Confidence In Public Institutions Research Articles

Changing Citizen Confidence: Orientations towards Political and Social Institutions in Australia, 1983-2010

Since the early 1980s, when confidence in institutions was first measured in an Australian academic social survey, Australia - and the world - has faced many political, social and economic changes. From corporate scandals and company collapses, to unprecedented terrorist attacks, to major ongoing international conflicts, to changes in government and all manner of political machinations, to the global financial crisis and its aftermath. One consequence of such developments has been that many major political, social and economic institutions have come under intense pressure. Using survey research data, this paper investigates how public confidence in various Australian institutions and organisations has changed over time. The results are variable and in some instances surprising. Confidence in some institutions has remained high, and in some low, over an extended period of time. In other cases, confidence has varied quite markedly at different time points. As well as looking at trends in the level of public confidence in institutions, the paper examines different dimensions of confidence together with underpinning socio-political factors. It also discusses theoretical and practical implications of the data.

Public Trust and Regulatory Governance as represented through the Media

Media coverage of politics often comments on decline of public's trust in institutions. There is a notion that public trust of is steadily decreasing. Many factors contribute to this reduced trust, including: unhappiness with performance, negativity of election campaigns, distrust of traditional political parties, scandalous behavior of officials (unethical, incompetent or corrupt conduct) and changing role of media. (1) The media is said to be more interpretive in its reporting and critical of politicians and government (2) and thus, politicians and are subject to criticism on a daily basis. The use of the eight-second spot, quotable quote, sound bite and live television in House of Commons (3) has assisted in turning politics into a public spectacle. The framing of political coverage in these negative tones stimulates public cynicism which leads to distrust in government. Past studies have suggested that increased public confidence in institutions, particularly regulatory agencies, results in increased public comfort with work of those agencies. (4) This is particularly important for regulators of new technologies such as agricultural or health biotechnology. In order for public to accept new technologies, a high level of public comfort is needed. Where regulatory processes are transparent and public is informed of new research and developments in regulatory process, public comfort (and public trust) increases. When there is a lack of trust in generally, and in regulatory systems specifically, producer and consumer utilization of new developments in biotechnology may decrease. There is no doubt that media exerts some influence on interactions between public and institutions. However it is unclear whether media shapes public opinion, or if media coverage is a mere reflection of public's opinion. This study examines level of public trust/confidence in regulatory agencies through public opinion data from 1990 to present. We collected and compiled data in three separate categories: politicians, civil/public service and regulatory agencies. We found that politicians have lowest levels of public trust, ranging from 18% to 46%. The civil/public Service has much higher levels of public trust, ranging from 47% to 72%. Finally, regulatory agencies (in this case Health Canada, Environment Canada and Canadian Food Inspection Agency) all maintained high levels of public trust, approximately 70% for every year surveyed. (5) The second part of this study examines newspaper coverage of Canadian regulatory agencies for agricultural and health biotechnology. …

The Influence of Tax Compliance Burden Upon the Size of the Informal Economy: Europe and Latin American Countries

The existence of shadow economy has serious implications for social and economic development. The reasons for informality are numerous and vary from one region to another. Whereas in Europe priority is usually given to the own economical benefit by means of tax evasion, in Latin America the situation is more complex; sometimes it is a personal option based on economical reasons but also on the lack of confidence in public institutions, other times it is a matter of need because of the inflexibility of labour market that cannot absorb the labour surplus into its industrialization process. This paper examines how much of the difference in the size of the informal sector and across European and Latin American countries can be accounted for by tax compliance costs (i.e., the cost of establishment and of paying taxes), and explores the odds of decreasing the expansion of the informal economy by acting on this parameter. The results confirm the advisability of having into account, in the fight against informality, the compliance tax cost as an important tool to enhance voluntary compliance, which has in turn chiefly to do with the efficiency of tax administration.

Deconstructing public confidence in state courts

Although researchers have consistently demonstrated the importance of confidence in public institutions like the courts, relatively little attention has been paid to understanding what confidence itself really is. This article presents data from two samples of community members, thereby building on and extending a preliminary investigation that sought to understand constructs related to confidence in state courts with student samples. Structural equation modelling results provide support for the dimensionality of the measures and indicate that dispositional trust has little to no independent effect on confidence. However, tendency to trust in governmental institutions, cynicism toward the law and felt obligation to obey the law are important predictive constructs. The current results are important both for researchers seeking to understand confidence in the courts and the judges and administrators who would seek to increase it.

Explaining Journalists' Trust in Public Institutions Across 20 Countries: Media Freedom, Corruption, and Ownership Matter Most

Building on the assumption that journalists’ attitudes toward public institutions can contribute to a decline in public trust, this article sets out to identify the driving forces behind journalists’ confidence in public institutions. Based on interviews with 2000 journalists from 20 countries, variation in trust is modeled across the individual level of journalists, the organizational level of news media, and the societal level of countries. Our findings suggest that the principal determinants of journalists’ trust emanate from a country’s political performance, from state ownership in the media, and from the extent to which people tend to trust each other. Journalism culture and power distance, however, seem to have relatively little weight in the calculus of journalists’ institutional trust.

DISCRIMINATION, EXCLUSION AND IMMIGRANTS' CONFIDENCE IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS IN EUROPE

ABSTRACT What determines the confidence of immigrants in public institutions? Using pooled data from the European Social Survey of 26 countries, the study examines whether processes of social exclusion and discrimination can account for migrants’ confidence in public institutions. Specifically, it examines the role of the quality of public institutions and of the migrant integration policies of the host country and how they interact with migrant status and proxies for experienced or potential discrimination in shaping institutional trust. Results show that the performance of public institutions matters less for the confidence of immigrants than that of natives, in particular for those who see themselves as an ethnic minority or members of a group that has faced discrimination. Second-generation migrants exhibit less trust than first-generation migrants. However, discriminatory processes appear to be of less importance than the expectations carried from the home country or acculturation processes.

A Comparison of Institutional Confidence in China and Taiwan

Employing 2006-2007 World Values Survey data, this paper analyzes citizens’ trust in institutions, and to unravel how diverse factors might affect people’s institutional confidence in China and Taiwan. The empirical results reveal that Chinese have higher degrees of trust toward both public and private institutions. Additionally, Chinese have higher confidence in public institutions than in private institutions, whereas Taiwanese prefer to trust private institutions rather than public ones. We also find that Chinese confidence in public institutions is associated with younger generation, better education, Post-Materialism, life satisfaction, democratic evaluation, interpersonal trust, and associational engagement; moreover, their trust in civil institutions is generated by democratic evaluation, interpersonal trust, and associational engagement. In Taiwan, citizens’ confidence in public and civil institutions derive mainly from four sources- life satisfaction, democratic evaluation, interpersonal trust, and associational engagement. Otherwise, younger generations in Taiwan are more likely to trust in civil institutions. The conclusion indicates that the Chinese government’s basis for legitimacy has switched from economic prosperity to democracy, and the state may face serious challenges from emerging critical citizens in the near future.

The Community Engagement of Immigrants in Host Societies: The Case of Canada

AbstractUsing the data from the General Social Survey (2003), the community engagement of immigrants in Canada has been examined along 15 different dimensions. The findings indicate that immigrants add to the overall level of community engagement in Canada in the areas of confidence in public institutions ‐‐ such as judiciary, government, police, welfare system, education, and health care ‐‐ and involvement in religious activities. The areas in which immigrants fall behind are those that involve social interactions with the host population (e.g., trust, neighbourliness, social networks, group activities, volunteering, etc.) or engagement with private sector (i.e., confidence in private institutions such as banks and major corporations). Some of these measures of community engagement improve over time, but there is also an alarming trend that some decline with longer stays in Canada. The implications of these findings are discussed.

Corruption and Confidence in Public Institutions: Evidence from a Global Survey

Well-functioning institutions matter for economic development. In order to operate effectively, public institutions must also inspire confidence in those they serve. We use data from the Gallup World Poll, a unique and very large global household survey, to document a quantitatively large and statistically significant negative correlation between corruption and confidence in public institutions. This suggests an important indirect channel through which corruption can inhibit development: by eroding confidence in public institutions. This correlation is robust to the inclusion of a large set of controls for country and respondent-level characteristics. Moreover we show how it can plausibly be interpreted as reflecting at least in part a causal effect from corruption to confidence. Finally, we provide evidence that individuals with low confidence in institutions exhibit low levels of political participation, show increased tolerance for violent means to achieve political ends, and have a greater desire to “vote with their feet” through emigration. JEL classification: D73, O12, O17 Despite considerable debate over definitions, measurement, and methodology, it is widely-accepted among academics and policymakers that well-functioning public institutions play an important role in economic development. In turn, a key ingredient in the effectiveness of public institutions is the confidence that they inspire among those whom they serve. For example, households or firms who do not have confidence in the police or the courts are unlikely to avail themselves of their services, and may resort to other informal means of property protection or dispute resolution. Similarly, if individuals lack confidence in the honesty of the electoral process they are unlikely to vote, leading to low

Legitimacy and context: implications for public sector reform in developing countries

AbstractThis article examines the interplay between legitimacy and context as key determinants of public sector reform outcomes. Despite the importance of variables such as legitimacy of public institutions, levels of civic morality and socio‐economic realities, reform strategies often fail to take such contextual factors into account. The article examines, first, relevant literature – both conceptual and empirical, including data from the World Values Survey project. It is argued that developing countries have distinctive characteristics which require particular reform strategies. The data analysed shows that in Latin American countries, there is no clear correlation between confidence in public institutions and civic morality. Other empirical studies show that unemployment has a negative impact on the level of civic morality, while inequality engenders corruption. This suggests that poorer and socio‐economically stratified countries face greater reform challenges owing to the lack of legitimacy of public institutions. The article concludes that reforms should focus on areas of governance that impact on poverty. This will in turn help produce more stable outcomes. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Identity, autonomy and conflict in republics of Russia and Ukraine

This paper discusses the results of the survey conducted in co-operation with the European Research Center for Migration and Ethnic Relations, concerning identity in the Autonomous Republics of Russia and Ukraine. The survey queried 6522 residents of such republics as Bashkortostan, Karelia, Komi, Sakha (Yakutia), and Tatarstan in Russia, and Crimea in Ukraine. It examined the construction of social identities, common narratives regarding threats and deprivations, confidence in public institutions, the prevalence of views toward national minorities as ‘fifth columns’, ethnic stereotypes, ethnocentrism, and other conflict indicators. An early warning model, built on the basis of the results, measured the potential for conflict based on these factors, and found that it was most pronounced in Bashkortostan and Crimea, and to a lesser extent in Tatarstan. Conflict was less likely in Sakha, Karelia, and Komi, although there were still certain indicators that suggested potential problems, including moderate support for independence in these republics.

Civic Trust and Governance in Armenia

Trust is the key for productive economy and business.-Tigran Sargsyan, Chairman of the Central Bank of Armenia1Honesty is more important than oil. If Armenia's judiciary system is not corrupted and it takes equitable solutions then this will certainly promote [the] country's economic growth.-Steven Ekovich, American University of Paris2Why do people not trust their government? Nye and his colleagues3 raised this key question in their diagnosis of what is wrong with American political institutions. Miller4 warned of increasing political cynicism and distrust among citizens in the early 1970s. Lipset and Schneider5 analyzed historical trends of declining political trust, comparing business, labor, and government; they maintained that a existed across diverse institutional sectors in America and that the gap began widening in the 1960s. According to Nye and his colleagues, only one-fourth of Americans trusted the government at the end of the 1990s, whereas in the mid-1960s, three-fourths of Americans trusted the government. Concerns about declining public confidence in both political and civil institutions begin with the assumption that support and trust are essential for functional institutions in a democratic society. Currently, the United States is not the only country concerned with declining public confidence in institutions. In their edited volume comparing public attitudes concerning in the United States, European countries, and Japan, Pharr and Putnam6 reported that declining institutional confidence plagued almost all the aforementioned countries. They summarize this situation as disaffected democracies. It is ironic that democracies face a strong internal threat in decreasing confidence among their citizens.The situation is even worse for the countries that democratized recently. South Korea provides another case of rapid decline in public confidence in political and civil institutions. 7 According to the World Value Survey results, Koreans' confidence in their Parliament declined from 70 to 15 percent between 1981 and 2001, while confidence in the courts and civil servants declined from 80 to 45 percent during the same period. Survey results show that Korean democracy in the aftermath of democratization8 shows symptoms of general crises.9Recent studies show that postcommunist societies suffer from a lack of public confidence in all institutions, and particularly in political institutions.10 In Poland, for example, peoples' confidence in the Parliament and the government, which had previously shown a high level of 85 and 65 percent between 1989 and 1993, respectively, fell to a low of 20 percent within five years.11This article concentrates on Armenia, a country that gained its independence only fifteen years ago. Armenia, which is in the South Caucasus, neighbors Georgia, Turkey, and Iran. Political stability of the countries situated in this region is vital for the region and for oildependent countries. Lack of trust toward the newly established democratic institutions impedes their development, hindering overall development.Survey MethodologyThe Institute for Honesty and Integrity conducted the survey between February 2004 and March 2005 in the following six cities: Yerevan, Berd, Yeghvard, Gyumri, Gavar, and Vanadzor and surveyed a total of one thousand respondents. The margin error of is 3.2 percent with a confidence level of 95 percent.All of the aforementioned cities, except Yerevan, were randomly selected. Yerevan was manually selected because it is the capital, as well as the largest city in Armenia. The total number of questionnaires was proportionately distributed, taking into consideration the official data on de jure urban population.The questionnaires, which were written in Armenian, included close-ended, single, and multiple-choice questions. The fifty-one questions were technically designed to minimize confusion. …

Understanding Public Confidence in American Courts

While studies of public confidence in institutions have long been a part of the public opinion literature, systematic analysis of public confidence in America's lower courts has been missing. This is troubling, especially since support for the rule of law is integral to a democracy and support for courts essential to the operation of the rule of law. I offer an explanation of public support for lower courts, finding that experience with courts, perceptions regarding the fairness of court procedures, and choices made over institutional design all play a role in explaining the public's support for state courts.

People, service and trust: is there a public sector service value chain?

This article reviews the evidence for the existence of a ‘public sector service value chain’, offering a new way of thinking about what Bouckaert and his colleagues have called the micro-performance approach to improving trust and confidence in public institutions (Bouckaert et al., 2002). In particular, the article focuses on the role of service delivery in enhancing citizen trust and confidence. But it does so in the context of a broader model, one that links service delivery to other important aspects of management performance, especially people management. The article refers to this model as the ‘public sector service value chain’, drawing on work by Heskett and others in the private sector (Heskett et al., 1994, 1997). The article reviews evidence for links between employee engagement (satisfaction and commitment) and client satisfaction in the public sector, and between public sector client satisfaction and citizen trust and confidence. The article identifies the five main ‘drivers’ of service satisfaction in the public sector, and reviews both purported ‘drivers’ of employee engagement as well as data documenting the influence service delivery appears to have on citizens’ trust and confidence in Canada. The article outlines a forward research agenda, to identify the drivers of staff satisfaction and commitment, as well as drivers of trust and confidence in public institutions, and to determine whether the proposed links in the ‘public sector service value chain’ can be empirically validated.

Judging by Appearances: Professional Ethics, Expressive Government and the Morality of How Things Seem

This article concerns society's ambivalence about of standards public officials and professionals. On the one hand, in order to maintain a high standard official conduct, we prohibit not only corrupt actions but also actions that resemble corrupt actions so that by building a prophylactic wall around the prohibited conduct we insure that official conduct is especially pure. In addition, appearance standards are defended on the grounds that they are important to maintaining public trust in elected officials, judges and professionals. Since ordinary people can only assess actions on the basis of information that is generally available, the public official or professional must take care to ensure that his public actions appear proper. But these protections may backfire. Rather than providing a firewall against corruption and self-dealing, the appearance standard may encourage public officials and professionals to avoid merely the appearance of wrongdoing. Moreover, by widening the range of improper actions – by including those that appear improper – there may be more ethics-related inquiries and prosecutions which, ironically, may itself erode public confidence in institutions by making it seem that there is far more corruption than was ever thought. Whether or not appearance of impropriety standards achieve their desired ends is an important empirical question. However, it is not the question I address in this paper. Instead, this paper considers whether there are different kinds of reasons that support prohibitions on the appearance of wrongdoing that do not depend upon controversial empirical claims. But first, why address this question here? What is the relevance of the reasons supporting appearance of impropriety standards to the question of the moral and legal significance of the expressive dimension of governmental action? While there are importance differences between a) appearing to do wrong and b) expressing a constitutionally problematic meaning, which I will elaborate below, there are important similarities as well. First, in each the focus of attention is on the external or public manifestation of something non-public (because inaccessible or internal). Second, in claiming that both matter morally, one asserts that actors bear moral responsibility how their intentions are instantiated in action. And third, both recognize the relevance of the action's audience in determining its permissibility. There are differences as well. Prohibitions on appearing to do wrong presuppose a distinction between the appearance and the reality. Appearing to do wrong is to appear to do some independently defined wrong action. The philosopher Julia Driver uses the helpful terms and wrongs. The mimetic wrong is wrong, if it is, in virtue of its resemblance to a non-mimetic wrong. The non-mimetic wrong is wrong, if it is, for reasons other than resemblance to something immoral. In the case of the expressive dimension of state action, by contrast, appearance and reality coalesce. For the Equal Protection expressivist, like myself, racial segregation is wrong and violates that Clause, even when it does no tangible harm, because it expresses denigration. How the action appears (denigrating) and how it is (denigrating) are the same. Moreover, appearance of wrongdoing prohibitions address instances where the observer mistakes the true nature of the action. The mimetic wrong is wrong, if it is, in virtue of someone mistaking it the non-mimetic wrong. The limitations on the observer’s ability to know are emphasized along with the likelihood of misjudgment or confusion. In the context of expressive governmental action, by contrast, we need not presuppose this confusion. Given both the similarities and the differences just mentioned between the appearance of impropriety and the expressive component of state action, is there a reason to use a discussion of one (appearance of impropriety) to enlighten the other (the expressive dimension of state action)? I think so. First, the question whether appearance of wrongdoing ought to matter and the question whether the expressive dimension of state action ought to matter are importantly similar in their focus on the actor's responsibility the external manifestation of his actions. Second, the fact that the appearance of impropriety rests on the observer’s mistake while no mistake is presumed in the context of expressive action strengthens the case the usefulness of the inquiry envisioned here. If there are good moral reasons the actor to be responsible how his actions are likely to be perceived when the perception is grounded on mistake, it would seem that there would be even better reasons the actor's responsibility what his actions convey when the observer mistakes nothing. Thirdly, appearance of impropriety standards are most commonly applied to public officials, legislators and judges. While they are controversial, they are also extremely common. Since our inquiry at this Conference focuses on the moral and legal significance of the expressive dimension of governmental action, an analysis of the moral grounding of appearance of impropriety standards may prove fertile ground.

Anxiety and Uncertainty in Modern Society

The intention of this paper is to relate the various standpoints regarding anxiety and uncertainty. Within the humanities and social sciences, research is pursued in many different disciplines without much interaction between them. Everyone's thinking is based on concepts which are domainspecific, and the distinctions, methods and arguments used are the ones that are generally accepted within the discipline. The divergent conclusions constitute pieces of a puzzle that are seldom if ever put together. There are even doubts about whether such a puzzle can be put together. It can hardly be denied, however, that inspiration is to be found in a consideration of the views and findings of colleagues from other disciplines who are working on the same problems. Now that we have as our guests two prominent academics, each with specific views about our subject, we should take this opportunity to discuss together some of the sociological, anthropological, economic, philosophical and theological approaches to anxiety and uncertainty. If a number of well-known authors are to be believed, lack of trust, uncertainty and insecurity affect the most affluent and modern societies. In French one speaks of precarite (Bourdieu, 1998), in German of Unsicherheit and Risikogesellschaft (Beck, 1986), and in English of “fear”, “risk” and “insecurity” (Douglas, 1992, Furedi, 1997; Bauman, 1992, 1997, 1999). All modern Western societies seem to be afflicted with the same dismal and frustrating human experience. Belgian society is no exception to this. In recent years we have regularly been subjected to the emotional reactions provoked by sensational events in the areas of politics (Agusta scandal), justice (the Dutroux affair) and public health (dioxin, BSE, foot and mouth). Less spectacular but no less real were the results of opinion polls which showed that confidence in public institutions in general, and politics in particular, is at an all-time low. In 1981, 54% of respondents said they had confidence in the justice system; in 1990 it was 44%; in 1999, 34%. Confidence in parliament declined by 8% in the past decade. Especially noteworthy is the declining confidence in the European institutions, from 65% in 1990 to 43% in 1999 (Dobbelaere et al., 2000). A study of the changes in confidence over the short term showed that confidence in public institutions increased in 1996. The Dutroux affair caused confidence to shrink, but from 1997 onwards it grew once more, and by 1999 had reached a level that was higher than in 1996. Although public confidence remains low, this study of shortterm trends demonstrates that it is wrong to see emotional reactions to troubling public fiascos as the primary cause of lack of public confidence (Elchardus & Smits, 2000). In other words, deeper, more fundamental and slowly evolving causes must be sought. Opinion polls have also been directed to other components of uncertainty and lack of confidence, components that sociologists, following Srole (1959), have referred to with the concept of anomie. Alongside the lack of confidence in social and political institutions, they also distinguish a lack of confidence in one's fellow citizens which is closely related to the idea that in society, it is `everyone for himself' (there is no solidarity; people only look after themselves; each individual exclusively seeks power and money; success is more important than concern for others; etc.). As far as this component is concerned, in Belgium there is much less confidence in one's fellow citizens than in neighbouring countries.

Voting Laws, Educational Policies, and Minority Turnout

Voting Laws, Educational Policies, and Minority Turnout

“Not on My Watch”

To fill in the “black hole” between remaining S&L assets and what is owed to depositors will cost about 500 billion figure ineptly professed by the General Accounting Office and widely echoed in media reports, political speeches, and on talk shows.An important aspect of this cost is that it is history—gone for good. It will not come back as the result of an economic rebound, for instance. In fact, the longer it takes to pay off this bill, the higher it will go.I speak with less conviction about such non-dollar costs of the S&L crisis as the loss of public confidence in public institutions and their officials. I do, however, believe they too are significant, and I do not agree with the cynics who argue that there was little or no confidence left to lose.

“Not on My Watch”

To fill in the “black hole” between remaining S&L assets and what is owed to depositors will cost about $200 billion in 1991 dollars. By any measure, this is a lot of money and is in fact about equivalent to the undiscounted $500 billion figure ineptly professed by the General Accounting Office and widely echoed in media reports, political speeches, and on talk shows.An important aspect of this cost is that it is history—gone for good. It will not come back as the result of an economic rebound, for instance. In fact, the longer it takes to pay off this bill, the higher it will go.I speak with less conviction about such non-dollar costs of the S&L crisis as the loss of public confidence in public institutions and their officials. I do, however, believe they too are significant, and I do not agree with the cynics who argue that there was little or no confidence left to lose.

The criterion of relevance.

To have one's name associated with that of Martha Eliot is an experience to be cherished. As one reads of her and of her work, or talks with her or with those who know her, most immediate and lasting impression conveyed is one of impeccable relevance. Martha Eliot makes as much sense in politics as in public health; her ideas are as germane to nursing or to social work as they are to medicine, she is as aware and as responsive to milieu of today as she was to that of great depression. This gift for relevance has made for life of unusual productivity-a life that has enriched understanding of all who came within its orbit. One might speculate as to whether similarly rigorous adherence to relevant, to that which has appropriateness and meaning within given context, would be equally effective applied to massive social effort such as community care of mothers and children. It could be posed that if resources of an affluent, scientifically developed country are to be turned to their fullest use for betterment of people, every public policy, every program decision, every implementation scheme should meet criterion of relevance to times with respect to problem in hand and to actual or potential resources available to deal with problem. Conversely, one could reason that lacking such relevance, social action might represent only wasted effort, but even actual harm. Inappropriate public action might, for example, destroy public confidence in institutions or individuals sponsoring action, or squander scarce and irreplaceable resources. Regardless of political affiliation it must be admitted that we are indeed in Great Society. This is an era of great expectations, of great dreams, and of great action. It is an era in which traditional values, ways, and concepts are being sharply challenged. Waste not, want not is replaced by obsolescence and disposable equipment; a penny saved is penny earned gives way to keep money in circulation; buy now-pay later; the poor we always have with us is being audaciously and imaginatively disputed. String saving is virtue in mass-produced economy; demolition of sound but inefficiently planned building is justified when production hinges on efficient use of manpower and equipment rather than on grinding human labor; poverty is tolerable condition in an affluent and ingenious society able to produce