Concept Of Truth Research Articles

Alethic desires, framing effects, and deflationism: Reply to Asay

AbstractJamin Asay has recently argued that deflationists about the concept of truth cannot satisfactorily account for our alethic desires, i.e., those of our desires that pertain to the truth of our beliefs. In this brief reply, I show how deflationists can draw on well‐established psychological findings on framing effects to explain how the concept of truth behaves within the scope of our alethic desires.

Murky waters: Incident at Loch Ness, Grizzly Man, and Herzogian notions of truth

ABSTRACT Werner Herzog avers that cinema reveals a truth beyond mere fact, a truth he calls ‘ecstatic truth’. The film that offers the clearest view of this conception, the mockumentary Incident at Loch Ness (2004), remains understudied and obscure. In Incident, Herzog plays a fictionalized version of himself who is making a documentary about the Loch Ness monster. This fictional version of Herzog shares the real Herzog’s filmmaking philosophy, a philosophy Incident lays bare for study: namely, Incident reveals how the pursuit of ecstatic truth takes us to the limits of human understanding. While Incident helps us explore the concept of ecstatic truth, I argue it also helps us understand much of Herzog’s oeuvre, including 2005’s Grizzly Man. In this paper, therefore, I analyze ecstatic truth as presented in Incident and apply that understanding to Grizzly Man and its controversial tape scene. Examining said scene through the lens of the ecstatic truth will, I argue, not only garner us fuller insight into Herzog’s films, but will also shed light on the effects of Herzog’s controversial choice to not play the tape of Timothy Treadwell’s death in Grizzly Man.

Jesus the Teacher of truth

Many people try to historically dispute the person of Jesus of Nazareth. The aim of this paper is to find contrary claims in the Scriptures to prove that Jesus is the eternal Teacher. This implies that Jesus’ mission has not come to end with his mission on Earth. In the first part of the paper, we will explain the Old and New Testaments’ meanings of a teacher. This will be followed with stating the differences between Jesus’ teaching and the teaching of the scribes and Pharisees. The aim of this is to prove the historicity of Jesus of Nazareth. In the second part of the paper, we will deal with the consideration of truth and connect the concepts of authenticity and truth. The eternal teacher of the Truth with his teaching frees those who accept him and encourages them to change their hearts and lives. His teaching transcends time and space boundaries. In comparison to the teachers of this world, Jesus is an authentic teacher who lives all that he teaches as example for his disciples of his communion with his Father. The teaching of Jesus is different from the Jewish teaching, as well as from any other teaching. Jesus as teacher of teachers provides an example of learning, especially in situations of temptation. As a teacher, Jesus has a unique “educational plan” - the doctrine of God’s kingdom and His teaching methods have a strong effect on students.

The Validity Measurement of Murder using Model Penal Code of Statutory Codes and Common Law Jurisdiction based on Heidegger’s Theory of Truth

Heidegger’s philosophy of truth is a critical revelation concerning criminalization. The idea of truth has been a long series of debates among scholastic artworks since the idea of man’s interactions cannot be extrapolated to knowledge-seeking existence. Hence, evidence law pertaining to types of killings, such as degrees of murder, with depraved heart killings of another, based on statutory codes and murder from common law jurisdiction, have elements for evaluation of its severity of criminal offense subject to punishment based on Model Penal Code. Although centuries have passed, erudite articulation of these issues led to the development of questions, like ‘what are the elements of murder crucial for unlawful perpetration?’, ‘what are the arguments concerning exact copy of legal instruments?’ or ‘what must be the facts needed to make it essential for the validity of measurement concerning crime perpetration of murder?’ for tools of becoming. This article asserts that when the concept of truth, known as Aletheia (disclosure), is applied to criminal law, there must be three repercussions for this truth characterization. First, Aletheia is not restricted to propositions resulting in the discovery of its various forms depicting Being-in-the-World. Second, the idea of truth does not only involve a substance for language and thought but also exposure to factual materials. Lastly, Aletheia simultaneously reveals and hides planned occasions, constantly discussing that the truth is always a becoming process, a series of returning existence. Every discussion of truth in murder under criminal law has the tendency to create another intricate philosophical issue. The three exceptional principles of truth, namely, correspondence, coherence, and pragmatic theories, are deemed to be inadequate in resolving the questions on proof of facts, as mentioned, due to the issue of existence. The theory of Heidegger suggests that we must rely on the ancient Greek concept of ‘unconcealment.’ Upon this validation, this paper applies critical assessment to reveal the concept of truth, seeking justice based on proof of facts involving the crime perpetration of murder constituting Heidegger’s opinions and judicial decisions. Heidegger’s truth is designed to Dasein (existence) as for being. The philosopher believes in the existence of truth due to exposure to its existence; hence, the Australian Legal System serves as the common ground in formulating laws based on legal theories as a legislative framework pre-emptive to constitutional law towards application of its legal practice and regulatory policies to be in harmony set for amendments of constitutional gaps in terms of applying the critical assessment of Heidegger to other comparative laws based on political agendas for monetary success.

Prolegomena to the Study of Love

Consider this propositional function which includes the dyadic predicate “loves”: “X does not love Y unless Y loves X” (or “if Y does not love X”). This function may be treated in four ways. (1) If universally quantified, it states a (purported) conceptual truth about “love” or the nature or essence of love. Love is necessarily reciprocal. (2) If universally quantified, it may alternatively be a nomological generalization stating an empirical or factual truth about human nature, i.e., about a pattern of reciprocity that occurs among people who are independently identified as lovers. (3) If instantiated with constants, it is an empirical proposition about the attitudes or behaviors of particular individuals (a, b, c). Finally, (4) the function may be treated axiologically; it expresses a normative judgment about what love ought to be or what lovers ought to feel or do. Other propositional functions may be constructed for the constancy, exclusivity, and benevolence of love. This essay investigates the implications of these understandings of the function and how they are logically related to each other.

"Truth and Temporality - Points of Intersection Between Actor and Character"

"Starting from a saying of Steinhardt, "the meaning of truth this is: truth exists, but it has a time and a space in which it is really truth" 259 , the intention is to outline a perspective on how the concept of truth overlaps or, in any case, works with the idea of temporality on stage. Historical time reflects tensions, rhythms and meanings that offer insights into the pulse of society, but also directions of interpretation. Theatre reflects time and takes up, in one way or another, ways of both propagating and receiving stage discourse. The idea of truth on stage proposes to the actor a permanent questioning of the way he treats the acting instruments, because the actor repeats gestures, texts, states; and often, what yesterday could be considered truth, today seems suspicious. How does time construct and de-construct the feeling or concept of truth for the actor?"

The intentions of information sources can affect what information people think qualifies as true

The concept of truth is at the core of science, journalism, law, and many other pillars of modern society. Yet, given the imprecision of natural language, deciding what information should count as true is no easy task, even with access to the ground truth. How do people decide whether a given claim of fact qualifies as true or false? Across two studies (N = 1181; 16,248 observations), participants saw claims of fact alongside the ground truth about those claims. Participants classified each claim as true or false. Although participants knew precisely how accurate the claims were, participants classified claims as false more often when they judged the information source to be intending to deceive (versus inform) their audience, and classified claims as true more often when they judged the information source to be intending to provide an approximate (versus precise) account. These results suggest that, even if people have access to the same set of facts, they might disagree about the truth of claims if they attribute discrepant intentions to information sources. Such findings may shed light on the robust and persistent disagreements over claims of fact that have arisen in the “post-truth era”.

How to Conquer the Liar and Enthrone the Logical Concept of Truth

This article informally presents a solution to the paradoxes of truth and shows how the solution solves classical paradoxes (such as the original Liar) as well as the paradoxes that were invented as counterarguments for various proposed solutions (“the revenge of the Liar”). This solution complements the classical procedure of determining the truth values of sentences by its own failure and, when the procedure fails, through an appropriate semantic shift allows us to express the failure in a classical two-valued language. Formally speaking, the solution is a language with one meaning of symbols and two valuations of the truth values of sentences. The primary valuation is a classical valuation that is partial in the presence of the truth predicate. It enables us to determine the classical truth value of a sentence or leads to the failure of that determination. The language with the primary valuation is precisely the largest intrinsic fixed point of the strong Kleene three-valued semantics (LIFPSK3). The semantic shift that allows us to express the failure of the primary valuation is precisely the classical closure of LIFPSK3: it extends LIFPSK3 to a classical language in parts where LIFPSK3 is undetermined. Thus, this article provides an argumentation, which has not been present in contemporary debates so far, for the choice of LIFPSK3 and its classical closure as the right model for the truth predicate. In the end, an erroneous critique of Kripke-Feferman axiomatic theory of truth, which is present in contemporary literature, is pointed out.

La Retórica de Aristóteles como dilatación del razonamiento práctico

Aristotle’s account of rhetoric goes beyond its previous consideration as an art of persuasion to be regarded as a suitable logic for human affairs. In the realm of ethics and politics, he needs to appeal to a logic that can deal with contingency without discarding the concept of truth. I claim that the double rapport of rhetoric with dialectic and ethical-political issues links public discourse with the question of rationality and practical truth. I will start with a brief overview of two passages of the Rhetoric that account for the liaison of rhetoric with dialectic. Secondly, I consider two contributions that rhetoric theory makes to the enhancement of the rationality of ethics. Lastly, I will reflect on the relationship of rhetorical discourse with practical truth.

Davidson on Truth

"Truth-conditional semantics is by far the best-known philosophical contribution of Donald Davidson. The main idea of this approach is to explain the concept of meaning by appeal to the concept of truth. Accordingly, we understand a sentence s of a natural language L, if and only if, we know its truth-conditions. Challenging in its nature, this proposal immediately caught the attention of the philosophical community, being equally appreciated and criticized. The aim of this paper is to argue that Davidson’s approach is too optimistic in its goals. In my view, truth-conditional semantics is unlikely to be the best way to shed light on the concept of meaning. By appealing to Tarski’s semantic conception of truth and assuming a primitive concept of truth, this perspective leaves too many questions unanswered and thus proves its limits. Keywords: Donald Davidson, meaning, truth, Truth-Conditional Semantics. "

Three Interpretations of the Truth of a Work of Art – Gadamer, Heidegger, Šliogeris

This article examines interpretations of ontological truth of the work of art in the philosophies of Arvydas Šliogeris, Hans G. Gadamer and Martin Heidegger. All of them believe that artwork may reveal the ontological truth. This common feature suggests the possibility to consider these three interpretations as a Heideggerian-type understanding of art. This paper argues that, while sharing the belief about the possibility of ontological truth in the artwork, their concepts of truth are fundamentally different, precisely because of the relation with language. In the first part of the article, the ontologies of works of art, the structures of experience, the importance of language and the interpretations of truth by the three philosophers are discussed. The second part explicates the essential points of tension and similarities between their concepts of ontology and the truth of artwork. The research reveals that language, as the basic plane of the junction with the world, in the experience of a work of art is more misleading than truth-revealing.

Non-adaequatio: Negative Dialectics in-between Kant and Hegel

The aim of this article is to frame Adorno’s concept of ‘nonidentity’ in the context of German idealism, namely, the philosophies of Kant and Hegel. The thesis to be defended is that “Secularization of Metaphysics” entails relinquishing, as well as prolongation of the German idealist tradition. The argument is developed in the following steps: 1) the constitution of an autonomous transcendental subject is shown to be rooted in the idea of Enlightenment; 2) by reconstructing Adorno’s conception of truth as non-adaequatio, I claim that Adorno’s philosophy is conducted from the perspective of the end of philosophy; 3) the sociohistorical character of the concept of ‘nonidentity’ is discussed in relation to Adorno’s understanding of history; 4) the concept of ‘nonidentity’ is discussed as implying a continuation of the Kantian project on a metacritical level; 5) Adorno’s critique of Kant is reconstructed in the context of Hegel’s Faith and Knowledge.

Hermeneutical Truth and Authorial Intention: Modern Projects

"The aim of this text is to reconstruct the meanings of the concept of hermeneutical truth, as it has been defined and explained in the main projects of modern hermeneutics (Dannhauer, Chladenius, Meier, Schleiermacher, Fr. Schlegel). I will explore the epistemological side of this concept, different from its meaning in hermeneutic ontology. Understood as correctness by modern hermeneutics, truth has been related to the authorial intention. The thesis I am arguing is that the meanings of hermeneutical truth and, related to them, the modern theories of authorial intention differ according to the metaphysical presuppositions that define the thought paradigms of modernity (Cartesianism, Kantianism, Romanticism and German Idealism): the centrality and activism of the self, the rationality of the self, the dependence of knowledge on the ideal of method, the discovery of the unconscious. Some modern hermeneutical theories express the tensions between these philosophical paradigms. However, I will argue that the authorial intention remains a limit of interpretation that prevents the risks of arbitrariness and hermeneutic relativism. Keywords: hermeneutical truth, authorial intention, interpretation, understanding, hermeneutics of suspicion, Modern metaphysics. "

The Validity Measurement of Murder using Model Penal Code of Statutory Codes and Common Law Jurisdiction based on Heidegger’s Theory of Truth

Purpose: Heidegger’s philosophy of truth is a critical revelation concerning criminalization. The idea of truth has been a long series of debates among scholastic artworks since the idea of man’s interactions cannot be extrapolated to knowledge-seeking existence. Hence, evidence law, pertaining to types of killings, such as degrees of murder, with depraved heart killings of another, based on statutory codes and murder from common law jurisdiction, have elements for evaluation of its severity of criminal offense subject to punishment based on Model Penal Code. Although centuries have passed, erudite articulation of these issues led to development of questions, like ‘what are the elements of murder crucial for unlawful perpetration?’, ‘what are the arguments concerning exact copy of legal instruments?’ or ‘what must be the facts needed to make it essential for validity of measurement concerning crime perpetration of murder?’, for tools of becoming.
 Methodology: This article asserts that when the concept of truth, known as Aletheia (disclosure), is applied to criminal law, there must be three repercussions for this truth characterization. First, Aletheia is not restricted to propositions resulting to discovery of its various forms depicting Being-in-the-World. Second, the idea of truth does not only involve a substance for language and thought, but also exposure of factual materials. Lastly, Aletheia simultaneously reveals, and hides planned occasions constantly discussing that the truth is always a becoming process, a series of returning existence.
 Findings: Every discussion of truth in murder, under criminal law, has the tendency to create another intricate philosophical issue. The three exceptional principles of truth, namely, correspondence, coherence, and pragmatic theories, are deemed to be inadequate in resolving the questions on proof of facts as mentioned due to issue of existence.
 Recommendation: The theory of Heidegger suggests that we must rely on ancient Greek concept of ‘unconcealment.’ Upon this validation, this paper applies critical assessment to reveal the concept of truth, seeking justice based on proof of facts involving crime perpetration of murder constituting Heidegger’s opinions and judicial decisions. Heidegger’s truth is designed to Dasein (existence) as for being. The philosopher believes in the existence of truth due to exposure of its existence, hence, the Australian Legal System serves as the common ground in formulating laws based on legal theories as legislative framework pre-emptive to constitutional law towards application of its legal practice and regulatory policies to be in harmony set for amendments of constitutional gaps in terms of applying the critical assessment of Heidegger to other comparative laws based on political agendas for monetary success.

A Deductive Solution to the Generalisation Problem for Horwich’s Minimalism about Truth

Abstract Minimalism is the view that our concept of truth is constituted by our disposition to accept instances of the truth schema ‘The proposition that p is true if and only if p’. The generalisation problem is the challenge to account for universal generalisations concerning logical truths such as ‘Every proposition of the form 〈if p, then p〉 is true’. This paper argues that such generalisations can be deduced using a single example of the logical truth in question and a single corresponding instance of the truth schema, employing the logical method of reasoning with arbitrary instances of universal and existential generalisations. Suggesting an inferentialist construal of Minimalism, the paper introduces conditional and general acceptance dispositions, distinguishes inferential meaning constitution from implicit definition, highlights the inferential nature of acceptance of instances of the truth schema, sketches a suitable account of structured propositions, compares higher-order with first-order means of quantification, and argues that the conception of truth Minimalism attributes to ordinary speakers is essentially inferential. It finally applies the deductive strategy to generalisations concerning logical validity as well as more complex logical truths.

Political Legitimacy as Grounded in the Wills of Citizens: A Reply to Peter

Abstract Fabienne Peter (2020) recently proposed a taxonomy of accounts of the meta-normative grounds of political legitimacy. In this article, I argue that there is an important distinction left out of that taxonomy that complicates the picture. This is the distinction between attitude-independent and attitude-dependent conceptions of normative truth. Through an examination of these conceptions of normative truth (and correlate interpretations of what counts as a normative reason) I argue that what Peter calls a fact-based conception of legitimacy may collapse into a will-based conception. Further, the distinction has important implications for what Peter calls the belief-based conception. Finally, I defend the will-based conception against Peter's arbitrariness objection through an examination of ideally coherent eccentrics.

Moderatism and Truth

AbstractAccording to moderatism, perceptual justification requires that one independently takes for granted propositional hinges. This view faces the truth problem: to offer an account of truth for hinges that is not threatened by skepticism. Annalisa Coliva has tried to solve the truth problem by developing a new form of alethic pluralism. I argue that the resulting view cannot offer a coherent characterization of “skeptical switch scenarios” while providing an effective anti-skeptical strategy. In a more positive vein, I defend an approach that combines a correspondence conception of truth with epistemological disjunctivism.

Truth, Moral Rightness, and Justification: A Habermasian Perspective on Decolonizing the University

AbstractIn this paper, Anniina Leiviskä examines the moral, political, and epistemic claims of the social justice movement known as “decolonizing the university” from the perspective of Jürgen Habermas's distinction between objective and normative validity and the respective notions of truth and moral rightness. Leiviskä challenges the view, held by some representatives of decolonization, that the normative and epistemic claims of the movement are inseparable from each other and suggests that evaluating the justification of the movement requires holding these claims at least analytically distinguishable. She argues that while the moral and political claims of “decolonizing the university” find strong justification through Habermas's discourse morality, its epistemic claims, especially the rejection of shared standards of knowledge, might have epistemically problematic consequences. Accordingly, Leiviskä suggests here that the epistemic justification of decolonization is conditional on the acceptance of shared epistemic standards — the pragmatic truth concept and the criterion of impartiality — which she develops in the paper on the basis of Habermas's pragmatic theory of truth and rational discourse as a model of justification. Finally, she proposes that the implications of these criteria for practices of higher education and the curriculum should be determined through an open and unconstrained discussion by the members of an inclusive university community.

The Governing Conception of Laws

In her paper, “The Non-Governing Conception of Laws,” Helen Beebee argues that it is not a conceptual truth that laws of nature govern, and thus that one need not insist on a metaphysical account of laws that makes sense of their governing role. I agree with the first point but not the second. Although it is not a conceptual truth, the fact that laws govern follows straightforwardly from an important (though under-appreciated) principle of scientific theory choice combined with a highly plausible claim about the connection between scientific theory choice and theory choice in metaphysics. I present and defend this argument and then show how the resulting understanding of governance gives rise to an especially strong version of recent explanatory circularity arguments against Humeanism about laws of nature. Finally, I present three options for a further understanding of the governance relation that are compatible with my argument.

Application of the Principle of Truth to Judiciary Institutions: Discourse of Judges at the Makassar Religious High Court, Indonesia

The application of the formal truth concept in civil courts, particularly religious courts, ought to have been abandoned. In several civil disputes, judges are guided by the pursuit of formal truth, resulting in unjust verdicts. This study examines the situation of the principle of formal truth in the investigation of civil matters in the Religious Courts and the view of the Makassar Religious High Court Judge regarding its application. This study is a legal-empirical investigation informed by legal philosophy. Techniques for data collecting consisting of in-depth interviews with key informants and research of court decisions and relevant literature. The findings of the study indicate that, first, the principle of formal truth that is applied to religious courts is still legitimate today, just as the HIR/RBg approach of proving civil cases in Indonesian civil courts is still valid. Second, the opinion of the judges of the Makassar Religious High Court regarding the application of the formal truth principle in the environmental courts of the religious courts demonstrates that, in general, the Makassar PTA judges believe that this principle must be applied as a trial process provision. In their opinion, the formal principle of truth serves as a guide for parties and judges when reviewing cases. Several other judges, however, believe that the formal truth principle should be substituted by the material truth.