Abstract
An expansive literature examines the relationship between Congress and the bureaucracy, but scholars know very little about the ideological orientation of congressional influence over bureaucratic institutions. In this project, the authors formally examine the policy implications of various theoretical models of legislative voting. They then analyze House roll call voting behavior on legislation directing the Environmental Protection Agency. The authors find compelling support for a model in which the majority party controls the agenda and members vote according to their preferences. This finding suggests that congressional influence in the form of legislative directives will favor a moderate faction of the majority party.
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