Concentrated Ownership Structure Research Articles

Firm Level, Ownership Concentration and Industry Level Determinants of Capital Structure in An Emerging Market: Indonesia Evidence

This study evaluates the impact of firm and industry level determinants plus ownership concentration on the capital structure decisions in Indonesia. This study finds that growing firms seem to employ high level of debt, taking advantage of the tax shield as explained by the trade-off theory. However, if the firms are operating in a highly dynamic environment they tend to take on less debt as to avoid bankruptcy risk. Known to be in a highly concentrated ownership structure, firms in Indonesia opt to debt financing perhaps to act as a controlling mechanism to mitigate agency conflicts that may exist between the large controlling shareholders and the minority. Aged and highly profitable firms with high tangible and intangible assets and liquidity level operating in a high munificence environment follow the pecking order theory. The insights on the impact of industry characteristics are novel especially on emerging market thus fill the gap in the literature.

The Research of Ownership Structure and the Quality of Accounting Information in GEM Listed Companies

The quality of accounting information is the hot topic nowadays. The accounting information disclosure is a system of corporate governance; ownership structure is the foundation of corporate governance, so ownership structure can give an impact on the quality of accounting information through corporate governance. This paper selects GEM listed companies’ data from 2012 to 2014 and researches the relationship between ownership structure and quality of accounting information from three aspects: ownership properties, ownership concentration and balanced concentrated ownership structure. The results show that the proportion of corporate ownership and the proportion of managerial ownership have positive correlations with the accounting information quality; the state-owned stake, ownership concentration and balanced concentrated ownership structure have not significant relationship with accounting information quality.

Nila Firdausi Nuzula and Chitra Sriyani De Silva Lokuwaduge. Do ownership structures really matter? A study of companies listed on the Indonesia stock exchange

Examining the ownership structure of Indonesian corporations and its contribution towards developing appropriate corporate governance is an interesting endeavour, as the country is putting a lot of effort in improving trusts and attracting more foreign investors. A concentrated ownership structure is a common feature in the Asia-Pacific region. For the present paper, an analysis was conducted centred on ownership structures and their impact on governance and firm value in Indonesia. Measurements for ownership structure were based on the percentages of institutional and managerial ownership, while independent commissioners, board of directors and audit committees were used to measure corporate governance and Tobin’s Q was used to measure firm value. The results of the study, which is based on secondary data gathered from all the companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2009 to 2016, reveals that ownership structure affects two measures used for corporate governance and firm value. As expected, ownership structure shows a statistically significant relationship with corporate governance.

Takeover Defenses in the Greek Economy

Takeover defenses are crucial factors for the success of a takeover bid. The European Commission considers takeovers a significant factor for the economic integration strategy of the EU and the Takeover Directive was issued in 2004 to regulate takeover bids.However, it is also important to consider the structural characteristics of the economy in which they operate. There is the concern that EU Member States have different market, legal and cultural structures.The present paper gives a description of takeover defenses and their application in the Greek economy; a weak economy operating in a premature non-contestable market with concentrated ownership structure. It analyzes the role of takeover defenses in Greece that has implemented the EU Takeover Directive in its jurisdiction.Subsequently, the legal framework is examined, followed by relevant case law and takeover activities related to market sectors that include banking, pharmaceutical, shipping, banking as well as privatizations.The examination of takeover defenses in hostile takeovers in the Greek market aims to promote the understanding of the operation of takeover defenses in a weak economy and to offer further understanding on the way economic growth and market structure characteristics influence takeover defenses and vice-versa.It, also, aims to provide feedback on future policy implementation in Greece and the European Union for the advancement of harmonization.

Ownership and Control of Widely and Closely Held Firms in India

The fundamental dichotomy between dispersed and focused ownership system has been a critical issue in the field of corporate governance. The concentrated ownership mainly controlled by families or state give more supremacy to firms over cash-flow rights. This study investigates the ownership structure of Indian corporates primarily vested in the hands of promoter and promoter groups. Using ordinary least square estimates, the study identifies the determinants of concentrated ownership structure. Further, the study attempts to provide evidence on the convergence of the controls in Indian firms, and thereby assess the wealth concentrated amidst few. The findings of the study reveal contrasting evidence against widely affirmed notion in finance literature by Berle and Means (1932) that widely held firm is the organizational framework of large enterprises. In contrast, our findings reveal that concentrated ownership holds large corporations. Moreover, in addition to the constituents such as firm size, the number of stock markets and geographic ownership also contribute towards a significant impact on concentrated ownership.

Can Governance Be the Solution to the Reactive Nature of Laws?

The financial scandals of the last decades have largely been attributed to the recklessness of corporate managers in the diffused (dispersed) ownership system, and excesses of controlling shareholders in the concentrated ownership structure. Coffee described the dispersed ownership system as market-driven with each stockholder owning a piece of the corporation whereas, concentrated ownership system relies on the controlling majority (Coffee, 2005), and mostly owned by family. The fall of companies like Enron, Parmalat, WorldCom, Nortel Networks and others have largely been the focus of financial economists in the recent history. Financial statement restatement, high market expectation for future growth, and lack of auditors’ independence have been linked to the downfall of these companies. In consequence, government introduced the long-awaited legislation in Sarbanes and Oxley Act (2002) with the aim of forcing companies into good corporate governance.

The capital structure dynamics of Malaysian firms: timing behavior vs adjustment toward the target

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to investigate how the timing behavior and the adjustment toward the target of capital structure interact with each other in the capital structure decisions. Past literature finds that both timing and targeting are significant in determining the leverage ratio which is inconsistent with any standalone framework. This study argues that the preference of the firm for timing behavior or targeting behavior depends on the cost of deviation from the target. Since the cost of deviation from the target is likely to be asymmetric between overleveraged and underleveraged firms, the direction of the deviation from the target leverage is expected to alter the preference toward timing or targeting in the capital structure decision.Design/methodology/approachThis study used the GMM system estimators with the Malaysian data for the period of 1992-2009 to fit a standard partial adjustment model and to estimate the speed of adjustment (SOA) of capital structure.FindingsThis study finds that Malaysian firms, on average, adjust their leverage at a slow speed of 12.7 percent annually and this rate increased to 14.2 percent when the timing variable is accounted for. Moreover, the SOA is found to be significantly higher and the timing role is lower for overleveraged firms compared with underleveraged firms. Overleveraged firms seem to find less flexibility to time the market as more pressure is exerted on them to return to the target regardless the timing opportunities because of the higher costs of deviation from the target leverage. Underleveraged firms place lower priority to rebalance toward the target compared with overleveraged firms as the costs of being underleveraged are lower and hence, these firms have more flexibility to time the market.Research limitations/implicationsThe findings of this study support that firms consider both targeting and timing in their financing decisions. No standalone theory can interpret the full spectrum of empirical results. The empirical work is based on partial adjustment model of leverage; however, this model has been criticized by inability to distinguish between active adjustment behavior and mechanical mean reversion. This is an avenue for future research.Originality/valueThis study investigates if targeting and timing behaviors are mutually exclusive as theoretically expected or they can coexist. A theoretical explanation and an empirical investigation support the conclusion that firms consider both targeting and timing in their financing decisions. This study provides evidence from Malaysian firms that are characterized by concentrated ownership structure and separation of cash flow rights and control rights of the firm due to pyramid ownership structure. Therefore, it provides evidence on how environmental characteristics may affect the capital structure determinants of the firm.

PATTERNS OF EFFICIENCY IN DISPERSED, DOMINANT AND CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES IN BRAZIL

ABSTRACT Purpose: The article aims to trace the behaviour of dispersed, dominant and concentrated ownership structures in Brazil and verify which of these structures is more efficient operationally and if there is a pattern to be followed. Originality/gap/relevance/implications: Static optimisation techniques are used by data envelopment analysis (DEA) to calculate the variable ‘efficiency', a differential in relation to previous studies that consider only outcome variables as a performance indicator. The article is one of the first in the area that traces the pattern of efficiency of ownership structures in Brazil. Key methodological aspects: The sample consists of 8,298 company years in the period between 1995 to 2012. To calculate the efficiency (dependent variable), static optimisation techniques were used by data envelopment analysis (DEA). After, the unbalanced panel data by GMM-Sys (system generalised method of moments) is applied to identify the influence of dispersed, dominant and concentrated ownership structures on efficiency. Summary of key results: The results showed that, although all the variables are positively related to efficiency, the graphic presented an inverted "U" format, i.e. dispersed and concentrated structures, mostly, are less efficient than dominant. Key considerations/conclusions: The study identifies that both agency problems and the expropriation of minority shareholders by the majority, stemming from weak legal protection in the country, significantly affect the efficiency of Brazilian companies, thus making dominant structures the most appropriated form of ownership structure in Brazil.

Corporate Governance and Firm Environmental Disclosure: In the Context of a Concentrated Ownership Structure

Corporate Governance and Firm Environmental Disclosure: In the Context of a Concentrated Ownership Structure

Reducing agency conflicts through bank dividend payout decisions: the role of opacity and ownership structure

ABSTRACTWe empirically examine whether banks’ dividend decisions are influenced by their degree of opacity and ownership structure. We find that banks with concentrated ownership structure pay lower dividends when they have high degrees of opacity, in line with the hypothesis that majority shareholders pay lower dividends to extract higher levels of private benefits. We do not observe such expropriation behaviour from managers in widely held banks. Further analysis shows that higher levels of shareholder protection and stronger supervisory regimes help to constrain opportunistic behaviour of majority shareholders. Our findings have critical policy implications for the Basel 3 implementation of restrictions on dividend payouts.

Executive pay and performance: the moderating effect of CEO power and governance structure

This paper examines the crucial question of whether chief executive officer (CEO) power and corporate governance (CG) structure can moderate the pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) using a large up-to-date South African data-set. Our findings are threefold. First, when direct links between executive pay and performance are examined, we find a positive, but relatively small PPS. Second, our results show that in a context of concentrated ownership and weak board structures; the second-tier agency conflict (director monitoring power and opportunism) is stronger than the first-tier agency problem (CEO power and self-interest). Third, additional analysis suggests that CEO power and CG structure have a moderating effect on the PPS. Specifically, we find that the PPS is higher in firms with more reputable, founding and shareholding CEOs, higher ownership by directors and institutions, and independent nomination and remuneration committees, but lower in firms with larger boards, more powerful and long-tenured CEOs. Overall, our evidence sheds new important theoretical and empirical insights on explaining the PPS with specific focus on the predictions of the optimal contracting and managerial power hypotheses. The findings are generally robust across a raft of econometric models that control for different types of endogeneities, pay, and performance proxies.

Investor reaction to IFRS for financial instruments in Europe: The role of firm-specific factors

We examine the market reaction to events related to the standard-setting process of International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 9 for over 3,000 European firms that have adopted IFRS. We find that the market reaction to IFRS 9 is largely affected by firm-specific factors associated with information quality and information asymmetry. In particular, lower information asymmetry and higher information quality have a positive effect on market-adjusted returns. This is in conflict with the common view that IFRS 9 will improve accounting quality for those firms that need it most (namely, small firms with low liquidity and concentrated ownership structure).

Audits, Audit Quality and Signaling Mechanisms: Concentrated Ownership Structures

Audits, Audit Quality and Signaling Mechanisms: Concentrated Ownership Structures

Investor Reaction to IFRS for Financial Instruments in Europe: The Role of Firm-Specific Factors

We examine the market reaction to events related to the standard-setting process of International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 9 for over 3,000 European firms that have adopted IFRS. We find that the market reaction to IFRS 9 is largely affected by firm-specific factors associated with information quality and information asymmetry. In particular, lower information asymmetry and higher information quality have a positive effect on market-adjusted returns. This is in conflict with the common view that IFRS 9 will improve accounting quality for those firms that need it most (namely, small firms with low liquidity and concentrated ownership structure).

Ownership structure and dividend policy: application of Lintner's dividend model in Sri Lanka

This paper investigates the effect of ownership structure on the dividend policy of 77 Sri Lankan firms listed in the Colombo Stock Exchange over the period 2006-2014. The Lintner's full adjustment model and the partial adjustment model are used to examine the potential relationship between ownership structure and the dividend policy. We find that the ownership identity matters in determining the dividends according to Lintner's dividend model in Sri Lanka. Compared to the full adjustment model, the partial adjustment model is superior in explaining the variation in dividends with variables associated in different ownership structures. There is a negative association between institutional, managerial ownership structures and the dividend policy and a significant positive association between concentrated ownership structure and the dividend policy. In addition, the dividend in the preceding year is highly significant in explaining the succeeding year's dividend, thus confirming the stability of the dividend policy.

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The objectives of this study are to examine the effect of investor protection and ownership structure to the relationship between IFRS adoption and earnings quality in Asian companies. Asia is chosen because it has unique characteristics, one of them is ownership structure in Asia is more concentrated on family. The data from this study is obtained from the OSIRIS database for the periode 2009-2013 in ten Asian Countries (China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapura, Taiwan dan Thailand). The sample in this study consists of 16.232 firm year observations and Multiple Regression analysis is used to test hypotheses. The results show that the effect of IFRS adoption to earnings quality depend on the level of investor protection in a country. When the investor protection is high, the IFRS adoption results in higher quality of earnings, but when the investor protection is low, there is no effect of IFRS adoption to the earnings quality. The other results also sho, contrary to the predicition, that concentrated ownership structure increases the relationship between IFRS adoption and earnings quality.

Consequences of earnings management for corporate reputation

PurposeBased on earnings management (EM) practices, the purpose of this research is to analyze their market social consequences on corporate reputation. Moreover, this paper illustrates this impact in the context of family firms which are led and controlled by family members, whose main interest is the long-run survival through succession.Design/methodology/approachA sample comprising 1,169 international listed companies for the period 2006-2010 was used.FindingsThe empirical evidence shows the negative impact of these discretionary accounting practices on corporate image. However, family firms have more incentives for controlling and monitoring managerial decisions, avoiding information asymmetries and, thus, EM behavior and their subsequent loss of reputation. Therefore, fewer negative effects on corporate reputation are observed in highly concentrated ownership structures as a result of the negative link between family control and EM.Originality/valueThis study presents a number of contributions because of its focus on specific discretionary practices and on family firms. This study contributes to previous literature on family firms, as previous papers do not tend to focus on EM issues. Moreover, in contrast to most of the studies that have focused on only one country, we use an international panel database. This leads to potentially more powerful and generalized results. In addition, this paper is the first attempt (to the authors' knowledge) to study the possible impact of EM on corporate reputation in the family firm context.

Governance, Efficiency and Risk Taking in Chinese Banking

We employ a hand-collected unique dataset on banks operating in China between 2003 and 2011 to investigate the impact of board governance features (size, composition and functioning) on bank efficiency and risk taking. Our evidence suggests that board characteristics tend to have a greater influence on banks’ profit and cost efficiency than on loan quality. We find that the proportion of female directors on the board appears not only to be linked to higher profit and cost efficiency but also to lower traditional banking risk. Similarly, board independence is associated with higher profit efficiency of banks; while the opposite is found for executive directors and in the presence of dual leadership of the CEO/chairperson. Among the control variables, we found that liquidity negatively affects profit and cost efficiency, while positively affecting risk. Interestingly, we find some evidence of an incremental effect of specific board characteristics on efficiency for banks with more concentrated ownership structures and state-owned institutions; while for banks with CEO performance-related pay schemes the effect on efficiency when significant is usually negative. Our results offer useful insights to policy makers in China charged with the task of improving the governance mechanisms in banking institutions.

Corporate governance, product market competition and managerial incentives: Evidence from four Pacific Basin countries

This paper examines how firm-level governance mechanisms affect the role of competition in influencing managerial incentives. Specifically, we examine how concentrated ownership structures affect the positive association between competition and pay-performance sensitivity. Using samples from four Pacific Basin markets, namely, China, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan, from 2001 to 2012, we found that competition leads to strong pay-performance sensitivity for widely-held firms, but not for family- or state-controlled firms. This result suggests that the governance role of industry competition is weakened when firms are controlled by family or the state. Our study deepens our understanding on how product market competition shapes managerial incentives and offers insights to policy makers who are interested in enhancing the effectiveness of industry-level corporate governance in shaping managerial incentives.

Corporate boards, large blockholders and executive compensation in banks: Evidence from Poland

The paper aims to investigate the impact of uniform board governance standards on the level of executive pay in banks with a controlling shareholder. Based on the sample of a hand-collected data on all executive pay of all public banks in Poland from 2005 to 2013, we find that board independence is negatively associated with executive compensation. In contrast to widely-held banks, independent directors in banks controlled by a blockholder provide restraint on the tendency to overcompensate. Thus, in concentrated ownership structure managerial power theory prevails over agency theory. However, the effect might be diluted as the number of board members increases.