Comprehensive Sanctions Research Articles

Shining a Light on a Malfeasant Superpower

Invisible War: The United States and the Iraq Sanctions. By Joy Gordon. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010. 376 pp., $39.95 hardcover (ISBN 978-0-674-03571-3). On August 6, 1990, amid the uncertainty and optimism of the end of the Cold War, the United Nations Security Council voted 13–0 (Yemen and Cuba abstained) to impose sanctions upon Iraq and demanded that Saddam Hussein withdraw his forces from Kuwait. Resolution 661 is very short, occupying less than a full page in the archive of Council action. But by imposing comprehensive sanctions, that resolution—and the subsidiary organ of the Council it created, the “661 Committee”—had an outsized impact. To be sure, the sanctions evolved over their lifetime. Following Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait in 1991, their objectives changed to demand that Saddam disarm and allow weapons inspectors. In 1995, Iraq was permitted some imports according to an “oil-for-food” formula, the procedures for which were refined on several occasions. An elaborate oversight apparatus emerged, including a force to suppress maritime smuggling, numerous inspection mechanisms and agencies, and an Office within the Secretariat. Despite these changes, prior to its repeal in 2003, the Iraq embargo was perhaps best known for its unintended humanitarian consequences—the view that sanctions may put “political gain” ahead of “civilian pain” (as per Weiss, Cortright, Lopez, and Minear 1997). For more than a decade, Joy Gordon has been a critic of sanctions. Her main contribution has been to utilize normative theories, such as the just war tradition, to evaluate the ethics and morality of sanctions. Invisible War brings this body of work to a crescendo.1 Here, Gordon's singular focus is the United States’ role in crafting and administering the embargo, which she describes as the “cruelest sanctions in the history of international governance” (p. 1). Following the devastation of the 1991 war, she relates how the …

Sanctions, Inducements, and Market Power: Political Economy of International Influence

This paper argues that economics sanctions, whether positive or negative, require market power on the part of the sanctioning state(s) and entail distributional consequences. As a result, sanctions result in the growth of state power and the monitoring and punishing of one's own allies and citizens. Similarly, countermeasures on the part of sanctioned states also entail market power and result in both the growth of state power and unintended as well as intended distributional consequences. The political requisites for both sides imply that democracies have a more difficult time imposing sanctions and autocracies the easiest in adopting countermeasures. Since outcomes are the combined result of sanctions and countermeasures, and given the incentives of sanctioned states in adopting countermeasures, even comprehensive sanctions have differential consequences and result in targeted outcomes and targeted sanctions generate unintended collateral damage.

Medicare Provider? … Then Read This

Medicare Provider? … Then Read This

Targeted Sanctions and Individual Human Rights

Since the beginning of the 1990s, the UN security council has experimented with, developed, and refined the instrument of targeted sanctions. Targeted sanctions were first introduced in 1992 to isolate and pressure the political leadership of Libya to turn over individuals suspected of involvement in the attacks on Pan Am and UTA. They were developed and refined with the financial targeting of the military leadership of the Raoul Cedras regime in 1994, following its overthrow of the democratically elected government in Haiti. The UN's move to targeted sanctions was complete following the full realization of the humanitarian crisis caused by the imposition of comprehensive sanctions against Iraq in the mid- to late 1990s (and the inability of the oil-for-food program to relieve adequately the human suffering involved). As a result of the debacle caused by the imposition of comprehensive sanctions against Iraq, UN sanctions today are targeted sanctions.Sanctions can be targeted in a number of different ways - against an individual, against a corporate entity (such as a firm or political party), against a sector of an economy (an arms embargo, aviation ban, or a ban on the trade in high-value commodities like diamonds, oil, or timber), or against a single region of a country (as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo). They can be used for a variety of different purposes, from the pursuit of individuals for legal prosecution to efforts to halt massive human rights violations, to enforce the terms of peace agreements, to counter the financing of terrorism, orto prevent or delay the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.There are both theoretical and practical advantages to the use of targeted sanctions, particularly when they are compared with the bluntness and relatively indiscriminate nature of comprehensive sanctions. In contrast to comprehensive sanctions, targeted sanctions can be applied gradually, combined with positive incentives, and relaxed more readily in the case of partial compliance by the targets of sanctions. There is an all or nothing character to comprehensive sanctions, and any relaxation or adaptation is often interpreted as a weakening of political resolve among the sanctioning parties. If properly targeted and implemented, targeted sanctions do not penalize an entire population for actions taken by an unrepresentative (and often unelected) elite. They can relieve the sanctions instrument of some, but not necessarily all, of its negative humanitarian costs.With the unusually rapid development of the regime to counter the financing of terrorism after 2001, with its national legal harmonization, parallel reporting requirements, and institutionalization within financial institutions, the potential effectiveness of multilateral targeted sanctions measures has been significantly enhanced.1 As a result, assuming a consensus can be maintained among the permanent five members of the UN security council, the application of targeted financial sanctions is likely to be more common, and possibly more effective, in the future.Despite these and other advantages associated with targeted sanctions, there is one issue that has undermined the instrument - the way in which targeted sanctions can violate individual human rights. The UN is a profoundly state-centric institution, and the UN security council was accustomed to the idea of member states acting collectively to impose a sanction on another member state. With the move to targeted sanctions, however, the security council moved from imposing sanctions against states to imposing sanctions against individuals, groups, and corporate entities. Ironically, this move was undertaken in the name of protecting the human rights of a larger population.When targeted sanctions were first introduced in the early 1990s, the rights of those individuals targeted, typically sovereign heads of state and/ or their key political supporters, were not of primary concern. …

Assessing UN Sanctions after the Cold War

During the Cold War, the United Nations' role in defending international norms was constrained by U S- Soviet rivalry. On the few occasions when economic sanctions were invoked, they were usually hortatory and relatively weak. With the end ofthe Cold War, UN sanctions initially became more frequent, more likely to be mandated by the security council, and more likely to be broad and painful. After a flurry of comprehensive sanctions, however, concerns were raised about the impact on vulnerable populations within target countries, as well as on neighbouring countries and other trading partners. UN sanctions since the mid-1990s have become both less frequent and narrower, often targeting individuals, and have had more limited economic, and perhaps political, impact.What has been the impact of these shifts on the effectiveness of UN economic sanctions? How is effectiveness measured and how have those assessments changed? The starting point for measuring the effectiveness of sanctions must be the nature ofthe goal sought, but the analysis must also take into account the fact that there are usually secondary objectives and that policymakers' true goals may be hidden behind the public rhetoric. Finally, the potential benefits of sanctions must also be weighed against the political, economic, and social costs of using them, as well as the relative costs and benefits of the other policy tools that are available.1The United Nations was created after World War II with the fundamental goal of promoting the collective security of its members, but its reach was limited to lesser disputes from the beginning because of US-Soviet differences.2 Over the years, and long before the Cold War ended, the United Nations also sought to uphold norms related to human rights within countries. As noted by eminent sanctions scholar Margaret Doxey:[N]ew rationales for sanctions have been provided by the development of new international norms in the second half of the twentieth century which go beyond respect for territorial integrity and political independence to encompass self-determination in colonial situations, racial equality, and a broad spectrum of human rights, including the right to democratic systems of government. If 'just sanctions' - like 'just war' - are the international community's justified response to norm-violation, a wide range of external and internal policies may how be judged to merit such a response.3Thus, one measure of UN sanctions that distinguishes them from other sanctions is the responsibility to ensure that they are just. While not entirely absent during the Cold War, concerns about the impact on individuals were raised to a new level by the humanitarian consequences of comprehensive sanctions, first against Iraq following the first Gulf War and then against Haiti in response to the overthrow of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Thus, most UN sanctions now have more than one explicit goal-to stem conflict or uphold international norms, and to do so without harming innocent civilians. But the response - targeted travel or financial sanctions against individuals - has raised other human rights issues that are just beginning to be addressed.4TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO ASSESSING SANCTIONS EFFECTIVENESSThe effectiveness of any policy tool can only be measured against the goals it is intended to achieve, as well as the costs involved in achieving them. While each case has one or more stated goals specific to that case, such as ending or mitigating conflict, promoting human rights or democracy, or discouraging the spread of weapons of mass destruction, operational objectives fall into three broad and overlapping categories - to signal disapproval, to deny or contain, or to coerce. Different types of sanctions are likely to be relatively more appropriate for some categories than others:* to signal disapproval, punish, or deter: hortatory sanctions that members are exhorted but not required to impose; and travel, financial, or property sanctions targeted at individuals. …

Reflections on the Sanctions Decade and beyond

Faced with unwelcome external situations that threaten national or international interests, governments must decide whether to respond and, if so, what form their response should take. This decision-making process is more complex and likely to be more protracted when multilateral action is contemplated. Although no two situations are ever identical and it is important not to draw false analogies, there are often common, or comparable, features from which useful lessons may be learned, and a review of relevant past experience should be a component of intelligent statecraft.When diplomatic, political, and/or economic sanctions are under consideration as an alternative or prequel to use of force, there is now a wealth of experience to draw on. In second half of 20th century, continuing into 2 ist, unilateral, regional and, in post-Cold War period, United Nations sanctions have been extensively used. Indeed, 19905 have been described as the sanctions decade.1 There were earlier cases of unilateral and group sanctions, for instance United States' sanctions on Cuba, imposed in i960 and still in place, and in 1979 western response to Iran hostage crisis and to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. But in years 1945-1990, sanctions were mainly a hot topic in relation to white minority rule in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and apartheid in South Africa. The Rhodesian government's unilateral declaration of independence in 1965 resulted in comprehensive sanctions ordered by security council. In contrast, mandatory UN sanctions against South Africa were limited to an arms embargo, but significant boycotts were imposed by nongovernmental organizations as well as intergovernmental bodies and individual governments, contributing to South Africa's isolation and financial difficulties. There were lessons to be learned from Rhodesian case. Sanctions were by no means a quick fix as British Prime Minister Harold Wilson had forecast: Rhodesian economy showed surprising resilience and support of South Africa as friend and neighbour assisted Smith regime to survive for more than a decade.With end of Cold War, however, a new consensus developed among five permanent members of UN security council (Britain, China, France, Russia, and United States), and a spate of mandatory sanctions began with response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. The Iraq sanctions remained in place until ouster of Saddam Hussein in 2003 and there were also high-profile sanctioning episodes involving Libya, Haiti, and former Yugoslavia. Other cases were prompted by conflict within and between African states and by conduct of Taliban regime in Afghanistan.2As is well known, article 39 of UN charter provides that nonviolent measures may be ordered by security council to deal with a threat to or breach of peace or an act of aggression. AU members are then required to implement them. However, many potential cases of sanctions fall by wayside because one or more of veto-wielding permanent members protects its own or its client's interests. It is also important to note that among 10 non-permanent members of council there may be divided opinions: need to be onside with allies may be a factor in supporting a sanctions resolution, but if there is no veto only nine affirmative votes are needed. Some members therefore may have opposed resolutions that have been adopted. Nor can support for sanctions be taken for granted in UN membership at large. Secondary penalties for noncompliance are unlikely to find favour; inducements are problematic. Three basic facts about security council sanctions are that they may or may not be achievable, that terms of any resolution will inevitably reflect compromise, and that there will be varying degrees of enthusiasm for implementation. Political will among all those involved is a crucial factor. …

Reforming UN sanctions in the shade of Iraq: Targeting regimes, sparing civilians

While the stated target of the 19902003 United Nations (UN) sanctions policy was the errant Iraqi regime, the Iraqi civilian population ultimately bore the brunt of its effects. The devastating record of this period is analysed in terms of the role played by the governments of the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK) and, as such, in terms of the UN's failure to live up to its role as a guarantor of international law. The UN, as of yet, has failed to fully audit the consequences of this era, and in this failure, has failed to consider alternative measures to sanction rogue regimes. This article surveys the over twelve-year sanction period, highlighting the fundamental defects of comprehensive sanctions programmes. In this spirit, the authors subsequently posit alternative models for future UN action and places these alternatives within the larger discussion of UN reform. Finally, the past and present UN policy towards Iraq is argued to represent a breakdown of international order, with the role of the UN vis--vis contemporary Iraq presented as particularly worrisome.

Dancing in the No-Fly Zone: A Woman's Journey through Iraq (review)

Dancing in the No-Fly Zone:A Woman’s Journey through Iraq Nadje Al-Ali Hadani Ditmars. Northhampton, MA: Olive Branch Press, 2005. 256 pages. ISBN 1-56656-634-7. In the midst of a flurry of publications on Iraq by journalists, politicians, diplomats, and academics, Hadani Ditmars' work undoubtedly stands out. Her book is not only engaging, interesting, original, and perceptive, but she has clearly done her homework. The book is full of information that provides the reader with a historical context and insight into the human cost of sanctions and war. Yet it is not just a book about misery. Dancing in the No-Fly Zone is about people pursuing art, culture, music, and entertainment despite economic deterioration, repression, and later on, war and occupation. Ditmars' book is also the story of a return. The Canadian journalist of Lebanese origin first visited Iraq in 1997. By that time Iraq had already been subjected to seven years of the most comprehensive sanctions regime ever inflicted on a country, in addition to the ongoing political repression by the regime of Saddam Hussein. After her initial trip, Ditmars traveled to Iraq on numerous occasions, writing for the New York Times, the Independent, the Globe and Mail, and Newsweek, in addition to broadcasting for CBC and BBC. In September 2003, six months after the invasion, the journalist returned to Iraq to find out what happened to her friends and the various people she had met on previous visits. Throughout the book Ditmars compares the situation and her experiences during earlier visits to the rapidly changing situation since the invasion. [End Page 128] Her stories about the sanctions period go against the grain of most existing literature: Ditmars does not merely write about the deteriorating infrastructure, health conditions, and poverty, although she refers to them. But she manages to provide insight into a dynamic and vibrant cultural scene, describing, for example, visits to the theater to see extremely popular plays, parties with friends, and dancing in the Al-Rasheed Hotel, or one of her best friends playing in the National Orchestra. In 2003, some new cultural and social spaces and opportunities seem to be opening up for her friends, and many people she talks to welcome the changes. However, most of what she describes points to a deterioration in daily living conditions and the author detects trends and developments related to the lack of security and the violence and corruption that have escalated tremendously since her last visit. As Ditmars tries to trace the steps of artists, actors, musicians, businessmen, even her former government minder, we sense her disappointment, waning enthusiasm, and increasing fear as the security situation worsens. The journalist visits her friends' houses, restaurants, churches, hospitals, theaters, prisons, ministries, and the infamous Green Zone. She is searching for visual metaphors of the new Iraq—Baghdad streets lined with death shrouds announcing the names of the recently deceased, mere yards from advertisements for the latest satellite dishes; the music and ballet school enclosed by barbed wire and bordered by an endless line of Iraqi soldiers waiting for their pay from American Marines; barefoot children leading looted race horses through traffic jams; and the mural of 26-year-old Esam Pasha painted over a portrait of Saddam Hussein (197). The mural, in Ditmars' words, "was a tame ode to the treasures of 'old Baghdad.' Buildings from the city's glorious past declared themselves in Disneyesque forms and fantasia-like colors. At best, it was decorative. At worst, it was irrelevant" (198). Esam Pasha, whose claims to be the grandson of Nuri al-Said, the prime minister under King Faisal II, are hotly disputed by Iraqi intellectuals, has become one of the symbols of the "new Iraq." Elevated to the status of an important Iraqi artist by the Western media, Esam proudly says, "the soldiers love my work" (198), but he has little credibility among established Iraqi artists and intellectuals inside or in the diaspora. As a social anthropologist trained in research ethics, and also being of Iraqi origin, I had to cringe several times as Ditmars described, quite [End Page 129] openly and without any sense of shame, lying about her professional identity...

U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: An Empirical Study

Using a gravity model, we conduct an empirical analysis of the impact of U.S. economic sanctions on U.S. trade with target countries and on third countries. Our findings show that the impact on U.S. trade is very sensitive to how the sanctioned country list is identified and selected. We find no significant impact of U.S. economic sanctions on trade between the United States and countries that are subject to selective sanctions. For only countries subject to comprehensive sanctions have we found a significant reduction in bilateral trade; and these same sanctions increased trade between target countries and the EU or Japan. Using a sample that includes only the formerly planned economies that were long the target of U.S. economic sanctions in recent history, our results show that U.S. economic sanctions have a significant impact on U.S. exports, imports, and total trade with these countries, and these effects have lingered for more than a decade after the Cold War had ended.

Legal boundaries to UN sanctions

The Security Council is empowered under Article 41 of the UN Charter to ensure international peace and security by imposing non‐military measures, including comprehensive economic sanctions. As UN sanctions have been shown to cause massive harm to civilian populations, the question has arisen whether the Security council is bound by any legal norms in designing and imposing economic coercion on populations and if so, what these norms are. The article's conclusion is that when imposing measures under Article 41, the Security Council is bound by the UN Charter, by general principles of international law and by human rights norms. Consequently it appears that in order to be effective, economic sanctions would have to be unlawful.

Questioning comprehensive sanctions: the birth of a norm

In this paper, the authors argue that a new international norm against comprehensive sanctions is emerging and gaining substantial support among states. A transnational network of individual activists, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) is driving the creation of this norm. To exercise its influence, the network mobilizes information about humanitarian suffering in states targeted by international sanctions and utilizes framing techniques to persuade others to endorse the new norm. Yet this explanation is incomplete. Humanitarian groups and norms trace their roots to the mid-1800s, and civilian suffering from sanctions undoubtedly goes back much farther, yet it was not until the mid-1990s that a norm against comprehensive sanctions began to emerge. In response, it is argued that the norm was triggered by the dramatic increase in sanctions imposed by the United Nations in the post-Cold War era. Both the UN’s accessibility and its prevailing humanitarian norms facilitated network influence. During the Cold War, states had imposed sanctions without utilizing the UN. With the dramatic increase in UN-sponsored sanctions in the 1990s, an organization whose normative foundations involve the alleviation of human suffering was itself direcdy responsible for imposing sanctions that deepened and prolonged human misery. This stark, well-publicized contrast offered a favorable normative and political environment in which the arguments of humanitarian groups would be taken seriously. It became impossible for states to argue that comprehensive sanctions and humanitarian well-being could be reconciled; as a result, one goal or the other had to be modified. Over time, steady network pressure to improve humanitarian conditions in sanctioned countries produced a reaction against comprehensive sanctions.

From Dumb to Smart? Recent Reforms of UN Sanctions

United Nations, Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA. Document S/2000/203, New York, 10 March 2000 (available online at www.un.org/News/dh/latest/angolareport_eng.htm), also called the Fowler Report. Targeted Financial Sanctions: A Manual for Design and Implementation. Contributions from the Interlaken (Providence: Watson Institute, Brown University, 2001) (available online at www.smartsanctions.se). Design and Implementation of Arms Embargoes and Travel and Aviation Related Sanctions--Results of the Bonn-Berlin Process (Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion, 2001) (available online at www.smartsanctions.de). Making Targeted Sanctions Effective: Guidelines for Implementation of UN Policy Options (Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 2003) (available online at www.smartsanctions.se). David Cortright and George A. Lopez with Linda Gerber, Sanctions and the Search for Security (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 249 pp. The former head of the Strategic Planning Unit at the United Nations Secretariat, Andy Mack, reports that he tried to find out, in the late 1990s, what the Secretariat and member states knew about the effectiveness of UN sanctions. (1) There were no reports on experiences with sanctions, no administrative setup to preserve institutional memory, and no implementation structures. At the same time, the UN Security Council was sanctions-happy. Since 1990, a total of fourteen sanctions cases have been mandated by the UN Security Council in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, (2) with only two cases mandated (Southern Rhodesia and South Africa) during the previous forty-five years. The absence of intellectual and institutional foundations for the UN's sanctions policy partly resulted from a lack of relevant experience, but it was also the result of deliberate policy by member states, particularly those making decisions in the Security Council. In the early 1990s, they were quite happy to mandate comprehensive sanctions on Iraq, Yugoslavia, and Haiti, without having any real knowledge about their effects. They also had few reservations about deciding on measures, such as arms embargoes, in the absence of institutional structures at the UN to help to implement, or even monitor, them. Comprehensive sanctions soon came under strong criticism, from academics, humanitarian groups, and UN member governments alike. As predicted by earlier research, sanctions hurt the population without having much influence on decisionmakers. The naive theory of sanctions, that economic pain in the targeted countries will somehow result in gain by those imposing sanctions, had little empirical support. (3) While political goals were seldom achieved, humanitarian effects of comprehensive sanctions were often very real. (4) The reports from Iraq were particularly devastating. (5) The population was clearly suffering while the inner circle of leaders around Saddam Hussein thrived. Baghdad was quite successful in blaming the UN for the humanitarian crisis in Iraq, both within the country and worldwide. A deep and growing rift developed over Security Council sanctions on Iraq, and sanctions in general. Governments deeply concerned over the Iraqi sanctions, including France and Russia, resolved never to be in such a situation again. This implied opposing any future comprehensive sanctions regimes that would give a permanent member of the Security Council veto power against ending them. The strong effects of some sanctions on the general population, particularly in the case of Iraq, were one central element of the UN sanctions crisis. The lack of any impact on the targets in a large number of sanctions was another. The stand-alone arms embargoes, in particular, seemed like a bad joke. Warring parties had little difficulty in obtaining the weapons they wanted. …

The Impact of International Economic Sanctions on Trade - An Empirical Analysis

International economic sanctions appear to be a common and recurring feature of political interactions between states. In particular, the United States is the country which has most frequently applied negative economic sanctions after World War II. In a parallel way, several measures, imposed by a multilateral organisation like the United Nations have taken place in recent years. This paper provides, through a gravity model approach, an estimation of the impact of economic negative sanctions on international trade. First, the study reports panel gravity estimates of bilateral trade between the U.S. and 49 target countries over the period 1960-2000, inclusive. The results show that extensive and comprehensive sanctions have a large negative impact on bilateral trade, while this is not the case for limited and moderate sanctions. A second estimation focuses on the impact of unilateral U.S. sanctions on bilateral trade volume between target countries and the other G-7 countries over the same period. The results show that unilateral extensive sanctions have a large negative impact, while limited and moderate ones induce a slight positive effect on other G-7 countries bilateral trade. Thus, in the first case the hypothesis of negative 'network effects' is confirmed, while in the latter the sanctions-busting argument should be defended. In both estimations, however, multilateral sanctions demonstrate a large negative impact on trade flows.

How Smart are Smart Sanctions?

For over a decade, the comprehensive trade sanctions against Iraq have hung like amillstone around the practice of economic statecraft. Scholars and policymakersalike recognize that the sanctions have had a devastating humanitarian impact onthe Iraqi population. Yet the sanctions have failed to coerce the Iraqi regime intofull compliance with the requisite UN Security Council resolutions. At the sametime, the United Nations has relied heavily on this tool of statecraft over the pastdecade, imposing sanctions fourteen times since 1990. In his 2002 Nobel lecture,Jimmy Carter said that nations must ‘‘strive to correct the injustice of economicsanctions that seek to penalize abusive leaders but all too often inflict punishmenton those who are already suffering from the abuse.’’ This presents a challenge: isthere any way to accommodate the rising demand for multilateral sanctions whileminimizing the humanitarian costs such policies create?Enter David Cortright and George Lopez. Under the auspices of the Universityof Notre Dame’s Fourth Freedom Forum, Cortright and Lopez are responsible fora healthy fraction of the recent scholarly work on economic sanctions (Cortrightand Lopez 1995, 2000, 2002). Their latest effort, Smart Sanctions: Targeting EconomicStatecraft, examines the prospect of smart sanctions: measures that are tailored tomaximize the target regime’s costs of noncompliance while minimizing the targetpopulation’s suffering. In its eleven chapters, this edited volume reviews the varioustypes of smart sanctions and their implementation by the United Nations, theUnited States, and the European Union. It will likely serve as the definitiveresource on the subject for some time.The logic behind smart sanctions is that for economic coercion to work properly,it is necessary to understand the domestic political economy of the targeted state.Most of the sanctions literature argues that as the costs imposed on the targeteconomy increase, so will the likelihood of success. However, some scholars(Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1992; Kirshner 1997) argue that this formulation is toosimplistic. What matters is not the target’s gross economic damage, but whether thetarget government and its key domestic constituencies feel significant economicpain from noncompliance. Smart sanctions are designed to raise the target regime’scosts of noncompliance while avoiding the general suffering that comprehensivesanctions often create. Like precision-guided munitions, smart sanctions targetresponsible parties while minimizing collateral damage. Examples include assetfreezes, travel bans, and arms embargoesFmeasures that stand in stark contrast tothe comprehensive trade ban against Iraq.Are smart sanctions more efficient? At first glance, the answer seems to be ‘‘no.’’Cortright and Lopez’s introductory chapter reviews the fourteen UN sanctionsepisodes since 1990. They note ‘‘even with this small number of cases, the obviousconclusion is that comprehensive sanctions are more effective than targetedor selective measures. Where economic and social impact have been greatest,

The Impact of International Economic Sanctions on Trade: An Empirical Analysis

International economic sanctions appear to be a common and recurring feature of political interactions between states. In particular, the United States is the country which has most frequently applied negative economic sanctions after World War II. In a parallel way, several measures, imposed by a multilateral organisation like the United Nations have taken place in recent years. This paper provides, through a gravity model approach, an estimation of the impact of economic negative sanctions on international trade. First, the study reports panel gravity estimates of bilateral trade between the U.S. and 49 target countries over the period 1960-2000, inclusive. The results show that extensive and comprehensive sanctions have a large negative impact on bilateral trade, while this is not the case for limited and moderate sanctions. A second estimation focuses on the impact of unilateral U.S. sanctions on bilateral trade volume between target countries and the other G-7 countries over the same period. The results show that unilateral extensive sanctions have a large negative impact, while limited and moderate ones induce a slight positive effect on other G-7 countries bilateral trade. Thus, in the first case the hypothesis of negative 'network effects' is confirmed, while in the latter the sanctions-busting argument should be defended. In both estimations, however, multilateral sanctions demonstrate a large negative impact on trade flows.

Economic sanctions as the propositional satisfiability problem

In this paper we are trying to answer the question of when economic sanctions have the best chance to succeed. Almost three hundred scholars from around the world participated in a survey designed to define which pre-conditions and actions by the sender are desirable in order for economic sanctions to succeed. The resolution algorithm is employed to find out whether there is a consensus among the scholars about the factors leading to the success of economic sanctions. The results provide evidence that when scholars were grouped by region the consensus could be reached that sanctions will succeed if: (1) modest policy change is sought, (2) sanctions are comprehensive, i.e., both trade and financial sanctions are imposed, (3) the target does not receive significant support from a third party, (4) the sender has much greater economy than the target, (5) there is international co-operation in the imposition of sanctions, and (6) the target is economically and politically weak and unstable. When scholars were grouped based on the level of economic development of their countries of origin, a consensus on all but one issue (sender’s welfare or economic interest are threatened by target’s action) was reached between scholars from economically developed nations and scholars from less developed nations. Surprisingly, experts from economically developed nations, i.e., the United States versus EU nations, could not reach a consensus on several issues.

Is the Current UN and US Policy toward Iraq Effective?

On a day like this day 10 years ago, evil and all those who made Satan their protector lined up one place, facing those who represented the will to defend what is right. Iraq has remained, the people have remained, the army has remained. Iraq has triumphed over the enemies of the Saddam Hussein, 17 January 2001 (1) More than ten years ago, President George Bush ordered US troops into the Persian Gulf response to Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait. At the end of the Gulf War 1991, the United Nations imposed sanctions on Iraq-UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 661--which were to remain place until the provisions of UNSCR 687 were complied, with, mainly the certification that Iraq has destroyed all of its weapons of mass destruction. In 1991, the UN expressed grave concern over the humanitarian situation and proposed a number of measures that would allow Iraq to sell limited quantities of oil to meet the population's basic needs while the sanctions remained place. Iraq refused all offers. Over the following five years there was widespread suffering, with food shortages, absence of essential medicines, and a general deterioration essential social services. (2) In 1996, the UN established the Oil-for-Food program, which allowed Iraq to sell oil for the purchase of goods essential for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. Weapons inspections Iraq, conducted by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), stopped prior to the December 1998 bombing of Iraq. Inspections have not been resumed, while sanctions and the Oil-for-Food program remain effect. Is this policy successful? Sanctions have kept Saddam in his box, but the Oil-for-Food program has allowed him to blame the UN for doing little to stop the widespread suffering and deprivation of his people. In addition, Saddam has not allowed weapons inspectors inside Iraq for the last three years, and support for the economic embargo on the international front is wavering. Now the situation is made even more complicated by the war on terrorism and Saddam's stated support for those who would harm the United States and the Western world. Still, President George W. Bush and his administration have opportunity to revisit the policy toward Iraq and devise a strategy that will work. This article reviews the current sanctions and Oil-for-Food policy Iraq from both national security and humanitarian intervention perspectives. The article is organized into three main sections--a review of the background, analysis of the current policy terms of national security and humanitarian criteria, and a recommendation for future policy. Background The comprehensive sanctions of UNSCR 661 were some of the strictest sanctions ever levied against a nation. In addition, April 1991 the UN passed UNSCR 687, which required Iraq to destroy all weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and stop all research into WMD, and which subjected Iraq to monitoring and verification. Soon after the implementation of the sanctions, the UN sent a mission to Iraq, which reported the makings of an imminent [human] catastrophe...if minimum life supporting needs are not rapidly met. (3) It was not until May 1996, however, that Saddam agreed to the Oil-for-Food program when he accepted UNSCR 986. The start of the program was delayed another seven months until December 1996 while Iraqi officials argued over the terms of implementation. Under the Oil-for-Food program, Iraq is allowed to sell oil for the purchase and import of food, medicine and medical equipment, and other goods for essential civilian needs. It is also allowed to import repair parts, equipment, and materials for use water sanitation, education, electricity, agriculture, and de-mining operations. UNSCR 1153 expanded the program to include repair to the civilian infrastructure and upgrading of the Iraqi oil infrastructure to enable it to pump the increased $5. …

South Africa's agenda in 21stcentury global governance

Can Thabo Mbeki change the world? It's a fair question. 'We will succeed', implored Mbeki to a captivated San Francisco audience in May 2000, 'in the struggle to end poverty and underdevelopment in our country and continent, provided we can count on the kind of support you gave us as we fought together to end the system of apartheid' (Mbeki, 2000). Thus the South African president invited leading representatives of US business, who in reality had for decades been die-hard supporters of apartheid (nearly uniformly opposing ANC calls for comprehensive sanctions), to help combat what Mbeki has already begun to term global apartheid'a system nearly as profitable for US capital as was South African racism.

The Impact and Effectiveness of Multilateral Economic Sanctions: A Comparative Study

This article examines differences in targeted and comprehensive multilateral sanction regimes in the post-Cold War era, and argues that targeted sanctions are more humane and effective than general trade embargoes. Improving the effectiveness of sanction regimes is also addressed. Through four comparative cases - Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, Angola, and Sierra Leone - differences in impact and effectiveness are explored. The former two cases are utilised to examine comprehensive sanctions, while the latter two represent targeted sanction regimes. To provide the framework necessary for evaluating sanctions, the article presents an overview of the sanctions literature, which may be particularly useful for non-sanctions experts. Through the comparative case study, the article finds some support for the hypothesis that targeted sanctions are more humane than comprehensive sanction regimes. However, the case of Sierra Leone indicates that even targeted sanctions can have unintended humanitarian consequences and should therefore be applied with extreme caution. The article does not find support for the hypothesis that targeted sanctions are more humane than comprehensive sanctions. However, this does not seem to be due to the targeted nature of the sanctions, but primarily to problems with monitoring and compliance, as both the cases of Angola and Sierra Leone indicate. This suggests that in order to increase effectiveness, further measures are needed to create effective monitoring systems, and that strengthened collaboration between countries and organisations is necessary. Furthermore, there should be careful monitoring of compliance throughout the duration of the sanction regime, and consideration of partial lifting of the sanctions in cases of partial compliance as this may generate further compliance.

Iraq Under Siege: Ten Years On

It has been ten years since the United Nations imposed comprehensive sanctions on Iraq. The sanctions were adopted on August 6, 1990, forty-five years to the day after the United States dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Japan, killing an estimated one hundred thousand people and leaving a toxic legacy that still affects the population of the area. The bombing was soon followed by an attack on Nagasaki. The coincidence is a telling one. For all the US government's rhetoric about halting the use of weapons of mass destruction, the United States stands in a league of its own in using and proliferating them. As horrific as the use of nuclear weapons against Japan was, perhaps five to ten times as many people have died in Iraq as a consequence of the war led by the United States and Britain, under United Nations (UN) auspices, during the last decade.This article can also be found at the Monthly Review website, where most recent articles are published in full.Click here to purchase a PDF version of this article at the Monthly Review website.