Conflict In Chechnya Research Articles

Donated or Mandated?: The NGO/Donor Relationship

Since the 1980s, the number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs1) has exploded as governments from the industrialized North have shifted away from state-directed to market-centered economic development and social change. Governments are willing to give increasing amounts of aid to NGOs for two reasons: 1) NGOs can deliver welfare services to the poorest of the poor more cost effectively than governments can, and 2) NGOs are seen as vital for developing democracy and a thriving civil society, which, in turn, is essential for the economic growth that the governments want to see. This increased aid has not only allowed NGOs to grow and proliferate, it has also made them increasingly dependent on government funding. For the majority, it represents more than half of their funding. As Ian Smillie notes, When CIDA (Canadian International Development Agency) sneezes, Canadian NGOs reach for their vitamin C (Edwards & Hulme, 1996, p. 3). NGOs walk a fine line in translating their monetary support into community projects. Accepting funds in the form of grants from government or private sources opens the agency to a broad spectrum of ethical considerations in planning, implementing, and evaluating its actions. The issues that balance the roles of funding, accountability, program quality, and capacity building are political, programmatic, and operational.Political IssuesWhen government grants are a major source of funding, it is not uncommon for political issues to be considered in the process. In accepting funds from one source, non-profit organizations must balance whether accepting the donation will give the wrong message to other potential donors or beneficiaries, whether they will be pressured to decrease political activism and auton- omy, and whether they will have to give up their ideals in order to not bite the hand that feeds them. Is compromise an option or an unethical breach?NGOs operate within a global community that is not stable and is not likely to become so. This means that foreign assistance will continue to be part of foreign policy strategies and objectives, including counterterrorism, and may at times be driven more by geopolitical concerns than by moral imperatives. For instance, the area affected by the 2003 earthquake in Iran received lots of official aid,2 to some extent because it was in a strategic area, whereas despite continued conflict and human rights abuses by Russian soldiers, conflict in Chechnya remains invisible as a humanitarian crisis (International NGO Training & Research Centre [INTRAC], 2004, p. 5). Aid to Afghanistan, Iraq, and other parts of the Middle East is also, in part, a political tool and takes precedence over other humanitarian needs elsewhere in the world that are not connected to terrorist threats or the stability of oil production and distribution. The war in Iraq has also shown the ambivalence of NGOs toward accepting US government aid. Some took on government contracts to provide aid; some refused donor funding from US-led coalition governments and worked only directly with Iraqi partners; and others did not go to Iraq at all (Interactional NGO, 2004, p. 4).Many NGOs such as Amnesty International or Greenpeace have their own political missions and use advocacy as a way of educating the public on issues, gathering support for their causes, effecting change, and encouraging communication and participation within communities. Their programming may also include teaching their target population how to advocate for themselves as a part of developing civil society. But if an NGO's political views differ substantially from those of one of its donors, the agency might face the dilemma of whether it needs to become less political for fear that the donor will withdraw funding altogether or insist that resources be pulled away from political activism (Bloc, 2005, p. 2). An agency also needs to weigh the concern that staff morale may suffer, if workers perceive that the organization's goals or vision is being affected by donor demands (Bloc, 2005, p. …

Conflict and Cooperation in an Actors' Network of Chechnya Based on Event Data

The conflict in Chechnya is characterized by a high degree of complexity. To capture this complexity, the authors produced an actors' network analysis drawing on one of the largest event databases today. The aim was to identify the main actors involved in the conflict, track down the most important conflictive and cooperative ties between actors, and compare the quality and intensity of interactions among actor groups. In total, 2,818 events reported between 2002 and 2005 were assigned forty-four actors categories. Measures of centrality and power and a combination of principal component and cluster analysis were used to produce graphs of the network. The authors found civilians to be the most important actors, closely followed by the Russian military, the Chechen fighters, and the Chechen government. The results are discussed in light of the current situation in Chechnya with reference to chances and limitations of the network approach with event data.

Russian Tactical Lessons Learned Fighting Chechen Separatists

The ongoing conflict in Chechnya has enabled Russia's armed forces to become expert in insurgency tactics. Russian lessons learned include foreseeng and predicting chechen use of deception and ambush operations as well as improvised explosive devices. Russia's armed forces also had to learn Chechen movement and command and control procedures. These lessons learned are important and should be studied by US forces since Iraqi insurgent tactics bear a striking resemblance to many of these procedures.

Is Putin the New de Gaulle? A Comparison of the Chechen and Algerian Wars

An expert on the conflict in Chechnya explores the parallels between France's Algerian war and Russia's war in Chechnya to understand why the prospects for a peaceful resolution of the Chechen war have appeared so elusive. Using histories of the conflict, interviews, the accounts of journalists and participants, and scholarly analyses, comparisons are made on several dimensions, including the colonial histories of the two regions, new leaders' approaches to the conflicts, and gendered aspects of the wars. Possibilities for a peaceful resolution in Chechnya are considered in the context of the complex issues of how civil wars end.

A World Challenged: Fighting Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century by Yevgeny M. Primakov (review)

REVIEWS 549 transformationprocess in his chosen countries,which have been well chosen to illustrate the variety of approaches and experiences common to several more countries at that time. The reader is able to read across the chronicle and see the effectof each decision, largeor small,in the widerframework. Betz is also correct in emphasizing the value of interviews and personal comment in evaluating the process in each country. The fundamentalpolicy documents and institutionswhose various incarnationshe charts,quotes and footnotes extensively -which future historiansand analystswill find a very valuable resource - are often so bland that only their rapid creation from tabulaerasaeis remarkable. What is utterly invaluable is the way Betz accompanies this blandness with the trenchant views of those who were instrumentalin theircreation- views about content and function, and what the realissueswere. Insightslikethese are often lost to posterity,or ignoredby foreignresearcherspreoccupiedwith formand processratherthan power and substance. For this very reason Betz's book should be required reading for political scientists. Apart from occasional lapses in orthography,my only criticismis that the book does not cover as much as it could. Fuller treatment of two areas in particularwould have made Betz'streatmentexemplaryratherthan outstanding . First,given the degree of ignoranceof militarymattersin the 'civil'halfof the equation, I would have welcomed a discussionof the role (orfailure)of the media in enhancing mutualunderstanding. Secondly, as evidenced by the Russian military'sweak grasp of the new political processes (see p. I39 and footnote 107, P. I83), there could be more on the extent to which the militarythemselves adopted a new interfacewith the general population, as opposed to the political leadership and aspiring bureaucrats.Chronicling their defence of the need for conscription, or their dealswith local bigwigswould have rounded out the social dimension of civilmilitaryrelations . But these are minor quibbles. Betz has done us a great service in floodlighting and fixing an evanescent period in the democratization of GreaterEurope.Both futurehistoriansand those facedwith similardilemmas will have reasonto thankhim. Conflict Studies Research Centre ANNE C. ALDIS UKDefence Academy, Camberley Primakov,Yevgeny M. A World Challenged: Fighting Terrorism in theTwenty-First Centugy. The Nixon Center and BrookingsInstitutionPress,Washington D.C., 2004. viii + I50 pp. Notes. Index. Li6.50: $22.95. TERRORISM has emerged as the key security threat facing the international community in the early twenty-firstcentury, and the challenge it presents to governmentsas they seekto formulatecoherent and effectiveresponsesto the evolving terroristthreathas a particularresonance in Russia. Its decade-long conflict in Chechnya is perceived within Russia's security elites as part of a counter-terroristoperation and PresidentVladimir Putin believes it involves high stakes: the very survival of the territorial integrity of the Russian 550 SEER, 83, 3, 2005 Federation. Primikov is uniquely placed to offer an analysis of the subject, drawing as he does on his life-long experience of the Middle East and his inside knowledge of Russian intelligence as a formerhead of Russia'sForeign Intelligence Service (SVR) as well as his political appointments as foreign minister and prime minister under Boris El'tsinin the i990s, which he does with greatskilland academic care. The book itselfis divided into seven chapters:'Terrorism:A TerribleForce Unleashed in the World';'The Aggressionof Islam:Truthor Fiction?';'Peace in the Middle East:A New Approach is Needed'; 'The U.S. War on Terror'; Centers of Power: One or Many?'; 'Lessons For All'; 'Russia's Role in the ContemporaryWorld'.Primakovexplores the development of militant Islam as an unstableand growingfactorin the post-Cold Warsecurityorder,noting en route some uncomfortableaspectssuch as the role of the CIA in helpingto fosterthese elements during the Soviet-AfghanWar of I979-89. He explains that after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan militant Islamic groups began perceiving the US as their main adversary, making inevitable the targetingof the US by such terroristgroups.Ideas on co-operation in the War on Terror are mooted, such as the need to share intelligence on terrorist organizations and their members. For Primakov, enhanced intelligence sharing is one of the key lessons that must be learned from the events of I I September 200I. A recurringtheme throughout the work, which supplies the backdrop to many aspects of Russian thinking on counter-terrorism,relates to the shifts that have occurred since the end of the Cold War away...

Is Putin the New de Gaulle? A Comparison of the Chechen and Algerian Wars

An expert on the conflict in Chechnya explores the parallels between France's Algerian war and Russia's war in Chechnya to understand why the prospects for a peaceful resolution of the Chechen war have appeared so elusive. Using histories of the conflict, interviews, the accounts of journalists and participants, and scholarly analyses, comparisons are made on several dimensions, including the colonial histories of the two regions, new leaders' approaches to the conflicts, and gendered aspects of the wars. Possibilities for a peaceful resolution in Chechnya are considered in the context of the complex issues of how civil wars end.

Russia's Restless Frontier: The Chechnya Factor in Post-Soviet Russia

The conflict in Chechnya, going through its low- and high-intensity phases, has been doggedly accompanying Russia's development. In the last decade, the Chechen war was widely covered, both in Russia and in the West. While most books look at the causes of the war, explain its zigzag course, and condemn the brutalities and crimes associated with it, this book is different. Its focus lies beyond the Caucasus battlefield. In Russia's Restless Frontier , Dmitri Trenin and Aleksei Malashenko examine the implications of the war with Chechnya for Russia's post-Soviet evolution. Considering Chechnya's impact on Russia's military, domestic politics, foreign policy, and ethnic relations, the authors contend that the Chechen factor must be addressed before Russia can continue its development.

Was Asian Maskhadov involved in the Moscow hostage crisis?

In October 2002, 41 Chechen militants took hundreds of people hostage at a performance of the ‘Nord Ost’ musical production in Moscow. More than one hundred people died when Russian police stormed the theater. Militant leaders Shamil Basayev claimed responsibility for the incident, but Russian officials said that he was shielding former Chechen President Asian Maskhadov. This article examines evidence that Maskhadov was involved in militant preparations for the hostage crisis. If Maskhadov were involved in this, or other, terrorist acts, it would have significance for his participation in prospective resolutions of the conflict in Chechnya.

An ambivalent war: Russia's war on terrorism

Since 9/11 the Russian Federation has professed strong support for the US war on terrorism and claimed to be Washington's most reliable ally in its victory over Afghanistan. Closer examination of Russian actions, however, reveals a consistently ambivalent approach to combating international terrorism. Russian actions in Chechnya and elsewhere are better understood in terms of traditional interests unchanged since Soviet times. Domestic considerations too have sometimes dictated Russian actions. Moscow will use the conflict in Chechnya to divert attention from problems at home. Even were the Russian Federation willing to pursue a more consistent and aggressive policy toward terrorism, its security forces lack the capability to do so effectively. The current reorganization of Russian armed forces does not promise to improve this situation.

Diplomacy and Murder in Tehran: Alexander Griboyedov and Imperial Russia's Mission to the Shah of Persia by Laurence s> Kelly (review)

748 SEER, 8o, 4, 2002 and political aspects of Naqshbandi merged, and a pattern of political leadershiplegitimatedby spiritualauthorityemerged, supplantingtraditional secular leadership. The first Naqshbandi leader to effectively combine both aspects was Ghazi Muhammad (?I793-i832), who declared ghazavat('holy war') as key to the establishmentof shari"a. Pursuitof this goal culminated in the creation of the firststateformationamongstthe North Caucasianpeoples, Shamil'simamate. The Naqshbandi movement representsthe firstattemptat modernization in the North Caucasus, introducing recognizably modern formsof political leadership, social contract and collective identity.As such it stands as the neplus ultraof indigenous, as opposed to Russian- or Sovietimposed modernization in the region. The chapters on the imamate provide an overdue focus on Shamil's administrative, fiscal, military and religious reforms. The account presented here provides a fascinating basis for comparison with more recent events. As the word play in the book's title suggests, the Naqshbandi search for responses to external challenges took the form of an introspectiveinquest,ajudicial enquiryinto the currentmoraland socialstate of Muslim communities. Initial targets for Naqshbandi activists were the recognized Muslim authorities advocating a more conciliatory relationship with the Russians. Ghazavat was therefore a bi-focal phenomenon, aimed at both the establishedMuslimauthorities,lambastedascorrupting'trueMuslim values', and the Russian menace. The radical orthodoxy of the Naqshbandi engendered a dual debate, on one frontbetween Muslims as to the formsthat a modern Islam should take, and on the other with the non-Muslim world. The extraordinary success of the Naqshbandiyya reflects the capacity of radical orthodoxy, reliant on other-worldly values, to feed an ideology of resistanceto challengesfirmlyrooted in thisworld. Adapted from a PhD thesis, this lucid, well-written account presents an importantcontributionto the historyof the North Caucasus, as well as to the intellectual history of Sufi Islam. For those who wish to probe the history of the currentsituationin the North Caucasusbeyond the recent wave of books dealing explicitlywith the conflictin Chechnya, thisbook is essentialreading. Department ofPolitical Studies LAURENCEBROERS School ofOriental andAfrican Studies University ofLondon Kelly, Laurence.Diplomacy andMurder in Tehran. Alexander Griboyedov andImperial Russia's MissiontotheShahofPersia.I. B. Tauris, London and New York, 2002. xiii + 3I4 pp Maps. Illustrations. Appendices. Notes. Bibliography .Index. 25s.00. GRIBOEDOV'S masterpiece Goreot Umahas ensured him a permanent place alongside the great names of Russian literature.Its undoubted literarymerits apart,itspolitical tendency and the author'sassociationwith the Decembrists have often led to his being identifiedwith the progressivewing of the Russian intelligentsia.But as ProfessorKelly's new biography shows, Griboedov was an extremely complex person and his career as a diplomat and servantof the REVIEWS 749 Tsar's government reveals a man of rich talents and puzzling contradictions. Witty, intelligent, an accomplished musician and gifted linguist as well as a skilful playwright, and with a great talent for friendship, he could also be inflexible, irascible,insensitiveand uncompromising, and had a penchant for duelling. His diplomaticcareerin the Caucasus,likehispersonallife, contains numerous occasions on which his moraljudgement and his diplomatic skills are both open to question. Burdened throughouthis life by a spendthriftand autocraticmother, whose attitude to her serfswas lamentable, he alwayshad financialproblems.Yet, despite these complexities and shortcomings,and the suspicions that descended on him after the Decembrist revolt, he impressed both Ermolov and subsequently Pashkevich, commanders of the Russian forces in the Caucasus, and made a brilliantcareer in the diplomatic service, thanksnot only to his efficiency,but also to his unwaveringpatriotismand his giftforlanguages. Kelly'sbiographyisthefruitof extensivelibraryworkand archivalresearch, both in Britainand abroad,aswell as of an intimateknowledgeof the relevant geographicalregions and addressesa number of vexed questionssurrounding both Griboedov'sown life and the historicalevents in which he was involved, not least, as the book's title implies, those which led to his death in Tehran at the hands of an infuriatedand fanaticalmob inJanuary I829. The degree of his involvement with the Decembrists and the question of whether he had enlisted as a member of the Northern Society before his departure from St Petersburgis examined in detail, as is hisrole in repatriatingRussiandeserters to Tiflis and theirsubsequentfate. The massacrein Tehran, the reasonsfor it, whetherit could have been avoided, and how farGriboedovhimselfmay have provoked it, receive ample treatment, as does the historical and cultural context in which the events took place. Not all the attendant problems are resolved, some areprobablyirresolvable...

Encircled Again: Russia's Military Assesses Threats in a Post-Soviet World

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a new democratic, market-based Russian state whose leadership declared the states of the capitalist West to be partners and allies threw the military establishment in Moscow into ideological as well as organizational disarray. Gradually over the last decade, new forms of thinking focused on Russia's national security, and new perceptions of threats to the security of the new Russian state have emerged within Russia's military. The identification of threats intended to define the mission of Russia's armed forces and support the funding of military programs has been influenced by a complex of factors in post-Soviet Russia's internal and external political environment. These have included the conflict in Chechnya, the spread of fundamentalist insurgency in Central Asia, the eastward expansion of NATO, NATO's military actions in the Balkans, the growing influence of the United States and other states in many former Soviet republics, the U.S.led military campaign against the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan, and the potentially long-term increased U.S. military presence in Central Asia. Discussion of military threats has also been affected by the military's institutional interests in influencing the direction of reform and shaping defense policy and budgetary decisions. Finally, threat discourse in the military has been influenced both by the ideological heritage from the Soviet period in which the current military leadership was largely educated and socialized, as well as by new post-Soviet ideological and intellectual currents, especially those which have arisen in antiliberal nationalist circles to which elements of the military leadership appear to be attracted.

Russian Public Opinion on Human Rights and the War in Chechnya

Two specialists on Russian society and politics analyze how Russians view human rights and the conflict in Chechnya, as well as factors shaping views on these issues within Russia, based on a survey conducted in October 2001. The authors discuss how their results diverge from the findings of other studies of Russian public opinion on issues relating to democracy, consider several explanations for the patterns they observe, and propose some appropriate policy measures.

Chechnya: The causes of a protracted post‐soviet conflict

The conflict in Chechnya is one of the most protracted of all the post‐Soviet conflicts and is the only violent secessionist conflict to have occurred within the Russia Federation. The article evaluates the main explanations for the conflict and challenges historicist and ‘ethnic’ war accounts. It presents an alternative analysis which focuses on the interrelationship and combined effect of history, contingency, the instrumentalization of conflict by political leaderships, intra‐Chechen cleavages, political economy, sectional interests and international factors. The article views the 1994–6 and 1999‐present wars as part of a continuum, and discusses how the dynamics of the conflict have changed over time, as new radicalising elements such as Islamic fundamentalism and Russian nationalism under Putin have become more salient.

The Moscow Hostage Crisis in the Light of the Armed Conflict in Chechnya

On 23 October 2002, a group of about 50 Chechens seized a Moscow theatre and held hundreds of people hostage, threatening to shoot their captives and blow up the building if Russian security amassed outside the theatre attacked. Their demand, that the operations mounted by the Russian army in Chechnya cease, was not taken into account by the authorities who, from the outset, declared that they would not negotiate. The crisis was brought to an end when special troops stormed the theatre, using gas in order to incapacitate the hostage-takers, and averted the detonation of a massive explosion that might have killed all the hostages. Up to 40 Chechens were killed as well as 129 theatregoers.

The OSCE and the conflict in Chechnya

The OSCE and the conflict in Chechnya

Authority and Weakness of the 1977 Geneva Protocol II in the Light of the Conflict in Chechnya

Authority and Weakness of the 1977 Geneva Protocol II in the Light of the Conflict in Chechnya

The political genesis of the conflict in Chechnya, 1990–1994

This analysis deals with the political causes of the first Russo‐Chechen war of the 1990s. It examines these causes in the larger context of post‐Soviet nationalities’ policy and the struggle for power in Yeltsin's Kremlin. Chechen President Dudayev's failure to provide effective governance created pro‐Russian Federation Chechen factions but Moscow's clumsiness in handling them by December 1994 left Yeltsin with only one option — full‐scale military intervention.

Moldova and Transdniestria: Painful past, deadlocked present, uncertain future

The ethnic conflict between Slavs and Moldovans in the Moldovan region of Transdniestria is one of the lesser‐known post‐Soviet conflicts, as, mercifully, its scale never reached that of conflict in Chechnya or Nagorny‐Karabakh. Nevertheless, this conflict, which started in 1990 after the Russian‐speaking Slavic minority on the left bank of the Dniester declared its independence from the Romanian‐speaking right bank, has claimed hundreds of lives. Today, it remains unresolved; a political settlement has not been achieved. The frozen ceasefire in the region simply preserved the status quo which is virtual independence for the self‐declared, but not recognised by any other state, Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR), or Dniester Republic, from Moldova. This work seeks to attempt to answer the following questions: what were the roots of the ethno‐political conflict in Moldova ? What were the circumstances that prompted the escalation of the conflict into bloodshed? To what extent did external forces influence events, and, finally, what are the prospects for a political settlement in the republic?

Address at the memorial service held at St Peter's Cathedral, Geneva 20 December 1996

There were six of them. Six individuals who with their skills, their hands and their hearts brought shelter, care, comfort and a smile to the wounded of the conflict in Chechnya. They came from Norway, Spain, Canada, the Netherlands and New Zealand, all under the banner of the Red Cross. They worked in the ICRC hospital at Novye Atagi. And they are no longer with us. A seventh lies wounded by the bullet which was intended to kill him. The grief of those who witnessed that carnage is felt by us all.

Public Opinion and the 1996 Elections in Russia: Nostalgic and Statist, Yet Pro-Market and Pro-Yeltsin

Between 1991 and 1996 Russia underwent a precipitous economic and social decline with decreases in production, gross national product, and wages, and increases in inequality, crime, and corruption. Most people experienced a decline in their standard of living, and many fondly recalled the security and stability of the communist era. Nevertheless, in the two main cases when the Russian electorate was confronted with a choice of directions in economic policy–the referendum of 1993 and the presidential elections of 1996–the majority chose reform. Writing about Boris Yeltsin's surprising victory in the 1996 presidential elections, aPravdacommentator mused: “Logically, he should have lost, since he was unable to fully solve any of the problems that have piled up: the stagnation of production, the impoverishment of a majority of the people, growing unemployment, the chronic nonpayment of wages, the decline in science, culture and education, the continuing conflict in Chechnya, etc. Nevertheless, Yeltsin received a majority of the electorate's votes.”