On 12 March 1983, the Seventh Summit Conference of Non Aligned Nations ended in New Delhi without the anticipated public confrontation over the recognizing or seating of delegates of either one of Kampuchea's two rival governments. Already on 19 December 1982, the Government of India, as host of the Conference, had announced that it would leave the Kampuchean seat vacant, even though the United Nations General Assembly on 25 October 1982 had affirmed the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) as the country's legitimate government. After intense, behind-the-scenes wrangling among conference delegates, the non aligned foreign ministers, on 6 March 1983, also agreed to keep the Kampuchean seat vacant.1 The New Delhi meeting, however, was but one of the latest, though more prominent, occasions that have pro vided a setting for the seemingly endless international tug-of-war over the future of Kampuchea. In its aftermath was to come an initially promising sign of a possible breakthrough in the long deadlock sur rounding the Kampuchean problem, that is, in the form of a possible future ASEAN-Vietnamese regional conference. The promise has not materialized after all. But the steps leading to it, and which form the burden of these pages, afford an insight into the complexities of Southeast Asia's currently most intractable diplomatic problem.