Confidence Shocks Research Articles

The Real Effects of Endogenous Defaults on the Interbank Market

This paper explains the reaction of the interbank market to confidence shocks by means of a micro-founded general equilibrium model with heterogeneous banks. The contribution of the model is threefold: first, it micro-founds the decision problem of banks, by explicitly relating counterparty risk to the issuance of new credit on the interbank market and showing that this channel amplifies the effects of the shocks; second, the model analyses the effects of a pure confidence crisis (i.e. when banks assess that their counterparts on the interbank market are more likely to default despite the fundamentals remain sound) showing that its effects are long-lasting and severe (i.e. a 1% increase in risk generates a contracts GDP by 1.5 bp and investments by 50 bp); third, the model shows that conventional policies to offset a confidence crisis (i.e. monetary policy cannot restore trust on the interbank market and solve the liquidity crisis induced by a confidence shock induces).

Effect of Confidence Shock on an Economy with a Shadow Banking System: Analysis Based on Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Model

We introduced a financial intermediary system including shadow banks into a New-Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework and analyzed the effect of confidence on the real economy. A model simulation indicated that confidence boosts growth and promotes consumption and investment in the real economy. The effects on the shadow banking system and traditional commercial banking system differed, thereby providing a new perspective for policy-making and economic structure model research.

Evaluating Regulation within an Artificial Financial System A Framework and Its Application to the Liquidity Coverage Ratio Regulation

We develop a general model of the financial system that allows for the evaluation of bank regulation. Our framework comprises the agents and institutions that have proved crucial in the propagation of the subprime mortgage shock in the U.S. into a global financial crisis: Commercial banks and investment banks, which can also be interpreted as shadow banks, interact on wholesale debt markets. Beside a market for short term interbank loans and long term bank bonds, other funding sources include insured customer deposits, uninsured investor deposits and repos. While credit to the real sector is the principal asset of commercial banks, investment banks specialize in trading securities, which may differ according to risk, maturity and liquidity. As a first application of the model we implement the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) regulation and analyze its impact on bank balance sheets, interest rates, the transmission of monetary policy and the stability of bank lending in the face of shocks. We find that the LCR regulation reduces the supply of loans to the real sector, increases the maturity and interest rate of long term wholesale debt, and strongly diminishes the role of the overnight interbank market as a funding source. Our simulations suggest that the transmission of changes to short term monetary policy rates is severely impaired when the LCR regulation is binding. Furthermore, we find that a strong confidence shock can lead to a protracted credit crunch under the liquidity regulation.

The role of confidence shocks in business cycles and their global dimension

This paper uses survey data on consumer sentiment to identify the causal effects of confidence shocks on real economic activity in a selection of advanced economies. Starting from a set of closed-economy VAR models, we show that these shocks have a significant and persistent impact on domestic consumption and real GDP. In line with the existing literature, we find that confidence shocks explain a large share of the forecast error variance of real economic activity. At the same time, the shocks we identify are significantly correlated across countries. In order to account for common global components in international confidence cycles, we extend the analysis to a FAVAR model. This approach proves effective in removing the correlation in country-specific confidence shocks and in isolating mutually orthogonal idiosyncratic components. As a result, the (domestic and cross-border) effects of country-specific confidence shocks are attenuated and the forecast error variance contributions are reduced. Overall, our findings suggest that, while confidence shocks play an important role in domestic business cycle fluctuations, they contain a strong common component, which confirms their global dimension.

Liquidity Traps and Jobless Recoveries

This paper proposes a model that explains the joint occurrence of liquidity traps and jobless growth recoveries. Its key elements are downward nominal wage rigidity, a Taylor-type interest rate feedback rule, the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates, and a confidence shock. Absent a change in policy, the model predicts that low inflation and high unemployment become chronic. With capital accumulation, the model predicts, in addition, an investment slump. The paper identifies a New Fisherian effect, whereby raising the nominal interest rate to its intended target for an extended period of time can boost inflationary expectations and thereby foster employment. (JEL E24, E31, E32, E43, E52, F44, G01)

Modeling Euro Area Bond Yields Using a Time-Varying Factor Model

In this paper, we study the dynamics and drivers of sovereign bond yields in euro area countries using a factor model with time-varying loading coefficients and stochastic volatility, which allows for capturing changes in the pricing mechanism of bond yields. Our key contribution is exploring both the global and the local dimensions of bond yield determinants in individual euro area countries using a time-varying model. Using the reduced form results, we show decoupling of periphery euro area bond yields from the core countries yields following the financial crisis and the scope of their subsequent re-integration. In addition, by means of the structural analysis based on identification via sign restrictions, we present time varying impulse responses of bond yields to EA and US monetary policy shocks and to confidence shocks. JEL Classification: C11, G01, E58

Does consumer confidence affect durable goods spending during bad and good economic times equally?

Recent econometric analysis shows consumer confidence innovations have long lasting effects on economic activities like consumption. Using US data, we show this conclusion is more nuanced when considering an economy that has different potential states. We investigate regime-switching models which use the National Bureau of Economic Research US business cycle expansion and contraction data to create an indicator series that distinguishes bad and good economic times and use this series to investigate impulse responses and variance decompositions. We show the connection between consumer confidence to some types of consumer purchases is important during good economic times, but is relatively unimportant during bad economic times. We also use this type of model to investigate the connection between news and consumer confidence and this connection is also shown to be state dependent. In the context of the animal spirits versus news debate, our findings show that during economic expansions, consumer confidence shocks likely reflect news, while during economic contractions, consumer confidence shocks are consistent with animal spirits. These findings also have important implications for recent policy debates which consider whether confidence boosting policies, like raising inflation expectations on big-ticket items such as automobiles or business equipment, would lead to a faster recovery.

How likely is a UK recession after Brexit?

In the wake of the UK Brexit vote, forecasters have rushed to downgrade their growth forecasts for the UK, with some now expecting a recession. Using the Oxford Economics' Global Economic Model, we examine how likely a recession is by looking at the shocks the UK economy faces and the policy responses. We conclude that while a sharp slowdown is likely – in line with our own new forecasts – a recession is unlikely. Many UK forecasters are now predicting a recession in 2017, even though ‘stand‐alone’ recessions in industrial countries are rare. Our forecast is less downbeat. The UK faces a series of negative shocks including to consumers and business confidence, but growth will be supported by the weaker sterling and likely policy responses. Using the Oxford Economics' Global Economic Model, we show that to shift our baseline forecast of growth of 1.1% next year to zero would require a very severe negative confidence shock. Our new baseline already assumes a shock equivalent to one‐third of that seen in the global financial crisis (GFC). All else being equal, the shock would have to be around two‐thirds of that in the GFC to cut GDP growth to zero in 2017. Our new baseline also does not incorporate all the possible policy levers the UK can employ. We currently assume the Bank Rate drops to zero, but if a ‘rescue package’ of £75 billion of QE and a fiscal stimulus equal to 1% of GDP was also added, then the shock to confidence needed to get zero GDP growth would have to be similar to that seen in the GFC. We do not consider this likely given the scale of financial stress and credit restriction that occurred globally at the time of the GFC.

World Economic Prospects

Overview: World growth cut as financial woes persist This month sees our world GDP forecast for 2016 cut to 2.3%, from 2.6% previously. Our new forecast implies this year will be the weakest for the world economy since 2009. Our 2016 growth forecast was over 3% in mid‐2015. But the economic backdrop has worsened markedly since, with steep drops in stock markets, slumping commodities and widening credit spreads. We flagged the risks from the financial market sell‐off last month and conditions have improved little since. Worse, there are some signs that weakness in the real economy may be broadening. This month's global downgrade partly reflects familiar factors such as worsening emerging markets: we now expect even deeper recessions in Brazil and Russia. The US forecast has also been downgraded again, to 2% from 2.4% last month. This in part reflects a soft Q4 GDP reading, one worrying detail of which was a weaker performance by consumer spending. Signs of a slowdown in services were also visible in the PMI surveys for January in the US and Eurozone. Partly as a result, our Eurozone growth forecast has been cut this month to 1.6% from 1.8%. With world industry already stagnant, signs of weakness spreading to services are unwelcome. We are particularly concerned that the financial market slump will create a negative global credit and confidence shock. Another concern is that the collapse in world stock prices is starting to have ‘negative wealth effects’. For most consumers, wealth effects are more likely to be generated by house price moves. In this respect, there is some room for optimism – house prices are still growing in most of the main economies. But housing is weakening in some emerging countries and world house and stock prices have tended to move together since 2007. Pressures on policymakers to act remain strong and are increasingly focused on using negative interest rates – as in Japan and Sweden in the last month.

Links Between the Trust in the ECB and Its Interest Rate Policy

We contribute to the new, albeit fast-growing empirical literature on the determinants of trust in central banks. Like in most other studies we use panel data models based on the Eurobarometer survey on trust in the European Central Bank. Firstly, we confirm the main conclusion from previous studies that the trust in the ECB has suffered from the crisis’ outburst. Moreover, households perceive the ECB’s responsibility for the occurrence of the crisis to go beyond the responsibility of other institutions. This finding casts some doubt on the central bank’s ability to manage expectations in a country having been hit by a severe negative demand shock, while this ability is precondition of the central banks’ power to boost aggregate demand when its interest rates are at the zero lower bound. Secondly (and most importantly), in addition to previous studies, we examine the links between the trust in the ECB and its policy. Our main result is that when households have pessimistic expectations, aggressive cuts in interest rates have an adverse effect on their trust in central bank. This result is in accordance with the ‘lack-of-confidence shock’ hypothesis developed by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012) and go against the ‘fundamental shock’ hypothesis which would imply positive effects of aggressive cuts for trust in the ECB. These findings are robust to changes in the estimation method, the definition of the lack of confidence shock, control variables and countries under consideration. We also show that it cannot be easily rejected as spurious.

The International Dimension of Confidence Shocks

Building on Beaudry, Nam and Wang (2011) - hereafter BNW -, we use survey data on consumer sentiment in order to identify the causal effects of confidence shocks on real economic activity in a selection of advanced economies. Starting from a set of closed-economy VAR models, we show that these shocks have a significant and persistent impact on domestic consumption and real GDP. In line with BNW, we find that confidence shocks explain a large share of the variance in real economic activity. At the same time, the shocks we identify are significantly correlated across countries. In order to account for common global components in international confidence cycles, we extend the analysis to a FAVAR model. This approach proves effective in removing the correlation in country-specific confidence shocks and in isolating mutually orthogonal idiosyncratic components. As a result, the (domestic and cross-border) impacts of country-specific confidence shocks are smaller and their contribution to business cycle fluctuations is reduced, confirming the global dimension of confidence shocks. Overall, our evidence shows that confidence shocks play some role in business cycle fluctuations. At the same time, we show that confidence shocks have a strong global component, supporting their role in international business cycles.

ECONOMIES OF SCALE IN BANKING, CONFIDENCE SHOCKS, AND BUSINESS CYCLES

Equilibrium indeterminacy due to economies of scale (ES) in financial intermediation is quantitatively examined in a monetary business-cycle environment. Financial intermediation provides deposits that serve as a substitute for currency to purchase consumption, and depositing decisions are susceptible to nonfundamental shocks to confidence. The analysis considers various assumptions on nominal rigidities and the timing of deposit decisions. The results suggest that indeterminacy arises for small ES, and the resulting confidence shocks qualitatively mimic monetary shocks. A calibration exercise concludes that U.S. economic volatility from this nonfundamental source has increased over time while volatility from fundamental sources has decreased.

EUROPEAN SOVEREIGN BAILOUTS, POLITICAL RISK AND THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF MRS. MERKEL

The European economy was hit by a confidence shock in 2009 when the Greek government of Papandreou discovered the true amount of public deficit. The subsequent loss of trust in European fiscal governance reduced financial markets' willingness to lend to indebted governments. The European Union established the Financial Stability Facility to support debt-ridden states but without lasting success. The continuously rising Greek bond yields suggest that the information transmitted from political leaders did not reduce investors' risk perceptions. We develop a theoretical framework, in which financial market participants do not know the real rate of return on Greek assets but infer it from the signals emitted by informed European governments. Based on a unique news dataset, we investigate the impact of good and bad news from the European institutions on the Greek interest spread. The results demonstrate that the noise around the European decision-making process substantially raised the bailout cost.

Unemployment, Consumer Confidence, Business Confidence, Inflation and Monetary Policy

This study examines how unemployment rate dynamically responds to shocks to consumer confidence, business confidence, inflation and monetary policy. Based on the vector autoregressive (VAR) analysis of the monthly data from 1978:M2 to 2012:M5, the results show that unemployment negatively responds to shocks to consumer confidence and business confidence. While consumer confidence is not responsive to FED interest rate shock, business confidence negatively responds to FED fund interest rate shock. The results also show consumer confidence and business confidence Granger-cause unemployment, and inflation Granger-causes consumer confidence. However, inflation and Fed Fund interest rate do not Granger-cause unemployment movement. For the 12-month horizon, the unemployment forecast error is 71% due to its own shock, 11% due to consumer confidence shock, 13% due to business confidence shock, 1.10% due to inflation shock, and 3% due to Fed Fund interest rate shock.

A Joint Analysis of the Effect of Business and Consumer Confidence on Stock Market Risk Premiums

This study is to assess the dynamics effects of business confidence and consumer confidence on stock market risk premiums and to determine the relative importance of business confidence and consumer confidence in forecasting the variability of stock market risk premiums though a variance decomposition. The results show that the response of stock market risk premiums becomes positive immediately following the shocks to business confidence and consumer confidence. Based on the variance decomposition analysis, the variability of stock market risk premiums is 95% due to its own shock and the rest is due to the shocks to business confidence (1%) and consumer confidence (4%) for the 3-month horizon. For the 6-month horizon, the variability of stock market risk premiums is 93% due to its own shock, 2% due to business confidence shock and 5% due to consumer confidence shock. The forecast error of stock market risk premiums is 90% due to its own shock and the rest is due to the shocks to business confidence (4%) and consumer confidence (6%) for the 12-month horizon. The results from the OLS time-series regression show that business confidence and consumer confidence jointly explain around 7.42% of the variation of stock market risk premiums.

Macroeconomic Determinants of Carry Trade Activity

AbstractCarry trades—popular strategies in the foreign exchange market—are long positions in high interest rate currencies financed through funds borrowed from low interest rate currencies. It has been shown for a number of bilateral exchange rates vis‐à‐vis the US dollar that shocks to interest rate differentials foster carry trade activity and lead to significant changes in the foreign exchange level. This paper considers which (or which combination of) structural shocks can be consistent with the implications of such an interest rate differential shock that has been identified in previous studies. It is especially demand and confidence shocks, rather than supply or monetary policy shocks, which are found to generate effects similar to those produced by an unexpected widening of the interest rate differential and overall lead to longer‐term gains from carry trade activity. Also provided is a measure of the potential gain/losses experienced by the actual positioning of market participants in the foreign exchange futures and conditional on the knowledge of the macroeconomic shock that occurred at the time of positioning.

Ambiguous Business Cycles

This paper studies a New Keynesian business cycle model with agents who are averse to ambiguity (Knightian uncertainty). Shocks to confidence about future TFP are modeled as changes in ambiguity. To assess the size of those shocks, our estimation uses not only data on standard macro variables, but also incorporates the dispersion of survey forecasts about growth as a measure of confidence. Our main result is that TFP and confidence shocks together can explain roughly two thirds of business cycle frequency movements in the major macro aggregates. Confidence shocks account for about 70 percent of this variation. (JEL D81, D84, E12, E32)

Macroeconomic Determinants of Carry Trade Activity

From a financial standpoint, the mechanics of the carry trade has been recently examined in Brunnermeier et al. (2009). They showed that shocks to interest rate differentials lead to carry trade activity and to significant reactions in the bilateral exchange rates vis-a-vis the US dollar that they analyse. Starting from their paper, we take a more macroeconomic standpoint and aim to identify what kind of structural shock can generate the implications of their interest rate differential shock. To this aim we add two macroeconomic variables and two indicators of confidence to the 4-variable financial VAR of Brunnermeier et al. (2009) and use sign restrictions on the impulse responses of the resulting larger VAR to identify four macroeconomic shocks. We evidence that demand shocks and confidence shocks are associated with longer-term gains from carry trade activity, relative to supply and monetary policy shocks. This finding also supports the widely reported idea that sentiment boosts position taking.

Macroeconomic Determinants of Carry Trade Activity

Carry trades - a popular strategy in the foreign exchange market - are long positions in high interest rate currencies financed by borrowing low interest rate currencies. Such positions are held as long as i) there remains a significant interest rate differential between the two currency groups and/or ii) exchange rate risk remains low. When either or both such conditions are violated positions are typically unwound, triggering rapid movements in the exchange rate level and its volatility and spillovers to other asset classes as well as to real activity. The recent global deleveraging has clearly evidenced the strength of this channel. From a financial standpoint, the mechanics of the carry trade has been recently examined in Brunnermeier et al. (2009). They showed that shocks to interest rate differentials lead to carry trade activity and to significant reactions in the bilateral exchange rates vis-a-vis the US dollar that they analyse. Starting from their paper, we take a more macroeconomic standpoint and aim to identify what kind of structural shock can generate the implications of their interest rate differential shock. To this aim we add two macroeconomic variables and two indicators of confidence to the 4-variable financial VAR of Brunnermeier et al. (2009) and use sign restrictions on the impulse responses of the resulting larger VAR to identify four macroeconomic shocks. We evidence that although all shocks may potentially have effects on developments in the interest rate differential and the exchange rate level that overall make carry trading profitable in the short run, demand shocks and confidence shocks only are associated with longer-term gains from carry trade activity, relative to supply and monetary policy shocks. This finding also supports the widely reported idea that sentiment boosts position taking. We also provide a measure of the potential gain/losses experienced by the actual positioning of market participants in the foreign exchange futures market, conditional on their ability to correctly anticipate the nature of the prevailing macroeconomic shock.

Full Dollarization: The Case of Panama

This paper analyzes the case of Panama, one of the largest countries currently adopting the dollar as its legal tender, and evaluates some of the predictions of the theory on the costs and benefits of full dollarization. The main conclusions drawn from the case of Panama are that on one hand, dollarization does not guarantee fiscal discipline, the elimination of currency risk does not preclude default risk or the high volatility of sovereign spreads, and that dollarization may increase slightly GDP growth volatility. On the other hand, a dollarized economy delivers delivers an impressive inflation performance and may even reduce the impact of external confidence shocks, although not external real shocks. Finally, it is not clear whether the low interest rates in Panama are a consequence of the dollarization regime or the competitive internationalized banking system.