Conceptual Baggage Research Articles

Digitizing the Archive: The Necessity of an "Early Modern" Period

Digitizing the Archive:The Necessity of an "Early Modern" Period Laura Mandell (bio) The notion of "period" has from its inception been a literary category. Robert Southey, among the first to collect poetry into disciplinary anthologies, divided poetry into two kinds by creating two types of poetry collections. His 1807 Specimens of English Poetry collects poetry that is of "historical interest" though small literary value, while his 1831 collection, Select Works of the British Poets, from Chaucer to Jonson, with Biographical Sketches, contains the "classic" English poets, as John Aikin puts it in the first volume published in 1820 but containing chronologically later poets. The first collection of "English classics" in which the table of contents arranges poetry by poet and poets by monarch's reign is George Ellis's Specimens of the Early English Poets (1790), the collection that, according to Stuart Curran, encouraged Romantic-era writers to situate themselves within literary history.1 As early as 1986, Thomas Vogler critiqued the concept of literary period that began, he argues effectively, during the "period" of Romantic literature: "what we continue to call the Romantic period raises in history the question of history" (134). For Vogler, the problem with conceptualizing literature into periods is that we imagine ourselves, consciously or not, to be at the end of history when we invoke it. Vogler's contention about the conceptual baggage attached to the concept of periodicity makes sense given the moment of its emergence historically. The concept of periodicity arose during the height of millennial hopes, when writers did in fact imagine themselves to be writing at the end of history and, therefore, from that perspective of mastery, able to look back on [End Page 83] the wide prospect of history and divide up its landscape into significant clumps. Vogler argues that the "spirit" we imagine each period to have is in fact simply a mirror, nothing real. He abides by Frederic Jameson's analysis of the use of periodicity by literary critics: whenever we define a particular Geist and look for it in an age, we will find it there, or at least find it foreshadowed.2 In 1993, to counteract the notion of a narrative unity that leads up to and ends now— whenever a literary critic's particular "now" might be—as well as the idea that each age has a spirit or unified aesthetic, Jerome McGann published The New Oxford Book of Romantic Period Verse. Its title suggests the argument made by the selection of poetry to be found inside. Many poets who wrote poetry during what we conventionally designate as the Romantic period—the Della Cruscans, for instance—did not in fact write in the high Romantic style. Periodicity is dead theoretically; it was dead by the year 2000. End of story? Not quite. Ten years after the publication of his book, McGann reacted to a new demand related to the digitization of literary texts. Romanticists and Victorianists needed two things: to be able to access and search in one place all the best digital materials available; and to be able to create such high quality digital editions and receive professional rewards for doing so (such as tenure and promotion), just as they would for a book. An editorial board's stamp of approval indicating that any given digital resource was of the highest scholarly quality would satisfy both requirements, and so McGann launched the Networked Infrastructure for Nineteenth-century Electronic Scholarship (NINES). A digital site that makes myriad separate web resources searchable at the same time—an "aggregator"—NINES allows searching the best nineteenth-century digital scholarship not only by the metadata of title, author, and dates, but also by word (McGann and Nowviskie): as much as possible, the index provides search returns from full text. One can see this as an online finding aid, or as a table of contents or index to the Internet for scholarly materials relevant to nineteenth-century scholars, though indeed anyone can use the site without charge. NINES was very successful, but there was a lot of pressure on the NINES group to serve as representatives of literary scholars in general when working with technologists, libraries, presses, and scholarly...

In Deep Waters: process theory between Scylla and Charybdis

In this article, I propose a middle way between current process and substance theorizing as I argue that both ‘pure’ views are fraught with theoretical problems. I base my proposal on the ontologies of Aristotle and A.N. Whitehead, who both maintain that being and becoming are equally important for a comprehensive analysis of change processes. Drawing on their insights, I develop a conceptual frame that distinguishes between change and becoming, and proposes to use the pairs of potentiality-actuality and activity-relationality as notions that are less fraught with conceptual baggage and more relevant empirically than the distinction between substance and process.

Beyond the archival model of memory and the affordances and constraints of narratives

In his ‘After the Archive’ article, Brockmeier outlines limitations of the ‘archival model’ of memory, taking into account several dimensions of the burgeoning field of memory studies. In responding to the weaknesses he cites, he introduces ideas about narrative and its role in shaping human thought and memory. While narrative brings important assets to Brockmeier’s effort, it also carries conceptual baggage that is examined here. In particular, the prospects and problems of what philosophers have labeled ‘narrative memory’ are outlined, and narrative tools are presented as having both empowering affordances as well as limiting constraints.

Words in the World: How and Why Meanings Can Matter

Why do people care about the meaning(s)/significance associated with a word? Does it make sense to advocate or to criticize a certain form-meaning association? This article argues that words do real cognitive and social work as they are deployed in social practice and that it is primarily through words and their histories of use that culture links to language. It is not semantic representations as such that matter but the (mostly extralinguistic) reference and conceptual baggage words acquire in their discursive world travels. Lexical significance shifts and is contested as part of shifting and contested customs, institutions, and ideologies.

Modelling codependence in biological systems

A central aim of systems biology is to elucidate the complex dynamic structure of biological systems within which functioning and control occur. The success of this endeavour requires a dialogue between the two quite distinct disciplines of life science and systems theory, and so drives the need for graphical notations which facilitate this dialogue. Several methods have been developed for modelling and simulating biochemical networks, some of which provide notations for graphicall4y constructing a model. Such notations must support the full panoply of mechanisms of systems biology, including metabolic, regulatory, signalling and transport processes. Notations in systems biology tend to fall into two groups. The first group derives its orientation from conventional biochemical pathway diagrams, and so tends to ignore the role of information processing. The second group focuses on the processing of information, incorporating information-processing ideas from other systems-oriented disciplines, such as engineering and business. This, however, can lead to the two crucial and related difficulties of impedance mismatch and conceptual baggage. Impedance mismatch concerns the rift between non-biological notations and biological reality, which forces the researcher to employ awkward workarounds when modelling uniquely biological mechanisms. Conceptual baggage can arise when, for instance, an engineering notation is adapted to cater for these distinctively biological needs, since these adaptations will, typically, never completely free the notation of the conceptual structure of its original engineering motivation. A novel formalism, codependence modelling, which seeks to combine the needs of the biologist with the mathematical rigour required to support computer simulation of dynamics is proposed here. The notion of codependence encompasses the transformation of both chemical substance and information, thus integrating both metabolic and gene regulatory processes within a single conceptual schema.

Can nationalism studies and ethnic/racial studies be brought together?

In order to overcome the conceptual debacle facing both Nationalism Studies and Ethnic/Racial Studies, we have to make sense of the terminological ambiguities still hampering mutual comprehension. This short article will focus on the common ground shared by the two disciplines, both of which participate in a common interest in ethnicity. Most of my theoretical sources admittedly consist of nationalism studies and ethnic conflict literature. On the basis of explanatory weight, methodological affinities and a shared conceptual baggage, I shall stress the need to keep nationalism and ethnic/racial studies together.

Pater Familias, Mater Familias, and the Gendered Semantics of the Roman Household

F EW LATIN TERMS COME as heavily loaded with conceptual baggage as paterfamilias. In both scholarly and popular discourse, paterfamilias, defined as head of household, evokes patriarchal organization characteristic of Roman family and of wider society.' Debates over family values in contemporary popular discourse make shorthand (and clumsy) references to model of family or the Roman code of Paterfamilias, as if everyone understands content of that model.2 A survey of undergraduate syllabi and study guides on internet shows that paterfamilias is often listed as a key term for understanding Roman society. At other end of scholarly spectrum, Real-Encyclopddie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft includes a long entry on paterfamilias by E. Sachers, who asserts that in reverence and obedience toward paterfamilias lay characteristic foundation for greatness of ancient Rome.3 A comprehensive survey of all uses of paterfamilias in classical texts, however, reveals a major disjunction between this modern understanding of term (rooted in Roman law) and ancient usage. The following sections draw on survey to generalize about where term is used and where it is not, and present quotations from ancient texts to illustrate what term connotes. I begin by illustrating common modern understanding of pater familias as severe patriarch whose power defined Roman family. The next sections analyze use of paterfamilias in legal texts and then nonlegal texts. The full word study shows that term appears predominantly in legal texts and much less densely in literary texts. In both discourses, most common meaning of pater familias is estate owner without reference tofamilial relations. The final section of this paper seeks to offer a gendered perspective on meaning of paterfamilias by a parallel survey of uses of materfamilias in classical Latin prose. Sociolinguists

Homophobia: an evolutionary analysis of the concept as applied to nursing.

Homophobia is a socially accepted, culturally based belief, which is heavily influenced by an individual's or a community's inherent attitudes, beliefs and values. This conceptual analysis of homophobia has endeavoured to review existing literature on homophobia and subsequently identify and examine the phobic constituents of the concept. References to homophobia are mostly from the 1970-1980 period and there is much unacknowledged conceptual baggage that accompanies the term, which results in restrictive and inappropriate ideas about this concept. This is mainly the consequence of comparisons of homophobia to other phobias, which directly infers fear of homosexuals, while in reality homophobia is more of a biased disgust at homosexuals' lifestyles. This paper attempts to re-conceptualize homophobia so that empirical research can begin to test the critical attributes of the concept. This forms the basis for the development of a comprehensive social psychological theory of attitudes towards homosexuals. Such a theory would transcend the unilateral and unidimensional concept of homophobia as a fear and help the understanding of attitudes and feelings towards homosexuals.

Pragmatism, Poststructuralism, and Socially Useful Theorizing

It is an unexpected pleasure have the opportunity respond Jean Anyon's Retreat of Marxism and Socialist Feminism: Postmodern and Poststructural Theories in Education. Professor Anyon has identified a number of important features in the recent turn toward poststructural and postmodern writing in education but I also believe, at least in a few noteworthy instances, that she has drawn the wrong inferences from it. This is a welcome opportunity discuss broadly these things. She begins by telling a story of difference. The story is about a change in the nature of criticism in education away from Marxist criticism an exploration of poststructural and postmodern ideas. This might be one step forward in her eyes but it is also, at least, one-half step backward. She believes that the language and perspectives of poststructuralism/ postmodernism provide opportunities for a progressive politics of education but is not convinced that those of us who have written in this genre have shed all of our old structuralist and modernist conceptual baggage. In failing do so, she believes that we have not come as far as she believes we had hoped or aspired.' Furthermore, she is not convinced that poststructural/postmodern thought is up the task of furthering emancipation and social justice. She concludes by outlining some characteristics of a socially useful theory. To attach the prefix postto a word is assert that somehow and in some way ideas, conceptualizations, or criticisms have exceeded an earlier outlook or position. According the Oxford English Dictionary, postis used refer something that is after, following, succeeding, later than, afterwards, or subsequent to that which was designated by the original term. What are these things that came before? Structur-

On the existence of ecological communities

uncontroversial assumption that living organisms arepresent – because organisms live, consume, reproduce,and die; nutrients arrive by various means, and nutrientsleave by various means. Lindeman therefore defined theecosystem into existence. Although he certainly be-lieved that some processes regulated ecosystem struc-ture, his ideas of regulation did not impinge upon thedefinition of ecosystem. Ecosystems are not defined asintegrated, discrete entities.We suggest that community should be defined in aparallel manner as “the living organisms present withina space-time unit of any magnitude”. The statement“communities exist” is no longer a fruitless ontologicalproblem (as Keddy 1993 suggested) but a tautology. Byusing an operational definition, we can now ask ques-tions concerning the properties of communities, and theforces underlying variation in communities.Wilson (1991) asked whether “plant communitiesexist in a more meaningful sense, as integrated, discreteentities”. Keddy (1993) argued that this question isunscientific. Our operational definition transformsWilson’s question to “Are there any communities whichare integrated and discrete?” This reformulation shouldbe scientifically valid by Keddy’s standards, as long asprocedures for defining and detecting integration anddiscreteness can be identified.Wilson implies that the general usage of the termcommunity connotes a strong degree of integration.Keddy believes that it is possible (but scientificallyvacuous) to list criteria which distinguish whether asystem exists as a community; these criteria are notlisted, but presumably involve some sort of integrationbetween species/and or environment. Some ecologistsdo indeed believe that integration is the key to defini-tions of community. In attempting to establish an episte-mology of ecology, Scheiner (1993) considered com-munities as natural entities which are defined by ‘link-ing processes such as interactions among populations.Allen & Hoekstra (1990) recognized that there is muchKeywords: Biome; Community concept; Communityecology; Heterogeneity; Homogeneity.IntroductionWilson (1991) raised the question of whether plantcommunities exist. He included the existence of assem-bly rules, niche limitation, discreteness, discontinuity,and integratedness as potential criteria for the existenceof communities. In response, Keddy (1993) argued thatthough it may be possible to draft a list of criteria for theexistence of communities, the debate over existence ofcommunities is an ontological and epistemological gamewhich is peripheral (and, Keddy argued, even harmful)to scientific progress. We suggest that community ecolo-gists define community operationally, with as little con-ceptual baggage as possible, so that we can put thedebate about their existence behind us.An operational view of the communityDefinitionsLindeman (1942) defined the ecosystem as “thesystem composed of physical-chemical-biological proc-esses active within a space-time unit of any magnitude”.As such, it is a perfect operational definition. We beginby considering the ‘space-time unit’. The space aspectof this space-time unit could be completely arbitrary,such as a 0.1 hectare quadrat, a cubic meter of lakewater, or a political district such as a province or nation,or it could be somewhat less arbitrary, such as a lake, awatershed, or an island. The time aspect of the unitcould be measured arbitrarily as seconds or decades, orsomewhat less arbitrarily as days or years.Whatever space and time units are chosen, physical-chemical-biological processes will be present – with the

Aristotle's Two Systems (review)

Book Reviews Daniel W. Graham. Aristotle's Two Systems. New York: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1987. Pp. xiii + 359. $66.oo. This book suffers from the self-conscious labors of the author to assert his thesis. That thesis, simply put, is that Aristotle had two systems, one developed in the organon based on a correlation of logic with ontology, the other the familiar hylomorphic-based system of the physical and metaphysical works. Professor Graham maintains that these systems are not only disdnct but that the first is historically antecedent to the second, and even though there is evidence of continuing appeal to the first position in the development of the second, they are "two incompatible philosophical systems" (15). Much that Graham says recommends the view that (i) the hylomorphic orientation plays little or no role in the organon. That much is solid scholarship that we all must come to terms with. It is another thing to claim (2) that Aristotle did not have hylomorphic views when he wrote the organon, and still another to say (3) that he abandoned the one conceptual scheme for the other. That (2) does not follow readily from 0) is already widely argued in the literature. The doctrinal idiom in which (3) is articulated goes back to Andronicus, and has been renounced by most scholars in this century. Interlaced with these points is the clear difference between difference, incommensurability , and incompatibility. Graham has shown difference, argued for incommensurability , and claimed incompatibility. That he persists in an equivocation between incommensurability and incompatibility obscures the difficulties and weakens his argument. Even his excellent analyses of the growth of views about causation (chap. 6) and actuality (chap. 7), which constitute the heart of the book, are more suggestive than decisive or coercive, and the bold claims of the "two systems theory," of which Graham seems so proud, detract from, rather than reinforce, the value of these central studies. This is a frustrating book. It is filled with so many abbreviations for formulas and definitions that they prove distracting rather than economical, and their significance ranges from the trivial to the esoteric, often leaving the reader to ponder whether it is worth tracing the abbreviations to their source to discover the significance of this or that occasional allusion. A linguistic model for the author's method along the lines of Saussure's diachronic/synchronic distinction, is introduced in the first chapter, but since it receives no subsequent attention it seems little more than excess conceptual baggage. Furth and Frede receive careful attention several places in the argument of the text, but stand as shadowy paradigms for unitarian and developmental approaches in ways that never seem to get cashed out in the text. Even though Graham exhibits [4391 44 ~ JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 28" 3 JULY n99o remarkable erudition in his expositions and analyses, his claims for hns own conclusions ale not related to other scholarship, lie says he is the "'only person who holds the Two Systems Theory with all its ramifications" (ix). But P. Gohlke advanced a similar thesis m terms of the "'potentia-actuf" doctrine not being in the earlier works (which was refuted by A. Mansion): so did Tannery (refuted by Rodier). Nor does he cite Walter Lcszel, who directly denies Graham's position by showing how the "atomic substantialism " of the logical works serves as an ontological frame for the whole corpus (see Logi~ and Metaphysics in Aristotle, Padova, 197o). In claiming "Jaeger's reconstruction of the early Metaphysics is generally accepted today as a secure landmark of Aristotle's development" (l n9), he has Ross swallowing this whole in ways Ross never did. and ignores subsequent scholars, including Reale whom, though, he treats at length on other matters. In the same spot he notes Ross's own conclusions ab~mt the early character of Physics t and 2, without worrying about how this encroaches on his own two systems theory. Early on he appeals to Owen as a precursor of his theory without taking account of Owen's pluralistic hypothesis, which makes Graham's systems account basically implausible. In the course of analysis, he treats matter as "'the final substratum that...

Technical Change and Applications of Dynamic Duality to Agriculture: Reply

Larson has made three basic points in his comment on the incorporation of technical change in dynamic duality models: (a) appending a time trend onto the empirical model to account for technical change is inconsistent with an autonomous theoretical model, (b) a current value function V discounted to time to, 0 < to < T, should not be confused with a value function J discounted to time t = 0, and (c) the firm's expectations of embodied technical change should be explicitly formulated in the theoretical model. The first issue focused on the Vasavada and Chambers paper, and the last two issues were addressed to the Howard and Shumway paper. We will respond to each of these points in order. First, Larson is correct that Vasavada and Chambers (and several other dynamic duality studies) have maintained an autonomous theoretical model but estimated a nonautonomous empirical model. The bridge between the two models is the assumption of static ex ante technology expectations on the part of producers with ex post awareness of technical change on the part of the analyst. While this assumption has seldom been made explicit in research reports and may appear inconsistent, its practical importance is often minor. For example, although we reported results in our AJAE article only for the nonautonomous theoretical and empirical model, we also estimated the parameters for the autonomous theoretical-nonautonomous empirical model. There were no differences between the two models in any of the test conclusions and only minor differences in the estimated rateof-adjustment parameters. Second, Larson's equation (11) is essentially the same as our equation (3') except that he defines a current value function V, discounted to time to, O < to < 0, while we define an initial value function J, discounted to time t = 0. Larson alleges that the discounting period alters the interpretation of the parameter estimates. However, the output supply, variable input demand, and investment equations are all unaffected by the discounting period. Thus, the interpretation of the estimated output supply and variable input demand equations, the rate-ofadjustment parameters and associated marginal values of investment in quasi-fixed inputs are the same whether one assumes the decision maker acts at time t = 0 or t = to, O < to < oo Finally, Larson correctly notes that we did not explicitly discuss how embodied technical change was included in our theoretical model. The implicitly maintained assumption was Larson's third alternative, i.e., that firms have static embodied technology expectations. Although this assumption may seem counterintuitive given our maintained hypothesis of nonstatic disembodied technology expectations, Larson's other alternatives also carry their own dilemmas. His first alternative was that firms could forecast future-embodied technical change with perfect accuracy (an impossibility), and his second was that firms expect disembodied technical change but actually experience embodied technical change. Each alternative maintains some conceptual baggage, the implications and empirical seriousness of which have not been fully explored. We are appreciative of Larson's identification of these issues and for the opportunity to enter into a dialogue on some of their theoretical and practical aspects. We would also note a printing error of some consequence near the bottom of the second column of p. 838 of our paper. It should read F4 <0.

Canon Fathers and Myth Universe

N THE SUBTEXT of these remarks are two questions that, together, constitute the pretext for what follows. The first of these questions is that of the reader who asks, What the hell does that title mean, anyway: Canon Fathers and Myth Universe? Well, it refers to the generally patriarchal literary canon, the literally patriarchal biblical one that is the source of the metaphor, the Fathers of the Church, whose patristic writings include the bases of law, the Anglican cathedral clergy, whose title is canon and who may be addressed as Father, and, of course, the military imagination, with its fecund visions of can(n)on fodder. And then there are the notions of a universal myth, the dominant myth of a human universal that turns out to be male, and the sexist international competition for Miss Universe. My title is at once the portmanteau that contains all that conceptual baggage and the background upon which the essay itself is projected. The other question in my suband pre-text is one that I have been asking myself with increasing insistence whenever I accept an invitation to give a guest lecture under the aegis of a Department of English or Comparative Literature. Crudely expressed (which is exactly how it is expressed in the depths of my consciousness), my question goes: Shall I choose a subject in feminist criticism or in criticism? This is a genuine question. On the one hand, my reputation and intellectual identity have both been informed by my work as a feminist critic. But the invitation is frequently at the instance of a search committee, as part of the hiring process. As a professional who is not gainfully employed, ought I not show that I can do regular criticism too? So the question is heartfelt and authentic. Yet it horrifies me. For criticism should not be served, like coffee, in and variant versions. In fact, though, depending on the region of this country in which you order it, coffee is interpreted as meaning that the cream has been added or, conversely, that it has not. (Regular, that is, is the opposite of both black and white-depending on where you stand.) Surely, I have been telling myself, I can construct an argument to show why, at this time, the proper project of criticism is the one with the feminism in it.