Congressional Influence Research Articles

Political pluralism of US domestic congressional influences: experience for Ukraine

Political pluralism of US domestic congressional influences: experience for Ukraine

Presidential Constraints on Supreme Court Decision-Making

Separation-of-powers studies of judicial decision-making largely focus on congressional influences. Less attention is given to the role of presidents, which is surprising given their vast policy-making powers. Accordingly, we develop a new theory of how presidents influence the Supreme Court’s review of statutes through potential legislative and administrative action. Using a data set of all federal laws passed between 1948 and 2015, we find, like others, that judicial review is less likely to occur when the court faces an ideologically hostile Congress. Unlike previous work, we reveal that such constraint is only effective when Congress is aligned with the president, who is less inclined to veto court-curbing legislation. We also find that the court’s distance to the president is constraining given threats of nonenforcement, but only when the law is salient, the president and public align, and the president exerts more control over implementation.

Congress' Domain: Appropriations, Time, and Chevron

Annual appropriations and permanent appropriations play contradictory roles in the separation of powers. Annual appropriations preserve agencies’ need for congressionally provided funding and enforce a domain of congressional influence over agency action in which the House and the Senate each enforce written unicameral commands through the threat of reduced appropriations in the next annual cycle. Permanent appropriations permit agencies to fund their programs without ongoing congressional support, circumscribing and diluting Congress’s domain. The unanswered question of Chevron deference for appropriations demonstrates the importance of the distinction between annual appropriations and permanent appropriations. Uncritical application of governing deference tests that emphasize the time and procedural steps an agency put into an interpretation would tend to favor deference for agency interpretations of permanent appropriations, but not for annual appropriations. Yet this result is upside-down if courts’ goal is to promote accountability and avoid interference with the balance of power between the political branches. Chevron has two core functions, a subdelegation function (it transfers the authority delegated in ambiguities from courts to agencies) and an anti-entrenchment function (it relieves interpretations of the solidifying force of stare decisis). As applied to annual appropriations, both functions respect Congress’s primary role in enforcement through the appropriations cycle; as applied to permanent appropriations, both functions interfere with Congress’s domain.

Congress and Administrative Policymaking: Identifying Congressional Veto Power

AbstractThe ability of presidents to unilaterally shape administrative policymaking challenges a foundation of congressional power: Rarely can Congress statutorily veto administrative actions over presidential opposition. Consequently, Congress has turned to other means of influence, including the appropriations and oversight processes, although questions remain about the degree to which they have been effective. To investigate, I study a spatial model of administrative policymaking that assumes Congress can execute a legislative veto, as well as a baseline model in which congressional influence requires a coalition with the president. I compare the two models and develop empirical tests that exploit instances when their implications differ. Applying the tests to data on federal regulatory policymaking shows consistent evidence that Congress exerts veto power over administrative activity, even over those actions endorsed by the president. I conclude by discussing some broader implications, including the extent to which existing studies understate the constraints on presidential power.

The Political Economy of the U.S. Department of Agriculture Rural Business-Cooperative Service

The U.S. Department of Agriculture Rural Business-Cooperative Service (RBS) was established with the goal of fostering rural development through grants and low-interest loans. However, rural revitalization is only effective if funds reach their intended recipients. With congressional oversight of the U.S. Department of Agriculture and geographic concentration of RBS benefits, the RBS may deviate from its stated objectives to satisfy congressional preferences. Using RBS grant and loan data from 2006 to 2014, the author performs a test of the congressional dominance model. The empirical results show that congressional membership on the relevant House and Senate subcommittees is associated with greater RBS funding. Congressional influence is a plausible mechanism through which development funding fails to reach those in the areas of greatest need.

Pathways of Power: The Rise of Hill Staffers-Turned-Commissioners

The expression “personnel is policy” has become a truism in Washington. Yet our understanding of how the political branches use appointments to project influence into the administrative state is incomplete. This Article leverages data on almost one-thousand commissioners on eleven major independent regulatory commissions to chart, for the first time, Congress’s growing practice of placing former legislative-branch personnel onto these entities. We then theorize that this phenomenon is rooted in fundamental changes in American politics in recent decades—and, in turn, that it has deeply affected administrative law and separation-of-powers dynamics. During the past several decades, the number of commissioners with prior service as a lawmaker or congressional staffer increased almost fourfold. Paradoxically, this sea change occurred during a period in which, according to conventional wisdom, Congress’s influence over administration declined. We contend that, faced with a set of worsening pathologies in Congress, lawmakers turned to appointments to influence policymaking. At the same time, congressional atrophy and an increasingly rocky confirmation process combined to make executive posts more attractive to Hill staffers than to others. This influx of staffers-turned-commissioners has substantially altered the functioning of these commissions and their place in the separation-of-powers system. Congress’s ability to “embed” loyal former staffers on commissions can benefit both institutions. From their new positions, former staffers can both enhance congressional influence over administration and provide commissions with valuable insights into the views and priorities of the branch that writes their statutes, sets their budgets, and oversees their activities. Staffers-turned-commissioners also bring with them political savvy, familiarity with the legislative process, and other skills developed on Capitol Hill. Further, as former staffers—steeped in the norms of an increasingly dysfunctional Congress—fill more seats on commissions, these bodies may undergo a degree of acculturation, encouraging more overtly political behavior among commissioners. Our descriptive and theoretical accounts generate two prescriptions. First, in evaluating potential appointees, presidents and senators should be attuned not only to those individuals’ preferences and expertise, but also to their institutional allegiances and potential impact on organizational culture. Second, increased congressional influence over independent commissions justifies a degree of presidential oversight. If commissioners are political actors—grounded in the politics of their congressional principal and carriers of Congress’s culture—they should be subject to controls from both political branches.

Structured-Induced Deference or Equal and Coordinate Actor: Congressional Influence on American Foreign Policy

Perhaps no separation of powers issue receives as much scholarly attention as the near monopoly modern presidents exert over foreign policy. Yet, despite an extensive literature on the subject, scholars have drawn different conclusions as to the causes of this change, finding that lawmakers either defer to the president or are equal and coordinate actors on foreign policy. Using the separation of powers as a guide, I attempt to rectify these differences and demonstrate instances in the roll call record where examples of both explanations are most evident. Recovering ideal point estimates between the 87th and 112th Congress on votes highlighting competing governmental objectives, findings show that the chamber median frequently shifts toward the president on foreign policy votes in the final passage stage and during the treaty process. However, evidence also shows Congress is less likely to defer to the president on domestic legislation and appropriations.

Independent Agencies in the United State - Law, Structure, and Politics

The authors of this book believe that the President and the Congress are engaged in a constitutional tug of war over the federal administrative agencies. I argue that this view fails adequately to address the politicization of agencies due to partisan congressional influence and oversight. Further, agency capture undermines an agency’s mission.

Sailing the water's edge: the domestic politics of American foreign policy

SAILING THE WATER'S EDGE: THE DOMESTIC POLITICS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. By Helen V. Milner and Dustin Tingley. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015. xv + 352 pp.Times of uncertainty in US foreign relations seem to produce shelves of new books prescribing a for the nation. This moment is no exception. The numerous challenges facing the country, from the rise of China to the barbarism of ISIS to a newly assertive Russia, have inspired many experts to suggest in print that American foreign policy is in need of a course correction.The upcoming presidential election has no doubt contributed to this mood, as candidates and their advisors spar over the best direction for future American engagement with the world. Should the nation adopt a more realist posture, eschewing any international actions not in direct support of America's material interests? Should it withdraw from the Middle East and pivot to Asia? Should the United States rely more on diplomatic tools in its foreign policy, recalibrating the relative power of the state and defense departments? Should foreign aid programs be eliminated as worthless or even perverse, or does expanding American generosity hold the key to the future stability of developing nations? Should high politics take a back seat to emerging transnational problems such as climate change and terrorism? Is it finally time to abandon America's postwar internationalist consensus?The new book by Helen Milner and Dustin Tingley, two highly regarded scholars at Princeton and Harvard respectively, provides some much needed clear thinking during this time of flux. Unlike most recent publications on the subject, Sailing the Water's Edge: The Domestic Politics of American Foreign Policy advocates for no new grand strategy to solve all of America's challenges abroad. Instead, it is a cautionary tale about how America's unique political institutions limit the foreign policy choices available to the president.Rather than taking a conventional approach by tracing foreign policy doctrines across time or reviewing the international challenges of today, Milner and Tingley analyze the various policy instruments available to the United States. When will US policy-makers choose military intervention to achieve their goals, and when will they make use of other tools such as aid, sanctions, trade, or immigration? Milner and Tingley argue that presidents will have the maximum freedom of maneuver over instruments, like military intervention, associated with few distributive effects and low levels of ideological conflict. By contrast, presidential influence will be limited over areas of policy with strong distributive implications, like trade policy or foreign aid, or those where political actors are strongly polarized, like immigration policy. This differential level of presidential influence is, of course, a function of Congressional influence. Congress, Milner and Tingley argue, will be most involved (and by consequence, best informed) about policies that are materially or ideologically salient.The authors trace this straightforward hypothesis through a series of very impressive empirical tests, all of which come at their question from different angles. Indeed, Milner and Tingley's book is likely to become a model for mixed-method empirical research both within international relations and beyond.For their first empirical test, the authors exploit an enormous dataset on lobbying activities to show that interest groups are more likely to lobby Congress on issues with distributional and ideological resonance, such as foreign aid and immigration. This finding supports one of the key foundations of Milner and Tingley's argument, as it shows why Congress might be more interested in some policy instruments than in others.Next, Milner and Tingley use another large dataset-this time of Congressional votes-to show that presidents are able to secure their foreign policy goals from the legislature more readily in less distributive areas such as military intervention. …

The political economy of the Essential Air Service program

We find that congressional influences affect the amount of airport subsidies that a congressional district receives through the Essential Air Service (EAS) program. The EAS program was passed with the goal of helping to continue commercial air service to rural communities following deregulation in the 1970s. Using data from 1998–2014, we find strong and consistent evidence that subsidies are higher in districts having congressional representation on the House Transportation and Ways and Means Committees. Our empirical results, when combined with news reports of members claiming credit for securing EAS funding, are consistent with the EAS serving private and public interests.

Placing a Limiting Principle on Federal Monetary Influence of Tribes

American Indian tribes are strange sovereigns. Though subject to the ultimate sovereignty of the United States in many ways, tribes retain powers that have not been explicitly divested by federal statute or treaty, or implicitly divested by restraints of tribes’ protectorate relationship with the United States. Defining tribal membership is one undivested power, and the federal government, including the Supreme Court, has recognized that particular power’s importance to tribes. Even so, this power, as well as others currently nondivested, appear to be subject to congressional influence should Congress choose to act.

Congressional influence as a determinant of subprime lending

We apply unique loan level data from New Century Financial Corporation, a major subprime lender, to explore whether attributes and committee assignments of Congressional Representatives were associated with access to and pricing of subprime mortgage credit. Research findings indicate enhanced credit access at discounted prices among borrowers represented by Congressional leaders and by members of the House Financial Services Committee. Black borrowers in districts represented by Congressional leaders also were more likely to obtain subprime mortgage credit. We do not find evidence of adverse performance differentials among the politically directed loans. Our results conform to those of Agarwal et al. (2014) in documenting preferential treatment of constituents in congressional districts represented by members of the House Financial Services Committee. Research findings provide new insights into the political geography of the subprime crisis and suggest gains to trade between subprime lenders and targeted Congressional Representatives in the extension and pricing of subprime mortgage credit.

Congressional modification of benefit-cost analysis as a vehicle for particularized benefits and a limitation on agency discretion: the case of the federal contract tower program

The literature on Congressional control of the bureaucracy has examined how members of Congress pursue strategies such as oversight, the limitation of discretion in legislation [Moe, T. (1989). The politics of bureaucratic structure. In J. E. Chubb & P. E. Peterson (Eds.), Can the Government Govern? Washington, DC: Brookings Institution); Huber, J. D., & Shipan, C. R. (2002). Deliberate discretion: The institutional foundations of bureaucratic autonomy. New York: Cambridge University Press], and the use of tools such as administrative procedures [McCubbins, M., & Schwartz, T. (1984). Congressional oversight overlooked: police patrols vs. fire alarms. American Journal of Political Science, 21(1), 165–179; McCubbins, M., Noll, R., & Weingast, B. (1987). Administrative procedures as instruments of political control. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 3, 243–277] and limitation riders [MacDonald, J. A. (2010). Limitation riders and congressional influence over bureaucratic policy decisions. American Political Science Review, 104 (November), 766–782] to exert influence over executive agency decision making. One area where Congress has attempted to exert control over agency decision-making is through the legislative modification of one of the most common bureaucratic decision-making tools: benefit-cost analysis (BCA). While scholars have examined political influence in agency regulatory impact analysis BCAs for proposed rules [Shapiro, S., & Morrall III, J. F. (2012). The triumph of regulatory politics. Benefit-cost analysis and political salience. Regulation and Governance, 6(2), 189–206], there has been a lack of examination of Congressional modification of agency BCA processes to justify and protect particularized [Mayhew, D. (1974). Congress: The electoral connection. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press] infrastructure projects in their districts. This paper will examine the effect of Congressional control over agency BCA processes to secure particularized benefits by developing an in-depth case study of the Federal Contact Tower Program (FCTP) operated by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) that examines the political and public management implications of Congress’s limitation of the FAA’s autonomy to operate the FCTP under current benefit-cost guidance. Building upon the literature on particularized benefits and Congressional delegation, the results of this study indicate that members of Congress use BCA processes to insulate infrastructure projects in their districts by restricting the ability of agencies to optimize program effectiveness.

Agency Design and Distributive Politics

This paper targets the intersection of two generally distinct literatures: political control of administrative agencies and distributive politics. Based on a comprehensive database of federal spending that tracks allocations from each agency to each congressional district for every year from 1984 through 2007, we analyze the responsiveness of agency spending decisions to presidential and congressional influences. Our research design uses district-by-agency fixed effects to identify the effects of a district’s political characteristics on agency spending allocations. Because most agencies distribute federal funds, we are able to provide empirical evidence about the relationship between structural features of administrative agencies and the degree of political responsiveness of their spending decisions. Because allocation of funds constitutes a readily comparable metric over time and across agencies, we are able to evaluate a host of competing hypotheses about the political control of the bureaucracy by both Congress and the President.

Congressional Influence as a Determinant of Subprime Lending

We apply unique loan level data from New Century Financial Corporation, a major subprime lender, to explore whether attributes and committee assignments of Congressional Representatives were associated with access to and pricing of subprime mortgage credit. Research findings indicate enhanced credit access at discounted prices among borrowers represented by Congressional leaders and by members of the House Financial Services Committee. Black borrowers in districts represented by Congressional leaders also were more likely to obtain subprime mortgage credit. We do not find evidence of adverse performance differentials among the politically directed loans. Our results conform to those of Agarwal, Amromin, Ben-David and Dinc (2012) in documenting preferential treatment of constituents in congressional districts represented by members of the House Financial Services Committee. Research findings provide new insights into the political geography of the subprime crisis and suggest gains to trade between subprime lenders and targeted Congressional Representatives in the extension and pricing of subprime mortgage credit.

Higher Education and Congressional Influence on Administrative Decisions: An Examination of NSF and NIH Research Grant Funding to Four‐Year Universities

ObjectiveThis study examines grant funding to four‐year universities to determine if institutions with more powerful congressional delegations receive more in research funding from the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the National Science Foundation (NSF).MethodsWe analyze grant awards to public and private not‐for profit universities from 2000 through 2009. We employ panel‐corrected standard errors with panel‐specific AR1 terms to determine the influence of representation on key congressional committees, in conjunction with institutional characteristics, such as size and mission, in shaping institutional success in securing grant revenues.ResultsTime series, cross‐sectional analysis suggests that members of the U.S. House and Senate may be able to influence the allocation of seemingly merit‐based grants and contracts made by the NIH and the NSF.ConclusionWe find some evidence that congressional‐bureaucratic relationships impact grant receipts, though the effects are moderate in magnitude.

Presidential Influence Versus Congressional Control in Action (Chapter 4)

How important is the President for US foreign policy? Studies in American politics—the Two Presidencies literature — assert that the president is much less constrained by Congress and other domestic forces in foreign policy than in domestic policy. Studies in international relations also often assume that the president is the most important actor in foreign policy and is relatively unconstrained by domestic politics. Additionally, studies in international relations often assume that each issue area in foreign policy can be studied in separation. We challenge each of these views. Using new data on roll call votes in Congress and on Presidential-Congressional budget interactions, we argue that 1. Foreign policy instruments should be analyzed jointly and comparatively because they are substitutable, 2. Some foreign policy instruments are more constrained by Congress and domestic forces and look more like domestic issue areas, 3. Other foreign policy instruments, because they can be linked more directly to national security, allow the President more discretion and influence over their use. Our research has two larger implications. Presidential bargaining with Congress over foreign policy matters since the Presidents tends to be more favorable on average to international engagement; rising congressional influence may circumscribe America’s role in the international system.

Legislative Gridlock and Nonpartisan Staff

This essay explores a recent proposal to reduce Congressional gridlock by using nonpartisan committee staff. It first describes past and present practice to have such staff serve the committees and a number of legislative support organizations. It then presents and tests a theoretical case of nonpartisan staff reducing gridlock that is premised on such staff having an expertise distinct from that of partisans and sufficient influence to affect legislative outcomes. The essay shows that the meaning of “nonpartisan” is somewhat nebulous and incomplete, which may make it difficult to identify, select, and retain persons with the attributes necessary to support the theoretical case. Staff incentives during Congressional service may further undermine the existence of those attributes. Finally, the essay suggests that the two components of the theoretical case — a distinctive expertise and sufficient Congressional influence — may to some extent be incompatible with one another. If nonpartisan staff must be “neutral” on policy issues in order to maintain their influence in Congress’s partisan environment, they may, in effect, be forced to surrender some of their expertise — their ability to analyze and persuade (in a manner different from partisans) why certain policy options are preferable to others. This “muted” expertise may impair their effect on reducing gridlock.

The Effects of Party and Agenda Control

An expansive literature examines the relationship between Congress and the bureaucracy, but scholars know very little about the ideological orientation of congressional influence over bureaucratic institutions. In this project, the authors formally examine the policy implications of various theoretical models of legislative voting. They then analyze House roll call voting behavior on legislation directing the Environmental Protection Agency. The authors find compelling support for a model in which the majority party controls the agenda and members vote according to their preferences. This finding suggests that congressional influence in the form of legislative directives will favor a moderate faction of the majority party.

Power or Posturing? Policy Availability and Congressional Influence on U.S. Presidential Decisions to Use Force

We examine two competing arguments relating to the role of Congress in explaining presidential decisions to use force from 1953 to 2000. We offer a policy availability rationale that suggests Congress matters in the decision to use force because presidents are motivated by their ability to influence legislative policy making. The models demonstrate that presidential success in Congress is the significant factor determining military action, not party control. Presidents employ force when their ability to influence policy is weak and avoid military actions when Congress supports the president's agenda. The results speak to the intersection of two important literatures, namely, presidential unilateralism and conventional theories on domestic politics and the use of force.