produced a corresponding expansion of influence of federal bureaucrats in the management of local (especially urban) affairs. In these and other appropriate areas, however, we lack careful studies of how the guideline process actually works? This scholarly

Report on Committee III

Political parties have been the traditional means by which the various groups in our society are able to articu late their views and goals; however, there has been a sig nificant decline in the role of political parties in our society. One basic cause has been the primary system. Problems created by reliance on primaries are that this process en courages more extreme candidates and reliance on style rather than program. It is argued in favor of primaries that conflict between Congress and the president is not a bad thing and the primary system is more democratic than the party system. A possible resolution to this debate is the idea of the regional primary. Concerning the separation of powers, there is an increasing tendency of Congress to delegate un checked authority to the Executive branch. Possible solutions to the problem are congressional oversight, unconstitutional delegation of powers, congressional veto, and the power of impeachment. Finally, there is the problem of Legislative effectiveness and the Executive function of planning. Con gress must work as a whole on plans to deal with the country's problems, but this is a difficult change for Congress to make.

The value of congressional oversight

The value of congressional oversight

The federal estate tax: A congressional oversight

The federal estate tax: A congressional oversight

Congressional oversight and the multilateral development banks

The existence of quasi-sovereign international institutions raises important questions regarding the level of national influence and the degree of democratic control over international political decisions which can be exercised within a multilateral political framework. Karl Kaiser suggests that “as the number and activities of international organizations expand, an area grows in which major decisions are made without much democratic control by the peoples and institutions which are affected or which support these activities financially. Because the national government is still the basic unit of political organization in contemporary world politics, it is necessary that national governments oversee the operations of the international institutions if the principle of public control over those who make the major political decisions is to be retained. For oversight to be effective, and for the principle of public control over the makers of political decisions to be retained, oversight must be reinforced by sufficient access to information so that governments can regulate these institutions and so that citizens can control governments.

Committee Seniority and the Choice of House Subcommittee Chairmen: 80th- 91st Congresses

SUBCOMMITTEES ARE THE PRIMARY loCus for detailed consideration of most of the legislation handled by the House of Representatives, and they are the infantry in the exercise of congressional oversight of the executive branch. Control of a subcommittee is, therefore, an important source of power within the House. As one early commentator notes, the subcommittee the inner circle of an inner circle, and subcommittee chairmen are at the center of that circle.1 Since most congressmen desire institutional power, subcommittee chairmanships are highly prized, so that the allocation of this scarce resource is a potential source of serious conflict within the House.2

Congressional Oversight of Executive Agencies: A Study of the House Committee on Government Operations. By Thomas A. Henderson. (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1970. Pp. 74. $2.00.)

Congressional Oversight of Executive Agencies: A Study of the House Committee on Government Operations. By Thomas A. Henderson. (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1970. Pp. 74. $2.00.) - Volume 65 Issue 3

The Congressional Committee System and the Oversight Process: Congress and Nasa

THIS ARTICLE stems from a study of congressional oversight of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.' Broadly conceived, the oversight process aims at what Charles S. Hyneman has called the and of the bureaucracy.2 It is differentiated from the more general legislative process by being concerned with controlling the content and administration of ongoing, established programs rather than the creation of new programs. As such, it is not a function belonging solely to Congress; but rather, it is shared with both the White House and the judiciary.3 Direction and control, however, is not an end in itself. The ends of direction and control are many. Involved may be considerations of power, policy, economic advantages, and even corruption. But the end I want to deal with is the role the oversight process plays in the bureaucracy's administration of its programs. This article deals specifically with the implications which the fragmented structures of both the national government and most particularly Congress have for achieving a rationally administered space program. Defining rationality in government policy formation and administration and recognizing when one has what has been defined has proved a very difficult problem for political science.4 Both economics and public administration give us a useful starting point with their concepts of instrumental rationality. Men and organizations are viewed as setting various goals. The most rational action is that which achieves these goals with the least amount of cost.5

Congressional Oversight of Administration: The Power of the Purse—II

Congressional Oversight of Administration: The Power of the Purse—II

Congressional Oversight Of Administration: The Power Of The Purse I

Congressional Oversight Of Administration: The Power Of The Purse I