More than thirty years ago, American political scientist E. E. Schattschneider published a book with persuasive title The Semisovereign People.' The central concern of his work was influence of what he termed the on democratic process. In it, he provided a first stinging criticism of earlier pluralists such as Bentley,2 Truman,3 and Latham.4 Schattschneider's insight was that pluralism does not lead to an unbiased representation of people's preferences because of an inherent class bias, leading to his poignant remark that the flaw in pluralist heaven is that heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent.'5 Indeed, unbridgeable chasm between desires expressed in We people .. . and influence of interest groups, pressure groups, factions, and lobbyists seems to indicate that there is quite some slippage in famous transmission belt between latent public desires and manifest private policies. Schattschneider was not alone in his insightful critique of concept of group theory of politics. In context of American politics, Theodore Lowi, Grant McConnell, and particularly Mancur Olson provided devastating criticisms of concept of interest group pluralism and its supposed harmonizing and equilibrating features.6 Robert Dahl, in Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy, observes that autonomous organizations do not always have to be detrimental to democratic process.7 They may be crucial as a source of expertise to further social interests. In fact, to some extent representative bodies seek feedback from special interest groups in order to gain information for political decisions. Simply stamping out these interest groups or factions, as James Madison called them, would be counterproductive, since eliminating them would limit a very important democratic freedom, freedom of association. This is precisely what Robert Dahl called dilemma of pluralist democracy, which of course Madison, writing a long time ago in his Federalist Paper No. 10, described unforgettably as: air is to fire what liberty is to faction. In a liberal political system there will always be factions. Consequently, representative institutions have to be designed in a way which makes it as hard as possible for one faction to dominate political process. The less desirable consequences of divided government such as gridlock, immobilism, and inevitable finger-pointing between governmental branches are result of a deliberate institutional design whose main principle is dispersion of power. Scholars such as Mancur Olson even speak of decline of nations as a result of impinging of extraparliamentary forces upon state. These extraparliamentary forces,