Conceptual Tension Research Articles

Freedom, human and divine

In this paper I seek to show how God's freedom is not reduced or His power diminished by His inability to be less than perfectly good even though ours would be. That ours would be explains why it might prima facie appear to us that there is a ‘conceptual tension’ between some of the claims of traditional theism and reveals some interesting (well, to me anyway) differences between human freedom and divine freedom.

Effortless Action: Wu-wei as Conceptual Metaphor and Spiritual Ideal in Early China

This book presents a systematic account of the role of the personal spiritual ideal of wu-wei-literally no doing, but better rendered as action-in early Chinese thought. Edward Slingerland's analysis shows that wu-wei represents the most general of a set of conceptual metaphors having to do with a state of effortless ease and unself-consciousness. This concept of effortlessness, he contends, serves as a common ideal for both Daoist and Confucian thinkers. He also argues that this concept contains within itself a conceptual tension that motivates the development of early Chinese thought: the so-called paradox of wu-wei, or the question of how one can consciously try not to try. Methodologically, this book represents a preliminary attempt to apply the contemporary theory of conceptual metaphor to the study of early Chinese thought. Although the focus is upon early China, both the subject matter and methodology have wider implications. The subject of wu-wei is relevant to anyone interested in later East Asian religious thought or in the so-called virtue-ethics tradition in the West. Moreover, the technique of conceptual metaphor analysis-along with the principle of embodied realism upon which it is based-provides an exciting new theoretical framework and methodological tool for the study of comparative thought, comparative religion, intellectual history, and even the humanities in general. Part of the purpose of this work is thus to help introduce scholars in the humanities and social sciences to this methodology, and provide an example of how it may be applied to a particular sub-field.

"SCIENCE" VS. "RELIGION" IN CLASSICAL AYURVEDA

AbstractThis paper evaluates claims that classical Ayurveda was scientific, in a modern western sense, and that the many religious and magical elements found in the texts were all either stale Vedic remnants or later brahminic impositions. It argues (1) that Ayurveda did not manifest standard criteria of "science" (e.g., materialism, empirical observation, experimentation, falsification, quantification, or a developed conception of proof) and (2) that Vedic aspects of the classical texts are too central to be considered inauthentic or marginal. These points suggest that attempting to apply the modern western categories of "science" and "religion" to ancient South Asian medical texts at best obscures more important issues and, at worst, imports inappropriate orientalist assumptions. Having set aside the distraction of "science" vs. "religion" in classical Ayurveda, the paper finds support for claims that brahminic elements were later additions to the texts. It concludes by arguing that this is best explained not in terms of a conceptual tension between religion and science but in terms of social and economic tensions between physicians and brahmins.

Regularities, context, and neural coding: Are universals reflected in the experienced world?

Barlow's concept of the exploitation of environmental statistical regularities may be more plausibly related to brain mechanisms than Shepard's notion of internalisation. In our view, Barlow endorses a bottom-up approach to neural coding and processing, whereas we suggest that feedback interactions in the visual system, as well as chaotic correlation dynamics in the brain, are crucial in exploiting and assimilating environmental regularities. We also discuss the “conceptual tension” between Shepard's ideas of law internalisation and evolutionary adaptation. [Barlow; Shepard]

Conceptual classroom environment - a system view of learning

This paper examines the relations between changes in the beliefs of an individual student and the distribution of beliefs in a classroom. The distribution of beliefs among students is termed here 'conceptual environment'. Based on social views of learning, we suggest that conceptual environment is an indicator of the conceptual tension in a group. We show that conceptual change of individuals does not necessarily result in changes in the classroom conceptual environment. Conceptual change is normally viewed as a personal process. We look at the relations between individual conceptual change (a microscopic view) and total classroom conceptual change (a macroscopic, system view). We study changes in students' ideas of a food chain. Then we look for underlying ontological beliefs that may explain students' ideas, and examine changes in students' responses prior and consequent to the instruction sessions. Classroom concepts of a food chain reflect an underlying set of beliefs of a mechanistic nature. For instance the metaphor of a 'chain of beads' is employed to explain the relations among elements of a food chain. Though more than half of the students changed their responses, ontological beliefs were hardly changed. Changes in students' responses apparently cancelled each other, thus from the classroom point of view, only a minor change was identified in the overall conceptual environment. The social-conceptual tension involved in conceptual change is not necessarily changed.

Earth And Heaven, 1750-1800: Enlightenment Ideas About The Relevance To Geology Of Extraterrestrial Operations And Events

A conceptual and methodological tension can be discerned among Enlightenment advocates of earth science, as regards extraterrestrial events and processes. True to the fundamental traditions of Theories of the Earth, many scientific thinkers exhibited clear recognition of the Earth's planetary status, as a member of a celestial family. To some this legitimated integration of a geological perspective into that of cosmology and astronomy. In extreme instances it even entailed an ideal of establishing earth science by deduction from principles of celestial mechanics. However, this integrative aspect of Theories of the Earth ran counter to another important element in the geological thinking of this era, one which asserted the overriding value of empirical investigation. In the minds of many empirical-minded champions of a natural history of the Earth, a true geology could only be built up through inductive discovery focussed exclusively on accessible terrestrial phenomena. Sometimes explicitly, often by merely tacit exclusion of extraterrestrial considerations, much geological investigation before 1800 tended to identify the integrity of the emerging science with the distinctively Earth-bound nature of the objects of study. The ideal of an autonomous geological science thus tended to be intertwined with a concept of terrestrial autonomy.

Liberty and the political compass (or how left-wingism is anti-liberty)

With respect to the phenomenal distinction that is conventionally made between ‘personal’ and ‘economic’ liberty, I do accept that “there is no logical incoherence in claiming that constraint of one can lead to an increase in the other.” Though, as Cole understands, I doubt the conceptual coherence of the distinction (let us call this view the ‘identity thesis’). So I assert that though the personal/economic distinction is conceptually dubious, it can stand unproblematically as illustrating the phenomenal distinctions that people do make. I cannot see how “this inherent conceptual tension at two points of the compass does threaten it with collapse” as a phenomenal illustration as well, if that is what Cole means (as his “despite Lester’s protests” indicates).

Shooting Yourself in the Foot with due Care: Psychotherapists and Crystallized Standards of Tort Liability

This paper discusses a conceptual tension that arises from the attempt to regulate the fiduciary therapeutic relationship through the law of negligence. This tension becomes particularly problematic when courts adopt crystallized duties as per se rules or as presumptive standards of care for psychotherapists. Under certain conditions, this tension can undermine the therapeutic process, the fiduciary nature of the therapeutic relationship, and the process by which professional organizations promulgate guidelines for their members. Thus, under certain circumstances, regulation through negligence law may frustrate both therapeutic and legal purposes. This paper suggests steps that courts and professional organizations can take to minimize the insidious effects of this tension, but it does not contend that these steps will resolve all of the difficulties associated with tort regulation of psychotherapy.

Conceptual tensions between theory and program: The chromosome theory and the Mendelian research program

Laudan's thesis that conceptual problem solving is at least as important as empirical problem solving in scientific research is given support by a study of the relation between the chromosome theory and the Mendelian research program. It will be shown that there existed a conceptual tension between the chromosome theory and the Mendelian program. This tension was to be resolved by changing the constraints of the Mendelian program. The relation between the chromosome theory and the Mendelian program is shown to be a good illustration of the influence of science itself on the rational standards governing scientific development.

Zeno's paradoxes and temporal becoming in dialectical atomism

The homogeneity of time (i.e. the fact that there are no privileged moments) underlies a fundamental symmetry relating to the energy conservation law. On the other hand the obvious asymmetry between past and future, expressed by the metaphor of the “arrow of time” or “flow of time” accounts for the irreversibility of what happens. One takes this for granted but the conceptual tension it creates against the background of time's presumed homogeneity calls for an explanation of temporal becoming. Here, it is approached with the help of a claim to the effect that the instant (moment) itself has a structure isomorphic to that of time as a whole. Then the asymmetry of past and future in regard to temporal becoming is associated with the internal structure of the very moment, and not with external relations between different moments of time. In this paper ideas of ancient atomism and contemporary dialectics are brought together. It is for the sake of a contrast to what is known as logical atomism that I choose to call this view dialectical atomism. The latter admits dialectical contradictions and, so far as the logical status of contradictions is concerned, bears reference to paraconsistent logics. In the paper there is an outline of a method of converting any consistent axiomatic formal system into a paraconsistent theory.