Confederate Command Research Articles

Brigadier General John D. Imboden: Confederate Commander in the Shenandoah (review)

Reviewed by: Brigadier General John D. Imboden: Confederate Commander in the Shenandoah James A. Ramage Brigadier General John D. Imboden: Confederate Commander in the Shenandoah. By Spencer C. Tucker. (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2003. Pp. 372. $32.00.) Spencer Tucker provides the first critical biography of the life and career of Confederate general John D. Imboden, and it will likely endure as the standard study. The book identifies exaggeration and uncorroborated statements in Imboden's writing and separates fact from fiction. This was indeed a formidable task, given the fact that James I. Robertson and other historians have declared Imboden's postwar writing unreliable and almost worthless. Harold R. Woodward Jr., in [End Page 205] Defender of the Valley: Brigadier General John Daniel Imboden (Berryville, Va., 1996), the only previous biography, solved the dilemma by accepting Imboden's tales as truth. Tucker attacked the problem head on and discovered that Imboden exaggerated as well in his official reports and other writings during the war. However, with extensive research in primary and secondary sources, Tucker highlights Imboden's strengths and points out that he has not received proper credit for his contributions to the Confederate war effort. The most well known Imboden tale is his Battles and Leaders of the Civil War (1887–88), an account of Thomas J. Jackson's great B&O rolling-stock heist at Harper's Ferry in May 1861. Imboden was present, as captain of a Virginia artillery battery, but Tucker concludes that his story is "a bit bizarre" (40) and "there simply is no proof of the event having transpired" (41). At First Manassas, Imboden's battery contributed to Jackson's defense of Henry House Hill, and as commander of the First Virginia Partisan Rangers, Imboden scouted and guarded wagons for Jackson in the Valley Campaign. The other famous Imboden tale is that before the battle of Port Republic Jackson met with him in private and told him the details of his battle plan. Tucker found Imboden's claim "indeed strange" (88) in light of Jackson's policy of secrecy, and "probably not true" (89). As a partisan raider, Imboden displayed initiative, used hit and run, and avoided wasting his men in attacking stronger enemy forces. Robert E. Lee approved, promoted him to brigadier general, and incorporated his command into the regular cavalry. Imboden defended Lee's supply wagons on the retreat from Gettysburg, and Lee appointed him commander of the Valley District. In 1864 Imboden delayed Franz Sigel's advance up the Valley and gave time for Gen. John C. Breckinridge to bring up his men. However, Imboden stretched the truth when he claimed that he won the battle of New Market by pushing back the Union cavalry on the Confederate right. Tucker points out that actually Imboden's men were not involved in the fighting in any meaningful way. Nevertheless, Tucker shows that historians have given Imboden too little credit for holding the first line of defense in the battle of Lynchburg and stalling the Union attack long enough for Jubal Early to organize and win the battle. Tucker interprets that Imboden saved Lynchburg with this significant action. Weakened by typhoid fever, in December 1864 Imboden was relieved of duty in the Valley and placed in charge of prison camps that included Andersonville. Tucker shows that he was a capable administrator who did everything within his power and beyond to relieve the suffering in the camp. He conducted an unannounced inspection and took action to improve living conditions. He realized the situation was hopeless, and without approval from Richmond began paroling prisoners and having them taken to Union lines. Tucker's analysis contributes perspective to the problem of Andersonville, revealing just how unmanageable the situation was on the scene. [End Page 206] After the war, Imboden entered a career that was ahead of its time. Today we would call him the state director of economic development for Virginia. He had offices in Richmond and New York City and traveled to London and throughout the United States to promote development of Virginia's railroads, land, timber, and coal. He was successful and had his happiest moments promoting Virginia at expositions such as the...

A Crisis in Confederate Command: Edmund Kirby Smith, Richard Taylor, and the Army of the Trans-Mississippi (review)

Reviewed by: A Crisis in Confederate Command: Edmund Kirby Smith, Richard Taylor, and the Army of the Trans-Mississippi Richard M. McMurry A Crisis in Confederate Command: Edmund Kirby Smith, Richard Taylor, and the Army of the Trans-Mississippi. By Jeffrey S. Prushankin. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2005. ISBN 0-8071-3088-5. Maps. Illustrations. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xx, 308. $39.95. In the spring of 1864 Union forces launched a double offensive against the Confederates in the "Trans-Mississippi." One arm of this effort advanced up the Red River into northwestern Louisiana; the other came overland across southern Arkansas. The Yankee objective was Shreveport, near the Louisiana-Texas border and the center of Confederate power, authority, and industry west of the Mississippi River. On 8 April at Mansfield southeast of Shreveport the Confederates turned back the Red River arm of the Yankee campaign. They then shifted their main effort northward to meet the other Federal column. That force, learning [End Page 514] of the result at Mansfield, soon turned back, and the danger to the Rebel position came to an end. Both Union columns were able to retreat without suffering serious damage. Jeffrey Prushankin uses this campaign as the focus of his fine study of Confederate command in the Trans-Mississippi. The leading Rebels—General Edmund Kirby Smith, commander of the department, and Major General Richard Taylor, in charge of Rebel forces defending Louisiana—are the central figures. The two had long disagreed about the overall policy that the Secessionists should follow west of the Mississippi. Smith favored efforts to regain Arkansas and to establish Rebel rule over Missouri (he owed his command to Arkansas and Missouri politicians). Taylor, who lived near New Orleans, believed that the Confederates should devote their main attention to Louisiana, with the ultimate objective of retaking New Orleans (captured by Federal forces in April 1862). This difference greatly hampered Rebel operations in the department, especially in 1864 when the Trans-Mississippi Confederates faced their most serious challenge. The dispute came down to what the Rebels should attempt to do in the aftermath of their victory at Mansfield. Should they concentrate on exploiting that success by mounting a full-scale effort to pursue the beaten Federals as they fled back down the Red River, as Taylor advocated, or should they shift troops northward to meet the enemy force in Arkansas, as Smith preferred? The former course might produce a great victory, perhaps even including the capture or destruction of the powerful fleet of gunboats that accompanied the Red River column. The second strategy would ensure the safety of the department. Taylor favored the former strategy; Smith preferred the latter. Since Smith commanded the department, many of the troops who had helped Taylor triumph at Mansfield went north to Arkansas. Taylor, left with a weakened force, could not trap the Unionists he had beaten at Mansfield, and they eventually escaped from the Red River Valley. Smith was able to do little more than follow and skirmish with the retreating column in Arkansas. Soon after the campaign ended the Smith-Taylor differences broke into the open and quickly turned very personal and very bitter. The whole sorry episode furnishes an excellent example of how military operations should and should not be conducted and of how good or bad personal chemistry can affect a nation's military fortunes. Readers wanting tactical lessons can skip this book. Those who wish to ponder the larger aspects of warfare can learn much from studying how Smith and Taylor defended the Trans-Mississippi in 1864. Richard M. McMurry Roanoke, Virginia Copyright © 2006 Society for Military History

A Crisis in Confederate Command: Edmund Kirby Smith, Richard Taylor, and the Army of the Trans-Mississippi

A Crisis in Confederate Command: Edmund Kirby Smith, Richard Taylor, and the Army of the Trans-Mississippi. By Jeffery S. Prushankin. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2005. Pp. xx, 308. Acknowledgments, maps, illustrations, notes, bibliography, index. $39.95.) Although operations in the Trans-Mississippi have hardly been ignored by historians of the Civil War, there is a longstanding and probably correct belief that this theater has not received sufficient attention or appreciation from students of the war. In recent years, a number of historians have endeavored to correct this by producing informative and insightful works on the campaigns and personalities that shaped the course of the war west of the great river. The latest addition to this corps of scholars is Jeffery S. Prushankin, whose new book, A Crisis in Confederate Command, deserves attention from anyone interested in the war in the West. As indicated in the title, the focus of this book is the troubled command relationship between Edmund Kirby Smith and Richard Taylor, which shaped and was shaped decisively by the course and outcome of the infamous Red River Campaign of 1864. In early 1864, Smith, commander of Confederate forces in the Trans-Mississippi, faced Federal threats from two directions to his base at Shreveport. Advancing from the north through Arkansas was a column commanded by Frederick Steele, while to the south a joint army-navy force under the command of Nathaniel Banks and David Dixon Porter pushed up the Red River. Smith planned to take advantage of his interior lines to defeat these two forces in detail. Yet, in defiance of Smith's relatively clear intention to maintain the defensive in Louisiana and make the decisive initial offensive against Steele, Taylor attacked and defeated Banks at the battle of Mansfield and induced the Federals to retreat back down the Red River. In the meantime, Smith was able to thwart Steele's advance, but could not deliver a decisive strike against the Federals in Arkansas. As was typical in the Civil War, a fierce debate emerged after the campaign over whether more could have been accomplished. Had Smith reversed his assessment of operational priorities at the outset of the campaign, Taylor groused, the result would have been the destruction of Banks's and Porter's forces, rather than the simple thwarting of the two Union offensives. The dispute between Smith and Taylor over the conduct of the Red River Campaign and other matters, as these things so often did during the Civil War, quickly became public and did not end with the collapse of the Confederacy. …

Brigadier General John D. Imboden: Confederate Commander in the Shenandoah

Brigadier General John D. Imboden: Confederate Commander in the Shenandoah

Brigadier General John D. Imboden: Confederate Commander in the Shenandoah (review)

Brigadier General John D. Imboden: Confederate Commander in the Shenandoah (review)

Ninety-Eight Days: A Geographer's View of the Vicksburg Campaign

Grant's campaign against Vicksburg has been studied from a number of perspectives--but always with the outcome in the foreground. This documented history of the final phases of the Vicksburg Campaign, from March 29 through July 4, 1863, examines the actions of Union and Confederate commanders as they unfolded, reconstructing their decisions based only on what they knew at any given time. In meticulous detail, Warren E. Grabau describes the logistical situation at key junctures during the campaign and explains how and why those situations constrained the choices available to Grant and Confederate commander John C. Pemberton. Alternating between Confederate and Federal perspectives, he allows the reader to see the situation as the commanders did and then describes how the available information led to their decisions. Grabau examines not only topographic and hydrographic features but also strategic, political, economic, and demographic factors that influenced the commanders' thinking. He analyzes the effectiveness of the intelligence-gathering capabilities of each side, shows how the decisions of both commanders were affected by the presence of the Union Navy, and describes the impact of political philosophies and command structures on the conduct of the campaign. Through his detailed analysis, Grabau even suggests that Grant had no actual campaign plan but was instead a master opportunist, able to exploit every situation. Remarkably detailed maps reconstruct the terrain as it was at the time and show how incomplete data often resulted in poor military decisions. Other supportive material includes Command Structures of the Federal and Confederate Forces in diagrammatic form as they stood at the beginning of the ninety-eight days. Ninety-eight Days is a monumental work masterfully executed, a reconstruction of military reasoning that is more analytical than any previous study of Vicksburg. It contributes substantially to our understanding of those military operations and demonstrates how crucial geography is to the conduct of war.The Author: Warren E. Grabau is a retired geologist with a long interest in the Civil War. He is he coauthor of two earlier books: Evolution of Geomorphology; A Nation-by-Nation Summary of Development (with H. J. Walker) and The Battle of Jackson, May 14, 1863 (with Edwin C. Bearss).

Feelin’ Mighty Southern: Recent Scholarship on Southern Appalachia in the Civil War

Southern appalachia, that region taking in western Virginia, eastern Kentucky, western North Carolina, East Tennessee, northern Georgia, and northern Alabama, proved to be the wild card in Civil War politics and strategy. From the beginning of the secession crisis President Abraham Lincoln viewed the supposedly loyalist mountain regions as an ideal base for military operations into vital Confederate territory, and a place to drive a wedge into Southern unity. Politically, not to mention logistically, the mountain regions turned out to be less hospitable, and certainly less cooperative, than Northerners hoped. The Southern Appalachians, however, proved equally troublesome to the Confederate command. After an initial burst of wartime fervor, many mountain residents grew increasingly resistant, and then violently hostile, to coercive Confederate mobilization policies. The mountain regions also provided havens for deserters and increasingly fertile ground for bushwhackers, bandits, and resistance movements. At the same time, the war was particularly cruel to the Southern Appalachians, and residents suffered from economic collapse, social fragmentation, failed institutions, brutal partisan infighting, and heavy-handed intervention by outsiders, both Northern and Southern.

Banners to the breeze: the Kentucky Campaign, Corinth, and Stones River

Banners to the Breeze: The Kentucky Campaign, Corinth, and Stones River. By Earl J. Hess. (The University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln and London, 2000. pp. 252. $32.00) Civil War military operations between the Mississippi River and the Appalachian Mountains were perhaps the most decisive campaigns of the conflict. Illinois and other loyal western states contributed vast numbers of men to the struggle to prevent Confederate domination of this vital region. Earl J. Hess's book Banners to the Breeze examines an important phase of the war in the West during the late summer of 1862. Hess's work provides a well-rounded narrative of the origins, personalities, and course of the 1862 western campaigns encompassing the battles of Perryville, Kentucky, Corinth, Mississippi, and Stones River, Tennessee. The book is one of the University of Nebraska Press's planned sixteen volume series Great Campaigns of the Civil War and is an excellent addition to Civil War scholarship. The main premise of Hess's book is that military operations were the fundamental determining factor for the outcome of the war. This was especially true between July 1862 and January 1863 when joint Confederate offensives East and West held the possibility of reversing the string of defeats that had pushed Southern armies out of Kentucky, much of Tennessee, and the Mississippi rail center of Corinth. If the Confederacy could have mounted successful invasions of northern territory, then the glittering possibility of foreign recognition might have been achieved. One of the ways Hess's work succeeds is by his use of excellent topographical and geographical descriptions of each campaign. His explanations of the lay of the land of the western theater and of the battlefields helps one understand the generals' tactical intentions, problems of mobility, as well as concomitant logistical difficulties. Hess also makes shrewd judgments of the leadership, describing the entire Confederate command structure in the West as schizophrenic, and he goes on to aptly sum up the generalship of Earl Van Dom and Sterling Price as artless bumbling. Hess amply credits Confederate General Braxton Bragg for skillfully initiating the autumn invasion of Kentucky and for his excellent disciplinarian and administrative qualities, but contrasts these with his indecisiveness and consistently inept battlefield performances. Union generals Don Carlos Buell and William S. Rosecrans also come in for their share of criticism for command failures and inability to grasp shifts in Washington political realities which radicalized the war's prosecution. Banners to the Breeze provides readers with a concise campaign narrative blended with the concerns and judgments of commanders as well as common soldiers, including the imprint their actions and morale left on their respective homefronts. …

General George E. Pickett in Life and Legend (review)

272CIVIL WAR HISTORY the literature, the author concludes that Lee was wrong, but based on what the Confederate commander knew and intended his decisions were "reasonable." In the end, Gallagher's Lee is believable. And his argument is persuasive that— through both success and aggressiveness—Lee became a significant factor in prolonging the life of the Confederacy. The second theme, the command structure of the Army ofNorthern Virginia, is pursued through seven essays that center on Stonewall Jackson, James Longstreet, Powell Hill, Richard Ewell, Jubal Early, and somewhat bathetically, John Magruder. Except for Jackson, whose career is viewed entire, the others are captured in moments ofcrisis at Seven Days, Second Manassas, Gettysburg, Wilderness, and the Valley campaigns of 1 862 and 1 864. In each case Gallagher approaches the individual and the event discretely and as a part of the larger picture of the war, in contemporary context and historical interpretation, and with crisp criticism and sympathy for obstacles and obfuscations. The third theme, the perception of the war by participants and their descendants , is central to five of the essays. Gallagher examines the attempt by former Confederates (from Jubal Early to LaSaIIe Picket) to control the war's legacy through the creation of the Myth of the Lost Cause, telling the story in a way that usually exaggerated the truth and sometimes flatly deceived. In the final two essays the author takes to task modern academics who have allowed political correctness—a term Gallagher does not use—to carry them so far astray as to obscure the fact that the Civil War was indeed a war. He concludes with a lucid and powerful argument for the preservation of the battlefield sites and demonstrates for the less imaginative their effective use in teaching social, diplomatic , and intellectual history. It is trite to note ofcertain books that not everyone will agree with all of their conclusions. In this case such an outcome was preordained, because Gallagher chose to confront such controversial topics. Yet is thorough research, his judicious arguments, and his balanced conclusions should advance understanding even with those not ultimately persuaded. It is easy to predict that this book, in addition to bringing pleasurable hours to the general public, will be added to the reading lists of many graduate seminars. Joseph L. Harsh George Mason University General George E. Pickett in Life and Legend. By Lesley J. Gordon. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998. Pp. x, 269. $29.95.) Richard M. McMurry observed several years ago, writing about the fame ofthe Army ofNorthern Virginia, that it would be difficult to find an educated American who has never heard of Pickett's Charge. But what does the average Civil War enthusiast know about Maj. Gen. George Edward Pickett himself? Perhaps that the Virginian graduated last in his class at West Point and saw his first BOOK REVIEWS273 combat during the Mexican War, perhaps that as a Confederate General, he was promoted beyond his capabilities and was known almost as much for his dandified manner and romance with a much younger woman as for his generalship; certainly that on the third day at Gettysburg a disastrous assault by his Virginia division and other units against the Federal lines on Cemetery Ridge made Pickett's Charge one of the most famous episodes in American military history. "Great God, where, Oh! Where is my Division?" a distraught Pickett sobbed after the repulse (i 16). While an 1870 exchange between Pickett and John S. Mosby may be apocryphal, it still has the ring of truth about it. Pickett said of Robert E. Lee, "He had my division massacred at Gettysburg." Mosby replied, "Well, it made you immortal" (163). As this illuminating new study demonstrates, however, such immortality has been more the product ofhis widow's portrait of "her soldier" as the ideal Southem gentleman and Confederate hero than the result of any significant assessment of Pickett's life and career. LaSaIIe Corbell Pickett, who outlived her husband by more than fifty years, spent most of that time writing or giving lectures about him, their marriage, the Old South, or the Lost Cause, and helped create the popular image of Pickett as the tragic...

A Shooting at the Galt House: The Death of General William Nelson

A Shooting at the Galt House: The Death of General William Nelson Kirk C. Jenkins Three Confederate generals were murdered during the Civil War: Gen. Earl Van Dorn was shot to death by the husband of a woman he had allegedly seduced; Gen. Lucius Walker was killed in a duel with Gen. John Marmaduke; and Gen. John Wharton was shot by a Texas cavalryman following an argument. But it has been the single slain Union general, William "Bull" Nelson, who has attracted the attention of historians over the years.1 The death of Bull Nelson is the stuff of screenplays: the killing occurred in a moment of crisis, in the midst of Braxton Bragg's invasion of the North, with the entire Federal army encamped around Louisville, about to take the field against the Rebels. The victim, a larger-than-life character who seemed to inspire only the strongest feelings of loyalty or hatred in everyone he met, was gunned down, unarmed, in front of one hundred witnesses by a Union general with the unfortunate name of Jefferson Davis. Best of all, the air of conspiracy and cover-up has always hung heavy over the story of Nelson and Davis's fatal confrontation. A friend of Nelson's who served as one of the pallbearers at his funeral charged in a 1906 article that Nelson was the victim of a conspiracy among Indiana officers in his command. Another author implied that the governor of Indiana, Oliver Morton, was involved in planning the shooting, and yet another suggested that Morton orchestrated Buell's dismissal to coincide with Nelson's death.2 Even the writers who have not seen conspiracy in the shooting itself have seen dark forces at work in the weeks following the incident. General Buell's 1 Richard N. Current, ed., Encyclopedia of the Confederacy, 4 vols. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993), 3:1009, 4:1652, 1679, 1I0T, Ezra J. Warner, Generals in Gray: Lives of the Confederate Commanders (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, i960), 315, 322, 332; The Civil War Book ofLists (Conshohocken, Pa.: Combined Books, 1994), 152-53. 2 A. M. Ellis, "Major General William Nelson," Kentucky State Historical Society Register 7 (May 1906): 62; Hambleton Tapp, "The Assassination of General William Nelson September 29, 1862 and its Ramifications," The Filson Club History Quarterly 19 (Oct. 1945): 204; Arthur A. Griese, "A Louisville Tragedy—1862," The Filson Club History Quarterly 26 (Apr. 1952): 143. Civil War History, Vol. xliii. No. 2 © 1997 by The Kent State University Press 102CIVIL WAR HISTORY chief of staff, James Barnet Fry, charged a calculated, cold-blooded government cover-up of the shooting, with Governor Morton cast as the lead villain, and other historians have since uncritically repeated Fry's claim.3 A serious charge indeed, but one in conflict with the evidence. It is time for one more look at the shooting of Bull Nelson. Before this article meets the eyes ofour readers, this city may be attacked by rebels and its streets reddened with blood. . . . Let all worldly matters be laid aside . . . meet with alacrity at the places where you are required to meet, and take with you the weapons which have been preserved as heirlooms in your families. . . . Never let it be said that the proud commercial capital of the State was surrendered to the invaders. Never while we have living men or dead bodies to form as breastworks against them. ... To arms and out! —Louisville Daily Journal, September 4, 1 862 Louisville had been under martial law for three weeks, ever since Confederate general Edmund Kirby Smith had swept into the state through the Cumberland Gap, pulverized a ragtag Federal force at Richmond, and captured Lexington and Frankfort. During those first days after the disaster at Richmond, everyone had assumed that Smith would keep right on going and take possession of Louisville as well. Louisvillians' nerves were further shaken as refugee families from the Lexington area descended on the city in droves with vivid stories of the ragged Southern veterans. Among the refugees were the new governor, James Robinson, and the entire state legislature, along with the state archives and over one million dollars in state...

Jefferson Davis and His Generals: The Failure of Confederate Command in the West. Modern War Studies.

Jefferson Davis and His Generals: The Failure of Confederate Command in the West. Modern War Studies.

The Confederate High Command and Related Topics. The 1988 Deep Delta Civil War Symposium: Themes in Honor of T. Harry Williams.

The Confederate High Command and Related Topics. The 1988 Deep Delta Civil War Symposium: Themes in Honor of T. Harry Williams.

Jefferson Davis and His Generals: The Failure of Confederate Command in the West.

Jefferson Davis and His Generals: The Failure of Confederate Command in the West.

Steven E. Woodworth. <italic>Jefferson Davis and His Generals: The Failure of Confederate Command in the West</italic>. (Modern War Studies.) Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 1990. Pp. xv, 380. $25.00

Journal Article Steven E. Woodworth. Jefferson Davis and His Generals: The Failure of Confederate Command in the West. (Modern War Studies.) Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 1990. Pp. xv, 380. $25.00 Get access Woodworth Steven E.. Jefferson Davis and His Generals: The Failure of Confederate Command in the West. (Modern War Studies.) Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 1990. Pp. xv, 380. $25.00. Michael B. Ballard Michael B. Ballard Mississippi State University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The American Historical Review, Volume 96, Issue 4, October 1991, Page 1296, https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr/96.4.1296 Published: 01 October 1991

Jefferson Davis and His Generals: The Failure of Confederate Command in the West.

Jefferson Davis and His Generals: The Failure of Confederate Command in the West.

Jefferson Davis and his generals: the failure of Confederate command in the West

Davis is a historical figure who provokes strong passions among scholars. Through the years historians have place him at both ends of the spectrum: some have portrayed him as a hero, others have judged him incompetent. In Jefferson Davis and his Generals, Steven Woodworth aims to show that both extremes are accurate - Davis was both heroic and incompetent. Yet neither viewpoint reveals the whole truth about this complicated figure. Woodworth's portrait of Davis reveals an experienced, talented, and courageous leader who, nevertheless, undermined the Confederacy's cause in the trans-Appalachian west, where the South lost the war.

Lee's Tarnished Lieutenant: James Longstreet and His Place in Southern History

In the South, one can find any number of bronze monuments to the Confederacy featuring heroic images of Robert E. Lee, Stonewall Jackson, J. E. B. Stuart, and many lesser commanders. But while the tarnish on such statues has done nothing to color the reputation of those great leaders, there remains one Confederate commander whose tarnished image has nothing to do with bronze monuments. Nowhere in the South does a memorial stand to intimate friend and second-in-command James Longstreet.In Lee's Tarnished Lieutenant, William Garrett Piston examines the life of James Longstreet and explains how a man so revered during the course of the war could fall from grace so swiftly and completely. Unlike other generals in gray whose deeds are familiar to southerners and northerners alike, Longstreet has the image not of a hero but of an incompetent who lost the Battle of Gettysburg and, by extension, the war itself. Piston's reappraisal of the general's military record establishes Longstreet as an energetic corps commander with an unsurpassed ability to direct troops in combat, as a trustworthy subordinate willing to place the war effort above personal ambition. He made mistakes, but Piston shows that he did not commit the grave errors at Gettysburg and elsewhere of which he was so often accused after the war.In discussing Longstreet's postwar fate, Piston analyzes the literature and public events of the time to show how the southern people, in reaction to defeat, evolved an image of themselves which bore little resemblance to reality. As a product of the Georgia backwoods, Longstreet failed to meet the popular cavalier image embodied by Lee, Stuart, and other Confederate heroes. When he joined the Republican party during Reconstruction, Longstreet forfeited his wartime reputation and quickly became a convenient target for those anxious to explain how a superior people could have lost the war. His new role as the villain of the Lost Cause was solidified by his own postwar writings. Embittered by years of social ostracism resulting from his Republican affiliation, resentful of the orchestrated deification of Lee and Stonewall Jackson, Longstreet exaggerated his own accomplishments and displayed a vanity that further alienated an already offended southern populace.Beneath the layers of invective and vilification remains a general whose military record has been badly maligned. Lee's Tarnished Lieutenant explains how this reputation developed--how James Longstreet became, in the years after Appomattox, the scapegoat for the South's defeat, a Judas for the new religion of the Lost Cause.

Lee's Tigers: The Louisiana Infantry in the Army of Northern Virginia (review)

178CIVIL WAR HISTORY It is unfortunate that this book is so grossly overpriced. It contains enough ammunition for years of spirited debate. Robertson is not always convincing, and some of his arguments are extremely shallow; yet the detail alone of this study maker, it henceforth a principal sourcebook on the 1864 struggle for Richmond. James I. Robertson, Jr. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University Lee's Tigers: The Louishna Infantry in the Army of Northern Virginh. By Terry L. Jones. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1987. Pp. xiv, 274. $22.50.) Louisiana made many contributions to the Confederacy during the Civil War. From a total white population of only 350,000 the state raised nearly 1,000 military companies and provided the South with approximately 56,000 troops. In this number were around 13,000 infantrymen who served in the eastern theater from First Manassas to Appomattox and became known as the fighting Louisiana Tigers, the shock troops of the Army of Northern Virginia. Though fierce in combat, these Louisianians gained an unsavory reputation early in the war that was to follow them through four years of combat. Their drunkenness, thievery, brawling, and general disorderly conduct came naturally, it seems, since Louisiana probably had a higher percentage of criminals, drunkards, and deserters in its commands than any other Southern state. Many of these undisciplined individuals were very poor foreigners who, having little enthusiasm for the war, deserted when the first opportunity presented itself. Also, a large number of immigrants were recruited off the rough New Orleans waterfront. Known both as "wharf rats" and "the lowest scrapings of the Mississippi," these men brought their vices with them into the army. No single Louisiana unit was responsible for the infamous reputation of the Tigers although Major Roberdeau Wheat's 1st Special Battalion is most often given this dubious honor. Wheat's men, however, were no match for either the Irish, Germans, and Creoles of Coppen's Battalion or the 14th Louisiana Volunteers when it came to rioting, looting, and robbery. In an effort to glorify the exploits of the Louisiana troops, some historians have glossed over their criminal behavior, treating very lightly the negative aspects of the Tigers. According to the author such apologies are unnecessary because ". . . Confederate commanders time and again called on them in the most desperate situations." It was the Tigers who blunted the initial Federal assault at First Manassas, played an important role in Jackson's Valley campaign, held fast at Spotsylvania's BOOK REVIEWS179 Bloody Angle, fought hand to hand at Fort Stedman, and led Lee's last offensive at Appomattox. "For all their vices, weaknesses, and failings, Lee's Louisiana Tigers emerged from the Civil War with one of the most respected military records of any southern fighting unit." For theirheroics on the battlefield the Tigers paid a heavy price. They suffered a 23 percent mortality rate. Approximately 2,000 of them were killed or wounded in combat. Another 1,300 died from other causes. All units suffered extensive losses. This is an excellent work, thoroughly researched, and well written. Mr. Jones does a masterful job of retaining a constant focus on his major thesis—the role of the Louisiana infantry in the Army of Northern Virginia —while at the same time giving the reader a clear, concise picture of the setting for his story. Furthermore, Lee's Tigers is the first comprehensive study of all the Louisiana units operating under General Lee. "The wild looting Tigers . . . made not a pious crew, but they fought." A civilian who knew the Louisianians only by reputation wrote the above which happens to summarize perfectly the volume under review. John G. Barrett Lexington, Virginia Major Butler's Legacy: Five Generations of a Shveholding Family. By Malcolm Bell, Jr. (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1987. Pp. xxiv, 673. $29.95.) This is a truly remarkable book, exciting, rapid paced, detailed, containing a wealth of information, and covering a century-and-a-half of American history. Nearly half of the book focuses on the fortune-hunting, Irish-born Major Pierce Butler, an officer in King George Ill's Twentyninth Regiment of Foot prior to the American Revolution, who married...

Conflict in East Tennessee: Generals Law, Jenkins, and Longstreet

CONFLICT IN EAST TENNESSEE: GENERALS LAW, JENKINS, AND LONGSTREET Guy R. Swanson Timothy D. Johnson WARTIME RIVALRIES AMONG American military commanders are familiar. During the Revolutionary War Generals George Washington and Horatio Gates had their differences, while during World War II cliques surrounded Generals Dwight D. Eisenhower and Douglas MacArthur. The Civil War is no exception. Officers on both sides were often at odds, and this circumstance was especially unfortunate for the Confederate army. Throughout the war the Confederacy faced an enemy of superior numbers and strength, and internal disunity in its military forces undoubtedly contributed to defeat. The career of General Evander Mclvor Law, a capable and vigorous brigade commander, illustrates these difficulties faced by the Southern army. Law was born on August 7, 1836, in Darlington, South Carolina, attended public schools, and graduated from the South Carolina Military Academy in 1856. During the next five years Law was a teacher and helped found a military high school in Tuskegee, Alabama, in 1860. After hostilities between North and South began in spring 1861, Law raised troops and served as colonel of the Fourth Alabama Regiment. He was wounded at First Manassas, but recovered to fight in the major battles through Sharpsburg. Promoted to brigadier general on October 3, 1862, Law served with Lieutenant General John Bell Hood's division (in General James Longstreet's corps) at Gettysburg. In late summer 1863 Longstreet's corps was detached from the Army of Northern Virginia for service with General Braxton Bragg's Army of Tennessee. Longstreet's corps participated in the September victory at Chickamauga and remained in and near East Tennessee until spring 1864. Strangely, the Army of Tennessee failed to capitalize on the Chickamauga victory and, as military advantages shifted to the Union army, tension developed between Bragg and Longstreet. In December 1863 the command disrupThe authors thank Professor Grady McWhiney of Texas Christian University and Pamela Franklin of The University of Alabama for their assistance during the preparation of this article. 102CIVIL WAR HISTORY tion, coupled with military setbacks, prompted Longstreet to bring charges against Law and two other subordinates.1 The dissention in East Tennessee began to take root in July 1863 during the Battle of Gettysburg. Early on July 2, General Robert E. Lee and his officers were discussing a battle plan with emphasis on the two Round Tops. The plan called for an oblique assault north of the Round Tops to ensure access to Cemetery Ridge from its lowest point, with the Confederates hoping to drive the Federals off the slope. Longstreet interrupted and suggested an alternative action. Lee tactfully dismissed the idea. Longstreet became angry and later that morning was slow in coordinating the troops he used in the attack. Lee chided Longstreet for the delay but knew that his subordinate was always well prepared for battle. Longstreet had also requested additional troop support and was waiting for General Law's brigade to arrive from the Pennsylvania countryside . Law received his marching orders at three o'clock that morning and his troops traveled twenty-eight miles before reaching the battlefield just after noon.2 As the battle raged, Law temporarily became division commander when Hood received a severe arm wound and was taken from the field. During the remainder of the Gettysburg campaign Law gained valuable command experience, and Hood's division fought superbly. Longstreet, however, criticized Law's efforts and remarked that Hood's "wellseasoned troops were not in need of a close guiding hand."3 After the Gettysburg defeat Confederate leaders reorganized their armies, sending Longstreet's corps to support Bragg's army in Tennessee. Longstreet wartted additional and capable troops to accompany him and arranged to transfer General Micah Jenkins's brigade, which had a reputation for aggressive fighting. As Longstreet conferred with President Jefferson Davis and Lee, the convalescing John Bell Hood volunteered to assume active division command and avert a potential struggle between Law and Jenkins. Law had commanded Hood's division at Get- 'For biographical sketches of Evander Mclvor Law and James Longstreet, see Ezra J. Warner, ed., Generals in Gray: Lives of the Confederate Commanders (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1959), 174-75, 192-93; Jon L...

Stones River: Bloody Battle in Tennessee (review)

BOOK REVIEWS appear in the works of Richard Sewell, Joseph Rayback, and Frederick Blue. Frederick J. Blue Youngstown State University Stones River: Bloody Battle in Tennessee. By James Lee McDonough. (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1980. Pp. xiv, 271. $14.50.) It is nearly a century since Alexander F. Stevenson pubUshed his Battle of Stone's River, and but for pamphlets and occasional articles since, that is the last word that we have had on the New Year's battle in middle Tennessee. It has deserved more, says James L. McDonough, author of this new treatment of the engagement, and indeed it does. The battle itself was a peculiar affair, fought in pieces and largely mismanaged by both Union and Confederate commanders. Certainly there was no clear-cut victor or vanquished in the fight itself, but the withdrawal of Braxton Bragg and his Confederates signaled thathe was unwilling to fight any more, and thatlefttheUnionwithamuch-needed success. It helped salve somewhat the painful memory of the Yankee debacle at Fredericksburg only a few days before, and despite his later failures as a commander in thefield, GeneralWilUam S. Rosecrans never lost the esteem and friendship of President Lincoln for giving him "a hard-earned victory, which, had there been a defeat instead, the nation could scarcely have lived over." McDonough has already produced a well-receivedvolumeon Shiloh, and, as a Tennesseean, his interest in Stones River comes to him naturally. So, too, does a well-displayed knowledge of the field itself and of the characters who fought over it in those cold December and January days. The likable, humorous, rather sympathetic nature of Rosecrans comes through, even while he fought a hesitating and poorly planned action. And the pathetic Braxton Bragg, consumed by his own fears and paranoias, unable to face responsibility for his acts, is here as well. McDonough touches only briefly upon Bragg's war against his own generals in the days after the battle, but it is enough to provide a good picture of a classic scapegoat hunt. McDonough is happily judicious in his conclusions about the battle. There are a few pages of unprofitable"what ifs" that areperhaps better left to the realm of informal discussion over a convivial glass than inserted in a scholarly volume. Yet, they are followed by a commendable reserve in judgment on the battle as a whole. McDonough resists admirably the universal temptation to claim more importance for his subject than it warrants. Indeed, he declares that most ofits participants were left wondering what, if anything, they had accomplished. After all, the Federals only won control ofa few more miles of middle Tennessee. With losses equal between the two armies, neither gained much by what 90CIVIL WAR HISTORY it inflicted upon its foe. Bragg's army was still at large and, indeed, would sting Rosecrans once more at Chickamauga and end his career. The greatest significance of Stones River, then, was simply that "the Federal army had prevented a Confederate victory at a time when the Union cause could hardly stand another defeat." And that alone was enough. Confederate morale in Tennessee took a deep dive, a direction vastly enhanced by thewar thatBraggpromptly began to wage upon his own generals. Within the high command of the Army of Tennessee, the repercussions of Stones River were heard for more than a year after the guns stopped. It began the demoralization and disintegration of a great army from within and gave a loss-weary Lincoln a New Year's win in what would be a year of victories, 1863. William C. Davis Civil War Times Illustrated Victims, A True Story of the CivilWar. ByPhillip S. Paludan. (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1981. Pp. xvi, 144. $11.95.) Phillip Paludan has combined the findings of the social sciences with an exercise in la petite histoire to create an intriguing study. From his base point, the massacre of thirteen Unionist mountaineers atShelton Laurel, North Carolina, the author expands the investigation to embrace larger issues, such as the impact of the Civil War on small communities, the causation and characteristics of guerrilla warfare, and the forces underlying human perversity. Faced with a scarcity of primary material, Paludan turns...