Concept Of Liberty Research Articles

Isaiah Berlin, Michel Foucault and the Politics of Neoliberal Freedom

Starting with a historical inquiry into the notion of freedom as a political concept, in this article I argue that neoliberal freedom has attempted to satisfy demands associated with two quite distinct forms of freedom, representing a new understanding of the concept. Drawing on Isaiah Berlin’s lecture on the two conceptions of liberty – positive freedom to and negative freedom from – I consider their apparent heterogeneity, stemming from alternate relations towards individuals, and forming the basis of opposing political systems. Against this opposition, the neoliberal notion of freedom, as developed in the early works of liberal economists and their vision of a social market economy, is marked by a synthesis of politics and the economy, one that enables social regulation in conformity with market demands. Reflecting Foucault’s argument that power operates through both productive and repressive practices, neoliberal freedom poses a new understanding of subjectivity, where individuals become ‘entrepreneurs of the self’. By connecting personal freedom to rational action in the competitive marketplace, neoliberal culture can claim to grant both negative freedoms from the state and enabling freedoms to be a rational subject. With brief reference to contemporary political events, I point out some of the problems and implications of this form of freedom.

The Influence of Liberty Concepts on the Legal Classification of Constitutions and Constitutional Governments

Due to global developments in constitutional law and especially the importance of principles of republicanism, the sovereignty of the people and the protection of individual rights and public liberties as the foundations of constitutionalism and constitutional government, it seems that a new category of constitution that is consistent with the principles and foundations of constitutionalism and the constitution should be provided. Therefore, the classical categories of constitutions are briefly introduced and then their unlawful aspects will be criticized and then, new categories of constitutions are introduced and described. This classification is based on the assumption that republic governments can be constitutionality and with a focus on the protection of liberty can use its power without being required to comply with liberty in its liberal concept. So as constitutions can be divided into two types of liberalism and republicanism, governments can be classified into two types of Republicanism and liberalism too. Since the classic categories have acted based on inductive method, therefore, this method has been used to criticize and propose alternatives.

Le “Discours de la servitude volontaire” et la cause protestante: les paradoxes de la réception de La Boétie

There is a paradox in La Boétie’s Discourse on volontary servitude between the primary intention of the author and the reception of the text by its readers during the religious wars. It is therefore necessary to distinguish between the time of its drafting and the time of its publication. The interpretative difficulty inherent to the Discourse facilitated its cooptation by the protestant reformers. Read in the religious context of the post-Saint-Bartholmew’s Day massacre, the Discourse acquired a seditious dimension it did not originally have. Like Luther before him, La Boétie defends a conception of liberty that is more spiritual than material, but the Monarchomachs transformed this «youthful exercise» into a call for armed uprising, not by the people directly but via the increasing power of the magistrates.

Recognition and Redistribution: Finding Common Ground between Two Conceptions of Freedom

Today, critical theory is marked by a conflict between two competing theories; these theories are recognition based theories of freedom and theories that equate justice with the notion of just distribution. The recognition paradigm argues that there are sources of oppression and exploitation that have less to do with material differences, and more to do with how people relate to each other in a social context, or even the attitudes that institutions can adopt towards certain groups of people (Cordelli, 2015, p.679; Honneth, 2012, pp.37-38; Schemmel, 2012, p.123; Young, 1999, p.417). Honneth's recognition theory, for example, advocates for the subordination of distributive justice to recognition concerns, making it a 'dependent variable in relations of recognition' and treating intersubjectivity as the primary means for promoting freedom (Honneth, 2012, p.46). That is, maldistribution ought to be considered a symptom of misrecognition or disrespect rather than being a primary cause for social injustice. This approach, however, is criticized as being an overly simplistic and one-sided account of morality that reduces justice claims to feelings of recognition and disrespect (Fraser, 2001; Lazzeri, 2009; Thompson, 2006; McNay, 2008; Zambrana, 2013, Zurn, 2005). For example, Fraser (Fraser and Honneth, 2003, pp.22-37) argues that a politics of recognition, centering on the concern of self-realization, is a reductive account of social justice that wrongfully equates morality to cultural concerns and psychological harm.Honneth (2014) attempts to shore up his theory by explicating how moral norms, and freedom itself, are embedded within and dependent upon social relations through a reconstruction of Hegel's three social spheres of action: relationships, markets, and the state. However, Honneth's theory of recognition still remains vague in terms of outlining a satisfying approach for dealing with the issue of distributive justice. Even if we accept that Honneth has successfully made the case that a theory of recognition is necessary for understanding social demands for distributive politics and their normative justification, it is still not sufficient in terms of dealing with a variety of distributive justice claims. As we will see, Zurn (2005) demonstrates that this deficiency in Honneth's theory is not easily remedied due to complications in Honneth's attempt to classify distributive justice claims as ultimately being recognition claims. However, if we are convinced of the necessity of a theory of recognition to explain and justify redistributive politics, then what is needed for a more complete theory of freedom is an account of distributive justice that at the same time embodies and addresses recognition needs. I propose, as one possible solution to this problem, supplementing Honneth's theory of recognition with an account of distributive justice that simultaneously addresses the recognition requirements for ethical life and freedom. The two supplements that I propose are drawn from Nussbaum's capability approach and Pettit's theory of non-domination. My aim in this article is to demonstrate how combining these two approaches is one example of how specific policies for distributive justice can be closely imbricated, even mutually reinforcing, with Honneth's border criteria of justification through mutually recognized social norms.1First, it will be argued that while Nussbaum's capabilities approach is decidedly a program for political action, it is not only sensitive to the diversity of conceptions of the good life held by individuals, but emphasizes the dignity and respect for individuals, and the importance of individual self-realization in underwriting free choice. It will also be shown that increasing opportunities for intersubjective recognition is necessary for the development of what Nussbaum calls her list of central capabilities, the capabilities a person needs in order to be counted free.2 The highlighting of various institutional provisions for the promotion of people's capacity to make meaningful political choices, what Nussbaum refers to as a positive conception of liberty, offers a distributive program of justice that can also address recognition needs identified by Honneth. …

Hayek’s neo-Roman liberalism

This article argues that Hayek employed a neo-Roman concept of liberty. It will show that Hayek’s definition of liberty conforms to that provided by Philip Pettit and Quentin Skinner, respectively the chief theorist and leading historian of the neo-Roman concept. It will go on to demonstrate how the genealogy of liberty Hayek provides is also the same as that offered by Pettit and Skinner. This is important, as the neo-Roman concept is not regarded, either by Hayek or by neo-republicans led by Pettit, as a product of political theory. Instead it is viewed as underpinning a historical tradition. Hayek’s self-conscious association with this tradition reinforces the article’s prior claim that Hayek’s conceptual writing on liberty is neo-Roman. Finally, the article considers how the neo-Roman nature of Hayek’s work complicates the historical narrative and political claims the neo-republicans make for the neo-Roman concept. It concludes that it is open to use by another, very different, political tradition: free market liberalism.

Sistema tonal vs sistema atonal: Reflejo del pensamiento filosófico

The objective of this article is to compare the tonal and atonal music systems, and understand how the change in the philosophical ideas from the nineteenth century on is reflected in the way of understanding and writing contemporary music. To reach this goal we will define tonality and atonality. Additionally we will analyze the aesthetic changes and the transformation of the worldview through the new ideas based on rationalism, positivism and subjectivism. We will find the relationship between the concepts of liberty, beauty and message that are transmitted through art, specifically by the means of music, throughout historical events and ideological changes.

Understanding Rousseau’s Forced Freedom Through Two Concepts of Liberty

How can someone be “forced to be free”? Why is the arrest of a drunk driver not actually against their will? This paper answers these questions by drawing parallels between Rousseau’s “Social Contract” and Isaiah Berlin’s essay “Two Concepts of Liberty”. The coherence of “forced freedom” depends on a specific understanding of “freedom”—namely Isaiah Berlin’s notion of “Positive freedom”. Positive freedom suggests that free actions are those which act in affirmation of a will rather than those acting in the absence of obstacles. Therefore, Positive freedom is concerned with the source of a will. Rousseau’s forced freedom is meant to be applied in cases of incongruence between an individual’s various whims, wills, and deep interests. Forced freedom does not act against a will but acts as a rationalization of an existing will to illuminate what it truly desires. In the case of the drunk driver, their implicit participation in society means that they must understand through some capacity why established drunk driving laws exist. An individual’s belief in Positive freedom is therefore necessary in order for them to internalize the coercion of the state and to allow themselves to be “forced to be free”.

Ecological Limits and the Meaning of Freedom: A Defense of Liberty as Non-Domination

It is now widely acknowledged that global environmental problems raise pressing social and political issues, but relatively little philosophical attention has been paid to their bearing on the concept of liberty. This must surprise us, because the question of whether environmental policies are at odds with individual liberty is bound to be controversial in the political arena. First, this article explains why a thorough philosophical debate about the relation between liberty and environmental constraints is needed. Second, based on Philip Pettit’s typology of liberty, it assesses how different conceptions of liberty fare in a context of stringent ecological limits. Indeed, a simple conceptual analysis shows that some conceptions of liberty are more compatible than others with such limits, and with the policies necessary to avoid overshooting them. The article concludes that Pettit’s conception of liberty as non-domination is more compatible with the existence of stringent ecological limits than the two alternatives considered.

‘Ownness created a new freedom’: Max Stirner’s alternative concept of liberty

This paper will examine Max Stirner’s notion of ownness as an alternative paradigm of freedom. I argue that ownness – which implies a radical form of self-ownership or self-mastery – is not reducible to any of the familiar categories of freedom such as negative or positive liberty; nor does it fit in with the republican model of liberty as non-domination. The problem with these understandings is that they make freedom dependent on external conditions – whether it is the actions of others, or the presence laws and institutions, or external rational and moral norms which the individual is expected to conform to. For Stirner, this dependence leaves freedom vulnerable and ultimately empty and meaningless. Rather, as I show, ownness proposes an ontological freedom – a permanent property of the self which exists regardless of the circumstances one finds oneself in, and which forms the basis for one’s resistance against constraint and domination. The aim of the paper is to show that ownness is a more effective and persuasive answer to the distortion of freedom under neoliberalism.

A Chestertonian Critique of Contemporary Liberalism and Its Aspirations to Cosmopolitan Reach

A prominent movement in contemporary liberalism drives toward cosmopolitanism; however, its foundations of value pluralism and equality as fairness will not sustain such an extension. A different tradition of liberalism did not reach toward global political institutions, but did include a doctrine of cosmopolitan respect for others. G. K. Chesterton propounded a Christian theory of liberalism that defended small, democratic communities of property-owning families. The theory also promoted the virtues of hope and charity. Not constructing global institutions, Chesterton’s liberalism inspires adherents to respect the autonomy and difference of others. Contemporary liberalism must be cosmopolitan and global according to its concepts of liberty and equality; Chesterton’s liberalism was patriotic, local, and respectful of others. The latter has the substance of cosmopolitanism, the former only the reach.

The History of Political Thought as secular genealogy: the case of liberty in early modern England

ABSTRACTThe History of Political Thought originated in, and partially remains an adjunct to the academic study of politics. As such it is not a mere subject matter or authentic tradition of speculation, but a secularising genealogy in some tension with an impulse to rigorous historicity. It provides an under-acknowledged context for the thinkers and concepts placed within it. The difficulties and consequent distortions are illustrated with reference to seventeenth-century discussions of liberty. It is argued that notions of negative liberty and Republican liberty as an ideological alternative are secularising genealogical projections that distort the character of seventeenth-century debate; but that republican liberty can be reformulated in more historically plausible terms as a special case of one of the entailments of contentious office-holding in and beyond a secularised conception of the political. Thomas Hobbes's conceptions of liberty provide a concluding illustration.

Renegade Revolutionary: The Life of General Charles Lee by Phillip Papas

Reviewed by: Renegade Revolutionary: The Life of General Charles Lee by Phillip Papas James J. Schaefer Renegade Revolutionary: The Life of General Charles Lee. By Phillip Papas. New York: New York University Press, 2014, 410 pages, $40.00 Cloth. In the last three years, more works have been published highlighting Major-General Charles Lee than in the past century. Phillip Papas’ Renegade Revolutionary: The Life of General Charles Lee, the most recent account in a revival of interest, illuminates this misunderstood gentleman whose character has been the target for many biographers. There are four standard historical interpretations of Lee and his actions during the era of the American War for Independence: he was a disrespectful and contemptuous gentleman; he was a traitor and a coward; he was an inept military commander; or he was a scapegoat who received unwarranted censure. The first three interpretations resonate more of partisan politics than fair evaluation, typically revolving around Lee’s uncouth social [End Page 159] behavior or, more appropriately, his ill-treatment of George Washington and his supporters. Unlike many of the previous histories and biographies on Lee, Papas subscribes to the fourth interpretation that Lee received repeated criticism. Renegade Revolutionary, however, does not focus on Lee’s behavioral shortcomings. Rather than judging him by his narcissism and insolence, the author instead highlights his contributions as a military strategist and literary propagandist to the American cause. An extensive bibliography of primary and secondary sources is used to great effect to explain the ebb of Lee’s popularity and illustrate his genius as a strategist and advocate. Lee’s story not only explores how social, political, and military institutions are brought together to create a new nation, but also how changes within these institutions altered the original concepts of democracy. Where histories and biographies have portrayed Lee’s relationship with Washington as a conflict of personalities based on the concepts of honor and reputation, Papas argues that the chasm between the two men was based on differences of military theory, and, by extension, political considerations. One of the main themes of this book is the difference in military ideas between Washington and his supporters and those of Lee. Papas shows how Lee wanted to work within the confines of a democracy, which meant citizen-soldiers filling the ranks of a national militia. A standing army, Lee maintained, was the bane of a democratic society as it posed the greatest threat to liberty. By advocating a petite guerre strategy, Lee promoted a national militia divided into smaller detachments, specializing in light infantry tactics. This approach was consistent with a colonial mindset and would allow the revolutionaries an increase in mobility and better logistical support. By moving the action to the western theatre of operations, farther from British ports of strength, the American forces would be able to exploit a thin British supply line and interrupt communications. Dividing a national militia into divisions allowed the colonies, or states, to maintain local control and responsibility over their own forces, allaying any fears that a national government might have tyrannical motives. This war of attrition had a further political upside: the war would eventually lose popular support in England and weaken the King’s, and Parliament’s, resolve. Lee’s experience and education dictated practices that best fit a colonial-style of warfare while remaining true to his thoughts on democracy. [End Page 160] Washington’s ideas on the use of the militia were much different. He envisioned a Continental Army, reminiscent of a disciplined European-style fighting force in which local militias played a supporting role, shoring local defenses, gathering intelligence, and harassing British forces. He saw the militias as too undisciplined and untrained to meet the British Army on the field. From a political perspective, the Continental Army’s role was advantageous as it was meant to reduce exacerbated forms of regionalism and political fragmentation, all the while garnering support for national unity. In this discussion Papas weaves the various differences, explicating and differentiating between leadership styles, tactics of waging war, and concepts of liberty and democracy, and then presenting how these various understandings culminated into debates regarding government centralization. As Papas discusses these themes...

How John Milton Was Lodged in the Curricula of U.S. Colleges after the Civil War

How John Milton Was Lodged in the Curricula of U.S. Colleges after the Civil War Dayton Haskin I How is it possible to like Milton?" Colin Burrow has memorably asked. Writers on "Milton in America" (where "America" refers only to the United States) have sometimes attempted to speak to this question, if only by implication. Some have traced the long tradition in New England of valuing Milton's emphasis on equality and freedom. Some have urged that his political prose embodies the concept of liberty that is enshrined in the Declaration of Independence.1 Writers who give extrinsic reasons for looking into Milton's writing offer a less bold intervention, however, than that made by the Mexican poet Mario Murgia, who, sensing a continuing potential in Milton's prose to challenge the exercise of tyrannical power, has translated Areopagitica (2009) and The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates (2011) into Spanish. Burrow, for his part, writing in the cool element of British prose, has at least gestured toward an answer that allows that reading Milton is valuable in its own right. Frankly acknowledging that there is much not to like [End Page 223] about Milton, he has nonetheless offered a dazzling meditation on Milton's "singularity" that encourages admiration.2 A telling if unspoken presupposition in Burrow's question gives it its edge. Ever since English literature was put into service as an academic subject, the likeliest forum in which new readers first encounter Milton's writing has been the school. After the Civil War in the United States, courses on English literature began to be offered for credit toward a bachelor's degree, and because Milton was regarded as one of the twin pillars of that literature, instructors felt obligated to reckon with him. Yet rarely did they assign students to read his major poetry. At the newly founded Massachusetts Institute of Technology (est. 1861), the professor of English explained why in the emerging "New Education," which excluded Latin and Greek, the study of older literature in the vernacular was unnecessary: "The times of Shakspeare [sic] and Elizabeth, or of Milton and the Commonwealth, are grown very remote from us in this nineteenth century."3 "The New Education" was the title of a provocative essay published in the country's leading journal of opinion. Written by MIT's professor of practical chemistry, the essay evaluated the growth of scientific and technological schools. It turned out to have far-reaching implications for the undergraduate curriculum in colleges of every sort. Within months of its appearance in the Atlantic Monthly early in 1869, the overseers of Harvard appointed its author, Charles W. Eliot, president of the nation's oldest college. Eliot's essay makes no mention of Milton. Yet it bears on our present subject because it proposes as a peculiarly "American" prerogative the exercise of freedom in breaking from the European past in the conduct of education. Eliot had spent two years in Europe studying the curricula, methods of instruction, and physical arrangements of Old World institutions. He urged his fellow citizens to insist that higher education begin to offer new academic disciplines. It was one thing, however, to jettison tradition in a school of technology. It would be another in a traditional liberal arts college, where the languages and literatures of classical civilization, with mathematics, had long [End Page 224] made up nearly the whole undergraduate curriculum. Although Harvard eventually set a decisive precedent when it ceased to require knowledge of Latin and Greek, Eliot discreetly downplayed the hostility to the classics he had seen at MIT. Instead, he sought to create conditions in which students were obliged to exercise their freedom. Eventually almost every course offered in the college was a free "elective." Gradually, the idea became commonplace that a liberal education might be obtained as readily via the study of chemistry as through the humanities. From this point of view, Paradise Lost seemed the very epitome of what modern students had been freed from. It was implicated with foreign classical literature by genre, by a density of Latinate syntax and vocabulary, and by intertextual relations. Its subject matter was a biblical story known to every child. A...

Ład wewnętrzny a ład polityczny. Pojęcie wolności w świetle humanizmu Irvinga Babbitta

In the light of Irving Babbitt’s (1865–1933) humanistic approach modern views on the problem of political order are menaced by an imaginative error twisting the truth of the inner dualism of human consciousness. Visions of an order that unveils itself spontaneously on the grounds of “enlightened self-interest” or gushes out of a natural sentiment of “universal sympathy” are based – as Babbitt claims – on misguided views on the conditions necessary to erect a just political community. The article provides an introduction to the main threads of Babbitt’s intellectual stance and proposes an interpretation of his humanistic philosophy as contrasted with “naturalistic” doctrines equipped with a concept of liberty understood as a freedom to realize one’s expansive appetites.

The Illiberal Democracy of Ancient Athens

Ancient Athenians introduced democracy, majoritarianism and popular sovereignty. They also introduced populism and rent-seeking. Moreover, Athenians didn’t invent the rule of law. The power of demos was almost unlimited, there were no constitutional guarantees, checks and balances. The laws were subjected to the whims of the majority of citizens or judges. Most importantly, individual rights were not recognized in Athens. The concept of liberty in Ancient Athens was very different from the concept of liberty that prevailed after the Great Revolutions of the late 18th and the early 19th century which led to the contemporary liberal democracies. We will discuss these issues with reference to famous historical episodes and trials. However, we will also see that the liberal ideas of individuality, toleration and the rule of law, appeared in a not-so-embryonic way, in three important works of the period (a tragedy, a comedy and a history book). These ideas were remarkably original but at the same time marginal. They didn’t exert any significant influence on the Athenian democratic institutions.This is the text of a Keynote Lecture at the international conference: “Ancient Greece and the Modern World: The Influence of Greek Thought on Philosophy, Science and Technology” (Ancient Olympia, August 2016).

The Old Neo-Liberalism. The Neo-Liberalist Germ in Mises' and Hayek's Theories

What is neo-liberalism? I’m going to affirm here that, as well as being a political doctrine born in the 1970s, neo-liberalism is the construction, the extension and the final reinforcement of a number of classical elements. My argument is that many of the typical aspects of contemporary neo-liberalism were already present in theories expressed by thinkers such as L. von Mises and F. A. von Hayek. As proof of this fact, I reclaim some characteristics of the present neo-liberal phenomenon as having been conceived by the above authors. These characteristics actually imply the ongoing spread of a dominant ideology that tends to pit the concept of liberty against those of rationality and critical consciousness. First, the article will analyse the changes that have occurred within the phenomenon of consumerism, which becomes en-twined with the competitive and entrepreneurial spirit of the individual; second, it will reflect on the wide-spread aversion to socialist policies, and in fact to all policies that provide for public intervention by the State and that change the relationship between State and economy; finally, it will relate these investiga-tions to the ideological and structural model that supports the European Union.

I—The Presidential Address Freedom and Nature: A Spinozist Invitation

Can we deal with environmental risks without giving up a significant degree of freedom? The answer is often thought to be no, but in this lecture I sketch a Spinozist invitation to view the matter in a different light. Spinoza’s conception of liberty is fundamentally a republican one, but, unlike other defenders of this tradition, he argues that we can be made unfree by non-human things such as viruses or weather patterns. In so far as we are subject to their arbitrary power, we are already in a condition of servitude. If we adopt this Spinozist diagnosis of our condition, the problem we confront is not so much whether we are willing to give up existing freedoms as whether we can find the means to overcome existing forms of servitude.

Animals Do Have an Interest in Liberty

Abstract According to Alasdair Cochrane, liberty can have value for most animals only because it allows them to obtain other desirable things, such as well-being. With this he concludes that humans can continue to use other animals as long as they treat them well. In this article, I reject this conclusion by arguing against the positive conception of liberty in favor of its negative or republican conception. I suggest that it is sufficient for a being to be capable of agency in order to have an interest in liberty, which deserves to be protected by the right to be free.

Quentin Skinner e a liberdade republicana em Maquiavel

A intenção deste artigo é discutir a concepção de liberdade encontrada nos escritos políticos de Maquiavel com base na interpretação feita por Quentin Skinner. Esta interpretação tem sido geralmente aceita por teóricos do chamado neorrepublicanismo, como Philip Pettit e Maurizio Viroli, sustentando suas ideias sobre a liberdade republicana. Não se trata assim de uma discussão meramente hermenêutica, mas de uma contraposição a uma interpretação parcial que, ao enfatizar o aspecto legal da concepção maquiaveliana, ampara uma perspectiva fortemente jurídica da liberdade republicana. O texto está dividido em três partes: a primeira apresenta as razões pelas quais a concepção maquiaveliana foi retomada por Skinner; a segunda expõe a sua interpretação; e a terceira problematiza aspectos desta interpretação com base em características fundamentais do pensamento político de Maquiavel que devem ser consideradas na avaliação de sua concepção de liberdade.

Using Isaiah Berlin’s two concepts of liberty to rethink cultural policy: a case of Poland

The overarching aim of this paper is to rethink the normative aspects of Polish cultural policy after 1989, using a conceptual framework built upon Isaiah Berlin’s two concepts of liberty. More specifically, this article aims to analyse the rhetoric used in cultural policy and the practice of policy-making, in order to uncover and characterise the normative role that the state has played in shaping and executing cultural policy in Poland after 1989. The analysis shows that Polish cultural policy has been dominated by a perfectionist logic, which corresponds to Isaiah Berlin’s concept of positive liberty. It means that cultural policy has not been axiologically neutral but instead it has been based on state’s judgements about what kind of art is worthy support. On the other hand, the analysis shows that Polish cultural policy after 1989 cannot be classified as negative liberty.