Concession Price Research Articles

Incorporating Social Benefits in Concession Price Negotiation for Public–Private Partnership Contracts

Public–private partnership (PPP) has become the most popular contract agreement form for infrastructure projects. To fully enjoy the benefits of PPP contracting, the value of the concession price should be carefully determined with quantitative justification. Traditional methods of determining the value of concession price are based on the evaluation of financial indexes such as net present value and financial return on investment. However, more and more research has highlighted the importance of evaluating social benefits in decision-making due to its capability to assess not only the financial performance of the projects but also the social and environmental values. Therefore, this research innovatively investigates the role of social benefit in concession price negotiation and aims to determine the optimal concession price with a specific focus on government-pays PPPs. Following quantification of social benefits, the payoffs of project parties for concession price negotiation are modeled mathematically, and bargaining game theory is employed to explore the bargaining behaviors of project parties during negotiation. A numerical example is used to demonstrate the developed negotiation-based determination process. The data analysis results show that the proposed method can successfully determine the optimal concession price. Also, considering the monetary value of social benefits in concession price negotiation, the payoffs for the government and corporate social responsibility (CSR)–oriented concessionaire are significantly improved. When determining other critical concession parameters such as the concession period, scholars and practitioners can follow the modeling process developed in this research to incorporate social benefit into the discussion.

Enhancing the decision-making process for public-private partnerships infrastructure projects: a socio-economic system dynamic approach

Public-private partnerships (PPP) have many critical socio-economic concession variables that need to be determined during the negotiation of the PPP contracts. However, their determination presents complexities to decision-makers due to these components’ interdependencies. Assessing the dynamic and interdependent relationships between the socio-economic concession components can enhance the development of PPP concessions. System dynamics (SD) techniques have provided a holistic system understanding of several complex structures from a holistic perspective. This paper aims to build a novel socio-economic SD model to facilitate the decision-making process for PPP projects via determining and assessing the adequate concession period, concession price (user-payment), government subsidy, and the capital structure (in the form of equity). A case study for a PPP toll-road project (I-4 Ultimate) is utilized to validate the proposed model’s results. Higher concession prices increased net present value (NPV) levels and PPP effectiveness. Simulation results showed that the variables are interdependent, and a change in the value of one variable will lead to a change in the values of the other variables. The results also showed that the concession price (user-payment) has a major influence on the concession variables. The model proposed in this study gives a holistic perspective of the complex interplay between PPP effectiveness and several socio-economic variables and is potentially valuable in facilitating and enhancing the decision-making process for PPP projects. While many scholarly discussions have been fronted on the use of system dynamics modeling in PPPs, the specific and unique combination of concession variables is the ultimate contribution of this study to the existing body of knowledge.

A socio-economic multi-objective optimization approach toward enhancing public–private partnerships’ concession agreements in infrastructure development

The participants of the public–private partnership projects have different parts in developing the concessions, hence different perspectives and goals. Besides, the public–private partnership concession agreement has many parameters and components, and a change in one component will have a considerable impact on other components. Thus, determining the optimal value for different concession parameters by providing a series of feasible contribution options was investigated in this paper using two different multi-objective optimization models: genetic algorithm and Thompson sampling. Two case studies (the US I-495 and the I-4 Ultimate) were used to construct and validate the results of the model. The model results showed that the socio-economic sustainability performance increases as the private equity increases and the public equity decreases. The results also showed that the socio-economic sustainability performance increases as the concession price (user-fee) decreases. Having these contribution options could facilitate the decision-making process for both the public and private parties. The genetic algorithm model obtained faster optimization results when compared to the Thompson sampling model; however, the Thompson sampling obtained better results. Moreover, the use of the model could improve the socio-economic sustainability performance of the public–private partnership projects.

A game-theoretic approach to developing a concession renegotiation framework for user-pays PPPs

In public–private partnership (PPP) contracting, a common practice for the hosting government is to fix the contractual clauses before signing a concession agreement with private investors. If there is no negotiation stage in a tendering process, the critical contractual parameters, e.g., the concession period, are usually stipulated by the government at the pre-contractual stage. However, due to the incompleteness of PPP contracts, the practice of presetting contractual parameters often leads to ex-post renegotiation or even project failure. Revenue uncertainty has become one of the most significant sources of PPP contract renegotiation, especially for user-pays PPPs such as highways and tunnels. In order to facilitate renegotiation between project parties in a user-pays PPP project, this paper develops a concession renegotiation framework targeting three critical contractual parameters, i.e., concession period, concession price and government guarantee, to control the revenue risk for project parties. Game-theoretic modelling is the approach used to determine the optimal adjustment values for the critical contractual parameters. The bargaining game model is developed to find the optimal adjustment values for the concession period and government guarantee when a renegotiation process is initiated, while the coalitional game model is employed to discuss renegotiation of the concession price. This study contributes to the theoretical foundation for understanding the renegotiation framework of user-pays PPP projects. Project JG is taken as a numerical example to validate the proposed model. The project parameters are extracted from the historical data for a local highway PPP in Yunnan, China and analysed using the econometrics software MATLAB. The renegotiation outcomes show that to control the revenue risk for private investors, the concession period needs to be extended to 34 years or the concession price adjusted to a number ranging between 4.38 and 5.13 USD. The data analysis outcomes also suggest that to control overly lucrative conditions for private investors, renegotiation of the concession price is a better choice.

Determining concession periods and minimum revenue guarantees in public-private-partnership agreements

Public–private partnership (PPP) schemes show strong capability in delivering infrastructure projects. One challenge in designing PPP contracts is optimising the length of the concession period and level of the minimum revenue guarantee (MRG) to satisfy both public and private parties’ interests. Existing research excludes interaction between the concession period and MRG, but a method that can determine their values simultaneously is needed. This study fills the research gap by proposing a synthetic measure to determine the values of the concession period and MRG. An imperfect information bargaining model is created to find the equilibrium return rate on investment. To achieve the equilibrium of the bargaining game, the required length of the concession period and level of the MRG are calculated based on Monte Carlo simulation and real option analysis. Project QJ is created as a numerical example to verify the applicability of the proposed method. The outcome shows the proposed determination process identifies the optimal length of the concession period and level of the MRG. The length of the concession period is inversely proportional to the level of the MRG and this correlation is influenced by the probability of achieving the equilibrium return rate on investment. When this probability equals 70%, an MRG is not required once the concession period exceeds 24 years. The results also show the concession period decision range is sensitive to change in the concession price.

Win-win pricing method for BOT projects using a simulation-based evolutionary optimization

Several failures have been reported in maintaining the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) projects viability through their life cycle. BOT contracts are one of the popular tools to respond to fund deficiencies in infrastructure projects, thus it is crucial to determine optimum concession terms for them. In previous research, the value of social benefits has mostly been neglected in the decision-making process, which results in unfair distribution of benefits between the government and the concessionaire. Therefore, a pricing framework based on a Simulation Multi-Objective Optimization (SMOO) method is developed in this research which includes the value of social benefits as well as the effects of uncertainties in BOT projects. The application of the model to a real-world project confirms that it presents a win-win solution in which the benefits of the two contracting parties are simultaneously maximized compared to the results obtained by using conventional methods. The results confirm the contribution of this research to reach a consensus on concession price and to keep the project viability as a result of its ability to cope with the high volatilities through simulation techniques. Furthermore, it can help the decision-makers to either seek a balance between both sides’ interests or determine the concession price based on their preferential strategies.

Study on Adjustment Mechanism for Concession Price of Traditional Village Conservation PPP Project

At present, the financing gap seriously restricts the comprehensive and orderly promotion of traditional village protection work. Introducing the PPP model into the construction of traditional village protection projects has become one of the effective ways to solve the financing gap. In order to improve the efficiency of the concession price adjustment of the traditional village protection PPP project, and coordinate the relationship among the multiple stakeholders of PPP model, this paper uses the least government subsidy, the largest net present value, and the lowest franchise price as the income adjustment target to build the quasi-operability. The linkage adjustment model for PPP project concession period, concession price and subsidy. By adjusting three variables, several schemes are obtained, and finally, according to the max-min synthesis algorithm, the scheme with the greatest degree of multi-objective satisfaction is selected.

Joint impact of airline market structure and airport ownership on airport market power and profit margin

This paper investigates the joint impacts of downstream airline market structure, airport ownership structure, concession services, and low-cost carrier (LCC) presence on airport market power and profit margin. Lerner indexes for a sample of 61 major airports around the world were calculated for the period 2008–2014. Then, regression analysis was conducted to identify the determinants of the airport Lerner index. We find that a more concentrated downstream airline market would reduce the profit margin for a public airport but increase the profit margin for a private airport. A higher share of concession service is found to decrease the airport's overall profit margin (accounting for both aeronautical and concession services). Airports with significant LCC presence have a lower profit margin. Finally, the concentration in airline market is found to have a larger negative impact on airport aeronautical price than on the concession price.

BALANCING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERESTS THROUGH OPTIMIZATION OF CONCESSION AGREEMENT DESIGN FOR USER-PAY PPP PROJECTS

In user-pay public private partnership (PPP) projects, private sectors collect user fees to cover cost and reap revenue. For projects that cannot be self-financed, public sectors usually invest public funds to make them financially feasible. The concession agreement allocates revenues and risks, and lies in the center of balancing public and private interests. However, stakeholders may have contrary opinions regarding the optimization of concession agreement. While private sectors are concerned about earning money, public sectors pay more attention to the efficient use of public funds. To address this challenge, this paper firstly identifies several key concessionary items, including concession period, concession price, capital structure and government subsidy. Then, a multi-objective optimization model is presented using discounted cash flow method, in which key concessionary items act as decision variables and public and private interests are represented by two sub-objectives. Subsequently, the model is solved using non-dominated sorting genetic algorithm-II (NSGA-II). Furthermore, a numerical case based on Beijing No. 4 Metro Line is provided to demonstrate the application of the model. Results show that the proposed model can produce a series of viable combinations of concessionary items that balance public and private interests, which provides practical references for relative decision making activities.

Critical Factors of Concession Pricing for Public-Private-Partnership Infrastructures: An Empirical Study Based on Chinese Urbanization

Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) approach is a useful tool to ease government’s financial deficit in infrastructure and provide chances for private investors to enter into public sector of construction industry. However, many PPP projects claim failures because of loss of revenues attributable to unrealistic concession price. In this research, variables impacting concession price are outlined based on empirical data and literature review. These variables are categorized into four factors using exploratory factor analysis, i.e., institutional supports, corporate strategies, market dynamics, and external impacts. This finding is expected to serve as a common factor checklist for PPP participants when formulating a reasonable concession price for all kinds of PPP transportation infrastructure projects to facilitate a win-win situation for all stakeholders.

Concession Price Adjustment Decision in Wastewater Treatment BOT Project

Concession Price Adjustment Decision in Wastewater Treatment BOT Project

DEVELOPING A CONCESSION PRICING MODEL FOR PPP HIGHWAY PROJECTS

The concession pricing is one of the most important issues during the negotiation period of PPP contracts. Pricing should vary in accordance with risks assumed by the private sector and embody equitable risk sharing between the government and the private sector to lower the minimum feasible concession price and ensure effective risk management. In this study, a general concession pricing model is developed through cost-benefit analysis from the perspective of the private sector. The model integrates project risk variables, price parameters, and other financial elements into a concession pricing formula based on cash flow table. Meanwhile, to cope with the occurrence of unforeseeable losses triggered by risk factors, such as interest rate fluctuation, inflation, traffic volume change, etc., a price adjustment mechanism is established to adjust the initial price and ensure the project's financial viability. The concession pricing model and adjustment mechanism allow the government and the private sector to reach a consensus on the tariff scheme of a PPP project. It is believed that the model is beneficial to create a “win-win” situation for both the government and the private sector.

System Dynamics (SD) -based concession pricing model for PPP highway projects

The design of concession price is essential to financial viability of Public–Private Partnership (PPP) highway projects. It is one of the most important variables that need to be determined during the negotiation period. However, there are few methods available for calculating the value of this variable. Research described in this paper aims to develop a reliable, objective, and systematic model for determining a rational concession price for PPP highway projects based on pro forma financial statements developed during the feasibility study period. The pricing parameters and price risk factors of PPP highway project were first identified and compiled through a comprehensive literature review. A concession pricing model using System Dynamics technique was then developed based on concession pricing parameters and the effectiveness of the proposed SD-based concession pricing model was verified by a real toll tunnel project located in China. The test result shows that the proposed model is reliable, accurate, and suitable for the application by practitioners for concession price determination. To overcome the effect of risk factors on concession price, a pricing adjustment model using Case-base Reasoning (CBR) technique was proposed to consider the unquantifiable risk factors. It is believed that a rational and practical concession pricing model can create a ‘win–win’ situation for both the private investor and the host government. This research framework can also be used as a reference to study other facilities' pricing models.

Comparison of Recent Toll Road Concession Transactions in the United States and France

Recent concessions in France and in the US have resulted in a dramatic difference in the valuation placed on the toll roads; the price paid by the investors in France was twelve times current cash flow whereas investors paid sixty times current cash flow for the U.S. toll roads. In this paper we explore two questions: What accounts for the difference in these multiples, and what are the implications with respect to the public interest. Our analysis illustrates how structural and procedural decisions made by the public owner affect the concession price. Further, the terms of the concession have direct consequences that are enjoyed or borne by the various stakeholders of the toll road.

Tolls, Terms and Public Interest in Road Concessions Privatization: A Comparative Analysis of Recent Transactions in the USA and France

Recent concessions in France and in the USA have resulted in a dramatic difference in the valuation placed on the toll roads; the price paid by the investors in France was 12 times current cash flow whereas investors paid 60 times current cash flow for US toll roads. In this paper, we explore two questions: what accounts for the difference in these multiples? and what are the implications with respect to the public interest? Our analysis illustrates how structural and procedural decisions made by the public owner affect the concession price. Further, the terms of the concession have direct consequences that are enjoyed or borne by the various stakeholders of the toll road.