TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE Book Reviews 639 are introduced in chapter 5 and rarely mentioned again. Some of his generalizations could also be questioned. He concludes that the program’s political problems “underscored how marginal it was to the interests of some congressmen” (p. 141), but a more interesting puzzle is why it was more than marginal for more than a few members. There also is a debatable claim that, because of the lack of technical and scientific expertise in Congress, “unlike most of the policy issues that Congress deals with, the initiation of a major new scientific project engages the advocates of the project, but usually no organized opposition” (p. 124); studies of congressional policy-making tell us that big-science projects are far from unique in their lack of detailed scrutiny and organized opposition. When Smith writes that “the transition to a politically feasible Space Telescope program” was not “a particularly orderly or rational process” (p. 385), he is not breaking new ground, but the detail and scope of his narrative make it one of the most comprehensive and useful accounts of big science, big technology, and politics. Richard P. Barre Dr. Barke is an associate professor in the Science and Technology Policy program at Georgia Institute ofTechnology. Among his publications is Science, Technology, and Public Policy (Congressional Quarterly, 1986). His research interests focus on the interplay of public regulation and support of science and technology and the politics of public subsidies for R&D. Sandia National Laboratories: The Postwar Decade. By Necah S. Furman. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1990. Pp. xxv + 858; illustrations, notes, bibliography, index. $45.00. How could an organization possibly merge the goals, expectations, and procedures of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), the Department of Defense (DOD), and private industry? This story is told in Sandia National Laboratories, which traces the development of the nation’s chief nuclear ordnance engineering facility from its World War II origins to its maturation in the mid-1950s. During this period, Sandia evolved from a weapons-production division orga nized by academics at the Los Alamos atomic bomb project to a weapons research and development laboratory operated by AT&T. The introduction of standardization and quality-control regulations, formalized business practices, and systems-engineering concepts gave Sandia the organizational and technical sophistication to develop advanced weapons and cope with the political and administrative complications of producing a highly secret product in collaboration with DOD, AEC, and other weapons laboratories. Necah Furman makes the story of this unique organization come alive. Her prose is vivid and readable, and she has collected outstand 640 Book Reviews TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE ing photographs that capture the spirit of working at Sandia during the various stages of its evolution. One of my favorites vividly portrays the hardships of the early days of Sandia base. It shows a frowning young man standing at attention; behind him flaps his laundry, hung from a makeshift line strung across the window covering of a primitive hutment. The detailed presentation of Sandia’s changing organizational structure, which could have become deadly dull, is enlivened with amusing anecdotes. For example, the story of the crucial transition from the informal, egalitarian management style of wartime Los Alamos to the highly structured, hierarchical style of AT&T is dramatized by a description of the interaction between Sandia’s first president, George A. Landry, and his staff. To the amazement of Sandia employees, Landry was driven the four-block distance from his home to work in a chauffeured car. The highranking AT&T executive was equally amazed when subordinates blithely called him by his first name. Although Landry shaped Sandia into a businesslike organization efficient enough to simultaneously handle increasing AEC regulations and crash programs initiated by the military, employees managed to retain some aspects of the old Sandia: after forming unions, they successfully opposed Landry’s attempts to trim the laboratory’s generous benefit package, which included five weeks of vacation each year. The chief weakness of Furman’s book is that the sketchy presentation of technical material leaves the impression that techno logical innovation played an insignificant role in the evolution of this weapons laboratory. Furman explains that classification restrictions prevented full treatment of weapon development. This is...
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Apr 1, 1997
P.E Gartz 
Open Access