Conception Of Ourselves Research Articles

Principles of the Unification of our Agency

Do we need principles of the unification of our agency, our mode of acting? Immanuel Kant and Christine Korsgaard argue that the reflective structure of our mind forces us to have some conception of ourselves, others and the world—including our agency—and that it is through will and reason, and in particular principles of our agency, that we take upon ourselves to unify and test the way(s) in which we make our lives consistent. I argue that the principles suggested—the hypothetical imperative and the categorical imperative—function to unify our understanding of ourselves and others as agents as efficacious and autonomous and that the extent to which those concerned render themselves efficacious and autonomous in cosmopolitan education or elsewhere is due to the extent to which they act in accordance with and are motivated by the suggested principles and in particular the categorical one. I first discuss how the principles function to unify our agency and how the categorical imperative functions as a test of maxims for our actions, how the will is the source of our morality, and how we are forced to have practical identities. I end with some remarks on what it means to acknowledge the mentioned principles in cosmopolitan education.

On Sloterdijk's Terror from the Air: The Book of (Political) Air Conditioning

On Sloterdijk's <i>Terror from the Air</i>: The Book of (Political) Air Conditioning

Cybersemiotics: An Evolutionary World View Going Beyond Entropy and Information into the Question of Meaning

What makes Cybersemiotics different from other approaches attempting to produce a transdisciplinary theory of information, cognition and communication is its absolute naturalism, which forces us to view life, consciousness and cultural meaning all as a part of nature and evolution. It thus opposes a number of orthodoxies: 1. The physico-chemical scientific paradigm based on third person objective empirical knowledge and mathematical theory, but with no conceptions of experiental life, meaning and first person embodied consciousness and therefore meaningful linguistic intersubjectivity; 2. The biological and natural historical science approach understood as the combination of genetic evolutionary theory with an ecological and thermodynamic view based on the evolution of experiental living systems as the ground fact and engaged in a search for empirical truth, yet doing so without a theory of meaning and first person embodied consciousness and thereby linguistic meaningful intersubjectivity; 3. The linguistic-cultural-social structuralist constructivism that sees all knowledge as constructions of meaning produced by the intersubjective web of language, cultural mentality and power, but with no concept of empirical truth, life, evolution, ecology and a very weak concept of subjective embodied first person consciousness even while taking conscious intersubjective communication and knowledge processes as the basic fact to study (the linguistic turn); 4. Any approach which takes the qualitative distinction between subject and object as the ground fact, on which all meaningful knowledge is based, considering all result of the sciences including linguistics and embodiment of consciousness as secondary knowledge, as opposed to a phenomenological (Husserl) or actually phaneroscopic (Peirce) first person point of view considering conscious meaningful experiences in advance of the subject/object distinction. The phaneroscopic semiotics includes an intersubjective base as Peirce considers all knowledge as intersubjectively produced through signs and view emotions and qualia as Firstness. The integrative transdisciplinary synthesis of Cybersemiotics starts by accepting two major, but not fully explanatory, and very different transdisciplinary paradigms: 1. The second order cybernetic and autopoietic approach united in Luhmann’s triple autopoietic system theory of social communication; 2. The Peircean phaneroscopic, triadic, pragmaticistic, evolutionary, semiotic approach to meaning, which has led to modern biosemiotics, based in a phenomenological intersubjective world of partly self-organizing triadic sign processes in an experiental meaningful world. The two are integrated by inserting the modern development of information theory and self-organizing emergent chemico-biological phenomena as an aspect of a general semiotic evolution in the Peircean framework. This creates the Cybersemiotic framework, where evolutionary experiental and intersubjective sign processes become the ground reality, on which our conceptions of ourselves, action, meaning and the word are built. None of the results from exact science, biology, humanities or social sciences are considered more fundamental than the others. They contribute on an equal footing to our intersubjective semiotics knowing process of ourselves and the world

Self-Knowledge of Personality: Do People Know Themselves?

The intuition that we have privileged and unrestricted access to ourselves – that we inevitably know who we are, how we feel, what we do, and what we think – is very compelling. Here, we review three types of evidence about the accuracy of self-perceptions of personality and conclude that the glass is neither full nor empty. First, studies comparing self-perceptions of personality to objective criteria suggest that self-perceptions are at least tethered to reality – people are not completely clueless about how they behave, but they are also far from perfect. Second, studies examining how well people’s self-perceptions agree with others’ perceptions of them suggest that people’s self-views are not completely out of synch with how they are seen by those who know them best, but they are also far from identical. Third, studies examining whether people know the impressions they make on others suggest that people do have some glimmer of insight into the fact that others see them differently than they see themselves but there is still a great deal people do not know about how others see them. The findings from all three approaches point to the conclusion that self-knowledge exists but leaves something to be desired. The status of people’s self-knowledge about their own personality has vast implications both for our conception of ourselves as rational agents and for the methods of psychological inquiry.

TWO APPROACHES TO HUMAN RIGHTS

Building on his very impressive set of articles published over the last ten years, James Griffin's On Human Rights (henceforward G) argues that human rights are protections of personhood, and he develops an account of personhood as centrally comprising agency: Human life is different from the life of other animals. We human beings have a conception of ourselves and of our past and future. We reflect and assess. We form pictures of what a good life would be – often, it is true, only on a small scale, but occasionally also on a large scale. And we try to realize these pictures. This is what we mean by a distinctively human existence – distinctive so far as we know.... Human rights can then be seen as protections of our human standing or ... our personhood (G, pp. 32–3).

Aesthetic Identity, Well-Being, and the Right to Beauty

In this essay I will argue that beauty is an important part of human well-being. Not only may experiences of beauty contribute to physical and mental recuperation, but beauty also figures importantly in our conceptions of ourselves and our natural and social environment. Relating ourselves to norms of beauty and evaluating our environment from the point of view of its (lack of) beauty, we form ourselves aesthetic identities that are also important aspects of our self-esteem. Given the importance of beauty to human well-being, and given that an argument can be given for a right to well-being, the conclusion of this essay will be that there is also a right to beauty.

Will the Real Moral Judgment Please Stand Up?

The recent, influential Social Intuitionist Model of moral judgment (Haidt, Psychological Review 108, 814–834, 2001) proposes a primary role for fast, automatic and affectively charged moral intuitions in the formation of moral judgments. Haidt’s research challenges our normative conception of ourselves as agents capable of grasping and responding to reasons. We argue that there can be no ‘real’ moral judgments in the absence of a capacity for reflective shaping and endorsement of moral judgments. However, we suggest that the empirical literature indicates a complex interplay between automatic and deliberative mental processes in moral judgment formation, with the latter constraining the expression and influence of moral intuitions. We therefore conclude that the psychological literature supports a normative conception of agency.

Global justice, climate change and Miller’s theory of responsibility

This article assesses Miller’s conception of global responsibility, partly in terms of its internal plausibility and coherence, but particularly from the point of view of its capacity to deal with the issue of global climate change. Global climate change is challenging for most theories of responsibility (which are tied to our conception of ourselves as agents), which are (a) individualist and (b) focused on direct, rather than indirect, outcomes. This essay argues that Miller’s connection theory is better equipped to theorize this problem, but that its focus on the need to generate remedial duties should lead us in a different direction than simply focusing on existing agents and institutions. It should lead us to set up coordinating (global) institutions and enforceable agreement to deal with this problem.

Geography, pedagogy and politics

This Forum takes seriously the proposition that everything we do as geographers is potentially `relevant' to the affairs of the wider society. Using expanded conceptions of `pedagogy' and `politics', the Forum suggests why and how we are always engaged in processes of shaping and steering this wider society, wittingly or not, and intentionally or not. In the minds of many of us, this shaping and steering only (or mostly) occurs through activities we assume to be self-evidently `relevant' in intention or effect — like undertaking policy-relevant research. However, this Forum argues that it is misplaced to regard only a select group of our activities as socially consequential. Pulling together recent debates on `participatory', `activist' and `public' geographies, the Forum offers arguments and examples that show readers the potential relevance of the whole range of diverse practices in which we professionally engage. The introduction and five subsequent contributions together suggest that we aim for a `joined-up' conception of ourselves and our activities as professional geographers embedded in a wider society. As such, the Forum aims to make a distinctive contribution to ongoing discussions of how big-G academic geography relates to the plethora of small-g quotidian geographies — imagined and real — that are the stuff of our world.

Who we are

Who we are

To change the world, to celebrate life

For those of us for whom philosophy is not merely a parlor game but a way to conceive and to change our lives, there is a struggle to be faced. If we forsake the intolerable aspects of our world in order to celebrate what is beautiful in it, we risk endorsing that intolerability. Alternatively, if we jettison the celebration of life for world-changing, we join the ranks of the many revolutions of the last century that killed their own. This article suggests that if we articulate the point of intersection between Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the flesh and Foucault’s concept of power - i.e. the body - we may be able to develop a conception of ourselves that embraces both ends of this seeming dilemma.

The nature and significance of behavioural genetic information.

In light of the human genome project, establishing the genetic aetiology of complex human diseases has become a research priority within Western medicine. However, in addition to the identification of disease genes, numerous research projects are also being undertaken to identify genes contributing to the development of human behavioural characteristics, such as cognitive ability and criminal tendency. The permissibility of this research is obviously controversial: will society benefit from this research, or will it adversely affect our conceptions of ourselves and each other? When assessing the permissibility of this research, it is important to consider the nature and deterministic significance of behavioural genetic information. Whilst to date there has been much discussion and debate about the properties of genetic information per se and genetic determinism, this has not been applied to behavioural genetic research and its ethical implications. Therefore, this paper elucidates how behavioural genetic information can be distinguished from other types of genetic and non-genetic information and also synthesizes the determinative significance of genetic factors for the development of human behavioural traits. Undertaking this analysis enables the ethical issues raised by this research to be debated in an appropriate context and indicates that separate policy considerations are warranted.

The ambivalence of otherness: the manifestation of ‘whiteness’ in an Australian school—1988–1998

In recent times, and in times of insurgent globalisation, modern notions of identity and with them, conceptions of essential and primordially defined difference seem to have fallen apart. Identity is understood as postmodern, a ‘moveable feast’ of ever-in-process, negotiated differences. The examination of the material and conceptual terms and conditions that position these logics otherwise suggests that these arguments remain tied within conceptions of ourselves made through the ambivalent conceptions of others. In this paper, I trace these paradoxical relations as they are represented in a particular local Melbourne school at each end of a decade and at a time of increasing demographic change and global transformation. Teachers and parents understood and defined their identities and the identities of others in ways that were increasingly fragmented, changing and complex. Beneath these changing patterns, they continued to define others as different and as not us in ways that were ambivalent and extreme. These negotiations took place differently in recent years as the definitions of essential notions of identity changed and became more complex to define. Nevertheless, they continued as ambivalent stories of otherness that transversed the tortuous spectrum between orientalism and nativism speculated upon in post-colonial writings.

Brain-wise: studies in neurophilosophy

Progress in the neurosciences is profoundly changing our conception of ourselves. Contrary to time-honored intuition, the mind turns out to be a complex of brain functions. And contrary to the wishful thinking of some philosophers, there is no stemming the revolutionary impact that brain research will have on our understanding of how the mind works. Brain-Wise is the sequel to Patricia Smith Churchland's Neurophilosophy, the book that launched a subfield. In a clear, conversational manner, this book examines old questions about the nature of the mind within the new framework of the brain sciences. What, it asks, is the neurobiological basis of consciousness, the self, and free choice? How does the brain learn about the external world and about its own introspective world? What can neurophilosophy tell us about the basis and significance of religious and moral experiences? Drawing on results from research at the neuronal, neurochemical, system, and whole-brain levels, the book gives an up-to-date perspective on the state of neurophilosophy -- what we know, what we do not know, and where things may go from here.

Philosophy in medicine

Dr Harper should be congratulated for his attempt to entice physicians to philosophical values (January 2003 JRSM1). His article touches on several aspects of philosophy that can be viewed on a par with medicine. Philosophy (from the Greek for love of wisdom/knowledge) was the unifying theme in classical education. It encouraged the quest for why and how things come to be and provided a mechanism for reasoning that could be applied to any academic discipline. In modern times, when medicine is threatened by information-overload, the philosophical process (inquiry, critical reasoning, analysis) can offer valuable insights for practice. However, as Dr Harper indicates, acceptance demands an end to the misconception that philosophy is incompatible with practical science. The general view is that, while science has answers that command widespread agreement, philosophy is interested in matters on which there is less consensus. By challenging concepts and assumptions, the philosophical approach can generate new perspectives in science. Advances in genomic biotechnology, for instance, illustrate the difficulty of deciding what to do with scientific discoveries. We need to consider what society we wish to have and our relationships with each other and our surroundings, which depend on our conception of ourselves as human beings at societal level. This is where, in our opinion, Dr Harper's article is overambitious in scope. In trying to cover a large area, he omits certain issues that are important in explicating/exploring the common ground between philosophy and medicine; for example, how should ethics be applied in the medical arena, or how does morality ethically connect with human society? His choice of philosophers was necessarily limited, but in an article about science as applied to medicine we would have included the following: Thales of Miletus, the first natural scientist and analytical philosopher in Western intellectual history; Aristotle, for his observation, methodological classification and empirical analysis; Bertrand Russell, for his logical analysis;2 and Michel Foucault, for his insightful analysis of scientific knowledge and social control.3

Consciousness and language

One of the most important and influential philosophers of the last 30 years, John Searle has been concerned throughout his career with a single overarching question: how can we have a unified and theoretically satisfactory account of ourselves and of our relations to other people and to the natural world? In other words, how can we reconcile our common-sense conception of ourselves as conscious, free, mindful, rational agents in a world that we believe comprises brute, unconscious, mindless, meaningless, mute physical particles in fields of force? The essays in this collection are all related to the broad overarching issue that unites the diverse strands of Searle's work. Gathering in an accessible manner essays available only in relatively obscure books and journals, this collection will be of particular value to professionals and upper-level students in philosophy as well as to Searle's more extended audience in such fields as psychology and linguistics.

The Reductionist and Compatibilist Argument of Epicurus' On Nature, Book 25

AbstractEpicurus' On Nature 25 is the key text for anti-reductionist interpretations of Epicurus' philosophy of mind. In it, Epicurus is trying to argue against those, like Democritus, who say that everything occurs 'of necessity,' and in the course of this argument, he says many things that appear to conflict with an Identity Theory of Mind and with causal determinism. In this paper, I engage in a close reading of this text in order to show that it does not contain any clear statement of either a doctrine of radically emergent properties and "downwards causation" (contra David Sedley) or of the non-reducibility of the mental to the atomic (contra Julia Annas). I argue that Epicurus' main thesis is that we cannot consistently argue against our conception of ourselves as rational agents, and that it is our reason that allows us to reform our characters, control our actions, and blame and praise one another appropriately. The way that Epicurus describes the development and causal efficacy of reason in On Nature book 25 is consistent both with reductionism and (more surprisingly) with causal determinism.

The Objectivity of Value

is the value of the capacity to weigh reasons itself, which we find in ourselves, but also equally in every other member of the universal community of rational agents. This is the basis of moral reasoning. Its principle is to treat all rational agents as having an objective value that is fundamental, supreme and equal. It is solely through this moral value that happiness acquires its value, and the principle of prudence becomes binding on us; it is likewise solely through the value of happiness that more limited ends, and hence the means to them, acquire their value. Therefore, the three species of practical reasoning stand in a definite order of priority. Moral reasoning takes precedence over, and governs, prudential reasoning, and prudential reasoning takes precedence over, and governs, instrumental reasoning. The common dogma that all practical reason is instrumental is based on the false idea that all reason must begin with desire (for an end) and that the role of reason is merely to supply the means to the end. But apart from our conception of ourselves as capable of setting ends, and as having reasons to pursue the ends we set, there would be no reason for us to take the means to our ends apart from the momentary desire we might feel to perform the actions that count as those means. However, an agent who always felt that desire, apart from any reason to feel it, would not need instrumental reason. An agent needs instrumental reason at all only insofar as it must create in itself a desire to employ the means it realizes are necessary for its end. It creates this desire through its awareness of its value as a rational agent, and the consequent objective value of the ends it has set for good reasons. 25 David Hume, “The Standard of Taste,” in David Hume: Selected Essays, ed. S. Copley and A. Edgar (New York, 1993). 26 This is what Kant calls our “empirical interest” in the beautiful (Critique of the Power of Judgment, in Kants gesammelte Schriften, vol. 5, pp. 296–98).

Intersexuality and the Categories of Sex

Operations on intersexuals indicate that the sex of a person is based on more than biology. Expectations about proper gender activities furnish the frameworks through which certain features and combinations of features are understood to be fundamental to bodies and to comprise their sex. Yet, we can ask whether this interpretation is either coherent or consistent with our fuller conceptions of ourselves. Is there a point to interpreting a person as a sex?

Intersexuality and the Categories of Sex

Operations on intersexuals indicate that the sex of a person is based on more than biology. Expectations about proper gender activities furnish the frameworks through which certain features and combinations of features are understood to be fundamental to bodies and to comprise their sex. Yet, we can ask whether this interpretation is either coherent or consistent with our fuller conceptions of ourselves. Is there a point to interpreting a person as a sex?